Recognition of the Report:

“AUDA-NEPAD is delighted to be working with the Africa-Europe Foundation to monitor and accelerate the commitments of the AU-EU Dialogue. Our partnership transforms dialogue into action, contributing to a critical paradigm shift in development cooperation.”

Nardos Bekele-Thomas, CEO of the African Union Development Agency

“The work done on the Report is really remarkable. The Report of the Africa-Europe Foundation pushes us to look back but also pushes us out of the comfort zone. I think the report is really impressive from that point of view.”

Koen Doens, European Commission Director General for International Partnerships

“When I read the Africa-Europe Foundation Report I realise how incredibly wide and deep the relationship is - this is what the Report is telling us: a story of more and deeper.”

Arancha Gonzales, Dean of the Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, EU and Cooperation of Spain, former UN Under-Secretary General

“We have this Report that is extremely well written and with a significant number of recommendations on how to move forward to improve the relationship (...) and to deliver on commitments: this is necessary to restore trust between Europe and Africa.”

Mo Ibrahim, Co-Founder and Chairman of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation

“Let me congratulate the Africa-Europe Foundation for the really good work and for trying to get data that is difficult to get, to give an analysis and a good rendition of what is done.”

Vera Songwe, Chair of the board of the Liquidity and Sustainability Facility and former Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa

“This is a data rich report about the broad interactions between the EU and Africa that exhibits the relevance of the Africa-Europe Foundation as an independent organisation uniquely qualified to elevate the debate that still does not get enough public attention (...). The Africa-Europe Foundation deserves credit for honouring its pledge to monitor progress in the implementation of commitments made to advance the EU-AU agenda.”

Mark Suzman, CEO of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

“The Africa-Europe Foundation Report is timely and extremely interesting.”

Pascal Lamy, Honorary President of Notre Europe-Jacques Delors Institute, former Director General of the World Trade Organization

“I welcome AEF’s push to challenge these silos and demonstrate how working across silos, notably the climate-health-development nexus, must underpin all areas of the Africa-Europe partnership.”

Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweal, Director General of the World Trade Organization, former Chair of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, former Minister of Finance of Nigeria

“The Report of the Africa-Europe Foundation is a remarkable piece of work. Through outreach, dialogues and Town Hall debates, we now need to take this Report to the people of our societies, in particular our young people, and build a common vision for the partnership between our two continents.”

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, former President of the Republic of Liberia, Nobel Laureate
The Africa-Europe Foundation was established in December 2020 to promote and strengthen relations between our two neighbouring continents through building of a genuine partnership with shared visions for a shared future.

A key pillar of the Foundation’s work, this Commitment Tracking Report focuses on the Final Declaration of the 6th European Union-African Union Summit held in Brussels in February 2022. It aims to assess progress against commitments made by both regions - as expressed in the Declaration - be it in terms of finance, policy or impact, and to identify some potential avenues for better processes, as well as additional actions.

The Report builds on data provided by the AU and EU and, where available, from Member States, as well as non-state/non-institutional actors. It is conceived as a resource to complement the existing institutional monitoring processes implemented by the AU and EU through their Ministerial Follow-up Committee, and represents an independent analysis of the delivery of commitments. The Report also aggregates views and analysis from the AEF multistakeholder dialogue platforms, its Strategy and Expert Working Groups, as well as youth, focus groups and public polling on new challenges and opportunities that this Partnership remains uniquely placed to address in a world increasingly challenged by interconnected crises.
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The multiple crises facing our world today – from climate change to pandemics, from widening inequalities to enduring or new conflicts – feed into a trend that impairs the ability to properly address them: a crisis of trust in institutions, whether governments, domestic administrations and international organisations, or the multilateral system.

This lack of trust is global, and not only limited to the Africa-Europe Partnership. This is a deepening, widening crisis that needs to be addressed.

Feeding the growing mistrust is the apparent failure to deliver on official commitments. The perceived inability of governments, institutions and partnerships to deliver on their publics’ expectations and needs exacerbates the deteriorating situation.

This is the rationale underpinning the emphasis on the importance of the monitoring of commitments specifically made in the Final Declaration of the 6th EU-AU Summit.

Therefore, the focus of the Africa-Europe Foundation Report 2024 is to provide an initial review on the state of implementation of commitments made at the 6th Summit, as outlined in the Final Declaration and in the accompanying Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, at the time of its second anniversary.

We hope these findings can contribute to monitor progress, identify weaknesses, as well as opportunities, and strengthen mutual accountability. We trust it can also offer useful inputs to many forthcoming milestone events – the 2024 African Union Summit, multiple elections in Africa and Europe, and the 7th AU-EU Summit planned for 2025.

The 6th EU-AU Summit was launched in a positive mood, with associated expectations of a renewed and strengthened partnership. However, enthusiasm was quickly dampened on both sides. In Africa, concerns and queries remain about the inequitable initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the challenge to deliver on promised finance, heightened perceptions of double-standard approaches, and the growing attraction of alternate partnerships with less conditionalities. In Europe, concerns and queries grow about the deteriorating security and governance landscape in Africa, a heightened sense of unfairness over a growing lack of acknowledgment about the positives of the partnership, and some fatigue over the daily hurdles of working relationship with the AU institutional architecture.

Furthermore, the geo-political and economic fallout of the Russia/Ukraine war, which commenced one week after the 6th EU-AU Summit, and the more recent divisive positions over the Israel-Gaza conflict, all cast a dark shadow over proceedings.

This overall scenario threatens to both mask some of the Partnership’s already attained key achievements, while also undermining its prospects.
Africa owns immense human and natural capital, assets that are key to becoming a global driver of economic growth and building a low-carbon global economy; an ever-growing youth with key innovative capacities that could add up to 800 million people to the global workforce by 2050; 70% of uncultivated global arable land; 70% of the world’s solar potential; critical minerals for energy transition; and ideal locations for carbon capture and storage.

Europe lacks most of these critical resources and is weighted down by an ageing population. On the plus side it possesses the financial, technical, cultural and knowledge capital along with a key experience in building and integrating markets. Shared, this combined knowledge and experience can contribute to leveraging Africa’s potential and enable it to become a powerhouse in both green industry and digital strategy through the fusion of the respective and complementary strengths of both regions.

Taking a short-term view, it is easy to be pessimistic; taking a more far-sighted view highlights enormous potential.

The inception phase of the AEF has underlined an interesting contention: Outside the bubbles of media debates, political discussions and institutional negotiations, citizens on both sides – in particular young people – are hungry for change, eager for collaboration, and ready to commit to playing their part.

### World regions: median age (2023 & 2100)

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<tr>
<th>World region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
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<td>Latin America and the Caribbean</td>
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**Graphic 1: Share of youth population (2023 and 2100)**

**Africa**

- **2023**
  - Africa: 4.1%
  - Latin America and the Caribbean: 6.9%
  - Asia: 8.7%
  - North America: 20.3%
  - Europe: 59.4%

- **2100**
  - Africa: 4.8%
  - Latin America and the Caribbean: 3.8%
  - Asia: 5.3%
  - North America: 40.6%
  - Europe: 44.9%

**Africa’s share of the global youth population will more than double from 20% in 2023 to 45% in 2100**

**By 2085, Africa’s youth will overtake Asia’s as the world’s largest**
The ongoing work of the AEF Strategy/Working Groups has highlighted the willingness and ability of non-traditional AU-EU institutional stakeholders – business sector, local governments, youth groups, civil society networks – to step up, drive impact and bypass existing silos in many areas: climate, access to energy, food security, health, digital, infrastructures and innovative finance.

We need to amplify the voice of the quiet majority who are aware, in their daily life, that this partnership does indeed serve mutual interests, and who support cooperation and long-term investments. This is key to counter the too often negative and divisive political rhetoric prevalent in both continents. Implementation of AU-EU commitments still operate largely in conventional agreements between institutions, in silos, relayed through a rather impenetrable language that obfuscates rather than unlocks creative solutions.

We hope this report contributes to the debate, and to that end we welcome feedback, new data and, most of all, collaboration by joining forces to advance this key partnership.
This first report of its kind on the State of Africa-Europe is centred on a review of the ten headline commitments resulting from the 6th EU-AU Summit held in February 2022, widely ranging from financial pledges to policy reforms, from peace and security to education and digital skills.

For the first time, the importance of monitoring the implementation of commitments was highlighted as a key point, and as such included in the 6th Summit Final Declaration.

Since the 6th Summit, the Africa-Europe Foundation – as an independent organisation – has worked with the European Union and African Union, along with other interested stakeholders to gather, check and collate data on progress.

The ensuing report provides a first baseline for commitment tracking, albeit still limited by the current level of and access to data, and the fact that commitments were largely drafted without specificity (baseline and targets) and timelines.

The Partnership remains significant for both Africa and Europe.

Africa and Europe have strong historic ties. Some, such as the colonial legacy, still need to be duly acknowledged. But beyond the historical connections, there are also close contemporary links that should be fostered. From people to people interactions, through cultural exchanges building on the large African diaspora enriching communities across Europe, to growing economic relations.

Africa is an important and growing trading partner for the EU. It is a considerable export destination for EU goods with the Member States, with Portugal (19.9%), Cyprus (19.5%), Malta (18.2%), Spain (15.2%) and Greece (14.7%) having the highest shares of exports to Africa in their total exports to countries outside the EU (2021). African goods are critical for the European supply chains, with Spain (17.2%), Portugal (13.2%), Italy (12.2%), France (11.7%) and Greece (11.4%) having the highest shares of imports from Africa in total extra-EU imports (2021). In 2021, EU exported US$ 146 billion to and imported US$ 142 billion of goods from Africa, with an overall trade surplus of US$ 4 billion.

The EU remains Africa’s biggest trading and development partner. In 2020, EU accounted for 33% of exports to, and 31% of imports from non-African countries. In 2021, 30.9% of Africa’s external trade of goods was with the EU (US$ 268 billion). European investors are, by far, the largest holders of FDI stock in Africa at US$ 160 billion (2020) with France (US$ 54 billion), Netherlands (US$ 54 billion), Italy (US$ 29 billion), and Germany (US$ 15 billion) among the top 10 investor economies (2021). The EU is the largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) provider to Africa with US$ 23.4 billion (2020) of investments.
Monitoring a partnership requires shared indicators and relevant data.

Institutional acknowledgement of the need for monitoring of political commitments, demonstrated in the conclusions of the 6th Summit, was a critical first step. The ensuing consultation process between the AU and EU to develop a shared follow-up mechanism is ongoing. Increasing investment in the follow-up and monitoring of commitments is key to success. However, the lack of shared definitions, processes and tools, as well as timelines for commitments, are accompanied by significant data gaps - particularly on Member State actions, on both the European and African sides. At EU Member State level, key actions closely related to the 6th Summit commitments are being implemented by national development agencies, from SIDA to AFD, but the relevant data on progress are not always available and, in any way, never consolidated at EU level. Available information on the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, especially on the aggregate level, remains limited, although more details become now available on specific investments. At the AU level, while processes are being put in place to track progress, there is limited evidence – if any – that they have been operationalised. While EU and AU institutions are aware of their monitoring commitments, less attention is paid at national level and by other actors. It is therefore key to translate commitments into relevant indicators in order to measure progress. This is not an easy task, as it requires political commitment and intricate technical coordination.

The upcoming 3rd EU-AU Ministerial and 1st EU-AU Ministerial follow-up committee meetings could provide an opportunity for institutions and Member States to first agree on relevant indicators. This would help to produce a framework and begin publishing information to help frame the proceedings of the 7th AU-EU Summit planned for 2025. The Foundation stands ready to support this effort.

While perceptions in the media, among civil society organisations and even officials working on the partnership appear dominated by a sense of “over-promising and underdelivering,” factual assessment of what has already been achieved highlights a number of positive results.

a. Health: Significant investment in vaccine manufacturing is bearing fruit. Team Europe is supporting manufacturing facilities in 4 African countries (out of 8 with existing vaccine manufacturing capacity) to date, creating new jobs and contributing to the AU’s goals of ensuring 60% of Africa’s routine vaccines are produced on the continent by 2040.

b. Reallocation of additional SDRs: EU Member States have pledged to reallocate US$35.4bn in SDRs, principally through IMF trust funds, contributing to the US$100 billion rechannelling target made by high-income countries in 2021. Yet, the IMF’s disbursement process so far has been slow, with only three African countries having received as of January 2024 disbursements totalling SDRs 162.56 million (equivalent to about US$ 216 million).

c. Illicit Financial Flows: A new Team Europe Initiative on Illicit Financial Flows and Transboundary Organised Crime (EUR 450 million), to be launched in 2024, aims to significantly enhance partnership in this domain, with a strategic opportunity to implement the scope and recommendations of the 2015 Mbeki Report.

d. Africa’s voice on the multilateral stage: Supported by the EU, the African Union seat at the G20 and a third seat for sub-Saharan African on the boards of IMF and WB recognises the importance of a fully-fledged voice for Africa in the global architecture.

e. Continental integration: 47 out of 55 AU Member States have ratified and deposited their instrument of ratification of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The EU stands as an important partner in the implementation of the Agreement, with EUR 630 million to
support African economic integration and trade, including EUR 40 million in technical assistance support to AfCFTA Secretariat. This partnership could develop further through the support of better integration of AfCFTA with the EU’s domestic policies, especially in the agriculture and climate sectors.

f. The co-investment approach: The emphasis on a shared investment agenda, including an Africa-Europe approach and private-public partnerships, is also embedded in the implementation methodology for Global Gateway.

Despite current misunderstandings and misgivings, a strong appetite for exchange and engagement remains across the two continents – in particular among and between young people.

Citizens of both continents recognise the added value of cooperation, and that a strong Africa-Europe Partnership can create a stable global middle-ground as the world becomes increasingly multipolar. The extent to which a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership can benefit our respective societies rated an average 4.1 out of 5 by youth across Africa and Europe taking part in AEF’s citizen consultations and surveys, #ReimagineAfricaEurope, led between July 2021 and January 2024. Over ¾ (76%) consider economic inclusion and decent job creation for young people as the areas where a strengthened partnership is most beneficial.

The nature of current challenges calls for a more interactive approach across traditional silos.

The global landscape highlights the growing interaction, and multiplier effect, of all current crises: climate, food security, health, debt, conflicts, terrorism... However, at institutional, government and administrative levels, most policies and workloads remain siloed. Addressing complex challenges such as the links between health and climate, or digital and mobility remains a challenge. This hinders the ability and agility to design unlocking solutions and projects. While the current poli-crisis affects all, its distribution disproportionally affects Africa, hence reinforcing the value of Africa-Europe cooperation, for example at the climate-development nexus and in the domain of sustainable finance, is of importance.

There is opportunity for an extended and innovative partnership by bringing in additional stakeholders.

Enlarging the scope of the partnership to additional actors such as local governments, business and finance sectors, and youth could bring new ideas to the table and contribute to swifter implementation of commitments made at the highest level. Consultations carried out in relation to the EU-AU Summit have consistently highlighted that the complexity of today’s challenges cannot be solved by governments alone. Dialogue and interaction need to develop beyond the confines of formal institutional structures, to include a multitude of stakeholders, from civil society networks to business, youth, local governments, institutional philanthropy and grassroot organisations. 61% of citizens consulted through the #ReimagineAfricaEurope campaign considered ‘Enlarging the Africa-Europe dialogue to diverse stakeholders who have the capacity for action, such as creating space for young people, the private sector and city leaders’ was the top priority to reset the partnership. Youth, CSOs, business and cities are priority actors and should be more involved, as underlined by 84% of respondents in 2023. Since the 6th Summit, recognising the importance of extending the partnership, the EU, the AUC and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), have worked together and with representatives of the civil society, local authorities, youth, and private sector, towards establishing a structured mechanism to engage with all relevant stakeholders of the Africa-Europe partnership.

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Consultations with youth and civil society have also revealed a desire for more dynamic and robust cultural collaboration and exchange. However, this still mainly occurs in an ad-hoc and fragmented manner, outside the official domain. Here is an area of high potential which the AU-EU institutional partnership has yet to appreciate and grasp.

To keep in pace with a quickly shifting landscape, agility and innovative actions are called for before the 7th Summit.

The global landscape has changed significantly since the 6th Summit two years ago. While the main commitments of the Summit still remain relevant, new needs and priorities have emerged. In a period of increasing volatility and shrinking resources, the Partnership can achieve the greatest impact when it aligns both long-term strategy and short-term political goals. Ongoing political dialogue can identify how the EU and the AU can join forces to respond effectively to geo-political shifts.

Crisis always triggers scope and opportunity to identify low-hanging fruits as well as innovative ideas. As the COVID crisis proved by eventually prompting an effective partnership in vaccine manufacturing, so can the ongoing climate challenge foster meaningful partnerships. Youth and civil society surveys, as well as experts’ consultations, point to diversified areas of high potential: cultural exchanges and collaboration, agri-food transformation and food security, carbon markets and decarbonation technologies, green technologies and critical minerals.

Africa’s increasing representation on the global stage presents opportunities to articulate and push common agendas in multilateral institutions.

The EU’s support for a specific African Union seat at the G20, and for a third sub-Saharan African seat on both the IMF’s and the WB’s boards could pave the way for further cooperation, without underestimating the larger global geopolitical context within which the Africa/Europe partnership operates. For Europe, this means recognising that Africa “cannot be taken for granted”, nor just be a battleground in a ‘new cold war’, and that African countries have the ability, and the right, to partner with multiple global actors, according to diverse shared agendas. For Africa, this means acknowledging that the Europe remains its biggest trade, investment, and foreign aid partner, and thus warrants a coherent African strategy.

In the immediate term, close Africa-Europe alignment on reform processes underway in the UN and Bretton Woods institutions is critical, including a focus on joint positioning on the WTO reform ahead of MC13.

A ‘partnership of equals’: going further.

Going beyond the specific commitments, focusing solely on the substance (the ‘what’), the partnership monitoring could also include the implementation process (the ‘how’). The Joint Vision included in the Final Declaration sets out principles for both Unions which could guide them in their joint efforts to achieve the heralded ‘renewed partnership’ – through a profound change in approach to one another.

“We need a new relationship software based on our vision of partnership rather than aid, towards shared growth and prosperity”

Closing remarks of Macky Sall, President of Senegal and Co-Chair of the 6th EU-AU Summit

As a pre-requisite for any real partnership, “equality” needs to be given its full meaning. Indeed, the AEF Charter highlights that any prospect of a transformative partnership “must acknowledge the prevailing power dynamics and inequalities of where we stand, build a strategic vision for where we want to go, and make sure that commitments made are implemented”.

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Meaningful outcomes and impact also rely on the partnership-building process. As such, and in the space and time allowed until the 7th Summit, assessing progress made towards establishing this partnership of equals is critical.

At this stage, the priority focus could be on the quality of engagement and joint decision-making, and adherence to the principles adopted in the Joint Vision. In practice, the two Unions could invest in:

a. **Changing the narrative:** This means moving away from any narrative depicting Africa as “a continent to be helped”, and Europe as “a saviour”, instead highlighting the African continent's assets and potential, and underlining a partnership with Europe that benefits both.

b. **Accepting diversity:** Partnership does not mean full alignment. There is a prevailing assumption that ‘a partnership of shared values’ requires a common position on any issue by the 55 AU and 27 EU Member States. This belies both the historical context and current interests of each AU and EU Member State. Awareness and understanding of the complexities prompting positions taken in global fora is necessary. The time of enduring alliances, whatever the issue at stake, has probably gone. This can be replaced, or at least complemented, by different coalitions of interests between different Member States, from both sides, around issues of joint interest.

c. **Implementing reciprocity:** As we move away from outdated aid-based relations to a genuine partnership, this will require equal commitments from both sides of the deal. The 6th Summit commitments still largely appear as a sum of financial commitments from Europe to Africa. Commitments from the African side also need clear articulation, and systematic monitoring of their implementation.

The Joint Vision for 2030 aims to ‘consolidate a renewed Partnership for solidarity, security, peace and sustainable and sustained economic development and prosperity for our citizens and for our future generations (...) founded on mutual respect and accountability, shared values, equality between partners and reciprocal commitments’.
Introducing the AEF Report 2024

This report captures available data and information on progress of implementation of the 10 headline commitments derived from the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit (see Box 1).

It is structured around chapters that group the 10 commitments into themes which represent strategic pillars of the long-term cooperation between Africa and Europe:

1. Health and Pandemic Preparedness
2. Science, Culture, and Education
3. Sustainable Finance
4. Climate and Development
5. Security and Peace
6. Mobility and Migration
7. Multilateralism

Those chapters follow a uniform structure:

First, they provide a summary of key observations on the progress and recommended areas of action for the strategic pillar under review. Depending on the theme, this cuts across several Summit commitments.

Second, they introduce specific commitments as featured in the Final Declaration and provide assessment on progress (new initiatives and policy cooperation). Where relevant, they outline contextual changes that may have impacted the pace and scope of delivery.

Finally, they identify areas of action that either can enhance implementation of the current commitments or finetune commitments to better reflect evolving priorities for the Africa-Europe Partnership.

The report includes three additional chapters: stating the case for monitoring implementation of political commitments as a trust-building exercise; a short summary of perceptions of diverse Africa-Europe constituencies (youth, local communities, institutional actors) on the state of, and priorities for, the Africa-Europe partnership; making a case for enhanced monitoring capturing not just the substance (the ‘what’) but also the cooperation process (the ‘how’) when delivering on commitments.

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**Box 1: The Ten Commitments of the Final Declaration of the 6th EU-AU Summit**

| Commitment 1: | Access to vaccines, African health sovereignty and comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic, including investment package for pandemic preparedness, health security and access |
| Commitment 2: | Facilitation of economic recovery through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, reallocation of SDRs and increased spending through international programmes |
| Commitment 3: | Combating Illicit Financial Flows, addressing domestic tax base erosion and profit sharing and cooperating on tax transparency |
| Commitment 4: | Scientific and technological cooperation; student, research and cultural exchanges; restitution of cultural assets and promotion of cultural heritage |
| Commitment 5: | Africa-Europe investment package for education |
| Commitment 6: | Investment package (energy, transport and digital infrastructure, energy transition, green transition, digital transformation, sustainable growth and decent job creation, transport facilitation and human development) |
| Commitment 7: | Implementation of the investment package through public funds and innovative financing and boosting regional and continental economic integration |
| Commitment 8: | Renewed and enhanced cooperation for peace and security |
| Commitment 9: | Enhanced and reciprocal partnerships for migration and mobility |
| Commitment 10: | Promoting effective multilateralism |
Chapter 1: Monitoring Implementation – a Trust-Building Exercise
Summits are about follow-up not just build-up, a sentiment shared by 57% of participants surveyed in AEF’s #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultations between July 2021 and January 2024. The agreement to establish a monitoring arrangement was a major outcome of the Summit as a tool with which to promote transparency and build trust: In their Joint Statement for the 6th EU-AU Summit “A Joint Vision for 2030” Heads of States and Government of EU and AU Member States have declared their commitment “to monitor the implementation of the commitments undertaken during AU-EU Summits … on a regular basis via existing AU-EU structures, including the AU-EU Ministerial Follow-up Committee”. President of the European Council Charles Michel proposed a monitoring mechanism consisting of AU and EU representatives, the private sector and civil society actors to review and report on which projects are “coming to fruition in accordance with the established schedule, and which projects may need further impetus, adaptations and improvements.” Building on this, political and operational monitoring mechanisms as well as tools for comprehensive commitment tracking are needed to build a reciprocal dynamic for Africa-Europe relations.

For twenty years there have been meetings between the African leaders and European leaders. (...) But what exactly has been happening? What commitments have each side made to the other? And did they live up to their commitments or not?"

Mo Ibrahim, Co-Founder of the Africa-Europe Foundation, AEF HLG Meeting, Nairobi 2023

The AEF has established an independent monitoring platform in complement to the institutional mechanisms established by the EU and the AU, with the aim, most importantly, to encourage a renewal of trust through improving access to information and visibility of progress in delivering the commitments. The objective of AEF’s monitoring function is to provide a basis to improve, not just report on, the joint performance of the AU-EU in delivering the commitments, thus contributing to strengthening the Africa-Europe partnership.

However, currently, the absence of common definitions, processes and tools, timelines for commitments, accompanied by significant data gaps - particularly on Member State actions - is hampering effective monitoring. The 6th Summit commitments did not articulate the state of play (the baseline) or, except for the vaccine roll-out and high-level financial contributions of the Investment Package, the expected outcomes (the targets). Accountability is not built into commitments and streamlined across the diverse stakeholders, and no clear criteria for SMART commitment-making and assessment have been yet defined to allow for effective and systematic reporting on progress. Information available on the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, in an aggregated format, is still quite limited; some progress has been made on improved communication with dedicated online resources for specific initiatives (such as published factsheets and new project announcements) and new monitoring tools are under development. At AU level, while processes are being put in place to track progress, there is limited evidence such processes have been operationalised. And while EU and AU institutions are aware of their monitoring commitments, less attention is paid to it at national level and by other actors. This makes transparent and accessible sharing of data, evidence and best practices challenging.
This report represents the baseline for commitment tracking, as current efforts to offer a ‘red, amber, green’ assessment of each goal have been limited by the current level of data and the fact that commitments were largely drafted without specificity (baseline and targets) and timelines. The AEF ‘commitment framework’ approach to monitoring of this report is therefore based on two dimensions:

1. **Tracking developments on the key programmes**, in the first instance, and their contributing projects. This includes key examples of initiatives developed in the framework of the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, including those designed and implemented through the Team Europe Initiatives and the 15 AU Flagships of Agenda 2063.

2. **Undertaking contextual assessment**, which places the design and implementation of both EU initiatives and AU Flagships in the broader context of Europe’s and Africa’s current sectoral priorities. This provides opportunity for nuance based on the dynamic economic and geopolitical environment, perceptions and trends, taking into account also the diverse stakeholders involved in delivering on commitments beyond the institutional actors.

While it is important to look at political and institutional follow-up in the context of the ‘6th Summit commitments framework’, monitoring progress of the Africa-Europe relationship also needs to look beyond. Many other projects are directly implemented by Member States and other diverse actors – from civil society to local actors such as cities. While they address the Summit priorities, they are not labelled EU-AU or presented as being in line with the 6th Summit commitments. Nonetheless, these projects, cooperation and exchanges in a wide range of priority fields contribute to the Africa-Europe partnership. The ‘6th Summit commitments framework’ approach is therefore complemented by analysis of the Africa-Europe relationship more broadly, including citizen trends and perceptions.

The report is structured into chapters which represent strategic pillars of the long-term partnership between Africa and Europe, policy areas which involve shared working and can yield mutual benefits for Africa and Europe. Each chapter captures data and information on progress of one or more of the 10 commitment areas defined by the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit (see Box 1) and focuses on the implementation of the AU flagships and key EU initiatives and joint policy coordination that best describe the institutional contribution to the areas of cooperation.

It is important to ensure AU-EU commitment tracking is aligned with and includes the AU’s Agenda 2063, not only to record African
contribution to the development agenda supported by the Joint Vision, but also to ensure that efforts are not dispersed, including on monitoring. There is a significant convergence and overlap of development strategies and related targets, including with UN Agenda 2030: the AU Agenda 2063 has 89.2% of convergence with the UN Agenda 2030 and 88% with the AfDB’s High 5s, according to UNDP (see Figure 1).

This report data is therefore based on information provided by relevant institutional partners from both sides including:

- Information on EU programmes, notably those announced under the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package.
- Data on the 15 AU Agenda 2063 Flagships included in the Agenda 2063 First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (FTYIP) - 2014-2023.
- Relevant project data and policy updates of the political actors of the partnership, including Members States on both sides.

This is complemented with broader observations going beyond just political and financial delivery and derived from AEF’s extensive multi-stakeholder consultations including:

- The #ReimagineAfricaEurope campaign composed of perception stakeholder surveys, citizen focus groups and “#AUEUTracker Special Dialogue” broadcast series.
- Our interregional dialogue platforms including the AEF High-Level Group, the AEF Women Leaders Network, and the AEF “Strategy Groups” and “Working Groups” (sectoral leaders from civil society, business, policymaking, and the youth sector, from both continents).
- Media tracking (mainstream and social media) and the aggregation of data and policy analysis from leading African and European knowledge centres and Africa-Europe roundtable discussions.
- Sectoral assessment studies and expert analysis and assessments from African and European research fellows affiliated to AEF and its partners organisations.

Figure 1: Convergence of key development strategies for Africa: AU Agenda 2063, UN Agenda 2030 (SDGs) and AfDB’s High 5s

Source: UNDP Africa Policy Brief Volume 1, No. 1. 2017
Box 2: AU and EU flagships and initiatives

There is no one common definition of ‘flagships’. They often refer to long-term and large-scale initiatives underpinned by an ambitious vision and transformational impact. The most common feature is their visibility.

**AU Agenda 2063 Flagships** refer to the AU’s flagships included in the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023) of Agenda 2063. The initiatives are designed to accelerate economic growth, foster a shared identity, and make visible the delivery of the Agenda 2063.

**Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs)** are the EU initiatives that are implemented through the Team Europe approach (EU institutions, EU Members States, and European DFIs) in partner countries. Besides initiatives implemented by the EU and individual Member State, TEIs are the main channel to deliver on the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, with two TEIs expected per partner country and regional TEIs. As of end of 2023, 79 TEIs have been developed in Africa in support of Global Gateway priorities.

**EU Flagships** are prominent Global Gateway initiatives identified by the European Commission and Member States, and endorsed by the EU Council. They are adopted on an annual basis since 2023 in a form of a list of priority projects, which fulfil established criteria, such as: include an infrastructure component, are large-scale, transformative and prominent examples of concrete results of the Global Gateway, and have significant visibility. Not all Global Gateway projects are Flagships. 89 flagship projects were identified in Africa for 2023 and 2024.

Towards a shared approach to monitoring progress

The upcoming 3rd EU-AU Ministerial meeting, together with 1st EU-AU Ministerial follow-up committee meeting, is an opportunity for institutions and member states to make progress on developing relevant joint monitoring tools - including indicators - and monitoring mechanisms. This will help start the process of establishing a coherent monitoring framework with information being published in advance of the 7th AU-EU Summit scheduled for 2025. The Africa-Europe Foundation stands ready to support in this effort. The establishment of this coherent monitoring approach could follow the below steps:

10 POTENTIAL MONITORING TOOLS AND MECHANISMS

1. **Select appropriate policy priorities to monitor** which are genuinely shared and hold most promise to deliver meaningful on-the-ground impact. The grouping of Summit commitments in strategic pillars of the long-term Africa-Europe partnership proposed in this Report is an example.
2. Map the relevant political initiatives contributing to advancing these policy priorities: key initiatives on both sides, such as Team Europe Initiatives, AU Flagships, EU initiatives, bilateral and multilateral cooperation between member states.

3. Identify which additional forms of cooperation between African and European stakeholders could contribute to advancing the priorities of the partnership, such as private sector cooperation, civil society exchanges, youth platforms, philanthropic work, university partnerships, city networks.

4. Formulate SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) indicators which capture how both the political initiatives and other forms of cooperation contribute to achieving delivery on the partnership's policy priorities. This will allow for comprehensive tracking of delivery on commitments over time.

5. Introduce a ‘green, amber, red’ assessment (on target, in progress, off target) to allow for quick and transparent communication on the status across the different policy priorities, as captured by the respective SMART indicators.

6. Agree on the participating actors of the permanent monitoring mechanisms, related processes and their operational functioning. This includes the political follow-up mechanisms, such as the AU-EU ministerial level meetings, including the Ministerial Follow-up Committee, with plenaries as well as thematic roundtables.

7. Establish permanent mechanisms which complement existing political structures for follow-up and monitoring, such as regular working groups involving political actors, member states, experts who can champion the priority areas, as well as independent civil society organisations, (supporting the operational monitoring by using the monitoring tools described above) (points 1 to 5).

8. Ensure regular and reliable data sources are provided to the larger public, with a central platform for registering and sharing progress of partnership priorities to ensure visibility, such as the AEF online Africa-Europe Tracker. This can streamline accountability across stakeholders – not only at institutional and member states level but also across private sector and civil society - contributing to this collective effort.

9. Allow for larger public dialogue forums involving diverse stakeholders, cutting across sectoral silos and reaching citizens across both continents, enabling informed debate on the developments which are being monitored, for increased accountability and visibility.

10. Complement results of the monitoring processes via technical expert analysis by independent think tanks which can identify constraints to progress in the different policy areas, and can then advise on how to unblock obstacles and accelerate joint action to deliver on priorities in line with the defined SMART indicators.
Box 3: Global Gateway strategy and investment package

As referenced in the conclusions of the 6th EU-AU Summit and described by the European Commission, ‘Global Gateway is a European strategy launched in 2021 to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy and transport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world’. Global Gateway aims to offer development opportunities for partner countries through investments in transformative projects aligned to partner’s needs, at the same time promoting EU’s interests and values, such as rule of law, human rights, international norms and standards, as well as creating opportunities for the EU’s private sector.

The Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package is the EU’s commitment to mobilise at least EUR 150 billion in investments by 2027 to bolster cooperation in sub-Saharan Africa in priority sectors and in line with the AU’s development aspirations and priorities under Agenda 2063, the EU-AU Joint Vision for 2030 as well as with the Sustainable Development Goals and Agenda 2030.

The Investment Package is being rolled-out through regional and country transformative initiatives in 11 priority areas:

- Accelerating the digital transition: 5. Digital.

For Northern African countries, the EU’s Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours is a comparable and complementing plan to the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package, with the objectives to foster sustainable development, address the region’s structural imbalances, and tap into the region’s economic potential.
Box 4: Enhancing EU Development Cooperation through Team Europe Initiatives – A View from GIZ, a TEI Implementing Partner

Team Europe Initiative is a collaborative effort involving the European Union (EU), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and EU Member States and their agencies aiming to translate critical priorities into tangible outcomes on the ground, fostering collaboration and development.

After two years of experience implementing TEIs, GIZ's initial reflection on this novel approach is that TEI's greatest value is in improved coordination between development partners within partner countries. Through strategic project mapping along country and thematic portfolios, joint project planning can lead to more efficient resource allocation and better leveraging of existing expertise embedded among the TEI partners. This can help advance development goals in a more sustainable way.

Yet, the cost of assembling the TEI partners comes in a form of increased complexity of coordination and communication. A lack of a shared narrative hampers external communication, impacting the initiatives’ effectiveness. Moreover, challenges persist in coordinating and communication about regional and continental TEIs that lack a natural ‘country host’, necessitating in developing innovative cooperation formats. The role of traditional partners involved in development cooperation, such as CSOs and NGOs, also remains unclear with their role at conceptualisation and design weaker than before.

Still, TEIs reflect EU Member States’ solidarity, addressing global challenges collectively. Mobilising joint financial and technical expertise can generate critical mass transformative change. Next steps to optimise TEIs should include:

- a standardised implementation process that covers coordination and communication;
- a common monitoring framework and tools;
- equal visibility for participating organisations and partner countries;
- greater involvement of EU delegations, especially in communication and coordination;
- and in the longer term, better integrating vital European policy areas that are contingent upon a broad European consensus to tackle global challenges collaboratively.
Box 5: Initial evaluation of the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan of Agenda 2063

Agenda 2063’s aim is to achieve inclusive and sustainable development of the continent. Its First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (FTYIP) comes to an end in 2023. The African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NEPAD) have been tasked to lead the evaluation of Agenda 2063 FTYIP (2014 – 2023) and the development of the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan (STYIP). The evaluation is ongoing with the results expected to be presented at the AU Summit in early 2024.

Following AEF consultations with involved stakeholders, initial observations from the evaluation process highlight mixed results so far:

- Agenda 2063 remains relevant to African development priorities, even as they have evolved over the past decade. The Agenda’s goals are highly aligned with the continental strategic framework as well as other development frameworks, principally the UN SDGs of Agenda 2030 and the AfDB's Hi5s.
- Agenda 2063 has been mainstreamed into national development plans and related sectoral plans, albeit not always with explicit referral to the Agenda or related continental strategies.
- FTYIP (2014 – 2023) has not been adequately costed, which makes it impossible to assess the resource gap for full implementation.
- Implementation of the FTYIP has been uneven across the continent as it has been dependent on capacity, resources, and governance of the implementing member state and its agencies.
- Monitoring and reporting of the implementation has not been easy with opportunity to strengthen the process through better alignment of indicators between various regional and global development strategies (i.e. Agenda 2063 Goals and SDGs).
- Significant progress has been noted for the following flagships: African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Pan African Virtual and E-University, and Pan African E-Network.
- Limited progress to date of the major infrastructure projects (Grand Inga Dam, African Integrated High Speed Rail Network) as well as key strategies for stronger pan-African integration (African Financial Institutions, African Outer Space Strategy, African Commodities Strategy, African Economic Forum) opens space for stronger partnership within the African community and with international partners, such as the EU, to improve implementation.
- The whole FTYIP remains relevant and critical for the next ten-year implementation plan with a focus on interconnected initiatives that promote African integration and which can have a significant contribution to Africa’s ambition, such as AfCFTA, African Passport and Freedom of Movement, African Commodities Strategy, and Silencing of the Guns.
- STYIP (2024-2033) will consider key lessons from the implementation so far, including:
  - the importance of a coordination and oversight mechanism, including the right governance at subnational, national, regional and continental levels for proper accountability;
  - Leveraging partnerships, including the private sector, civil society, philanthropy, citizens, and academia;
  - Resource mobilisation that is based on different financing models, not just direct funding;
  - A monitoring framework that tracks delivery against key indicators covering development impact and outcomes, as well as organisational effectiveness.
Chapter 2: Health and Pandemic Preparedness

This chapter deals with commitment 1 in the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: access to vaccines, African health sovereignty, and comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic, including an investment package for pandemic preparedness, health security and access to essential health services.
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Context:

- There is significant evidence of the severe damage the pandemic has caused to health gains achieved over the last decades in Africa and its impact on European health systems; for instance, a 37% overall reduction in visits and admissions in Europe and a 70% decline in patient flow in sub-Saharan Africa during the pandemic, with long-term effect on medical units and preventive services across the population. The resurgence of preventable infectious diseases such as measles in Africa and Europe, and the backlog in non-emergency health care in Europe demonstrate the importance of investing in emergency preparedness and building resilient health systems on both continents.

- There is increased global focus on the impact of climate change on health systems. The convening of the first health day at COP28 in December 2023 demonstrates the importance of collaborative and integrated approaches to addressing the profound impact of climate change on human health and the severity of diseases, as well as the capacity of health systems to react.

Examples of progress to date:

- Significant investment in manufacturing of vaccines is bearing fruit with local manufacturing facilities already creating new jobs, and new investments starting in medical products. These funds, together with sharing knowledge and expertise, also help towards achieving the AU’s goal of ensuring 60% of Africa’s routine vaccines are produced on the continent by 2040 (Partnership for Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, Medicines and Health Technologies in Africa and MAV+ flagship).

- The COP28 Health Declaration, endorsed by more than 120 countries, is a first step in ensuring that health remains on the global agenda as a critical consideration in climate financing and adaptation.

Potential areas of action:

- Accelerated implementation of initiatives to support the demand side for locally manufactured vaccines and medical products remains key to ensure success and sustainability of these investments. This should include ensuring the guidelines, costs and capacity-building required for purchase at scale of supplies. A similar effort should be made to ensure operationalisation of the investments, particularly by continued training of the local health workforce and ensuring efficiency in regulatory processes for supply chain integration that meets demand. In this way, capacity for local manufacturing and distribution of medical products can be increased. Governance of the system, ensuring the requested level of quality control, is also key.

- To build resilient and sustainable health systems on both continents that can help prevent and respond to future pandemics, it remains critical to sustain political focus. The current de-prioritisation of Health on political agendas underlines the importance of framing health commitments beyond the COVID-19 pandemic response, but also as part of a broader agenda to build sustainable and resilient health systems. It requires strong political leadership that will place health high on the global political agenda.
• Cross-silo approaches are critical to broaden health agendas with a focus on climate-health. Achieving desired health outcomes that are sustainable requires moving away from traditional, sectoral action and instead centrally incorporating health into the climate agenda.

Graphic 2: Climate-health nexus: Climate change effects on health and health systems

- Preventable environmental issues cause 1 in 4 deaths globally.
- If left alone, the health impacts of climate change could push an additional 132M people into extreme poverty by 2030.
- The African continent makes up just <1.5% of the global population but accounts for only 17% of greenhouse gas emissions. However, it experiences almost <4% of all global mortality attributed to climate-related disasters.
- Despite the urgent need in impacted countries, funding for climate adaptation is inadequate.

Prioritize local solutions driven by communities
Break silos for local action with lasting impact
Support a resilient local health workforce and its infrastructure
Catalyze flexible financing for local communities

• To combat present and future climate-health related shocks, a cohort of skilled health workers to meet growing demands will be necessary. They will need to be equipped and fully resourced with climate-resilient health systems, technology, and know-how. With a resilient local health force and associated infrastructure, Africa and Europe will be ready to respond effectively to climate-induced health emergencies while ensuring sustainable health outcomes.

• As part of the COP28 Health Declaration, countries have committed to follow up meetings with diverse line-ministers and stakeholders to define specific actions at the nexus of climate and health. Countries and other stakeholders that have signed the Declaration need to be held accountable for actioning these next steps, including the disbursement of the USD 2.7 billion in funding commitments to health initiatives (though questions remain on how much is new financing). The full realization of the non-binding Health Declaration will depend on defining clear indicators for progress and adequate financing, as well as a commitment to advancing the transition away from fossil fuels as noted in the final COP28 negotiated text.

• A need for stronger collaboration remains to prevent future pandemics in the context of global policy frameworks. These include the WTO agreement on a comprehensive response to COVID-19, and also the IPR waiver for COVID-19 diagnostics and...
therapeutics. Africa-Europe alignment to advance negotiations of the WHO Pandemic Accord are critical for the global health response. There is also potential to explore investment in a Pandemic Fund.

- Building on the strong leadership role played by the Africa CDC during the COVID-19 pandemic, there is now a need for advanced integration of existing health structures and strategies on the African continent. The political will of African Member States to create the enabling environment for implementation, including reliable quality control systems, is needed to deliver on the agreed commitments. Structured dialogues between these stakeholders, such as through the high-level steering committee on the cross-continental health partnership, are necessary. The group met in June 2023 to discuss health manufacturing, workforce, data and digital systems. They are set to meet again in March 2024 in Brussels. EU support for AU initiatives such as the AU Digital Health Strategy and the Africa CDC Digital Transformation Strategy likewise provide welcome assistance.

- Investing in clean cooking solutions is an example of a high impact initiative cutting across sectors, at the nexus of climate-health. To date, the level of political commitment and investment in clean cooking has not matched the global magnitude of the challenge: nearly 1 billion people still lack access to modern cooking solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, and almost 500 thousand people in Africa- mainly women and children- die prematurely due to household air pollution every year. Building on the momentum created at the 1st Africa Climate Summit, there is an opportunity for Europe and Africa to work together, creating and resourcing governmental clean cooking ‘delivery units’ with Kenya and Sierra Leone as champions.

**HEALTH**

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<th>The Ten Commitments Framework</th>
<th>Main Commitments</th>
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<td>COMMITMENT 1: Access to vaccines, African health sovereignty, and comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic</td>
<td>I. <strong>Ensuring fair and equitable access to vaccines</strong> by supporting local and regional mechanisms for procurement, as well as allocation and deployment of medical products; providing at least 450 million of vaccine doses to Africa, in coordination with the Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) platform by mid-2022; and mobilising EUR 425 million to ramp up the pace of vaccination, support the efficient distribution of doses and training of medical teams and the capacity of analysis and sequencing.</td>
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<td>II. <strong>Supporting fully-fledged African health sovereignty</strong> (...) by supporting a common agenda for manufacturing vaccines, medicines, diagnostics, therapeutics, and health products in Africa, including investment in production capacities, voluntary technology transfers as well as strengthening of the regulatory framework.</td>
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<td>III. <strong>Engaging towards an agreement on a comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic</strong> (including trade &amp; IPR).</td>
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<td>IV. <strong>Support initiatives for pandemic preparedness, health security and equitable access to quality essential health services</strong></td>
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I. Ensuring fair and equitable access to (COVID) vaccines

**Context:**

- Despite the availability of vaccine doses, limited funding to address health system and structural barriers contributed to low and slow COVID vaccine coverage in Africa, reaching 51.8% compared to 73.0% in Europe as of September 2023.
- Vaccine delivery was beset by a lack of transparency provided by suppliers to the COVAX mechanism on delivery schedules which compromised country planning for deployment. In addition, short shelf lives of some donated vaccines left insufficient time to deliver the vaccine within African countries.

**Examples of progress to date:**

- The delivery of a promised 450 million doses of COVID-19 vaccine reached 206.5 million (46%) by October 2022. Thereafter, the funds to purchase an additional 200 million doses were redirected to strengthening health systems and workforce training to support effective vaccine deployment.
- By October 2022 at least 375 million Euro from a promised 425 million was mobilised to ramp up the pace of vaccination, support the efficient distribution of doses and training of medical teams and the capacity for analysis and sequencing. This included the EUR 200 million redirected from the purchase of vaccine doses. The action has focused on selected countries with the most under-vaccinated populations through COVAX's COVID-19 Delivery Support (CDS) programme, hosted by GAVI.

**Potential areas of action:**

- The end of the COVID-19 pandemic led to a diminished focus on health, and thus the commitments made at the peak of the pandemic. Reframing these commitments towards investing in health systems will help ensure that both Africa and Europe are prepared to effectively respond to any future pandemic, that most likely will be linked to the climate crisis. Thus, pandemic preparedness and response should remain high on the political agenda with a focus on building long term resilient health systems.

II. Supporting fully-fledged African health sovereignty

**Examples of progress to date:**

- ‘Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa (TEI MAV+)’ - under implementation - was launched in May 2021 as a response to African leaders’ call for health sovereignty aiming to boost local manufacturing capacities in Africa and strengthen pharmaceutical systems. It offers a 360-degree approach encompassing: 1) industrial development, supply chains and private sector, 2) market shaping, demand and trade facilitation, 3) regulatory strengthening, 4) technology transfer and intellectual property management, 5) access to finance, 6) R&D, higher education and skills. MAV+ has so far mobilised over EUR 1.3 billion, involving 89 projects and 23 implementing partners. Tangible actions and results so far:
  - By December 2023, Team Europe had mobilised EUR 1.3 billion investment, combining grants and loans.
  - At regional level: there was the consolidation of the Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) hosted by the Africa
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (AfCDC); regulatory strengthening of the African Medicines Agency (AMA) in partnership with the European Medicines Agency, WHO and NEPAD, and the establishment of World Health Organisation’s mRNA technology transfer programme and hub in South Africa.

- At country level, investments taking place in Senegal, Rwanda, South Africa, Ghana, and Nigeria to set up and increase production capacity of vaccines and medical products, as well as technology development.

- In June 2022, the EU-Africa pharma and healthcare marketplace and matchmaking event brought together over 200 representatives of companies, and research organisations.

  - In March 2023, the Zambia-EU Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Forum gathered over 600 participants from Europe, Zambia and the region to build business relationships;
  - In April 2023, launch of MSc and PhD programmes in Biotechnology in partnership with the University of Rwanda.
  - In October 2023, at the margins of the Global Gateway Forum, a further EUR 134 million was signed to increase local manufacturing and equitable access to quality, safe, effective and affordable health products (i.e. vaccines, medicines and health technologies) in six African countries: Egypt (EUR 3 million), Ghana (EUR 32 million), Nigeria (EUR 18 million), Rwanda (EUR 40 million), Senegal (EUR 25 million), and South Africa (EUR 16 million).

“For the Global Gateway investment strategy on the development of pharmaceutical manufacturing hubs in Africa to be successful, it should be associated with a health workforce development strategy for pharmaceutical workers and regulatory specialists.”

Conclusions of the meeting AEF Strategy Group on Health on the State-of-Africa relations, October 2022

Potential areas of action:

- To meet its goal of reaching 60% domestic production of vaccines needed on the continent by 2040 - and to ensure long-term sustainability of those investments - accelerated efforts are needed to implement initiatives for locally manufactured products. It is necessary to continue expanding the scope to include local manufacturing of diagnostics and therapeutics. This can assist in ensuring long-term demand.

- Prioritisation of the actions that will fully operationalise the investments in locally manufactured vaccines may significantly contribute to achieving the AU’s goal ahead of schedule. Not only can that demonstrate the effectiveness of the Africa-EU partnership but can also significantly contribute to building resilience of African and global health systems in the context of (future) pandemic preparedness.
Box 6: Increasing medical manufacturing capacity in Africa

Initiatives to establish and increase Africa’s capacity to locally manufacture medical products have been accelerated through the leadership of the Africa Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (AfCDC) and through funding and partnership agreements with the EU and its Members States. A shared commitment to equitable partnership between AU and EU Member States has further contributed to the acceleration of bi-lateral agreements to develop an ecosystem of public and private actors to establish sustainable local capacity for medical product manufacturing in Africa.

Since 2022, The EU has made significant investments in the African Medicines Agency (AMA), the WHO’s mRNA technology transfer hub, and the Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing (PAVM) in response to the AU’s goal of meeting 60% of continental demand with locally manufactured vaccines by 2040. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been approximately 30 investment initiatives for vaccines manufacturing in Africa characterised by bi-lateral partnerships between the AU and its Member States, Europe, and other stakeholders. Most recently, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH supported a global event in June 2023 bringing together Team Europe, African pharmaceutical firms, investors and funders, development partners, and regional facilitators to discuss how to develop sustainable investment in vaccine manufacturing. In September 2023, the AfCDC and the French government signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen efforts to improve public health systems and health security in Africa.

The EU has made strategic investments in different parts of the vaccine production pipeline to increase local manufacturing capacity in Africa. This includes a EUR 11.26 million investment through the European Investment Bank for Emzor Pharmaceutical Industries to establish the first manufacturing plant of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) in Nigeria for the production of antimalarial drugs in July 2022; a grant facility of up to EUR 5 million into DEK Pharmaceuticals to support the construction, furnishing and validation of a fill and finish vaccine manufacturing facility in Ghana in March 2023; and an investment of more than EUR 140 million into Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Limited in South Africa in 2021 enabling the production of more than 225 million doses of the Johnson & Johnson COVID-19 vaccine at their manufacturing site. These investments complement others in Senegal to expand the workforce and in Rwanda to build a new facility to unlock local manufacturing capacity for vaccines.

However, some challenges remain, which require action by different actors and progress across different sectors including data collection and transparency from private operations. There has been limited investment in increasing local manufacturing capacity in Africa for other medical products, including diagnostics and therapeutics. A lack of information by private actors is evident on the progress of vaccine manufacturing initiatives and investments, including quantifying their impact on advancing the AU’s goal of meeting 60% of continental demand with locally manufactured vaccines by 2040. The COVID-19 pandemic was an accelerant for increased investment in vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa, but as the pandemic has receded, there is need for more clarity on how the established manufacturing capacity will meet local and evolving vaccination needs. Finally, more attention needs to be given to the market conditions for locally manufactured products, including the role of African governments, to ensure long-term demand for locally produced products.
Box 7: EU-Rwanda Partnership on Building Pharma/Medical Manufacturing Capacity

Over the last year, the focus of the EU-Rwanda partnership has been on (1) building vaccine manufacturing and (2) supporting the Rwanda FDA in regulatory strengthening.

Regarding vaccine manufacturing, the groundbreaking of the BioNTech vaccines plant took place in Rwanda in June 2022, following the signing of the Twinning agreement between the EU and Rwanda Food and Drugs Authority (RFDA) to support the enabling environment for regulation of medicinal products and vaccines in Rwanda. A consortium led by France, Germany and Belgium is supporting Rwanda to build regulatory capacity expertise.

The facility, which will be initially equipped with two BioNTainers, is the first mRNA vaccine production facility in an African network to provide sustainable production capacity for mRNA pharmaceuticals. Further manufacturing facilities in Africa including Senegal and South Africa are planned to follow.

Recently, Rwanda welcomed six mobile vaccine-production units developed by German pharmaceutical company BioNTech. Once assembled, they will become a vaccine production hub for jabs against a variety of illnesses, capable of producing up to 100 million mRNA vaccines per year. The containers, dubbed BioNTainers, will also pioneer treatments in the development phase against diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and HIV that are among the leading killers in Africa. Rwanda is expected to distribute the vaccines to the 55-member African Union bloc.

In December 2023, President Paul Kagame and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen inaugurated the first BioNTech Africa manufacturing site in Kigali. The occasion also marked an additional EUR 40 million Global Gateway investment to strengthen the Rwandan ecosystem for manufacturing health products. This includes investments in building skills through higher education, and vocational training, and fostering local R&D and biotech startups. With this new contribution, total Team Europe support to local manufacturing and access to medical tools and technologies in Rwanda comes to EUR 93.7 million.
III. Engaging towards an agreement on a comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic (including trade & IPR)

Examples of progress to date:

• In June 2022, an agreement was reached at the WTO on a global IPR waiver for COVID vaccinations for a duration of 5 years (excluding waiver for COVID diagnostics and therapeutics). In September 2023, WTO’s TRIPS Council met to consider a potential extension of the waiver for diagnostics and therapeutics.

• Continuous engagement in Geneva in the negotiations on a WHO international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response to be adopted in May 2024

Potential areas of action:

• There is still an opportunity for the EU, Africa, and the global community to agree on a comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic which would include a comprehensive TRIPS waiver that was originally proposed by South Africa and India, and which received overwhelming support from civil society and over 100 governments.

• Stronger collaboration is needed between leaders of Africa and Europe and its institutions to agree and implement a new global policy framework. This can lead to a better response to future pandemics, such as the WTO agreement on comprehensive response to Covid-19 (including IPR waiver for COVID diagnostics and therapeutics) as well as a common position in the currently negotiated Pandemic Accord which is critical for global health response. A closer collaboration and a single voice in the global dialogue on health could strengthen the health partnership and contribute to securing desirable outcomes for Africa and Europe at the upcoming political milestones.

“Europe can be a key global partner in strengthening health resilience by listening to the leadership in Africa’s COVID response. A first step would be proactively supporting voluntary technology transfer and a broad IP waiver at WTO negotiations.”

Agnes Binagwaho, Co-Chair of the AEF Strategy Group on Health
IV. Support initiatives for pandemic preparedness, health security and equitable access to quality essential health services

Examples of progress to date:

  □ Contributing projects: TRVST (a digital Traceability and Verification system for medical products) led by UNICEF; panel and roundtable at the African Health Tech Summit which took place in Kigali in December 2022.
• ‘Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) in Sub-Saharan Africa’ – in inception, launched at 2nd CPHIA in Kigali, December 2022. Aims to advance the SRHR agenda in the SSA region, with a particular focus on adolescent girls and young women, and include actions on increasing the availability, affordability and quality of SRHR commodities. Estimated budget of EUR 60 million.
• ‘Sustainable Health Security using a One Health approach’ – under preparation, expected to be launched by the end of 2023. Aims to achieve higher efficiency by coordinating programmes and promoting synergies with already ongoing initiatives. Indicative funding of EUR 391 million.
• ‘Support to Public Health Institutes (PHI) in Sub-Saharan Africa’ – in preparation. Aims to support public health institutes and public health policies to deliver their core functions, including health research, workforce, and prevention/promotion. The general objective of this TEI is to contribute to community health and wellbeing through the provision of public health services via public health schools and institutes. For example, by supporting the core-functions of the institutions, enhancing regional collaboration to jointly develop research, training and advocacy programmes, and by integrating African PHIs with European ones into international public health networks. The initiative will foster coordinated and collective action to address priority public health challenges, driving progress in key health indicators and towards universal health coverage.

Local and regional initiatives led by local partners:

• Burundi: with EU support, improved financial and technical management of health centres by introducing a performance-based approach; continued free health care for pregnant women and children under five years of age, leading to a significant reduction in the under-five mortality rate.
• Sudan: March 2023 a EUR 40 million EU support scheme aiming to improve the health conditions of vulnerable populations affected by extreme poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition including IDPs, refugees and Host Communities.
• Nigeria: December 2022 EIB signed a 14 million loan with Emzor for production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (antimalarials).
• Global: October 2023, the EC, the EIB and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation announced a new financing partnership of EUR 1.1 billion to eradicate polio and improve access to healthcare services for the most vulnerable populations. This comprised an EUR 500 million contribution to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative – specifically the World Health Organization and UNICEF – as well as EUR 500 million to expand the innovation capacity of health systems in low- and middle-income countries.
• In October 2023, on the margins of the Global Gateway Forum, the EU signed additional EUR 500 million bringing the total partnership amount to EUR 1.6 billion. The EC will guarantee EUR 500 million in loans by the EIB, focusing on commercially viable private sector initiatives by micro, small and medium-sized enterprises to strengthen health systems, primary health care R&D, skills, and the production and marketing of vaccines, medicines and medical technology.

• In February 2024, the EU pledged EUR 6 million for enhancing disease surveillance and laboratory capacity for the Africa Centre for Disease Control (ACDC) as part of the overall agenda to strengthen global systems for disease control, in line with EU’s Global Health Strategy and AU Agenda 2063 for strengthening local systems.

Potential areas of action:

• The 2nd Joint Africa-EU Ministerial Meeting in October 2021 has rejected the use of the term “Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR)”, instead recommending the use of “Reproductive Health and Rights (RHR)”.

• Addressing the impacts of climate change on health systems – through the spread of climate-linked disease, migration, and strain on food systems - will require a global and regional response. This should adopt a cross-sectoral approach that can effectively leverage local communities.

• Integration of existing health structures and strategies in Africa, and globally, is critical for the delivery of agreed commitments. It will also require the commitment and political will of African member states to create the enabling environment for implementation, including reliable quality control systems.

• The existence of resilient local health workforce and infrastructures is key. To combat present and future shocks, additional skilled health workers are needed to meet growing demands. They must be equipped and fully resourced with climate-resilient health systems, technology, and know-how. Only with capable, qualified health workers, including community health workers, can an effective response be mounted, and sustainable health outcomes ensured.

• The increasingly interactive nature of the current global challenges makes it imperative to break silos and examine issues of the health-climate-energy-agriculture-migration nexus. Climate change’s pervasive impact requires transcending traditional sector-specific interventions and embracing a comprehensive approach that recognises the relationships between sectors. Global, multisectoral agreements should increase accountability of high emitters, shift ownership to local levels, and promote all-encompassing policies that will catalyse and sustain action. For example, the employment of clean cooking solutions requires working across health-climate-energy sectors.

Additional comments:

• Investments support both AU initiatives such as the AU digital health strategy and the Africa CDC digital transformation strategy, as well as improved coordination and synergies between the numerous programmes already in existence.

• The new EU Global Health Strategy launched in November 2022 is complementary to the commitments included in the 6th EU-AU Summit. However, initially this new strategy caused concern of diverting both attention and funding away from Summit commitments.
Box 8: EU Global Health Strategy

There is strong alignment between the EU Global Health Strategy, the Global Gateway Investment Package, and the health commitments made at the 6th EU-AU Summit. The EU-AU Summit commitments on health focus on mobilising resources towards COVID-19 vaccine delivery and deployment, developing local manufacturing infrastructure for health products, and strengthening pandemic preparedness and health security. The EU Global Health Strategy focuses on ensuring better health for all in a changing world by focusing on the basics and supporting a new approach to global cooperation and partnerships. Enabling equitable access to quality primary healthcare, increasing domestic health financing, developing an adequate and balanced health workforce, addressing non-communicable diseases, and strengthening health research are shared priorities further outlined at the Summit and reinforced in the EU Global Health Strategy. Through the Global Gateway Investment Package, Europe has committed significant funding for emergency preparedness and response, building African domestic capacity to manufacture medical products, and continuing to combat communicable diseases such as AIDS, malaria, and hepatitis. Together, the EU Global Health Strategy and the Global Gateway Investment Package reinforce the majority of commitments made at the 6th EU-AU Summit.
Box 9: Clean Cooking Solutions at the nexus of Health, Climate, and Development

Access to clean cooking solutions is a health imperative. Ambitious commitments and concrete actions to achieve universal access to clean cooking are still lacking, despite presenting powerful levers to achieving human and ecosystem health, climate, gender and development goals.

To date, the level of political commitment and investment in clean cooking has not matched the global magnitude of the challenge. In fact, in Africa alone, this presents a $4 billion annual financing gap.

As 2030 approaches, the world remains far off track in its SDGs, including number 7 which commits to ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.

Nearly 1 billion people still lack access to modern cooking solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, and almost 500,000 Africans die prematurely due to household air pollution every year. Considering the annual toll on human health, forests, climate and local economies, clean cooking solutions should be central to national climate, health and development strategies.

Bold action must be taken by continental institutions and national political leaders to ensure the 900 million Africans that currently lack clean cooking solutions have the means to prepare food in a healthy, clean and affordable way, as well as to contribute to ecosystem recovery, regenerative livelihoods, cleaner air, and female empowerment.

At the 1st Africa Climate Summit in September 2023 in Nairobi, both Kenya and Sierra Leone announced the establishment of national clean cooking delivery units at presidential level, paving the way for other African countries to follow. These ‘delivery units’ would help shape funding and action where commitments exist, and promote the adoption of effective and robust policy frameworks.

The Summit also saw the launch of the Global eCooking Coalition (GeCCo), a joint initiative by the Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet (GEAPP), Modern Energy Cooking Services (MECS), Sustainable Energy for All (SEforALL) and Energising Development (EnDev), to advance the transition to electric cooking, underpinned by renewable energy sources.

At COP28, the African Union Development Bank (AfDB), International Energy Agency and Clean Cooking Alliance formed a new African Clean Cooking Consortium to drive forward country-level planning and programmes, catalyse investments and establish Delivery Units in an effort to achieve universal access to clean cooking on the continent within the next 10 years.

Furthermore, the AfDB committed to allocate up to 20% of its annual energy lending to clean cooking solutions, approximately $2 billion over the next decade, and the United Republic of Tanzania launched the African Women Clean Cooking Support Programme.

Europe and Africa should leverage progress made at the Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi and COP28 in Dubai to elevate the clean cooking agenda at both institutional and country levels, particularly given the concentrated efforts to better efficiency by bridging sector and finance silos. Thus the follow-up meetings to the COP28 Declaration on Health of diverse line-ministers may prove to be an interesting opportunity to drive the clean cooking agenda at ministerial level.
The AEF’s Health Strategy Group convenes experts and leading voices from both Africa and Europe to identify gaps and opportunities in health policy and policy implementation that can be addressed through a stronger Africa-Europe partnership.

Cooperation between the African Union and the European Union in the face of pandemics remains crucial. However, there are differences in position between many African countries and within the European Union and other European countries on critical issues such as the pandemic accord (WHO CA+) and language used in reference to sexual and reproductive health and rights. Continuous political transitions also present a challenge to sustained focus on critical global health issues that can be addressed by an Africa–Europe partnership. The AEF and its Health Strategy Group can bring continuity between administrations by providing member states and ministers with a ‘state of play’ on health issues in the multilateral context, including previously agreed positions and commitments.

The 6th Summit commitments made two years ago and AEF’s focus areas are still relevant, and provide a roadmap to address both the immediate challenges of pandemic and broader, long term health infrastructure needs. The geopolitical landscape continues to influence distribution and access to medical resources despite progress in building African self-reliance, domestic production capabilities, and regional collaboration. International cooperation and information sharing is crucial in addressing global health challenges, particularly between Africa and Europe, on which issues to elevate.

There is significant opportunity to integrate health into broader initiatives such as digital and climate. The Health Strategy Group underlined the timeliness of integration of digital solutions and technology into health systems including the importance of inserting health in the EU-Africa Digital Economy Task Force’s work. Digital health, particularly in a pandemic and green transition context, has transformative potential and could be one of the pillars of resilient global and local health systems. Further, gender and equity considerations in health, including ensuring equitable access to resources and support and in framing health policies and decisions, should be a basic component of integrated health initiatives.

Future health workforce observatory

Linked to progress towards SDG 3 and Universal Health Care by 2030, AEF Health Strategy Group has launched an initiative to establish a Health Workforce Observatory. This is intended to identify the competences and skills necessary for modern, data driven health care services. It will map the curricula and training pathways needed to ensure a strong pipeline of trained professionals, while also contributing to the reduction in brain drain.

The digital transition in healthcare will revolutionise the sector – creating bridges between the technology and health sectors is critical. A mapping of the necessary skills required for modern, digital and integrated health systems in both Africa and Europe for 2030 should be undertaken. Pathways to develop these skills need to be designed. This can help ensure continuous updating and upskilling for those in the health workforce, who do not come from a traditional biomedical education background.
Chapter 3: Science, Culture And Education

This chapter deals with the commitments outlined in the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: commitment 4 (scientific and technological cooperation, student, research and cultural exchanges, restitution of cultural assets and promotion of cultural heritage), commitment 5 (the Africa-Europe investment package for education - quality and safe education services, addressing learning gaps, and vocational education and training).
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Context:

• Africa-Europe cultural cooperation is very active but little of this is acknowledged at institutional level, resulting in relatively weak political support. Culture is consistently ranked a high priority in AEF’s youth platforms and dialogues (35% in #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultations consider ‘Cultural exchange and challenging misperceptions’ as a leading topic to enhance mutually beneficial Africa-Europe cooperation). However, to date, the Africa-EU partnership on culture is not a high-level or politically steered process. Rather, it is driven by organic actions of European and African artists.

• 6th Summit commitments are aligned with the priority areas in the AU Agenda 2063, with a focus on research, mobility, and skills development in line with current and future market needs, and with a strong element of e-learning. However, Summit commitments do not meet all funding requirements for the education sector. Existing pockets of excellence including universities across Africa are under enormous stress. The learning gap caused by the pandemic has undermined education efforts in Africa, with a resultant urgent need for strategies and funding during these times of fiscal tightening.

Examples of progress to date:

• Focus on Africa-Europe exchange on space technologies is increasing. The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security and Africa programme provides a framework for sustained cooperation between Europe and Africa in space science and technology, and earth observation. The launch of the African Space Agency in January 2023 was an important step to deepen cooperation, and leverage earth observation, especially in relation to climate and agri-food. A continued focus on space, including the roll-out of the EU-Africa Space initiative holds great potential for a strengthened partnership and cooperation as indicated by the first EU-AU Space dialogue in October 2023.
UNDERSTANDING SATELLITES AND SPACE APPLICATIONS

They can weigh from a few grams to several hundred kilograms and can cost anywhere from tens of thousands of dollars to millions of dollars. There are several types of satellites:

- **Telecommunications satellites** support communication irrespective of location and are typically used for television, radio, telephone, and internet.
- **Positioning satellites** provide positioning, navigation, and timing and data services; the best-known application of these satellites is for global positioning system (GPS) data.
- **Earth observation satellites**, and more particularly remote sensing satellites, provide images and data used for meteorology, cartography and environmental monitoring.

A Space application is an activity in which the use of signals or data from satellites can improve existing societal services or inform new services across public and private users.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural &amp; industrial disaster relief</th>
<th>Food security</th>
<th>Informing decent living conditions</th>
<th>Protection of health</th>
<th>Provision of education</th>
<th>Support for economic development</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responding to natural disasters e.g., floods, forest fires, locust epidemics; Monitoring and tracking desertification, cyclones, seabed pollution</td>
<td>Mapping of agricultural zones, water management; Measuring of social degradation, fishing</td>
<td>Regional planning, managing urban populations; Measuring air and other pollution</td>
<td>Mapping disease risk and outbreak; remote monitoring, and medical imaging; connectivity for telemedicine</td>
<td>Distance learning or tele-education</td>
<td>Transportation development; search for mineral resources; internet access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Graphic 3: Space observations and technologies**

Satellite space observations can improve existing societal services or inform new services across public and private users.

- **As an enabler for other areas**, digital solutions play a central role in the implementation of many of the initiatives across the different commitment areas. This ranges from digital skills and education (e.g. the Regional Teachers Initiative for Africa) to the development of green data centres as part of the green transition, or improved health access. As such, AU-EU digital cooperation has centred notably on Artificial Intelligence and the nexus between digital and space technology. At African national level there has been noticeable progress in the development of National Artificial Intelligence (AI) Policy, data governance, and implementation of Data Protection Rights in Rwanda, Ghana and Senegal, with the latter having developed and adopted a dedicated Data Strategy.
- **The most notable Africa-Europe cooperation within the space of digital innovation is the Digital for Development (D4D) Hub**. Launched in 2020, it has enjoyed considerable advances...
with 14 Member States participating in a Team Europe approach. However, unlike other areas covered by the Global Gateway, the EU’s digital cooperation still lacks a significant footprint in Africa. This may be due to China’s positioning as a key digital actor under the Digital Silk Road.

Potential areas of action:

• Enhancing visibility of cultural cooperation, which currently is largely ‘under the radar’, can encourage increased investment in those exchanges. With the new EU action on *Museums Cooperation* to be adopted in 2024 and the upcoming (currently under discussion) TEI initiative on *Cultural Cooperation*, there are opportunities to invest in this Africa-Europe partnership domain. Furthermore, with limited financial investments, giving more recognition to this dynamic area of cooperation can contribute to strengthening Africa-Europe relations beyond the area of culture and art.

• The 6th Summit commitments and Global Gateway have made skills development a critical element of the green transition agenda. Accelerating implementation of these commitments remains key, especially for youth entering the labour market. Reskilling and social safety nets can ensure that the green transformation will not undermine economic achievements and the status of local communities. Rather, they can contribute to accelerated development and job prospects. Standardisation of skills frameworks is critical, including a policy framework around equitable access to quality education. The African Continental Qualifications Framework (ACQF), a policy initiative underpinned by the AU Agenda 2063, will allow the comparability of qualifications across Africa so that young people can access work and study opportunities across borders. ACQF II forms part of the *Youth for Mobility for Africa* initiative under the Global Gateway placing various EU-supported initiatives under one umbrella.

• Accelerating investments in education and mobility between Africa and Europe and also between African states should be a priority. The recently adopted *AU-EU Innovation Agenda* provides a new framework for enhanced scientific, technological and innovation exchange between Africa and Europe. However, a strengthened focus on youth training and mobility should be mainstreamed across all areas of cooperation, as in the case of the *Youth Mobility for Africa*, a Global Gateway initiative aiming to increase strategic engagement between the EU and Africa in higher education and skills development. This would encourage building of social capital to support international policy frameworks such as the African Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Accelerated development and scale-up of Erasmus+ and ARISE-PP programmes holds large promise in this area of cooperation.

• Restitution of artifacts remains a critical issue, centrally embedded within Agenda 2063 (enshrined in Aspiration 5, and addressed by 2 out of 15 flagships). However, responsibility lies with Member States on both sides, hence negotiations only occur bilaterally between individual African states and specific European museums or governments. Europe’s possession of a vast collection of ancient African artifacts exceeds that of Africa and other regions. The launch of the Great African Museum presents an opportunity for enhanced cooperation in relation to the restitution of cultural artefacts, as well promotion of cultural exchanges.
EDUCATION, SKILLS, AND SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

### The Ten Commitments Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Main Commitments</th>
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</table>
| COMMITMENT 4: Scientific and technological cooperation, student, research and cultural exchanges, restitution of cultural assets and promotion of cultural heritage | I. Scientific cooperation and technology sharing  
II. Exchange programmes and partnerships between universities |
| COMMITMENT 5: The Africa-Europe Investment Package for Education (quality and safe education services, addressed learning gaps, and Vocational Education and Training) | III. Quality and safe education services and addressed learning gaps  
IV. Vocational Education and Training |

### I. Scientific cooperation and technology sharing

#### Examples of progress to date:

- Key initiatives include the EU *Earth Observation and Space Technologies; Regional Centres of Excellence*; and the AU-EU *Innovation Agenda*.

- The development of the *Earth Observation and Space Technologies* initiative has started. It has three components aiming at i) supporting the EU-AU Space Dialogue to improve the cooperation framework for space and innovation in Africa; including the newly established African Union Space Agency; ii) supporting the uptake of space data in the private sector, iii) fostering the development of space-based services in support to green transition.

- The *Africa-EU Space Partnership* programme, has seen progress with initial actions based on three components: 1. EU-Africa Space and Partnership; 2. Space and Green Transition – Focus on Early Warning; 3. Space and Private Sector.

- The initiative on *Regional Centres of Excellence* will provide scientific and technological support to the latter with the aim to improve their contributions to policy and decision-making processes, business development and other tailored services. All contracts have been signed and implementation is to start.

- The first Action to provide scientific and technical support to *Regional Centres of Excellence* in Sub-Saharan Africa in Green Transition areas (biodiversity and forest; water; oceans; agro-ecological and sustainable agri-food systems; climate and disaster resilience; and energy) is underway.

- The EU funded - and implemented by the Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (OACPS) *Research and Innovation Programme* - actions totalling EUR 60 million are ongoing since 2021 to unlock innovation potential and support transition into knowledge-based economies.

- The *Africa-EU Science4Refugees initiative* has been in operation since October 2015. It seeks to provide research and educational opportunities for refugees and disadvantaged children.
• The AU-EU Innovation Agenda was adopted in July 2023 by the AU and EU. This new strategic partnership aims to transform innovative capacities and achievements of researchers and innovators on both continents into tangible outputs, such as products, services, businesses and jobs. As part of the Global Gateway, with funding from EU programmes and NDICI-Global Europe, it represents the mainstay of Africa-Europe cooperation on Science, Technology and Innovation over the next decade.

• The EU-funded initiative African Research Initiative for Scientific Excellence Pilot Programme (ARISE-PP) strives to build individual and research teams’ capacities, provide institutional support, and increase the relevance and impact of research in Africa. Notably ARISE-PP focuses on AU-EU innovation agenda’s priorities: green transition, Innovation & Technology, Public Health, and Capacities for Science. It was set up to build scientific capacities in thirty-eight African countries by providing grants to early-career researchers.

• The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship African Outer Space Strategy aims to strengthen Africa’s use of outer space to bolster its development, with outer space critical to the development in all fields, such as agriculture, disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and finance, as well as defence and security. Key initiatives include:
  - Strengthening of the African Earth Observation (EO) System to improve management of the environment.
  - 4 geoportals to improve data access and knowledge management.
  - An environmental scan to identify cross-cutting areas among the four space segments: Satellite Communication; Navigation and Positioning; Astronomy; and Space Sciences.

• At least 2,000 people have been trained on Earth Observation, Satellite Communication, Navigation & Positioning, Space Science & Astronomy, and Space Regulatory Regimes.

• The AU has convened annual space dialogues with African space actors, with two reports and two baseline studies produced:
  - Priority areas of implementation by the African Outer Space Programme.
  - Study on Structural and Financial implications for African Space Agency.
  - Comprehensive Study on African Private Sector in Earth Observation, Geospatial and Allied Technologies.
II. Exchange programmes and partnerships between universities

Examples of progress to date:

- The EU Flagship Youth Mobility for Africa is a key initiative for encouraging youth mobility. This promotes mobility learning opportunities within Africa and between Africa and the EU, supports cooperation in higher education and skills development, and promotes Africa as a study destination. Operating at the regional level, as an umbrella initiative, with a budget of EUR 970 million from the EU, it encompasses the following programmes:
  - The **ERASMUS+** programme, promoting inclusive learning opportunities for young Africans through exchanges and targeted scholarships, and partnerships between higher education institutions. A total of EUR 570 million dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2021-2027 covers several actions such as International Credit Mobility, Capacity Building in Higher Education, Erasmus Mundus, Capacity Building in VET, and Virtual Exchanges in Higher Education and Youth.
  - The **African Continental Qualifications Framework (ACQF II)** launched in July 2023, supports the enabling of comparability of qualifications across Africa so that young people can access work and study opportunities beyond their own borders. The Qualifications Framework enhances regional integration, complementing instruments such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
  - Other programmes covered are the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme; Harmonisation of African Higher Education Quality Assurance and Accreditation (HAQAA3); the Young African Leaders Programme; and the forthcoming Africa-Europe Youth Academy.

III. Quality and safe education services and addressing learning gaps

Context:

- Education and skills are key pillars for Africa’s continued development as highlighted in the AU Agenda 2063. However, already existing pockets of excellence across the 54 countries in Africa, such as universities, are currently under enormous stress.
- One particular area of neglect across many African countries is digitalisation. This is despite a decrease in the digital divide in most countries: mobile phones are used in numerous, creative ways (e.g., for financial transactions) and digital tools have been developed and applied for e-learning. In terms of more sophisticated digital utility, however, Africa has yet to engage further with innovations including blockchain and artificial intelligence tools such as ChatGPT.

Examples of progress to date:

- Launched in January 2023, the **Regional Teachers Initiative for Africa** is a key Team Europe Initiative. It will invest EUR 100 million under the EU-Africa Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package to accelerate the training of new teachers for Sub-Saharan Africa, responding to its estimated need for 15 million new qualified teachers by 2030. It will focus on two areas: i) governance, management, and attractiveness of the teacher profession; and ii) professional development for teachers, with a focus on digital and green skills. The AU Commission is a strategic partner in collaboration with UNESCO and the International Teacher Task Force. The programme will support partner countries towards a more competent, motivated, and
inclusive teacher workforce that can improve learning outcomes and socio-emotional development of children in basic education.

- EUR 46 million Regional Teacher Facility, signed at the Global Gateway Forum in October 2023, will support implementation of the Regional Teachers Initiative for Africa helping develop and implement policies and provide education and professional development for teachers in Africa. The facility will be managed by Belgium, France and Finland.

- The Global Partnership for Education is a multilateral global programme to help transform education systems and ensure high quality basic education in partner countries. The EU, together with Team Europe partners, will contribute EUR 700 million between 2021 and 2027.

- The Youth Mobility for Africa new EU initiative includes an Erasmus+ component with 46 projects on Capacity Building in Higher Education involving 35 African countries in the pipeline.

- Additional initiatives, with EU support, include ongoing national programmes and actions focused on education and training in 43 countries in Africa.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Pan-African Virtual and E-University (PAVEU) aims to use ICT-based programs to increase access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa. This will be enacted by developing relevant and high-quality Open, Distance, and eLearning (ODeL) resources to offer students access to university from anywhere in the world and anytime. The project is an open, distance and e-learning arm of the Pan-African University (located in Yaoundé, Cameroon): 10 online courses, content and curricula have already been developed.
IV. Vocational Education and Training

Examples of progress to date:

- Key initiatives include EU Opportunity-Driven Skills and VET (OP-VET) in Africa and Regional Teachers Initiative for Africa.
- The TEI Opportunity-Driven Skills and VET (OP-VET) in Africa is a regional EU initiative that is expected to start in the first quarter of 2024. The EUR 75 million programme seeks to ensure orientation of VET interventions towards decent employment opportunities in selected sectors and value chains under the Global Gateway. This regional initiative is envisaged to be delivered by EU Member States (Belgium, Germany, Finland, France). It consists of three building blocks:
  - A request-based technical assistance facility to identify decent employment opportunities and related technical profiles in sectors and value chains aligned to Global Gateway priorities and to translate these findings in recommendations for VET provision that is responsive to identified employment opportunities;
  - Exposure to public-private partnerships on opportunity-driven VET at country and regional level;
  - A Competitive Funding Mechanism to finance regional/multi-country VET initiatives in support of (regional) value chains. Building blocks will complement programmes funded by EU and EU Member States at country level.
- The TEI OP-VET builds on the experiences of the VET Toolbox, a programme implemented in 11 African countries piloting VET provision catering to investment needs since 2020. It seeks to increase local benefits from (European) investments through VET and skills development.
- The TEI OP-VET is linked to the Erasmus+ programme ‘Capacity-building in the field of VET’.
- Experiences on capacity building of VET institutions in Sub-Sahara Africa – namely the orientation of VET provision in line with employment opportunities - will be used and disseminated within the TEI.
- Results of the Erasmus+ calls in 2022 and 2023 are positive, with 67 capacity building projects selected in the field of vocational education and training involving 23 Sub-Saharan African countries in 2022 and 21 in 2023. There will be annual calls until 2027.

Additional comments:

- The commitments are aligned with the priority areas of the AU Agenda 2063, hence designed to deliver on African priorities, notably on research and education mobility, skills development for current and future market needs, and e-learning.
CULTURAL COOPERATION

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II. Restitution of cultural assets and promotion of access to and protection of cultural heritage |

I. Culture, heritage, and artist exchanges

**Context:**
- Culture, heritage and restitution of cultural assets are important areas for the African Union and its Member States. Two Agenda 2063 flagships are dedicated to the thematic area enshrined in Aspiration 5: *Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity, Common Heritage, Values and Ethics*. The Final Declaration of the 6th Summit recognised this importance by including specific commitments and opening space for strengthened cooperation.

- Cultural and artistic exchanges most often happen organically. Various organisations such as cultural institutes, universities, think tanks, foundations, publishing houses and museums constantly handle cultural exchanges and conferences that do not involve the AU-EU institutions. However, they play a significant part in establishing cultural bonds between Africa and the EU. Among the institutional actors, various organisations that form part of the EU Member States National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) network are implementing the 2022 Summit commitment; currently without involvement from AU institutions.

- While there is considerable financial and non-financial support from Member States and regional institutions, no central registry exists that aggregates and reports on art and cultural activities.

**Examples of progress to date:**
- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Encyclopaedia Africana strives to provide an authoritative resource on the authentic history of Africa and African life. The project, initiated in 1962, was adopted as Agenda 2063 flagship during the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan. It does not have agreed targets for 2023. So far, the project has published three volumes of the Encyclopaedia Africana.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Great African Museum (GMA) seeks to showcase, protect and promote the rich cultural heritage of the continent. The flagship was conceived in 2016 and added to the First Ten-Year Implementation Plan with no agreed target for 2023. The Museum, in a temporary site, was launched in June 2023. An estimated $57 million are required for its implementation.

- EU projects for cultural exchanges and protection, and promotion of cultural heritage, are implemented in Togo, Mozambique, Mali, and Sudan. In addition, through the *European Spaces of Culture* programme, which has been running from 2019, the EU and member states promote cultural exchanges and cooperation in Angola, Kenya, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Benin, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Tanzania and South Africa.
European countries - Germany, Spain, Italy, France and others - have national cultural institutions in African capitals that arrange cultural exchanges.

The EU plans to establish a Cultural Cooperation Hub in 2024 to facilitate cooperation, co-production and mobility of artists between Africa and the EU. It will also support regional cooperation on culture in Southern and Western Africa.

**Box 10: Cultural engagement between Africa and EU**

Monitoring and reporting on cultural exchanges and heritage issues (including returning artefacts) is a complex issue with a multitude of stakeholders, many informal; thus, many successful activities remain “under the radar” either because they are quite episodic and happen on a small-scale, or because crucially the main funding comes from different pools. As an example, an exchange involving no formal or political stakeholders, was of Nuraddin Farah’s visit to Norway on 28th of September 2023. The famous Somali author, resident in South Africa, was invited to Oslo for a series of readings and debates. This was widely advertised as one of the most exciting literary events of the year - causing a stir in the significant Norwegian community of Somali-Origin.

**Examples of EU-Africa conferences on art and culture in 2022-2023:**

- “Art beyond Politics: Africa and the “other” Europe during the cold war” conference, May 2022 at the Vilnius Academy of Arts, Lithuania.
- 1st Deconfining hybrid Conference (Deconfining Arts, Culture & Policies in Europe & Africa), September 2023 at the Goethe-Institute Madrid, Spain.
- Africa Meets Europe: A forum for Young Leaders (AME), October 2023 at The Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, Berlin, Germany.
II. Restitution of cultural assets and promotion of access to and protection of cultural heritage

Context:
- Restitution of artifacts remains a critical issue. Europe's possession of a vast collection of ancient African artifacts exceeds that of Africa and other regions. Notably, American museums house a mere 50,000 African items, while European counterparts showcase much larger numbers — Belgium's Royal Museum for Central Africa has 180,000, Germany's Ethnological Museum holds 75,000, France's Quai Branly Museum possesses nearly 70,000, the British Museum exhibits 73,000, and the Netherlands' National Museum of World Cultures has 66,000.

Examples of progress to date:
- The AU has been developing a Framework for Action on the Negotiations for the Return/Restitution of Illicitly Trafficked Cultural Property from the Continent, which will provide a common framework for Africa to address the return and restitution of cultural artefacts.
- France and Germany started the process of restitution with President Macron's 2019 announcement to return 26 pieces to Benin, and Germany's return of over 1,100 artefacts of significance. These actions have been noted on the African continent.

Potential areas of action:
- There is an opportunity to make considerable progress on Africa-EU relations through increased political momentum for restitution. The issue of “decolonising” European museums has been an ongoing concern since the era of African independence. Beside regional discussions, negotiations occur bilaterally between individual African states and specific European museums or governments. The process of return of priceless artefacts, like cultural exchange, is complex and often requiring granular negotiations that take considerable time.
Chapter 4: Sustainable Finance

This chapter aggregates the following commitment areas as outlined in the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: commitment 2 (facilitation of economic recovery through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, reallocation of SDRs, and increased spending through international programmes), commitment 3 (combating Illicit Financial Flows, addressing domestic tax base erosion and profit sharing, and cooperating on tax transparency), commitment 7 (implementation of the Investment Package through public funds and innovative financing, and boosting regional and continental economic integration).
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Examples of progress to date:

- The new Team Europe Initiative on combating Illicit Financial Flows is a positive development. While a dedicated initiative on this key commitment shows noteworthy progress in the area, it remains vital to ensure a broad approach that captures different types of illicit flows which require bespoke responses. Focus should also be put on unblocking the funding available to AfDB under the IFFs recovery fund ($55 million initially). Current EU-funded initiatives largely focus on the origin (Africa) of the IFF transaction. Effective combatting of IFFs will not only require the strengthening of public administration and governance systems in Africa. It also requires that full advantage be taken of the financial administration systems in Europe, which have the capacity and resources to move faster and further to ensure transparency and accountability in financial flows, therefore acknowledging the role that the destination of IFF transactions (such as Europe) play in the outflow of African capital.

- The recent joint impetus given to carbon markets at the 1st Africa Climate Summit and at COP28 is an important development, key to leverage climate finance and trigger socio-economic and environmental benefits. On both occasions, European Commission President Von der Leyen delivered speeches inviting African partners to work jointly on deepening a platform for carbon principles, carbon understanding, and to identify the infrastructure needed to broaden the scope of the partnership. There is an Africa-Europe opportunity to build on this momentum to jointly advance on effective and ambitious global carbon pricing and true carbon credits, and accelerate joint efforts in support of the rollout of national carbon market activation plans.

- Although the EU remains the main development partner for Africa and globally, there are growing misgivings in Africa around Europe’s commitment when it comes to financing development on the continent. Recent ODA rise appears to be mainly due to in-country costs associated with donors hosting refugees from the war in Ukraine. In 2022, net ODA to sub-Saharan Africa decreased by 7.8% in real terms. This followed unprecedented investment in 2021, representing an increase of 4.3% on the previous year in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. While Africa still receives the largest share from European Development Finance Institutions (EUR 3.6 billion in new commitments in 2022), this represents a 5% decrease from 2021, as the EDFIs focus on climate finance (+45%). Whatever the political statements, there is a nagging feeling that there is indeed a trade-off between climate and development.

Graphic 5: Financial flows to/from Africa

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<td>-100</td>
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Potential areas of action:

- **Effective combatting of Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) requires increased political will on both sides.** While this critical topic was included as a central commitment in the Summit’s Final Declaration, joint action on this agenda remains limited. Both Africa and Europe are suffering damaging social and political impacts of IFFs. While Europe is responsible for a significant source of risk, and acts as a destination of IFFs from Africa, it also has the tools and systems available to meaningfully address IFFs quickly. Focus should be put on practical steps to implement recommendations of the 2015 Mbeki High-Level Panel on IFFs.

- **Carbon pricing and markets are part of a set of solutions to unlock climate finance and ramp-up climate action, complementary to other policies to achieve the objectives of the Paris Agreement.** As Africa builds the quality and integrity of its market, there are opportunities for Africa-Europe collaboration at each stage of development. This includes time-sensitive strategic alignment to ensure Africa’s contribution to the development of metrics and processes for the operationalisation of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, as well as technical and capacity building to lay the foundation for fair market access as the EU gets closer to its net-zero objectives, including through investments in infrastructure, local value chains, skills and governance structures.

- **Increased efforts by EU countries to reallocate special drawing rights (SDRs) are welcomed but more actions are needed to deliver this finance,** such as joint pressure to address the blockage in the US Congress to unlock the flow of funds. However, the current average of EU Member States’ SDR reallocations (25%) – skewed upwards thanks to strong pledges made by Spain and France at 50% and 40% respectively - puts the bloc below more ambitious commitments from high-income countries, such as Japan, Australia, China and Saudi Arabia (pledging 40%, 39%, 34% and 29% of their respective SDR allocations). Africa and Europe should in the meantime put joint emphasis behind the African Development Bank’s (AfDB) proposal to recycle SDRs using a hybrid capital instrument. This will allow them to be leveraged at a 1:4 ratio on capital markets to issue bonds and mobilise additional concessional lending funds. COP28 saw France commit to support a similar instrument through a form of
a guarantee, as European regulations do not allow direct financing of MDBs through SDRs, with Spain indicating its willingness to further explore such modality. Continued effort should be placed on recycling at least 30% of national SDR allocations and channelling them to the AfDB in priority – which, for the EU, needs identifying a working solution with the ECB to preserve the monetary financing prohibition regulations, for example through SDR-denominated bonds – with increased focus on the use of reallocated SDRs.

• Focus and speed to provide debt relief for debt stressed countries remains a critical issue and requires enhanced attention. The financial condition of African states is significantly worsening, impacting on its ability to delivery on national and continental priorities across key sectors of development including climate adaptation, health and education. Africa is borrowing at a cost up to 8 times higher than the richer nations and is paying a 500% premium on capital market borrowing compared to those available through the World Bank. From January 2022 to March 2023, African currencies lost 8% of their value, increasing their debt by 10% of GDP. By 2024 it is estimated that Africa will pay a total of $74 billion to service its external borrowing (medium and long-term requirements due). There has been progress on debt, including commitments made at COP28 by the World Bank, European Investment Bank and African Development Bank and other institutions to expand climate-resilient debt clauses in their lending; but these remain band-aid solutions if the cost of capital is not addressed.

• African risk assessment is more and more challenged by African countries, as unrealistic and unfair. There could be an opportunity to join forces to organise a conversation with the 3 Big rating agencies, to better understand their criteria and process, and potentially challenge it. At COP28, Fitch Ratings indicated their intention to consider revisions to credit rating criteria for loans to ensure use of climate-resilient debt clauses does not impose a burden for borrower countries. Simultaneously, knowledge sharing and technical capacity building within the international community can support borrower countries to improve data reporting in national statistics offices and central banks, so as to minimise issues of transparency an reliability in risk assessment.

• There is scope to strengthen involvement of additional actors in delivery on commitments, including business and philanthropy. Privileging blended finance options, leveraging pension funds and focusing on domestic capital mobilisation all remain critical for accelerated implementation of the ‘Joint Vision’. A shift from a focus on Official Development Assistance towards long-term co-investment in Africa’s growth, by public-private investment in Africa’s infrastructure and industrialisation is key.

• The AU is still heavily reliant on external contributors. As of 2022, the AU relied on external contributions for 66% of its total annual budget (in particular the EU which contributes over 50% of the AU’s budget), with 31% coming from Member State contributions and the remaining 3% from administrative and reserve funds. While the EU’s 2022 budget was $180 billion, the AU’s budget for the same year was $650 million. With 27 member states in the EU vs 55 member states in the AU (currently reduced to 49 with the suspension of Gabon, Niger, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Mali following recent coups) and a population less than three times that of Africa, the EU has a budget 276 times bigger than the AU. Leveraging domestic African funding remains a key priority.

• The COP28 Declaration on the Global Climate Finance Framework, and related expert taskforces, should be monitored and see immediate follow-up, for example at the 2024 IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings. This Declaration lays out the key principles for a financial architecture to deliver on climate and achieve the Paris agreement
goals. Unlike other Declarations launched at COP28, such as on Health and Agriculture which were endorsed by over 100 countries, it was only endorsed by 13 countries, including France, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, and Senegal. The recommended actions outlined include:

- delivering on past commitments with continuity (e.g. annual $100 billion, doubling adaptation finance, replenishment of the Green Climate Fund, financing the Loss and Damage Fund);
- freeing up fiscal space (e.g. through wider use of climate-resilient debt clauses, debt-for-climate swaps, additional SDR rechannelling, and an ambitious 2025 replenishment of the International Development Association - IDA);
- widening sources of concessional financing (e.g. through global philanthropies, taxation mechanisms, emissions pricing, and the implementation of MDB capital adequacy framework recommendations and their mobilisation of private capital via risk-sharing instruments).

• Focus on quality data to ensure transparency and accountability in climate finance and build trust between actors. This means working with the OECD and UNFCCC to set clear definitions for what climate finance encompasses, and address reporting issues and standardise practices, including through the timely publication of data, reporting both committed and disbursed resources, and undergoing independent audits. A new study by the ONE Campaign found that nearly two-thirds of climate finance commitments aren't recorded as disbursed (e.g. Nigeria received 76%, or $4.5 billion, less and Senegal 66%, or $2.8 billion, less than they was promised between 2013 and 2021) or have little to do with climate (e.g. being diverted to other initiatives). Between 2013 and 2021, this amounted to $343 billion in misrepresented finance. In addition, the study showed 58% of all climate finance disbursed to the most indebted countries between 2019 and 2021 was in the form of loans.
DEBT TREATMENT AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The Ten Commitments Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMITMENT 2: Facilitation of economic recovery through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (CFDT), reallocation of SDRs, and increased spending through international programmes</th>
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Main Commitments

I. Supporting the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative and new allocation of SDRs

Context:

- The macroeconomic conditions, including currency devaluations, adverse risk rating assessments and a need for greater access to additional international finance is precipitating a worrying debt crisis in Africa. As of August 2023, the IMF listed 39 PRGT-eligible African countries, rating their risk of debt distress. For 17 countries this risk was ‘moderate’ and for 13 countries it was ‘high’ (Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Sudan). Of the 10 countries listed as in debt distress, 8 are in Africa (Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe). Compared to November 2022 data, Mauritania downgraded from ‘high’ to ‘moderate risk’, Chad and Mozambique downgraded from ‘in distress’ to ‘high risk’, while Ghana joined the list of countries in debt distress as of May 2023.

- Dynamic increase in interest rates, and the fact that most of African debts are detained in foreign currency, have significant impact on Africa’s ability to service its foreign debts. From January 2022 to March 2023, African currencies lost 8% of their value, increasing their debt by 10% of GDP. By 2024 it is estimated that Africa will pay a total of $74 billion to service its external borrowing (medium and long-term requirements due).

- In 2022, public debt of Africa reached USD 1.8 trillion. That is close to Spain’s current level of public debt estimated at USD 1.66 trillion. In contrast, the EU’s overall public debt reached USD 13.2 trillion, with the latest data from March 2023 showing further increase to USD 14.6 trillion. Even as 23 countries in the region now face unsustainable debt burdens, very few have defaulted. Only two states – Ghana and Zambia – stopped servicing their external debts, while three others have sought to restructure their obligations – Chad, Ethiopia, and Malawi. To avoid debt default, African finance ministers opt instead to cut spending on public services. This undermines long-term development strategies and puts in jeopardy any impact of global investments in Africa that rely on strengthened public sector role.

Examples of progress to date:

- The September 2023 G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration re-emphasised “the importance of addressing debt vulnerabilities in low- and middle-income countries in an effective, comprehensive and systematic manner.” Leaders called for “continued discussion
on policy-related issues linked to the implementation of the Common Framework to ensure it is further operationalised in a “predictable, timely, orderly and coordinated manner.” They welcomed progress in the formation of an official creditor committee for Ghana and called for swift debt treatment in Ethiopia, while stressing the need to “continue working towards enhancing debt transparency” through creditor data sharing with multilateral institutions.

The June 2023 Summit for a New Global Financing Pact saw progress on the Common Framework, with Zambia reaching a $6.3 billion debt restructuring deal with official creditors after waiting for over two years. “These delays reflect the problems that motivated the creation of the Common Framework in the first place”, including complex coordination among creditors and country institutions. The Common Framework has yet to give economies enough breathing room at the scale and speed required. The Paris Summit saw the IMF acknowledge the need to accelerate debt restructuring, making it predictable and timely, agreeing to greater clarity on processes and timelines, as well as the need for debt service payment suspensions during negotiation periods. The European Commission voiced similar recommendations in support of improving the Common Framework, including granting standstill of debt service payments during negotiations and setting predictable timelines for the formation of creditor committees and provision of financing assurances by creditors.

Continued progress was seen on Zambian debt at the World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings in October 2023, with the agreement of a MoU between Zambia and its bilateral creditors, including China and France. Terms of the restructuring include an “average extension of debt maturities of more than 12 years, with interest rates set at 1% during the next 14 years and up to 2.5% after that.” As a result, over the next decade, Zambia will pay approximately $750 million to official creditors, compared to $6.3 billion before the restructuring agreement was reached. Official creditors and bondholders agreed to the restructuring on the condition that the IMF would review the health of Zambia’s economy in a few years; and should it have recovered sufficiently, increase repayments. However, in November 2023, the country faced yet another setback when official creditors rejected a preliminary deal to rework $3 billion in bonds over the view that it may not offer comparable debt relief.

In January 2024 Ethiopia joined Zambia and Ghana in the list of countries that have defaulted on their debt, after the country failed to pay a $33 million bond coupon on a Eurobond. With a pattern of unrelenting debt stress, leaders from Kenya, Colombia and France announced the launch of a Global Expert Review on Debt, Nature and Climate at COP28. This coalition is tasked to independently review the impacts of sovereign debt on climate action. Furthermore MDBs and international institutions announced a new global taskforce to scale-up debt-for-nature swaps, while a number of actors made new commitments to expand Climate-Resilient Debt Clauses in their lending. For example, the UK announced the first ever climate-resilient debt clause to Senegal, the first in Africa. The World Bank announced it will start offering these clauses in existing loans, which will pause debt as well as interest for two years in the event of a natural disaster; and the AfDB, EBRD and AFD announced plans to integrate these clauses in sovereign loan agreements. Seventy-three countries called on donors to expand the use of these clauses by 2025 – a tangible tool when close to 1 in 2 debt-distressed countries paid more in debt than they received in climate financing.

Good progress has been made on the 2021 commitment to re-channel $100 billion worth in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to lower-income countries. As of October 2023, EU Member States have together pledged $35.4 billion, equivalent on average to 25% of their allocation (140.4 $ billion) – 50% for Spain,
and 40% for France. This stands below more ambitious commitments from high-income countries, such as Japan, Australia, China and Saudi Arabia (pledging 40%, 39%, 34% and 29% of their respective SDR allocations). The total rechannelling currently amounts to approximately $86 billion, not including the $21 billion pledge from the United States still blocked by Congress.

- Countries primarily channel their SDRs through two IMF trust funds: the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) and the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST). The PRGT operates through both loan and subsidy resources, requiring a sizeable amount of the latter - around SDR 3.5 billion to keep up with the rising interest rates and facilitate the zero-interest loans. 17 EU Member States have provided grants to the PRGT subsidy account, for a total amount of about $490 million. The EU itself, which holds no SDRs, has complemented the overall effort by granting EUR 100 million to the PRGT subsidy account and contributed EUR 50 million to support the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) and the development of EBID’s trade finance activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU Country</th>
<th>Total SDR allocation (in $ billions)</th>
<th>Percent of total allocation pledged</th>
<th>Pledged SDRs (in $ billions)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4.67</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27.35</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>10.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>36.13</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20.44</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>4.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>2.41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>12.94</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6.02</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$140.40bn</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$35.4bn</td>
</tr>
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Note: This table is based on a SDR-USD exchange rate from Oct. 29, 2021. Based on public data as of October 2023.
Source: ONE Data Dive, [https://data.one.org/data-dives/sdr/](https://data.one.org/data-dives/sdr/)
The Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) is tasked with providing long-term affordable financing to support countries in building resilience to longer-term challenges, including climate change and pandemic preparedness.

At the Summit for a New Global Financing Pact in June 2023, IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva announced a commitment to increase the capacity of the fund by 50%, from approximately $40 billion to $60 billion, citing the increased demand with “40 countries expressing interest.”

As of January 2024, 16 countries have formally requested support from the Trust, and all have been approved. Only eight have received disbursements, of which three in Africa – Rwanda, Senegal, and Seychelles.

Potential areas of action:

- Multilateral development banks (MDBs) have emerged as an attractive option to channel SDRs given their capacity to leverage these reserve assets on capital markets to issue bonds and mobilise additional concessional loans. It is currently estimated that Africa will require $1.3 trillion annually to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. The African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Inter-American Development Bank have put forward a proposal to use SDRs as part of a hybrid capital instrument, generating a multiplier effect that would raise three to four times the value of the loaned SDRs. The AfDB is seeking an initial contribution of SDR 2.5 billion (equally split between five contributing countries at SDR 500 million each) to operationalise the project; but while a few countries have expressed interest, limited progress has been made due to legal constraints, thus meaning the EU considers, in accordance with its Treaties, only countries outside of the EU can contribute. However, COP28 may have marked a turning point, with IMF staff confirming the reserve asset status of SDRs being rechannelled through MDBs, and signalling their readiness to bring the SDR hybrid capital proposal to the IMF’s Executive Board in the near future. Additionally, the Governments of France, Japan, and Spain expressed support for the hybrid instrument, with France voicing its readiness to provide a guarantee through the Liquidity Support Agreement, which underpins the instrument and ensures contributing countries can still account for SDRs as reserves. Given the scale of challenges faced, efforts must be ramped up to find solutions that support the African Development Bank’s proposal to leverage SDRs through a hybrid capital instrument and increase highly concessional loans. The Government of Brazil has already confirmed these efforts would form part of their G20 presidency agenda in 2024, providing a platform to further their operationalisation.

- December 2023 also marked the mid-term review of the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA), its
concessional financing arm exclusively for the lowest-income countries. Its last replenishment raised a record $93 billion; and World Bank President Ajay Banga has called on countries to make the upcoming 21st replenishment, which will be launched in early 2024, even larger given growing demands. Looking ahead, the Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group of Finance Ministers has backed calls for IDA contributions to be tripled by 2030.

RESOURCES MOBILISATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Ten Commitments Framework</th>
<th>Main Commitments</th>
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</table>
II. Addressing domestic tax base erosion and profit sharing, and cooperating on tax transparency |
| COMMITMENT 7: Implementation of the Investment Package through public funds and innovative financing, and boosting regional and continental economic integration | III. Leveraging public funds to stimulate private investment by mobilising innovative financing instruments  
IV. Promote accountable, transparent, inclusive and responsive governance, in conformity with the relevant international instruments  
V. Use all means of implementation, including ODA and financial tools such as infrastructure trusts and capital market instruments, to ensure support to African entrepreneurship in engaging in strong and vibrant economies. International and national financing development institutions, including the European Investment Bank, and the African Development Bank, and public/private partnerships will be mobilised to this effect  
VI. Continue our work to leverage and facilitate transparent remittances, including the reduction of transaction costs, for the development of national and local economies |
| COMMITMENT 2: Facilitation of economic recovery through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (CFDT), reallocation of SDRs, and increased spending through international programmes | (cont. V.) Ensuring increased spending through international programmes to facilitate economic recovery (health, climate, biodiversity, education and security) and examine lending instruments for sustainable investment projects in priority sectors |

I. Combating Illicit Financial Flows

Context:
- The AU has actively highlighted the risks of IFFs for over a decade, while combatting IFFs has been at the core of the EU action to support Domestic Resource Mobilisation and notably the EU Collect More, Spend Better Strategy. The 2015 Mbeki Report of the AU/
ECA High-Level Panel on IFFs from Africa has provided detailed recommendations and identified actions needed to address the commercial component (trade mispricing, transfer pricing, and profit shifting), the criminal component and the corrupt component of the IFFs. It has also highlighted the role of the AU and regional cooperation as well as the need for international collaboration, noticeably with the EU. However, to date, few of the report’s recommendations have been implemented.

Examples of progress to date: 

- A EUR 450 million Team Europe Initiative on Combating IFFs and Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) is expected to be launched in 2024, as an essential complement to other global efforts to ensure accountable, transparent, inclusive, and responsive governance. This TEI will directly contribute to the UN 2030 Agenda (target 16.4) aiming to “significantly reduce illicit financial flows and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organised crime” by 2030. Moreover, it is a contribution to the Addis Ababa Action Agenda which aims to substantially curb illicit financial flows from tax evasion, tax avoidance and other harmful tax practices, as well as money laundering and corruption.

- Key initiatives include:
  - Launched in January 2023, the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism in Eastern, Southern, Central Africa and Yemen project of EUR 5 million over two years.
  - EUR 20.15 million for the EU Global Facility on CFT AML (National anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing).

- A EUR 10.3 million Multi Donor Action with the African Union, the European Commission, Finland and Germany at the continental level, including a regional project Fighting Illicit Financial Flows in Africa on tax motivated IFFs.

- In complement, EU and African countries are also part of the Addis Tax Initiative (ATI) joining efforts to combat tax motivated illicit financial flows under the Declaration 2025. It also takes place under the EU Collect More, Spend Better Agenda which is a comprehensive agenda to support African countries build capacity in international taxation, domestic revenue mobilisation, public finance management and debt.

Potential areas of action:

- The current EU-funded initiatives largely focus on the origin (Africa) of the IFF transaction. Without concerted efforts to address at the same time the destination (often Europe) for those transactions, achieving intended, and large scale, results remain a significant challenge. Ensuring EU external action initiatives are complemented through EU domestic policies will be critical to make significant progress.

- Combatting large-scale and sophisticated criminality requires robust governance systems and processes in place. Thus, it will require strengthening public administration and governance systems in Africa. At the same time, it should take full advantage of the financial administrations in Europe that have the capacity and resources to move faster and further. Enhanced cooperation and coordination between the administrations in Africa and Europe will be necessary to see significant progress. Fundamentally, designing new initiatives should ensure the IFFs are treated as a joint problem across both continents.
In Focus: Update from the AEF Working Group on IFFs

A shared problem between developed and developing countries, curbing the estimated annual illicit capital flight of $88.6 billion from Africa matches half of the continent’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) financing gap. Essential to addressing IFFs are good governance, greater political will, and the successful recovery and return of stolen assets.

The UNECA High-Level Panel (HLP) on IFFs’s 2015 seminal report provided the blueprint for global actors to effectively tackle IFFs and unlock domestic resources to finance African development needs during periods of fiscal tightening and debt crises. However, it had not received proper attention until the 6th Summit, where joint actions were presented to reaffirm a commitment to jointly combat IFFs.

With four broad categories of IFFs (tax and commercial practices, illegal markets, theft and terrorism financing, and corruption), as well as disjointed definitions and methods used to define IFFs, a multilateral approach can help address this problem more effectively. At the centre of the conversation are tax policies and actions to implement such as: voluntary disclosures, exchange of information (EOI) mechanisms, and stringent offshore inquiries. The 2023 Tax Transparency in Africa report provides a comprehensive overview of how such measures implemented between 2009 and 2022 resulted in African countries effectively boosting their tax revenues, interest, and penalties. This positive trend conveys how stepping up efforts within the continent has changed the tax transparency landscape in such a way that successful domestic resource mobilisation is on the horizon.

Still, Africa cannot lead this fight alone. Destination countries for these illegal outflows play a role in curbing IFFs by ensuring that their national and local jurisdictions do not facilitate the flow of IFFs. Not only the European Union or the United States of America, but also entities such as the United Nations (and its Tax Committee), the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the World Customs Organization, the G20, and other relevant organisations must contribute to ensure a cohesive, global approach. This aspect of the IFFs debate has since entered a new era, with the status quo now being challenged.

Since 2022, a long-running campaign for a UN body to replace the OECD as the “global rule-maker on tax” has continued to build steam as African countries call for a more inclusive and comprehensive negotiation process for a global UN Convention on Tax. With concerns among the OECD and its members (including some EU Member States) that the creation of a UN Tax Convention would be “a needless duplication of the OECD’s work on tax transparency”, the Africa Group, China, and the Group of 77, remain firm that the needs and priorities of developing countries are not yet addressed in the OECD’s Inclusive Framework guidance. The EU and Member States have engaged in negotiating the options presented in the UN Secretary-General’s report on the global tax, advocating for Option 3 seen as less duplicating OECD work.

IFFs as a global issue will require open dialogues, which can only be realised with a balanced Africa-Europe partnership. With aims to foster an inclusive platform, the Africa-Europe Foundation’s new working group on IFFs launched in September 2023 seeks pragmatic, solutions-oriented approaches to build on the aspirations of the HLP Report.
II. Addressing domestic tax base erosion and profit sharing, and cooperating on tax transparency

**Examples of progress to date:**

- **Africa Initiative** was launched in 2014 by the African members of the OECD’s Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax. African membership of the Initiative has grown to 33 countries in 2021. This initiative has resulted in nearly 2,000 African officials being trained which has resulted in a 26% increase in information requests. Since its launch in 2014, nine African countries have “identified or recovered EUR 233 million in additional revenue” via Exchange of Information Requests (EOIRs).

- EU provided a EUR 5M contribution to the implementation of the **G20/OECD Base erosion and profit shifting action plan (BEPS)/Inclusive Framework**, in line with the Addis Tax Initiative principles.

- In late 2023, the EU extended its global contribution to the OECD Global Forum, aiming to provide relevant technical assistance and capacity building in partner countries. Examples of such programmes include a EUR 2 million contribution by the EC to the Africa Initiative, for a BEPS and transparency standards programme in West Africa, implemented jointly with ECOWAS, its 15 member countries and Mauritania.

**Potential areas of action:**

- Domestic resources are the largest and most important source of financing for development but are often limited by governments’ ability to raise tax revenues due to capacity constraints of tax administration. Tackling complex international tax arrangements, which divert profits that are otherwise liable for corporate tax, requires skilled tax auditors. Through the avenues of international cooperation, such as the Oslo Dialogue and OECD’s Task Force on Tax Crimes and Other Crimes (TFTC), improved co-operation between tax and law enforcement agencies, including anti-corruption and anti-money laundering authorities, can contribute to counter financial crimes more effectively addressing some of the domestic capacity constraints. Governments should also take full benefit of available international schemes that promote upskilling of tax auditors through exchange of practices, such as the OECD/UNDP Tax Inspectors Without Borders programme. It facilitates expert audit assistance in areas such as transfer pricing; thin capitalisation; advance pricing agreements; anti-avoidance rules; consumption taxes (e.g. VAT, GST); high net-worth individuals; pre-audit risk assessment and case selection; audit investigatory techniques; and industry-specific or sector-specific issues. Since 2022, it has expanded its services to provide practical hands-on assistance on criminal tax investigation. The programme delivered a total of $ 1.7 billion in additional tax collected and $ 3.9 billion in additional tax assessed across Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

- 2021 OECD report “Developing Countries and the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS: OECD Report for G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” considers the priorities and capacities of developing countries and examines ways for increased domestic resource mobilisation, among others, outlining how developing countries could better benefit from the international tax reform. The subsequent Roadmap, published in 2022 and updated in 2023, provides a reference for tangible actions to address constraints in resource mobilisation.
III. Leveraging public funds to stimulate private investment by mobilising innovative financing instruments

Context:

• Several components of the current EU multi-annual financial framework (the MFF, the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027) mobilise the necessary resources to deliver on the Global Gateway Investment Package commitments valued at EUR 300 billion, of which EUR 150 billion is earmarked for Africa. The main components include:
  o Heading 6, the Neighbourhood, Development Cooperation and International Cooperation Instrument (NDCCI) - Global Europe, specifically, its financial arm, the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), which will make available up to EUR 135 billion for guaranteed investments in infrastructure projects between 2021 and 2027 globally.
  o Up to EUR 18 billion will be made available as grants from the EU budget.
  o European financial and development finance institutions have planned investment volumes of up to EUR 145 billion.

• Due to increased inflation, funding for key thematic programmes took a hit during COVID-19, and overall funds reduced due to the frontloading of resources in the MFF in 2021 and 2022, meaning funding amounts would gradually decrease in the following years despite growing challenges. In response, the European Parliament requested a comprehensive revision of the multiannual financial framework to take place in 2023 to ensure the continued resilience and flexibility of the EU budget.

Examples of progress to date:

• Given the original MFF was agreed before the global economy was impacted by multiple crises (COVID-19 pandemic, war in Ukraine, sovereign debt distress), civil society organisations have been advocating for increased funding for external action and more robust flexibility instruments in order to better respond to the domino effects of an inflation, energy and climate crisis. In June 2023, the European Commission released its proposal for the MFF revision: a total increase of EUR 66 billion, including an additional EUR 10.5 billion to be allocated to Heading 6 - Neighbourhood and the World, of which 75% would go to migration and EUR 3 billion to the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). Likewise, proposals to top-up special instruments that ensure the flexibility of the EU budget, included EUR 2.5 billion for the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) and EUR 3 billion for the Flexibility Instrument. In September 2023, the Budget Committee of the European Parliament also set out its position, proposing a EUR 1 billion top-up of Heading 6, a EUR 1 billion top-up of the NDICI, a EUR 2 billion top-up of the SEAR instrument and a EUR 3 billion top-up of the Flexibility Instrument - all of which are in addition to the original proposal of the European Commission.

• The MFF revision was supposed to be agreed to at the European Council meetings of 14-15 December 2023, but was blocked by Hungary. Member State negotiations continue in January 2024. As it stands, the deal would slash the new funding for external action proposed by the European Commission, and supported by the Parliament, with migration management being prioritised instead.

• In October 2023 at the Global Gateway Forum, the European Commission and KfW signed an agreement for the EUR 100 million African Local Currency Bond guarantee programme, which aims to enhance access to long-term financing in local currency for African businesses and mobilise further EUR 820 million in private investment by 2027.
The programme’s main aim is to drive down financing costs, support market transparency and foster the development of capital markets in partner countries. It is part of the European Fund for Sustainable Development plus (EFSD+).

**Potential areas of action:**

- Once the current MFF revision is agreed, negotiations for the next EU long-term budget will commence in 2025, covering the years 2028 to 2034. At a time of political change, following the 2024 European Elections which will bring in a new Parliament and College of Commissioners as well as the new African Union Commission leadership, the Africa-Europe partnership stakeholders should already mobilise to help secure a long-term budget that supports the realisation of joint programmes and priorities by providing strategic foresight for the post-2030 agenda.

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**In Focus: Update from the AEF Working Group on Carbon Markets**

Carbon pricing and markets are part of the set of solutions to unlock large resources for attracting climate finance and ramping-up climate action, with high potential for the Africa-Europe partnership. Africa is endowed with unique natural assets, including premier carbon sinks, which have the potential to absorb millions of tons of carbon dioxide annually. This translates into potentially significant climate finance with important co-benefits for communities and the environment.

Carbon pricing and markets are complex, often volatile, and can be subject to manipulation. Key conditions must be put in place for high integrity carbon markets to proliferate – particularly in those markets that rely on the unregulated Voluntary Carbon Markets (VCM). Yet, carbon pricing mechanisms and carbon markets have the greatest potential for global climate and socio-economic impact if they pair high requirements for integrity and quality with fair and equitable market access and revenue distribution.

In April 2023 in Nairobi, AEF launched an Africa-Europe Working Group on Carbon Markets bringing together experts and leaders from diverse organisation settings to catalyse cooperation on Carbon Markets as part of a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership.

The work of the Group focuses on two aspects: (i) Transformative and inclusive dialogue. Providing a safe space for tackling the various dimensions of cooperation, from pricing carbon credits and carbon activation plans to facilitating cross-continental platforms for the exchange of innovative practices across Europe and Africa; and (ii) Impact on policymaking. Opening space for fresh policy thinking in the context of key multilateral convenings in 2023 including the 1st Africa Climate Summit in Kenya (September) and COP28 in the UAE (December), as well as towards 2024, a key year for EU-AU cooperation ahead of the 7th Summit planned for 2025.

Collaboration is needed to ensure convergent – not divergent – paths towards market-building in Europe and Africa. True partnership approaches can drive a symbiotic relationship, in which (1) African carbon credits and low-embedded emission products efficiently serve EU demand, (2) EU investment spurs both further economic growth and stability in African countries, and (3) African deployment of European and joint innovation helps accelerate industrial development, brings innovation down the cost curve to drive scale, and supports both European and African industrial actors in a quest for global competitiveness.

With true partnership and collaboration, Africa and Europe can be pioneers in carbon pricing and markets, and inspire, accelerate, and improve global climate positive growth and action.
Since then, the role of carbon markets in financing climate action has gained momentum at the 1st Africa Climate Summit and at COP28, with several African countries (e.g. Kenya and Rwanda) launching their carbon market frameworks and activation plans, and a group of European countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Finland, Belgium and Austria) launching a set of recommendations to restore trust by averting greenwashing in companies. The World Bank likewise announced a new road map for high-integrity carbon markets. This new initiative aims to work with 15 countries to produce up to 126 million forestry credits by 2028. The Bank will certify their environmental and social integrity, and the credits could generate up to $2.5 billion. The 15 countries include Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Republic of Congo — all part of the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility. 2024 will see the programme kick off with five countries.

Yet, the carbon credits talks at COP28 collapsed over integrity concerns, and limited progress was achieved on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, global demand for carbon credits will increase as advanced economies get closer to achieving climate neutrality. Article 6 of the Paris Agreement will pave the way for carbon credits to be traded on the international market, and these credits may be needed for countries to achieve their next round of NDCs. As such, Article 6 cooperation between Africa and Europe is essential, and the two should work on Article 6 preparedness, notably from the perspective of capacity building.

Figure 2: Realising the potential of carbon pricing and markets through Africa–Europe collaboration

1. Align understanding of the opportunity and what’s needed to realise it; and avoid closing windows
   - Bring together African and European policymakers to understand what’s at stake - both economically, politically, and environmentally - and the mutual upside of effective collaboration.
   - Align on what’s needed to realise the full potential of carbon pricing and African carbon markets; and the key areas for Africa-Europe collaboration
   - Make provision for African products under CBAM (where needed to avoid a ‘lock in of exclusion’) and proactively support the provision of low-emission products by African industry

2. Build the pillars for strong Africa - EU synergies in carbon pricing and carbon markets
   - Increase funding to African projects so that more projects make it to market
   - Monetise the breadth of Africa’s contributions to climate and environment to drive up price for African credits, and make more projects investable
   - Develop the right policy, regulation, governance and skills to establish a high-quality high-integrity, efficient carbon credit ecosystem in Africa that is attractive to investors
   - Concurrently develop and expand Article 6.2 collaboration to immediately realise mutual benefit and uphold a demand pull for market building efforts Build these fundamentals based on a continuously updated understanding of what is needed to ultimately achieve fair and equitable market access - and adjust initiatives as needed

3. Build towards efficient, fair and equitable market access with higher integrity and quality as a global example
   - Ensure fair and equitable market access for EU compliance markets Ensure fair and equitable market access for low-emission products Uphold and consistently raise bars on quality, integrity, and social justice
   - Identify and disseminate lessons learned to lead the global community towards such synergistic collaboration

The AEF Carbon Markets Working Group
IV. Promote accountable, transparent, inclusive and responsive governance, in conformity with the relevant international instruments

Examples of progress to date:

- In addition to the EU Collect More, Spend Better Agenda, the EU, through the IMF, has allocated EUR 50 million to capacity building and training programmes for the betterment of economic governance, taking a climate and gender lens to management. Additionally, a programme of EUR 8 million has been approved to support public finance and budget management in Portuguese-speaking African countries.

- The Paris 2023 Summit for a New Global Financing Pact increased support for innovative finance models, announcing the creation of a taskforce to examine the mobilisation of resources through taxation. Particular attention was brought to a global financial transaction tax, which estimates state could raise between EUR 162-270 billion each year, and which currently exists in over 30 countries. Within the EU, an EU-wide financial transaction tax could raise between EUR 17 billion and EUR 26 billion. Likewise, a global shipping tax on related greenhouse gas emissions was discussed, with estimates that it could raise $5 billion per year. These discussions were furthered during the 1st Africa Climate Summit, whose Nairobi Declaration urged “world leaders to consider the proposal for a [global] carbon taxation regime including a carbon tax on fossil fuel trade, maritime transport and aviation, that may also be augmented by a global financial transaction tax to provide dedicated affordable and accessible finance for climate positive investments at scale.” Following these key discussions, France and Kenya formally launched a taskforce on international taxation at COP28. The group will examine new sources of revenue to unlock financing for development, nature and climate action, initially targeting the specific industries outlined above. Additional taskforce members include Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, and Spain, with the European Commission as an observer. The European Climate Foundation will support in the operationalisation of the group, which will meet for the first time in early 2024 to appoint experts and define a workplan. The taskforce is set to put forward concrete proposals at COP30.

- Other initiatives include the continued support to strengthen the capacity of the African Governance Architecture with an AU mandate to promote good governance (EUR 25 million from 2020 to 2024). Bilateral programmes include a EUR 303 million Support Programme for Economic Governance (PAGE) in Tunisia to improve private sector ecosystems and monitor economic policies; in Morocco, EUR 62 million to the HAKAMA II public governance programme and EUR 50 million for the Appui Européen à Réforme de l’Administration Publique programme; and in Libya technical assistance to public economic and finance institutions (e.g. ministries and central bank) to improve the business environment in the country.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship African Continental Financial Institutions aims to accelerate regional integration and socio-economic development through the establishment of institutions to mobilise resources and manage the African financial sector. Key initiatives include setting up the following pan-African institutions:
  - The African Central Bank (ACB) build a common monetary policy and single African currency to accelerate economic integration. A statute and structure of the African Monetary Institute (which is a precursor to the African Central Bank) have been submitted for input to the Association of African Central Banks.
The African Investment Bank (AIB) to foster economic growth and accelerate economic integration.

The African Monetary Fund (AMF) to facilitate economic integration by eliminating trade restrictions and providing greater monetary integration, as envisaged under articles 6 and 44 of the Abuja Treaty;

The Pan-African Stock Exchange (PASE) to create a virtual continental market.

Box 12: Reform of the global governance architecture: amplifying Africa’s voice

September 2023 saw the fulfilment of a long-requested step in this direction, with the G20 granting permanent membership to the African Union at the Leaders’ Summit in India. This move, which now gives the AU the same status as the EU within the Group, will be formalised next year. It not only strengthens the continent’s position on the global stage but allows it to participate in critical discussions of direct impact, including the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment.

African representation in the UN Security Council and voting shares within the Bretton Woods institutions are still hot topics. At the IMF, the entire African continent – with a population of over 1.4 billion – has a comparable quota share, and thereby voting power, to Germany, which has a population of 83 million. To address these imbalances, quota formulas should be frankly discussed. In the meantime, with the eurozone holding 21% of vote shares at the IMF and European countries holding 33.2% of shares at the World Bank’s IBRD (compared to Africa’s 7.3%), they have the opportunity to put their voice behind sensible institutional reforms backed by the African partners to accelerate and make lending more affordable.

V. Use all means of implementation, including ODA and financial tools such as infrastructure trusts and capital market instruments, to ensure support to African entrepreneurship in engaging in strong and vibrant economies. International and national financing development institutions, including the European Investment Bank, and the African Development Bank, and public/private partnerships will be mobilised to this effect; (and) Ensuring increased spending through international programmes to facilitate economic recovery (health, climate, biodiversity, education and security) and examine lending instruments for sustainable investment projects in priority sectors.

Examples of progress to date:

- Based on the latest available figures, official development assistance (ODA) from members of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2022 “rose to an all-time high of USD 204 billion, up from USD 186 billion in 2021”. This represents a 13.6% increase in real terms, largely due to increased spending on in-country refugee costs stemming from the war in Ukraine. From 2021 to 2022, these costs went from 4.6% of ODA to 14.4% - the highest volume ever reported by DAC members, even exceeding the peak in 2015-2016. If these costs are excluded, “2022 ODA still rose by 4.6% over 2021 in real terms.”
VI. Continue our work to leverage and facilitate transparent remittances, including the reduction of transaction costs, for the development of national and local economies

Examples of progress to date:

- Remittance inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 6.1% in 2022, with remittances to Nigeria accounting for around 38% of the total. The World Bank projects further growth of remittances in 2023.

Potential areas of action:

- European Development Finance Institutions (under the EDFI Association) have sustained their level of investment with EUR 8.6 billion of new commitments in 2022. Africa received the largest share, with EUR 3.6 billion allocated. However, this represents a 5% decrease from the 2021 investment level, as EUR 3.3 billion focused on climate finance (45% increase from 2021 level). EIB has invested EUR 10.8 billion in 2022 outside the EU.

- Data for 2022 show that net bilateral ODA flows to Africa amounted to $34 billion, representing a drop of 7.4% in real terms compared to 2021. Within this total, net ODA to sub-Saharan Africa was $29 billion, a fall of 7.8% in real terms. During this time, only France and Portugal increased their aid to Africa.
Chapter 5: Climate and Sustainable Development

This chapter deals with the following commitments of the 6th Summit Final Declaration: Commitment 6 (The Investment Package: energy, transport and digital infrastructure, energy transition, green transition, digital transformation, sustainable growth and decent job creation, transport facilitation, and human development), Commitment 7 (implementation of the Investment Package through public funds and innovative financing, and boosting regional and continental economic integration).
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Context:

- The importance of the climate-development nexus. Addressing climate change and pursuing economic development have often been viewed as separate objectives, involving trade-offs between reducing carbon emissions and stimulating industrial activity. AEF has continuously challenged this framing since its first High-Level Group Report on an Africa-Europe Climate Alliance of 2020, outlining that no trade-off between climate and development is acceptable. Adaptation, more than mitigation, as well as access to energy for all, are the priorities for Africa and its people. Defining the ways and means to make sure that climate action becomes “one of the main drivers of Africa’s growth”, as underlined by both President William Ruto and the President of the European Commission at the 1st Africa Climate Summit in September 2023, is key.

Examples of progress to date:

- Significant progress has been made on infrastructure investments and enhanced regional integration following the accelerated ratification of the AfCFTA by 47 member states. Investments in intercontinental connectivity, such as transport corridors, energy and digital infrastructure, remain critical to unlock economic opportunities. It will be important to align external investments with EU trade policy, especially around agriculture and climate, ensuring EU policy aligns with efforts to establish a common free trade area in Africa. Investment priorities should be developed jointly with key African agencies, such as AUDA-NEPAD, AfDB, and the PIDA Secretariat, and aligned to strategic development plans (principally the AU Agenda 2063), to include the Continental Power System Master Plan (CMP) and creation of the Africa Single Electricity Market (AfSEM).

The launch of the AU-EU high-level dialogue on economic integration to strengthen trade relations and sustainable investment is a significant achievement. With 30 years of implementation of the EU Single Market, the EU can share its experience with AfCFTA, both in tariffs harmonisation and reduction of non-trade barriers, and explore opportunities and risks attached to the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) in a transparent and frank process.

Graphic 7: African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

With a potential market of more than 1.4 billion people, the AfCFTA surpasses the EU single market, USMCA and MERCOSUR combined. The AfCFTA is the largest free trade agreement in the world in country terms (54):

However, intra-continental trade in Africa remains the lowest of any world region:

Source: MIF based on UNDESA

Source: MIF based on UNCTAD
Potential areas of action:

• Scaling up climate adaptation measures is an area for collaboration with significant cross-sectoral impact. The COP Global Stocktake political phase should have delivered a strong message on elevating, both politically and financially, adaptation, as well as mainstreaming it across key sectors of Africa-Europe cooperation, from health to agri-food and energy systems. Unfortunately, limited progress was achieved on adaptation action and finance at COP28. The road towards COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, should lead the two continents towards adaptation mainstreaming and greater alignment on issues - ranging from meeting the $100 billion annual 2020 for climate finance, the doubling of adaptation finance, the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), parity of mitigation and adaptation finance given pressing needs, and the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Reaffirming the commitment to important climate resilience initiatives, such as the Great Green Wall, and developing new projects, such as the Transboundary Water Management initiative, will contribute through a Team Europe approach to Africa’s climate objectives. Furthermore, the expansion of the Team Europe Initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa to additional EU countries, providing increased finance for adaptation in Africa, should be monitored for greater action and impact. The EU’s domestic policy on green transition, such as the European Green Deal, has important consequences for African countries, both positive and negative. Spaces for Africa-Europe discussion in this context remain critical.

• Africa and Europe should realise the full potential of carbon pricing and markets. Given Europe’s expertise, and Africa’s assets, Africa and Europe can become pioneers in carbon pricing and markets, and inspire, accelerate, and improve global climate and biodiversity action. It is key to underline the importance of carbon pricing collaboration and equitable market access beyond putting a price on emissions (in EU ETS and CBAM) as critical means for both climate action and the achievement of development goals and SDGs. EU’s expertise can be leveraged to catalyse cooperation and activity on the African continent - notably on issues related to good governance and solid MRV systems, carbon pricing, trade, Article 6 readiness, and advocacy support for a fairer system that does not undermine Africa’s capacity to be part of the global carbon market economy. At the 2023 Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact, the EU launched a Call to Action for Paris-aligned carbon markets. Championed by France and Spain, the Call aims to lay the foundations for robustly designed, high integrity domestic and international carbon markets to drive the necessary emission reductions, which if realised, could generate substantial financial flows for mitigation and adaptation, therefore supporting all goals of the Paris Agreement. Until now, the Call has been supported by 31 countries (the EU 27 + Barbados, Canada, Cook Islands and Ethiopia). Other parties are invited to join and implement the Call, alongside the initial signatories.

• While the EU’s strategic partnerships on sustainable raw materials value chains including the MoUs signed with Namibia, DRC and Zambia are noteworthy, there is space for strengthened Africa-Europe exchange in support of Africa’s processing capacity: trading relationships between Europe and Africa remain imbalanced. In 2021, 68% of goods exported from Europe to Africa were manufactured goods, meanwhile 65% of imports from Africa were raw materials and energy. The EU Critical Raw Materials Act obliges that by 2030 40% of processing and refining be done in Europe. Understanding it is key to prioritise value addition in the extraction of critical minerals from Africa’s soil, the EU with such strategic partnerships is moving in the direction of supporting Africa’s processing capacity. For example, from the EU-Namibia MoU: “The Namibian government is
committed to work with the European Union throughout the entire value chain, including local beneficiation of minerals, in order to contribute towards industrialization as outlined in the National Development Plans.

- In addition to projects under the Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI) initiative, opportunities remain for more structured and franker Africa-Europe conversations around energy. For example, a similar format to the Ministerial meetings on Agri-Food Systems could be implemented for the energy sector.

- Although not central in the 6th Summit conclusions, greater attention must be given to agri-food systems and food security. The worsening food crisis - aggravated by climate change impacts, pandemic related inflation, the Ukraine/Russia war and demographic pressure - has triggered additional migrations and aggravated instability on the continent. Thus, it should be high on the priority list for the Africa-Europe partnership. Strengthening alignment between EU investments into sustainable agri-value chains and African priorities around resilient food systems for food sovereignty is key. African partners should ensure delivery on the 2014 Malabo Declaration commitment of spending 10% of national expenditure on the agriculture sector development.

- Agricultural transformation should combine a significant increase in yields by building more climate resilient systems, including healthy soils. To prevent farming extending further into environmentally sensitive areas, sustainable intensification can leverage multiple innovations: agroecology, use of bio fertilisers, greater crop-livestock integration, landscape-wide approaches, and networks for the spread of climate resilient seeds. Transformation in the Africa-Europe Agri-food Systems partnership requires clear agendas that leverage existing initiatives at both national and international levels before inventing new initiatives. Opportunities lie in developing a joint approach to the post-Malabo period, after 2025, and exploring mechanisms which can support agricultural transformation beyond the use of ODA, such as removing restrictive elements on Africa agricultural exports to Europe and encouraging co-investments in production and processing.

- Africa and Europe should not miss the opportunity to partner on ocean governance and blue economy. Africa and Europe could agree a joint effort at multilateral level to address collective responsibility regarding the state of the oceans and strengthen international ocean governance. Such opportunities include working jointly towards the full ratification and operationalisation of the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the Global Plastic Treaty in advance of the 3rd United Nations Ocean Conference, to take place in Nice in June 2025. Beyond ocean governance, the two continents should work towards capacity sharing, building on the two continents’ knowledge and expertise. In doing so, Africa and Europe can accelerate livelihood diversification for coastal communities by helping both artisanal and private sector actors, while promoting entrepreneurship, gender, and youth agency. A sustainable blue economy provides a shared space for building an equitable vision of the Africa-Europe partnership, if pursued with honest intent, sufficient resources, and just implementation among and within countries.
# INFRASTRUCTURE

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Ten Commitments Framework</th>
<th>Main Commitments</th>
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<tr>
<td>COMMITMENT 6 / The Investment Package (energy, transport and digital infrastructure, energy transition, green transition, digital transformation, sustainable growth and decent job creation, transport facilitation, and human development)</td>
<td>Investment in infrastructure (transport, energy, and digital) aligned with the PIDA PAP2</td>
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**Examples of progress to date:**

- **12 strategic corridors in Africa** aligned with AU PIDA-PAP 2 have been identified to enhance greener EU-Africa connectivity: (1) Liberia (*Praia/Dakar-Abidjan Corridor*), (2) the expansion of the Port of Banjul, (3) Gambia (*Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Corridor*), (4) Guinea Bissau Safim-M’Pack road (*Praia-Dakar-Abidjan Corridor*), (5) Kenya Nairobi Clean Bus Rapid Transit Line 3 (BRT 3), (6) Cameroon (*Libreville/Kribi/Douala-N’Djamena Corridor*), (7) Chad (*Libreville/Kribi/Douala-N’Djamena Corridor*), (8) Cameroon-Chad (*Libreville-Kribi/Douala-N’Djamena Corridor and Bamenda-Enugu Corridor*), (9) Sfax-Kasserine Corridor road infrastructure project, (10) extension and upgrading of infrastructures of the Autonomus industrial- and artisanal-fishing Port of Pointe-Noire in Congo Brazzaville, (11) TEI on Connectivity in Egypt, and recently added, (12) **the Lobito Corridor**. These identified corridors remain to be translated into actionable projects in collaboration with African partners. In a time where supply chains are vulnerable, the EU strategic corridor approach provides guidance to avoid funding dispersion and concentrate action to be more efficient, more visible and impactful.

- Transport is a priority under Global Gateway. Growing foreign and domestic investment flows in the transport and logistics sector offer new opportunities for local economic development and decent job creation. The impact of the European Green Deal in partner countries is growing as well as the opportunities to support them in their own efforts to decarbonise the transport sector. Under Global Gateway, Team Europe is working on the development of all forms of transport – road, rail, maritime and aviation, and urban mobility.

- An initial pipeline of projects was presented by the EU to the AUC and RECs at the meeting of the Technical Working Group on Infrastructure held in the margins of the Dakar Financing Summit in February 2023. The most mature projects are (1) *Praia-Dakar-Abidjan*, (2) *Mombasa-Kisangani* and (3) *Libreville-Kribi/Douala-N’Djamena* corridors. EU-funding, from member states, as well as EUR 750 million from the regional action Investments in Regional Infrastructure, for these projects will cover transport, energy and digital. An Agreement on this was signed between the EU and the AUC in December 2022. Additionally, at the G20 Summit in India in September 2023, the EU announced joining forces with the US to support the Lobito Corridor, linking Angola, Zambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. An MoU outlining the collaboration between the partners involved, EU, DRC, Zambia, Angola, the USA, AfDB and the Africa Finance Corporation, was signed during the Global Gateway Forum in October 2023. The Corridor will be supported by a feasibility Study.
Box 13: Africa’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA)

PIDA is the strategic framework for regional and continental infrastructure development, aiming to secure connectivity across Africa’s five regions. It provides a basis for engagement with Africa’s development partners on the delivery of regional and continental infrastructures and aims to facilitate the physical, economic and social integration of the continent in support of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The first PIDA Priority Action Plan (PIDA-PAP 1) covered 51 programmes divided into 433 projects covering transport, energy, ICT and trans-boundary water sectors. PIDA-PAP 2, running between 2021-2030; currently includes 69 projects.

The AfDB has provided over 50% of financing secured by infrastructure projects under PIDA PAP 1, making it the lead financier of this strategic pan-African initiative which required a total investment of $161 billion. The capital cost of PIDA’s long-term implementation through 2040 is currently estimated at more than $360 billion.

• On the regulatory side, the EU, EIB and other partners in a Team Europe approach are committed to work on all eleven strategic corridors, in cooperation with RECS. This includes soft measures such as institutional support to road transport and trade facilitation. Approved in 2022 this will provide support to the harmonisation at regional, and in the longer term, continental level of road transport laws and regulations. Action focusing on Trade and Transport Facilitation Measures of Strategic Corridors is under preparation for a total EU contribution of EUR 315 million.

• Other transport initiatives include EU financing estimated at EUR 4 million for a capacity building project on Sustainable Aviation Fuels (SAF) eligible for ICAO’s Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). The project to be implemented by ICAO and EASA will foster the production and uptake of SAF in 14 African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, and Tunisia. Additional projects include EU financing of EUR 10 million for the ‘Global Maritime Technology Cooperation Centres Network phase II’, a project which is implemented by IMO. The project will expand technical support, capacity development programmes and geographic outreach to improve maritime energy efficiency in participating regions in line with IMO targets. The African Regional Centre is hosted by the Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (Jikuat). The EU is also extending technical cooperation in the field of civil aviation through the establishment of an Aviation Project (EUR 10 million). This promotes a safe and sustainable aviation environment and further support development of the Single African Air Transport Market (SAATM).

• Regarding digital infrastructure, the EU EurAfrica Gateway Cable, a digital connectivity submarine cable connecting Europe and Africa, is still under identification: the blending platform is established at regional level with EUR 300 million available for grants. On the Regional Fiber Optic Backbones across Africa, with an initial pipeline of investment opportunities in all sub-regions identified, discussions are ongoing with DFIs.
On the margins of the Global Gateway Forum in October 2023, the EU announced new transport infrastructure initiatives:

- EUR 89.5 million Multi-annual Action Plan for Somalia, in line with the Joint Operational Roadmap, bolstering Somalia’s ongoing state-building process and focusing on resilient infrastructure, as well as nutrition and social protection, and including a EUR 20 million allocation for budget support;
- An upcoming study for the development of the Walvis Bay port in Namibia, the entry point from the Atlantic side to the Walvis Bay – Maputo Strategic Corridor;
- EUR 25 million EU grant blended with EUR 120 million loan from EIB to modernise the Cabo Verde’s port infrastructure, including the expansion of the Porto Grande in São Vicente and the Mindelo Cruise Terminal Onshore Power Supply in São Vicente.
- EUR 20 million grant for Dakar Public Transport Network Restructuring for the acquisition and modernisation of buses as part of a wider EUR 355 million project delivered jointly with the EIB, France and Germany to boost sustainable and smart mobility.

The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Single African Air-Transport Market (SAATM) aims to create a single unified air transport market in Africa, improve air services connectivity and air carrier efficiencies, remove restrictions on ownership, and provide for the full liberalisation of frequencies, tariffs, and capacity, as well as mechanisms for fair competition, dispute settlement, and consumer protection. 35 AU Member States have signed the commitment to support full operationalisation of SAATM. To date, only 19 member states have fully implemented concrete measures:

- The regulatory instruments, namely consumer protection regulations, competition regulations and the rules of procedures of the SAATM Executing Agency (AFCAC) have been completed.
- A continental study on the benefits of the SAATM covering all 55 AU Member States has been completed.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship African High Speed Train Network aims to connect all African capitals and commercial centres to facilitate the movement of goods, services and people, reduce transport costs and relieve congestion of current and future systems. Key initiatives include:

  - The FTYIP of the African Integrated High Speed Railway Network (AIHSRN) has been developed with 14 pilot projects and 3 accelerated pilot projects. Regional readiness workshops have been undertaken.
  - AU Member States have been trained on the Luxembourg Rail Protocol and the Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment.

Additional comments:

- Investing in transport corridors, and transport infrastructure generally, will address a significant constraint for agricultural transformation – providing access to regional markets for produce, supply of agricultural inputs and machinery at better prices. This should lead to improved yields, increased revenue and income.
- However, addressing hard infrastructure and transit measures along the strategic corridors is not enough to improve trade facilitation. A range of bureaucratic and other rent-seeking interests prevent full implementation and thus reduce the benefits of investments in trade facilitation.
ENERGY

The Ten Commitments Framework

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Examples of progress to date:

- With 600 million people still lacking access to reliable energy, and over 900 million lacking access to clean cooking solutions, notwithstanding this key hurdle for many businesses, access to energy remains a priority for Africa.

- The current geopolitical crises are redrawing the global energy-resources map, underlining the benefits of a closer partnership between the neighbouring continents. EU efforts to diversify its energy supplies, both gas over the short to medium term, and renewable energy over the long term, including green hydrogen, have led to strengthened collaboration on energy between EU countries and African countries, among which Algeria, DRC, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya and Namibia.

- The plethora of global crises has led the EU to revise its position towards energy security with the REPowerEU initiative. The EU’s need to diversify its energy sources – because of the Russia-Ukraine war - through additional gas imports from Africa has raised questions about a “double-standard approach”. It remains essential to ensure efforts are focused both on EU’s diversification and ramping-up Africa’s access at the same time. As yet, unwillingness from the EU’s main development agencies or finance institutions, such as EIB, to invest in Africa’s gas has not changed.

- ‘The Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative (AEGEI)’ is one of the key initiatives of the Global Gateway Africa–Europe Investment Package, aiming to deploy by 2030 at least 50 Gigawatts of renewable electricity generation capacities, and providing at least 100 million people in Africa with access to electricity. Moreover, it provides strategic support for Africa’s electrification plans, including development of the Continental Power Systems Master Plan (CMP) and the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM). AEGEI includes both infrastructure investments and soft activities. It promotes investments in transformational infrastructure projects (clean energy generation and transmission projects, and off-grid decentralized solutions), and with African partners to promote a conducive environment, by improving the institutional, policy, regulatory and business frameworks.

- At COP28, Team Europe partners, including 12 EU member states, the EIB and the EBRD, announced over EUR 20 billion for the AEGEI for the 2021-2027 period. This includes EUR 3.4 billion in grants from the EU. This figure will increase as more initiatives will be implemented and as the private sector investments will materialise. The first 30 national and regional actions and projects have been approved, reflecting a total budget of EUR 540 million.

- Additionally, since the 6th Summit, several national and regional projects, partnerships,
and programmes have been launched. The EU signed initiatives with Morocco (EU-Morocco Green Partnership), Namibia (Implementation of MOU on sustainable raw materials value chains and renewable hydrogen), Egypt (Joint Statement on the Nexus of Water Food and Energy during COP27), Kenya (Green Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap for Kenya), DRC (MoU for a partnership on critical and strategic raw materials value chains), and Zambia (MoU on a strategic partnership on sustainable raw materials value chains). Other bilateral and regional programmes include Rwanda, Tanzania, DRC, Burundi, Central Africa, Western Africa, Southern Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Cameroon, Djibouti, Libya, Mozambique among others. New bilateral initiatives were launched during the Global Gateway Forum in October 2023, including:

- EUR 43 million Green Deal #TeamEuropeKenya - Part II in Kenya which will promote sustainable development, renewable energy, and environmental protection;
- EUR 246 million support for Cabo Verde to boost the green transition, sustainable transport and digital connectivity. EU grant of EUR 29 million blended with an EIB sovereign loan of EUR 120 million to achieve energy sustainability by developing a pumped storage facility and other essential components to optimize energy use, as well as a EUR 22 million corporate loan to support Cabeólica’s wind farm expansion project, adding 13 MW;
- EUR 146 million joint finance with AFD (half of the total cost) to construct the Kakono hydropower plant in Tanzania add 87.8 MW;
- TEI to support investment in the energy transition and decarbonise the economy by developing green hydrogen industries in Mauritanian.

- At the 11th Commission-to-Commission held on November 2022, the two sides reiterated support for development of the Continental Power System Master Plan (CMP) and the African Single Electricity Market (AfSEM). Support will be provided through the Global Technical Assistance Facility to the African Union Development Agency (AU/NEPAD). In September 2023, a meeting of the AU Specialised Technical Committee on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy (STC-TTIIE) recommended adopting both AfSEM and the CMP as AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Projects. At COP28, it was recognised that the CMP and AfSEM fit very well in the global and Africa's COP28 commitments to triple renewable energy and pursue green growth by 2030.

- Progress has also been made with establishment of a ‘One Stop Shop’ to enhance private sector investments in clean energy production and access to electricity in African countries. At the international level, the EU supports development of Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), including with South Africa and Senegal.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Grand Inga Dam still ongoing project is expected to generate 43,200 MW of power to support current regional power pools and transform Africa from traditional to modern sources of energy. Inga Dam could ensure access for all Africans to clean and affordable electricity. The AfDB has provided support for the rehabilitation of power plants from Inga 1 and 2, the construction of a high voltage line between Inga and Kinshasa (400 kV, 277 km in length) and the rehabilitation and extension of Kinshasa's distribution network; the Inga Law to facilitate the execution of the project has been enacted in DRC, and awaits ratification. An MoU has been signed between the Government of the DRC and two service providers regarding the legal and operationalisation modalities.

- At COP28, EU president Ursula von der Leyen launched the global pledge on renewables and energy efficiency, together with the COP28 presidency and 118 countries as part of the World Action Summit. The final text at COP28 included the pledge to triple the global
renewables power capacity to 2030 with 130 countries committing to increasing to at least 11,000 GW and doubling energy efficiency improvement rates by 2030.

**Potential areas of action:**

- Currently, there are few structured conversations between Africa and Europe on energy access and transition. Africa and Europe could amend this deficit by establishing a constructive space for countries on both continents to plan a shared, prosperous, decarbonised future compatible with climate goals. While EU and African energy priorities differ – given unequal levels of development – the two continents can continue to work jointly on the actions and finance needed to deliver energy access, clean cooking solutions, and credible energy regulatory frameworks at national and regional levels.

### In Focus: Update from the AEF Strategy Group on Sustainable Energy

Sustainable energy access, investment and innovation are of core importance to Africa and Europe. Both continents recognise the vital importance of rolling out an ever-larger quantum of sustainable energy, but from very different starting points. Half the population of Africa is still without power, and two thirds of people continue to rely on woodfuel and charcoal for cooking, both of which have very damaging consequences for human and ecosystem health. There is great potential for cross-continental collaboration, at multiple levels, to accelerate Africa’s energy access and industrialisation, and Europe’s energy transition and rapid decarbonisation. These two energy transformations need to advance in parallel and linked manner, to deliver human development, economic opportunities, and energy security, within a carbon-constrained world.

At the 6th Summit, the two continents made clear their firm commitment to full implementation of the Paris Agreement and the COP process, recognising that Africa’s energy transition is vital for its industrialisation and to bridge the energy gap. As such, Europe expressed its support to Africa in its transition to foster just and sustainable pathways towards climate neutrality.

The AEF Strategy Group on Sustainable Energy was established in 2020, as a platform to explore common and contrasting challenges. In its first phase, a range of initiatives for Africa-Europe collaboration were put forward, such as investing in design and delivery of energy policy and regulation, through support to the African School for Regulation; rolling out clean cooking solutions to the more than 900mn people in Africa still reliant on dirty fuels; and calling for greater Africa-Europe energy partnerships, beyond Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs). Over the last year, the SG has turned its attention to track commitments made at the 6th EU-AU Summit, including delivery of the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative.

As made clear at the 1st Africa Climate Summit held in Nairobi ahead of COP28, the African continent offers Europe and the broader global economy a wide range of potential “solutions” to the climate emergency, which include Africa’s role as a green hub for energy intensive industry (steel, cement, fertilisers), and serving as a major sink for carbon removals. Recent agreements show what is possible when Africa and Europe work together, such as the EU partnerships with Namibia and Kenya on green hydrogen, the Just Energy Transition Plans (JETPs) in South Africa and Senegal, the Kenya-Germany 100% renewable plan by 2030, and proposed Energy Transition Plans (ETPs) in Nigeria and Ghana. Further aspirations...
include initiatives such as the Continental Power System Master Plan (CMP) and creation of the Africa Single Electricity Market (AfSEM), which act as vital building blocks for Agenda2063 and climate compatible energy systems.

The SG noted the very limited structures for dialogue between Africa and Europe on energy access and transition. For the year ahead, a series of national energy dialogues at country level could lead to more effective bilateral engagement between Team EU and specific African countries. Africa and Europe should also build on recent events, including the Africa Climate Summit and COP28 to help fix this fragmentation and build a constructive space for the two continents to plan a shared, prosperous, decarbonised future compatible with climate goals. Such a coordination platform could follow the format for Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture Ministers from the two continents, and could be clustered regionally and around energy transition priorities, recognising the diverse energy assets, technical capacities and financial resources of different countries.

A massive scale-up in investment is required in both Africa and Europe to deliver their respective energy transformations. While JETPs provide much needed public investment from bilateral and multilateral sources, institutional funds and private sector capital also need to be mobilised at speed and scale for investment in energy generation, transmission and access. Institutional capital from Africa and Europe will need to be needed to close the energy finance gap, for which clear, consistent energy policy and regulation are critical, alongside much more ambitious global finance mechanisms.

Box 14: The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)

Introduced on 17 May 2023, Europe’s groundbreaking Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) sets a global precedent by pricing embedded emissions in products imported into the EU. It is primarily an environmental measure, ensuring goods imported into the EU have a carbon footprint similar to EU production. This approach influences other jurisdictions, and shapes carbon pricing and markets.

The CBAM aims to level the playing field for EU businesses, by imposing a carbon price on imports from non-EU countries with laxer carbon pricing policies, and hence preventing carbon leakage, as when businesses relocate to non-EU jurisdictions to evade stringent regulations. By driving demand for low-emission products, CBAM will drive low-carbon development beyond EU borders.

However, concerns arise among many African stakeholders regarding CBAM’s impact on their export of high-carbon goods, rendering them uncompetitive. Africa can only meet EU demands through a shift over time to green production. Hence, consultation with African parties on implementation over time is crucial. CBAM’s transition period starts from 1 October 2023, although no charges will be levied for the first three years. Over the next few years, close collaboration with African stakeholders could ensure mutual benefits are delivered, including fostering green industrialisation in Africa.
Examples of progress to date:

• The EU has allocated EUR 8 billion for worldwide food security and food systems programmes in partner countries until 2024, out of which EUR 4.5 billion is marked for Africa. The global figure includes EUR 2.2 billion in immediate humanitarian food and nutrition assistance for the most vulnerable countries, and EUR 5 billion for medium to longer term investment in sustainable food systems.

• Cooperation is focused on making African food systems more sustainable and more resilient to unfavourable trends, shocks and crises: ‘Resilient Food Systems’; and ‘Sustainable agri-food value chains’ both aim to boost public and private investments in African agri-food value chains, with a focus on value addition, employment creation, sustainability and food and nutrition security.

“There is an urgent need to do more on getting initiatives moving so they can deliver, as well as to move away from a focus on poverty and emergency development assistance to develop a true agri-food partnership based on cooperation and investment in projects of scale.”

Ibrahim Mayaki, Co-Chair of the AEF Strategy Group on Agri-Food, African Union Special Envoy for Food Systems

• The European Commission announced additional financial support to Sub-Saharan Africa following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Team Europe response to global food insecurity comprises: (1) investments in food production and resilience; (2) emergency response to the current food crisis in countries where the needs are the most acute. Africa has been the main beneficiary of the Solidarity Lanes Action Plan launched in May 2022. The plan enabled the export of 51.5 million tons of grain, oilseeds and related products from Ukraine to the rest of the world, most notably to Africa, between May 2022 and November 2023.

• Financial announcements in totalled EUR 2.2 billion: for countries in the Horn of Africa (EUR 633 million); the Sahel and Lake Chad (EUR 1 billion); and a special measure in 2022 of EUR 600 million covering African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, including 17 sub-Saharan African countries. Similarly, in 2022, a Food and Resilience Facility for North Africa was set up, with EUR 225 million, to respond to commodity shortages, contribute to balance of payments stabilisation, and sustain social protection systems faced by this additional acute crisis.

• New initiatives to boost food security and agriculture production were announced in October 2023 at the Global Gateway Forum:
  o Senegal: EUR 15 million EU support to transform value chains for certain products to increase food security, as well as create jobs and expand export opportunities. This initiative complements existing agrifood investments, bringing the total investment to EUR 66.5 million;
Mauritania: EUR 13.7 million to promote sustainable food systems and access to quality and affordable food by strengthening value chains and economic operators.

- Specific initiatives linked to sustainable agri-food value chains and regional trade integration of the agri-food sector were launched in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Sustainable Cocoa Initiative in Ghana, Ivory Coast and Cameroun (EUR 43.75 million). In the same vein, work on specific agricultural value chains continues, including infant foods and plant proteins, while a recently signed EUR 56 million agreement aims at transforming selected value chains, such as for example cashew nuts and maize. The ambition is to enhance food security, job creation, and preservation of natural resources and biodiversity, and form the basis of an upcoming EU initiative on Cashew.

- Support to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) included several studies around value chains, one of which was commissioned by the AUC. Led by the International Trade Center, this has diagnosed value chains with high potential for sustainable development in Africa, including infant foods, cashew nuts, coffee, livestock, fortified foods, orphan crops, and/or aquatic foods. The livestock and pastoralism value chains are also key priorities to be supported through several regional programmes.

- The DeSIRA initiative (Development Smart Innovation through Research in Agriculture), supporting the transformation of food systems through innovation and closer connections between farmers and researchers, will be extended into a new phase: DeSIRA+. 100 M EUR are foreseen to implement regional actions in Africa, with African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and EU Member States cooperation agencies. Actions will mobilise all actors in food systems to engage in agroecological transition.

- Complementing the development of on-land agri-food value chains, attention was also given to sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in Africa. The FISH4ACP programme, an initiative of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, aims to build sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in 9 small-scale fisheries value chains in Africa, while the ECOFISH programme, a joint endeavour of the EU and the Eastern Africa, Southern Africa, and Indian ocean regions, aim to ensure sustainable management of the inland and marine coastal fisheries. In cooperation with FAO and CIRAD, the EU is financing 27 country-level food systems assessment in Africa. 18 have been published to date. The EU plans to assist Africa with extension services, building on the outcomes of the country-level food system assessments noted above.

- Following the outcomes of the 11th EU-AU Commission-to-Commission meeting in November 2022, and the 5th EU-AU Agriculture Ministerial Conference of June 2023, the two commissions agreed to set-up a joint task force to identify short and long-term challenges related to access and affordability of fertilisers and to propose solutions. It was also agreed to establish a high-level dialogue on economic integration to strengthen trade relations and sustainable investment between the two continents in furtherance of the development of regional value chains and industrialisation of Africa. The first meeting is planned to take place in the first half of 2024.

- At COP28 in December 2023, the EU and Member States launched a global Team Europe Initiative on Deforestation-free Value Chains, supported by an initial package of EUR 70 million in new funding. The initiative will help address deforestation on a global scale and support the commitments outlined in the Glasgow Leader’s Declaration on Forests and Land Use from COP26 to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030. This strategic initiative marks a significant step in the EU and Member States’ commitment to foster inclusive partnerships with producing countries.
The COP28 Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action endorsed by 137 world leaders, has mobilised over $2.5 billion to address climate-related issues in agriculture. Experts welcomed the recognition of the link between food and climate, expressing hope that the funding and partnership will empower small-scale farmers to scale up sustainable practices, enhancing resilience and combating the effects of climate change.

Potential areas of action:

- Greater attention should be paid to agriculture and food security in the 6th Summit follow-up. Agri-Food Systems were almost entirely omitted from the 6th Summit conclusions, whereas it is a significant area of ongoing Africa-Europe cooperation, and a critical area for Africa’s food security, employment and private investment.

- EU and Africa could focus on developing a joint approach and actions for the post-Malabo period (after 2025). Alignment of objectives (beyond Agenda 2030), and agreement on joint strategies will ensure complementarity of ongoing and new initiatives and maximise impact of investments.

- EU and AU could explore policy and regulatory mechanisms which can support agriculture transformation, beyond the use of ODA. For instance, removing restrictive elements on Africa agricultural exports to the EU (including in the external dimension of the European Green Deal and EU’s Farm to Fork strategy) could open European markets to African farmers and, particularly exporters of processed food.

- Agricultural transformation must combine a significant increase in yields by building more climate resilient systems. To prevent farming extending further into grazing lands and environmentally sensitive areas, sustainable intensification should leverage multiple innovations, such as agroecology, use of bio fertilisers, greater crop-livestock integration, landscape-wide approaches, and networks for the spread of climate resilient seeds. Access to and sustainable management of land and water resources will be ensured through equitable land tenure and governance systems.

- African governments should deliver on their agreed policy commitments, especially in light of the current food crisis, set out by the CAADP (Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme) and the Malabo Declaration (2014), of spending 10% of national government budgets on agriculture sector development.

- It remains essential for EU investments in agri-food value chains to be directly linked to agreed African priorities, such as building resilient food systems, nutrition issues, and development of local value chains. This may include export cash crops.
The agri-food sector is of great significance to both African and European economies and societies. For the former, agri-food continues to represent up to 35% of the continent’s GDP, and to employ a majority of the working population. Many African countries rely on exports of agricultural commodities, usually in unprocessed form, for a large share of their foreign exchange earnings. Access to land and pursuit of farming provide a strong sense of identity and belonging for the majority of people. In Europe, while agri-food represents a much smaller share of total GDP, at less than 2%, and employs far fewer workers than manufacturing or services, questions about how food is produced and broader landscape management generate lively public debate.

The agri-food sector is closely linked to many other dimensions of human development – health, climate, water, culture, and biodiversity, amongst others. Hence, management of agricultural land and patterns of livestock and crop farming have major implications for a wide range of outcomes, such as greenhouse gas emissions, groundwater levels, and local economic activity. The agri-food sector in both Africa and Europe is responding to rapid changes in technology, social and ecological pressures. The pathway for agrifood system transformation must be mapped in the broader context of climate adaptation and mitigation.

Today, agri-food systems in Africa and Europe are confronted by a multifactor crisis of rare magnitude, affecting Africans disproportionately, given the adverse impacts from the Ukraine war, climate shocks, inflation, and debt distress.

The AEF Strategy Group on Agri-food Systems was established in 2020, as a platform to explore common and contrasting challenges. In its first phase, it put forward a range of initiatives for Africa–Europe collaboration, such as investing in agro-ecological knowledge hubs, advocating for greater support to agri-food SMEs, and transforming the Sahel’s landscapes through the Great Green Wall and related restoration activities. Over the last year, the SG has turned its attention to tracking of commitments made at the 6th Summit. While the agri-food sector was not a major item for discussion at the summit, actions were agreed for implementation as part of the Global Gateway and related mechanisms.

The SG has noted the large number of initiatives underway, both in emergency response to food crises, and in longer-term investments in raising productivity of agricultural production and food processing. However, given the large number of non-ODA linkages, in the fields of trade and investment, it warned against the danger of Africa and Europe only focused on the aid relationship. The SG queried the attention paid to cash crop production in lieu of increasing output of basic foodstuffs, such as sorghum, millet, maize, fonio, cowpeas and other legumes, and called attention to be focused on the fundamentals of farm production – soil quality and health, to build more resilient food systems. A focus on chemical fertilisers alone misses the critical need for broader investment in this fundamental resource, to create long-term resilience. The SG recognises clearly that public sector investment provides the critical backbone to agriculture’s sustainable transformation, with need for consistent policy and regulation to encourage long term private sector investment.

For the year ahead, the Agri-food SG will first track the extent to which the 6th Summit commitments are being implemented, and second reflect on the challenges posed by long-term trends on both continents, as regards demography, pressures on land, climate shocks, and loss of biodiversity. Food systems need redesign into systems that are durable, resilient and regenerative, based on agroecological principles. Given that Africa’s population is projected to double by 2040, there is a need to undertake research on how the increase in the population will impact the food systems and how it might address this challenge. The AU has agreed the CAADP as the overarching framework for agrifood transformation, so it is important to anchor all initiatives within the post-Malabo framework, to be revised in 2024.
Examples of progress to date:

- **Climate Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction**
  - The Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa was launched together with France, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands at COP27. Additional EU member states are joining forces, including Czechia, Sweden, Italy and Spain. The initiative brings together existing and new climate change adaptation programmes of around EUR 1.4 billion and leverages its impact by improved coordination and a reinforced policy dialogue on adaptation between the EU and AU. It aims at improving the identification of risks, strengthening policy and governance and leveraging resources to that end. The EU’s EUR 1 billion pledge is partly repackaging existing commitments, thus not all funding is new or additional. Governance and coordination arrangements at the EU level have been agreed with EU member states to set up a TEI Management Group and a TEI Secretariat.
  - As an example of cooperation, the EU launched a EUR 35 million specific programme on Boosting Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Change in Somalia.
  - At COP28, nearly 200 nations have agreed on a framework for the World Bank to operate the Loss and Damage Fund. As of January 2024, pledges to the fund total approximately USD 655.9 million, of which more than half was pledged from the EU and Member States.

- **The ‘Great Green Wall (GGW)’**
  - This long-lasting regional programme promotes sustainable land management and livelihoods in dryland Africa. Led by the African Union it is highly ambitious in scope, with the aim to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land by 2030, sequester 250 million tonnes of carbon, and create 10 million green jobs. However, current results are far below the targets set, with somewhere between 4-20% of the total area restored by 2020. While large sums have been pledged, such as $19bn at the One Planet Summit in 2021, little of this has been realised; noting that sustainable land management, given its nature, take some time to materialise and show impact.
  - At the same time, the EU announced at COP27 that it has over-delivered on its commitment of EUR 700 million per year, and new national projects in Senegal and Niger are receiving support. In total, more than 188,000 hectares of land were restored in 2022 under the Re-greening Africa programme, notably through agroforestry, mainly in countries of the Great Green Wall.

- **The NaturAfrica**
  - This key initiative has funding earmarked for EUR 1.4 billion to 2025 (out of a global EU budget of EUR 7 billion for biodiversity by 2027). It aims at supporting biodiversity conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa by taking an innovative people-centred approach. By structuring support on Key Landscapes for

- The regional NaturAfrica programme on transboundary landscapes was adopted at the end of 2022 and interventions will cover 44 countries and more than 35 transboundary and national landscapes. Launched in 2021 at the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) World Conservation Congress in Marseille, the initiative received new impetus at the CBD (Biodiversity Conference)'s COP15 in Montreal in December 2022; and more recently at the Congo Basin Forest Partnership in March 2023 (Libreville, Gabon), and at the 1st African Protected Areas Congress in March 2023 (Kigali, Rwanda).

• ‘Transboundary Water Management’ Team Europe Initiative:

- The TEI aims to harness water’s potential for domestic use, agriculture, fishing, energy, transportation, biodiversity and environment. Eventually the TEI will cover 60% of the African territory and benefit 900 million people, accelerating transboundary water management and supporting regional integration. With a total budget of EUR 404 million, an upscale of this envelope is foreseen with the progressive inclusion of blended finance and EIB actions. The TEI-TWM provides a framework for coordinated action between EU Member States, the EU and the EIB. On the AU side, the member states, the AU Commission, the African Ministers’ Council on Water (AMCOW), the African Network of Basin Organisations (ANBO), and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are involved as partners.

- Some country programmes are contributing to the efforts of the TEI through sustainable landscapes or water basin management, notably in Senegal, Kenya, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Central and Southern Africa. Similarly, at basin and regional level, some water management projects have either started or are in preparation.

- Additional initiatives were announced in October 2023 during the Global Gateway Forum:

  - EUR 20.4 million contribution to the Green and Blue Deal – Comoros Ulanga ne Maesha (Environment for Life) programme signed in October 2023 focusing on boosting Comoros’s environmental and food resilience.

  - EUR 15 million support to Senegal to improve ecological state of Hann Bay to address pollution and install wastewater treatment units. This is part of a wider project, together with France and the Netherlands, which has totalled EUR 187.6 million.

**Potential areas of action:**

- Africa and EU need to jointly reaffirm their commitment to important climate resilience initiatives, such as the Great Green Wall, and ensure the means are available for effective roll-out, monitoring and evaluation. At the same time, new projects, such as the Transboundary Water Management project, which has much to contribute to Africa’s climate objectives, require investment to ensure visibility and secure high-level buy-in.

- Improve access to, and quality of, existing climate finance requires priority actions. While the need to increase funding to address complex climate challenges is clear, many African governments face complicated, time-consuming procedures to access existing facilities. Tight rules on which bodies can receive funding, lack of harmonisation between funds and the length of time it takes to get to disbursement, are all areas where progress needs to be made.

- EU domestic policies on green transition, such as the European Green Deal and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), have
important consequences for African countries, both positive and negative. They raise serious concerns at the African level and merit closer discussion between Africa and EU before they are imposed, with a longer time-period agreed to enable African economies to adjust.

- The climate conversation and policies need to include health. The climate change crisis nurtures a global health crisis that defies business-as-usual approaches. Policymakers and funders must reflect this urgency and rapidly scale-up efforts to develop innovative financing modes for climate-resilient health investments and fund innovative local approaches to climate adaptation.

**Graphic 8: Climate-health nexus: Climate change effects on health and health systems**

- Climate change's severe and accelerating impact on human health and health systems risks hard-won gains in global health and poverty reduction.
- The poorest countries and people shoulder the heaviest burden of climate change while contributing the least to its causes.
- Despite the urgent need in impacted countries, funding for climate adaptation is inadequate.

- Preventable environmental issues cause 1 in 4 deaths globally.
- If left alone, the health impacts of climate change could push an additional 132M people into extreme poverty by 2030.
- The African continent makes up just 17% of the global population but accounts for only <4% of greenhouse gas emissions. However, it experiences almost 35% of all global mortality attributed to climate-related disasters.
In Focus: Update from the AEF Working Group on Climate Adaptation

Africa and Europe are both facing a climate crisis, but the debate on how to tackle this joint crisis should be framed around how to find substantial common ground and solutions. The extreme weather events of the last years have demonstrated the vulnerability of the two continents. The two continents’ multiple regions face a growing common challenge to which they need to find solutions both in the immediate and in the longer-term.

The European Union (EU) has started taking proactive measures to tackle the climate crisis by putting in place several sets of regulations and standards to stay within the planetary boundaries and undertaking investments to foster green growth. The African Union (AU) endorsed the continent’s first collective climate response framework, the AU’s Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032), with a particular focus on strengthening adaptation, enhancing financial flows and leveraging regional flagships.

Despite being at different levels of human and economic development, the two continents would benefit from strengthening a shared vision on adaptation, on which to build a solid partnership, through the reinforcement of a joint learning platform, from which experts can share know-how and best practices, and develop cross-continental solutions which support both sides.

The aim of the AEF Working Group on Climate Adaptation is to leverage the platform established by the AEF in 2022, amplifying both African and European voices on adaptation-related issues, with experts exchanging knowledge, best practices, and identifying gaps and investments/projects possibilities, as well as to mainstream adaptation in the Partnership.

The EU, together with its member states, has positioned itself as the largest contributor to climate finance globally. Funds, estimated to be more than 20 billion euros per year, have been allocated for Africa specifically to respond to this crisis with several structures to channel investments. However, these steps are seen with much scepticism in Africa because of the lack of capacity to access climate finance, inadequate financing both in terms of quantity and quality, limited progress in leveraging public funding to attract large-scale private investments, and a skewed focus on climate mitigation when Africa, like much of the developing world, above all needs financing for adaptation and resilience.

At the 6th Summit, climate action was one of the priority areas of discussion. At COP27, the Team Europe Initiative on Climate Adaptation and Resilience in Africa was launched with an envelope of EUR 1 billion. However, since then, whilst the scope has been broadened to additional EU countries, there has been little sign of progress on delivery, and limited rapprochement between Europe and Africa on adaptation-related issues. This includes getting agreement on the Global Goal on Adaptation, the delivery of EUR 100 billion per year promised for 2020, the doubling of adaptation finance, and an increased share of adaptation finance as part of the New Quantified Goal on Climate Finance.
OCEANS AND BLUE ECONOMY

The Ten Commitments Framework

COMMITMENT 6: Investment Package (Energy, Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Energy Transition, Green Transition, Digital Transformation, Sustainable Growth and Decent Job Creation, Transport Facilitation, and Human Development)

Main Commitments

Investment in the Green transition including supporting the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) of African Countries under the Paris Agreement to enhance mitigation and adaptation

Context:

Ocean represents a strategic domain of cooperation, with great potential. It is gaining increasing traction politically, as seen through the outcomes of the 2022 UN Ocean Conference, the 2023 Our Ocean Conference, and the adoption of the High Seas Treaty in June 2023 and ongoing preparation for the 2025 UN Ocean Conference, to be co-hosted by France and Costa Rica. The EU communication on international ocean governance was adopted in June 2022. This domain remains however still peripheral to the AU-EU partnership.

Examples of progress to date:

• COP27 saw the launch of a Blue Mediterranean Partnership on sustainable blue financing with the Union for the Mediterranean, EIB, KfW and EBRD. This aims to support the transition to a sustainable blue economy in the European Union’s Southern Neighbourhood countries in the Mediterranean region. Another partnership was announced at COP28, to restore and protect the Mediterranean: the Blue Mediterranean Partnership (BMP). Its implementation fund is hosted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) will target concrete investments in biodiversity protection, sustainable fisheries and aquaculture, reduction of plastic pollution, and sustainable tourism in non-EU Mediterranean countries.

• Furthermore, funding has been committed to support programmes adopting and promoting a seascape approach. These programmes cover several thematic areas, including international ocean governance, sustainable blue economy, the conservation/restoration of marine and coastal ecosystems, as well as marine science. This support is at national, regional, sub-continental and multilateral level and provides a strong basis for renewed impetus for the development of an African-Europe partnership on the ocean.

• The AU Centres of Excellence (AU-CoEs) are specialised institutions and research centres dedicated to enhancing the capacity of African countries to govern and manage their marine and freshwater resources effectively by developing knowledge and the necessary skills in steering solutions to advance Africa's sustainable development of fisheries, aquaculture and blue economy. In January 2023, the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) established a network of eight CoEs across Africa (with two additional centres expected).

• In 2022, the EU allocated EUR 5 million to support scientific and technological support to SSA Regional Centres of Excellence. They will contribute to addressing critical knowledge gaps in marine science needed to deliver equitable and just adaptation strategies for coastal communities.
• Recognizing the inherent transboundary nature of marine resources, which underscores the imperative for regional cooperation, the EU has committed EUR 180 million to bolster regional ocean programs. This commitment is strategically directed across three key axes: ocean governance, sustainable blue economy, and the conservation/restoration of marine and coastal ecosystems. A significant aspect of the regional programmes in Africa involves addressing the pressing issue of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, building on other ongoing programs (e.g. PESCAO and ECOFISH).

• In addition to this, as part of the EU-Tanzania Annual Action Plan, the two sides announced a Team Europe Initiative on Blue Economy for EUR 110 million. One can expect other initiatives of this kind to be replicated across the African continent, building on the 30 multi-annual indicative programmes (MIPs) that include ocean-focused actions for Africa.

• Also, the EU launched in 2023 a EUR 10 million specific programme in Mauritania, promoting the blue economy, eco-friendly fishing systems and strengthen fisheries value chain.

Potential areas of action:

• It is crucial to monitor progress and evaluate the effectiveness of existing initiatives and actions. This will help the partnership achieve its desired outcomes, and ensure necessary adjustments are made promptly. It would be valuable to conduct an analysis of existing/previous initiatives on ocean governance and blue economy which could be replicated at the Africa-Europe level.

• The partnership can offer technical assistance and capacity building to African countries to help develop ocean governance frameworks tailored to their situation and aligned with ongoing international treaties’ discussion. This includes providing training, sharing best practices, and facilitating knowledge exchange between the two continents.

• Africa and Europe could join efforts at a multilateral level to address collective responsibility regarding the state of the ocean and strengthen international ocean governance. As such, opportunities lie in the two continents working jointly towards:
  ○ Aligning policies and strategies between the EU and Africa to create a harmonized approach to ocean governance, fostering a collaborative and mutually beneficial partnership.
  ○ Supporting the strengthening of governance structures, regulatory bodies, and enforcement mechanisms at both regional and national levels to ensure effective implementation of agreements and protection of critical marine zones.
  ○ Ratifying and implementation of the High Seas Treaty, the Plastic Treaty currently negotiated, the Ocean and Climate Dialogue at the UNFCCC COPs, as well as in ensuring the full implementation of latest policy developments, including the WTO Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.
  ○ Facilitating and promote transboundary cooperation on marine resources management, recognizing the interconnectedness of marine and coastal ecosystems across borders and international waters.
  ○ Collaborating to establish and strengthen legal frameworks that promote transparency, accountability, and sustainability in marine and coastal activities, fostering a conducive environment for investments.

• Africa and Europe could convene leaders from the two continents to elevate the bar politically and financially for the ocean. A Ministerial Conference could be supported by the work of the Africa-Europe Strategy Group on Ocean Governance, to advance continental priorities, seek common ground and mobilise a Team Europe approach for the benefit of the cross-continental partnership.
In Focus: Update from the AEF Strategy Group on Ocean Governance and Blue Economy

Ocean governance and blue economy represent a strategic domain of cooperation which is not yet central to the AU-EU dialogue – but one with immense potential. The two continents could greatly benefit from establishing a permanent Africa-Europe dialogue platform and ‘action tank’ on ocean governance, to incubate continuously strategic and concrete proposals and initiatives, share innovative practices, advance joint advocacy, and enhance the Partnership.

Launched in 2023, the Africa-Europe Strategy Group on Ocean Governance and Blue Economy, facilitated by the Africa-Europe Foundation, under the leadership of the European Commission and in partnership with the African Union Commission has started developing a shared vision on oceans, on which to build a solid Partnership which supports both sides.

2024 is poised to be a pivotal year for international ocean treaties and renewed political leadership on both sides of the Mediterranean Basin, and 2025, will be anchored by the 7th AU-EU Summit, and the 3rd United Nations Ocean Conference (UNOC3), the two continents should seize this window of opportunity to work better together on issues related to ocean governance and the blue economy.

There are key common priorities that provide the basis for advancing the Africa-Europe Ocean Partnership, with the potential to deliver solutions to existing challenges and advancing practical actions on the ground for communities and natural ecosystems. These should center on governance by reinforcing multilateralism and advancing global treaties, and capacity sharing through the exchange of the best available science, data, and policy options to forge a mutually beneficial partnership focused on self-interest and co-benefits.

On governance, cross-continental policy alignment and joint action at the multilateral level could offer the opportunity for both continents to work towards the full ratification and operationalization of the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ) and the Global Plastics Treaty, as well as to work collectively towards eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies and debating the contentious issue of deep-sea mining. Seeking alignment on these would demonstrate Africa-Europe unity on the international stage and joint leadership in driving the ocean agenda for its sustainable management and protection.

Furthermore, witnessing the African ocean leadership in spearheading the development of a regenerative blue economy is an opportunity to create programming synergy and partnership action with Europe. By working jointly in supporting Africa-led leadership and initiatives, the Africa-Europe partnership can be reframed at bi-continental and international level. Recent African ocean leadership is inspirational and offers a springboard of opportunities for joint action.

To achieve SDG14 by 2030, it is also imperative to build new capabilities in Africa and Europe, supported by partners who are at the forefront of international experience. In doing so, attention should be geared towards pressing issues that require urgent solutions. This includes the management of fisheries, but from the perspective of adding greater transparency to the system, and contributing to fighting illegal fishing activities while increasing the collection of data and knowledge around fish stocks. Tackling such issues would have direct implications for reducing food insecurity and improving human’s livelihoods and marine ecosystems.

In the same vein, establishing a cross-continental network of knowledge hubs, leveraging the best EU and AU centres in existence, including the recently designated African Union’s
Centres of Excellence (AU-CoEs), could significantly contribute to enhance evidenced-based policymaking, programming, and improve ocean literacy at large. Such a network could serve as a landmark of cooperation and promote the sharing of the best available science, policies, and data across the two continents. There is already a lot of good practices in Africa, including traditional knowledge, which could be beneficial for Europe. Working in tandem on specific issues could be instrumental in solving these.

Given that Africa and Europe have shared ocean and seascapes, the sharing of best practices represents a strategic opportunity to connect the two continents’ experiences and obtain concrete results for socio-economic and environmental development – aligned with international global frameworks and latest declarations affecting the two continents.

DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

The Ten Commitments Framework

| COMMITMENT 6: Investment Package (Energy, Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Energy Transition, Green Transition, Digital Transformation, Sustainable Growth and Decent Job Creation, Transport Facilitation, and Human Development) |
| Investment in digital transformation that supports trusted connectivity through investments in infrastructures and an affordable and enhanced access to the digital and data economy while boosting digital entrepreneurship and skills |

Context:

- Overall, the EU is looking to quickly scale up and expand its investments in digital portfolio, and to demonstrate what a European model of digital cooperation has to offer. Implementation of digital infrastructure and transformation initiatives face challenges not only in Africa but across many countries globally; competing models of digital transformation, such as promoted by China under the Digital Silk Road in Africa, offer different, and often incompatible approaches to governance and data protection. As such, this continues to raise concerns regarding digital governance and state surveillance in Africa and across the globe.
- The digital transformation is central to the AU’s Agenda 2063, with three out of the 15 AU Flagships centred around digital and space: the Pan-African Virtual and E-University which, despite effective rollout of online curricula and rising numbers of applicants, is facing challenges in terms of financial sustainability and getting continental and international accreditation; the Pan-African E-Network on telemedicine and tele education, which has been extended for a second phase in collaboration with the Government of India; and the Africa Outer Space Strategy (discussed more in detail under Commitment 4).
- Regional initiatives are also taking shape, such as the Amilcar Cabral submarine line to be spearheaded by the ECOWAS Commission, with the feasibility study of the project yet to be approved. Such digital infrastructure projects tend to be very ambitious with a strong potential for transformation and impact, but progress is slow with initiatives still at early implementation stages. In this context, it might be opportune to consider complementary technologies based on the use of satellites to enable cost-effective and inclusive access to internet.
As an enabler for other areas, digital solutions play a central role in the implementation of many of the initiatives across the different commitment areas, from digital skills and education (e.g., the regional teacher training programme) to the development of green data centres as a key part of the green transition, or of improved health access. As such, AU-EU digital cooperation has recently included work on Artificial Intelligence and the nexus between digital and space technology, and led to development of Digital Economy Packages with Kenya, Nigeria and the DRC.

**Examples of progress to date:**

**Infrastructure**

Aligned with the *AU Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030)* and the international aspects of the EU’s Digital Compass:

- The EU *EurAfrica Gateway*, has feasibility studies under way to identify the digital connectivity submarine cable infrastructures to form an international submarine fibre cable system connecting Europe and Africa, providing Africa with secure and trusted access to global networks.

- The *Amilcar Cabral submarine*, a high-speed infrastructure to join Guinea, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone for a total budget of USD 74.5 million. The ECOWAS Commission spearheads the project with the feasibility study yet to be approved.

- The *Medusa Project*, a collaboration between the EU and EIB to provide underwater cable to connect Europe with North Africa, is under development at a total estimated cost of EUR 342 million, with the EU providing a grant contribution of EUR 40 million and EIB of EUR 100 million, expected for completion in 2026.

- The *Regional Fiber Optic Backbones* across Africa, with an initial pipeline of investment opportunities in all sub-regions identified by the EU and ongoing discussions with DFIs.

These include the completion of the Central African Republic fibre optic cable, as well as the second phase of a fibre optic backbone and solar-power cell phones towers in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

- The *Satellite-Based Connectivity Across Africa*, partly financed under the Global Gateway, to provide satellite connectivity to underserved regions, with deployment expected to begin in 2025 and a start of operations in 2027-2028.

- The *Africa Connected* guarantee programme, launched at the Global Gateway Forum in October 2023 in partnership with Finnfund, entails EUR 100 million in guarantee capacity to mobilise more than EUR 1 billion in sustainable investments for digital infrastructure and digital service platforms in Sub-Saharan Africa.

**Digital entrepreneurship and skills**

- The *African-European Digital Innovation Bridge (AEDIB)* design phase is under completion, and aims at addressing policy, regulation and access to finance.

- The *Digital for Development (D4D) Hub* and *D4D Access initiatives*, launched in 2020, aim to foster human-centric digital transformation and upscale investments in a Team Europe approach, with now 14 EU Member States participating.

- *SMEs AFRICA* promotes Copernicus EO data access to end-users in African countries including Gabon, Senegal, Ethiopia and South-Africa to address climate change and sustainable development.

- *Space2Waves* foster earth observation technologies in six Blue Growth sectors and support European SMEs’ competitiveness by promoting access to international markets including South Africa.

- The *AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Pan-African Virtual and E-University (PAVEU)*, launched in December 2019, aims to use ICT-based programs to increase access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa.
• The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship **Pan-African E-Network** aims to build capacity for service delivery in the bio and nanotechnology industries, quality education, as well as medical tele-expertise and consultations. The first phase of the project was launched in 2009 in partnership with the Government of India. The Agreement has been signed by 48 AU Member States and was extended in 2018. A Satellite Hub Earth Station in Dakar and 150 VSAT pieces of equipment have been installed. 22,000 students obtained degrees; 770 annual tele-medicine consultations were carried out; and 6,700 Continuous Medical Education (CME) sessions held.

**Data and data governance**

• The **AU-EU Data Governance in Africa Initiative**, co-financed as an EU Global Gateway initiative at EUR 60 million, and building on the **Data Policy Framework** developed by the AU in 2022, is in the inception stage. It will work on three objectives with different geographies: support to the implementation of the **AU continental Data Policy Framework**, data value in around 6 priority countries, call for proposals for **Digital Social Innovations across Africa** and development of a pipeline of investments for data infrastructure such as **Green Data Centres**, national and regional actions on eGovernance and Regulatory Cooperation.

• **National Artificial Intelligence (AI) Policies** have been adopted in Rwanda, Ghana and Senegal.

**Digital economy**

• As an example, TEI in Kenya at EUR 437 million on **Human Centred Digitalisation**, with a **Digital Transformation Centre** launched in May 2023 to promote digital connectivity, jobs, skills, digital business, and digital government.

• Additional Digital Economy Packages were launched in Nigeria, with EUR 820 million in support of Nigeria's digital transformation strategy covering infrastructure for high-speed connectivity, digitalisation of public administration, data governance, and digital skills and innovations, and the DRC, with investments covering new digital infrastructure and data governance.

**Potential areas of action:**

• While the potential of AI technologies across a variety of sectors has been widely recognised, many AU member states are lacking the necessary environment to enable effective adoption of AI, including access to reliable energy, infrastructure, data ecosystems, STEM education and governance. Digital-led space technology, and in particular geospatial data, provide opportunities across a wide spectrum of Africa-Europe cooperation from natural resources management and increased connectivity, to enhanced disaster monitoring and environmental protection. To further advance cooperation in these areas, addressing gaps in infrastructure, regulatory environment, skills and finance remain key.

**Additional comments:**

• EU initiatives aimed at accelerating the digital transformation register some progress in their design and sign-off phases. However, while progress is made on specifying funding sources and project details, initiatives remain at a very early stage. The most advanced project is the **Digital for Development (D4D) Hub**, already launched in 2020, and increasingly associating partner countries in a Team Europe approach, with 15 Member States participating, together with the private sector, civil society organisations, and academia.
# REGIONAL INTEGRATION

## The Ten Commitments Framework

| COMMITMENT 7: Implementation of the Investment Package through Public Funds and Innovative Financing, and Boosting Regional and Continental Economic Integration | Boost regional and continental economic integration, particularly through the AfCFTA. Work gradually towards the progressive and mutually beneficial integration of our respective continental markets |

- The **African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)** is a key Flagship of AU Agenda 2063. Adopted in March 2018, to date 54 AU Member States have signed the AfCFTA Agreement, 47 Member States have ratified it, and 46 have deposited their instruments of ratification.

## Box 15: The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)

AfCFTA, stemming from Agenda 2063, unites 55 AU members and 8 RECs, forming the world's largest free trade area. It aims to:

- Elevate 30 million Africans from extreme poverty and increase incomes for 68 million living on less than $5.50 a day.
- Raise Africa's income by $450 billion by 2035, boosting the world's income by $76 billion.
- Increase exports by $560 billion, primarily in manufacturing, leading to substantial wage gains, especially for women (10.5%).
- Attract 111% to 159% more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), with Europe, Asia, North America, and South America as key contributors.

Main progress of AfCFTA initiatives include:

- On trade in goods, 43 countries have submitted their tariff offers to liberalise trade.
- On rules of origin negotiations, about 87% of the tariff lines have been agreed upon.
- 42 initial submissions by State and non-State Parties have been made, covering the five priority sectors to advance the implementation of the objectives of the Protocol on Trade in Services.
- In May 2021, the Phase II Committees have been established to facilitate negotiations on the Protocols on Investment, Competition Policy, Intellectual Property Rights, Ecommerce, and on Women and Youth in Trade.
- The AfCFTA Committee of the Director Generals of Customs has been established.
- Work to operationalise the Dispute Settlement Mechanism is underway.
- The Business Investment Forum was launched in August 2021 to further expand bilateral business relations. The Forum has not been convened since.
Examples of progress to date:

- EU EUR 630 million support to African economic integration and trade, particularly through the AfCFTA, Regional Trade Agreements, and also bilateral agreements such as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
  - EU EUR 40 million TEI Technical Assistance Facility to the AfCFTA Secretariat, signed in December 2021 and co-funded by FR, DE, and SE, is operational since June 2022.
  - Support in specific key trade areas, such as: tariffs (e-tariff book launched in July 2022); rules of origin (EUR 6 million programme); technical barriers to trade and quality infrastructure, and trade in services (two programmes totalling EUR 245 million).

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship African Commodities Strategy aims to transform Africa from a raw materials supplier and integrate it within global value chains. Strategy and an Action Plan were adopted in September 2021. Ongoing initiatives include:
  - The development of the agro-processing and value chain within the framework of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).
  - Harnessing the Blue Ocean Economy.

- The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship African Economic Platform (AEP) is a forum bringing together African political leadership, private sector, academia, and civil society to reflect on how to accelerate Africa’s economic transformation and progress on the Agenda 2063 goals. The first, and only to date, forum was held in Mauritius in 2017. AU plans for another forum to take place in 2024 or 2025.

- The 7th EU-Africa Business Forum (EABF) was held in February 2022. EU supports with EUR 15 million investment the establishment of a permanent EABF structure to further stimulate, enlarge and deepen the engagement of private sector actors. This permanent structure will be operational from the second half of 2024.

- Several studies were launched in 2022 to identify regional value chains. One of them, an AU-EU value chain diagnostic, identified four regional and high yield value chains for further consideration: infant food, automotives, pharmaceuticals and cotton apparel. The EU is working to further promote its collaboration with the AUC through participation in a Steering Committee on Regional Value Chains and plans to contribute to its resulting action plans.

- The EU is supporting the AUC in developing a continental African Circular Economy Action Plan.

- Key initiatives for SME support – specifically youth business – include the Team Europe Initiative Investing in Young Businesses in Africa (TEI IYBA) in Sub-Saharan Africa. The initiative aims to help young businesses and entrepreneurs in Africa, especially women, to launch, consolidate and grow sustainable businesses and create decent jobs. To date, the initiative has been launched at country level in Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Togo, Comoros and soon in Benin, South Africa and Cameroon. It encompasses 180 programmes amounting to EUR 4.6 billion, including:
  - EUR 22.65 million for the IYBA SEED programme which aims at supporting the entrepreneurship ecosystem in a comprehensive manner in selected African countries;
  - EUR 38 million for the Women Entrepreneurship for Africa programme targeting entrepreneurial skills and focusing on MSMEs and business support organisations;
  - EUR 40 million for the Developing Employment in Senegal programme.
  - Within the European Funds for Sustainable Development + (EFSD+) MSME window, a strong emphasis has been placed on aligning proposals with TEIs and specifically with the TEI IYBA.
Youth-specific support includes initiatives of key cooperation between the EU and AU, such as the ongoing AU-EU Youth Hub and the new AU-EU Youth Lab and newly launched *The Youth Empowerment Fund* in October 2023. Both are contributing to implementing *the EU Youth Action Plan*, as well as the EU-AU Summit and *Africa Week* recommendations and commitments.

Other areas of EU cooperation include a EUR 750 million *Programme for Infrastructure Investments* agreed at the Commission-to-Commission meeting in November 2022 which supports critical continental infrastructure, including transnational connectivity.

A new *EU-AU High Level Dialogue on Economic Integration* was established with its first meeting set to take place at the next EU-AU Ministerial. Its main goal is sharing EU experience relevant to the implementation of AfCFTA and promoting business links between the continents.

**Potential areas of action:**

- The EU has been supporting AfCFTA with significant investments. It will be crucial to align external investments with EU trade policy, especially around agriculture and climate, to ensure EU policy does not undermine early efforts in establishing a common free trade area in Africa. Coordination and cooperation with European partners, such as DG Trade and DG AGRI, the DFIs and European private sector, will be necessary to ensure support to AfCFTA.

- The more concrete steps to strengthen efforts around the implementation of AfCFTA are a positive development. The current very low level of intra-regional trade in Africa—18%, compared to 68% in Europe— is an important obstacle to economic development as few African domestic markets have a sufficient critical mass to promote economic diversification and promote industrial specialisation. With 30 years of implementation of the EU Single Market, the EU can share its experience with AfCFTA, both in tariffs harmonisation and reduction of non-trade barriers. Launching the newly established High-Level Dialogue on Economic Integration can provide a good platform for exchanging lessons, while respecting each other’s sovereignty over implementation plans and proposals.

**Additional comments:**

- Bilateral Economic Partnership Agreements and trade deals with individual African countries may undermine the AfCFTA. Both EU and AU partners are responsible for ensuring the trade and economic partnership agreements do not weaken the strategic objectives of AfCFTA.

- The monitoring and discussion of all EU programmes on continental, regional and multi-country economic integration and trade is assured by the *Sub-Saharan Africa Multi Indicative Programme, Thematic Consultative Group on Economic Integration and Trade*. The Group is comprised of the EU, AfCFTA Secretariat, AUC, RECs, representatives of regional Business Councils, and International Financial Institutions. Three meetings have already been held, including the latest one in Arusha in March 2023.

- *Transport corridors* provide a good opportunity to strengthen African market integration, and support its operationalisation in a specific location at a concrete time. The flagship infrastructure development projects under AU PIDA, as well as the 12 *Strategic Corridors* identified under the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package are an important support to realising successful development corridors in Africa and enhancing the AfCFTA by unblocking infrastructure bottlenecks.
This chapter deals with commitment 8 of the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: renewed and enhanced cooperation for peace and security.
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Context:

• Important preventative peacebuilding work is being ensured by youth with opportunities for enhanced Africa-Europe exchange. From the UN Youth, Peace and Security Agenda, to the Youth for Peace (Y4P) Africa Programme, the European Youth Forum, and Women and Youth in Democracy Initiative (WYDE) - there is an increasingly strong network and international exchange among young people. They aim to underpin institutional peacebuilding processes and strengthen the rights, empowerment, and participation in public and political life of youth and women as key actors of development and change. Building on this, ensuring strengthened and regular exchanges among youth and women between both continents remains a high priority.
• The largest share of the AU's total budget is spent on its Peace Support Budget, representing 43% of its budget in 2022. Additional focus should be placed on support for predictable financing of AU-led peace support operations mandated by the UN Security Council, through UN-assessed contributions, and pressure put on the UNSC to reach an agreement on this long-standing matter.
• Regardless of significant progress on peace and security in the African region since the start of the millennium, 2020 has seen an increase in military coups in Africa. The recent coups underscore challenges governments face in addressing extremism, growing insecurity, economic instability, and rising poverty rates. More preventive robust actions should be explored to solve burgeoning crises and ensure attention is paid to governance and economic development, complementing an EU focus which currently tends to overemphasise security and counterterrorism measures.
• Despite the surge in coups in Africa, Europe's attention has remained largely focused on Russia's war in Ukraine, and more recently on the Israel-Palestine crisis. Out of the European Peace Facility's total EUR 12 billion budget for 2021-2027, the EU has allocated EUR 3.6 billion for Kyiv. By comparison, it has allocated EUR 730 million to the AU covering its peace support operations between 2022-2024. Continued support for Africa-led peace initiatives is key. Building the AU’s security capacity represents a long-term investment, acknowledging that tangible results may not occur immediately, particularly amid the current complex global landscape.
• The four Western African countries to experience a coup d'état between 2021 and 2023 - Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger - shared common trends: The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) has reported a decline between 2017 and 2021 both in ‘Overall Governance’, and ‘Security & Rule of Law and Participation, Rights & Inclusion’. Burkina Faso (-34.2, 1st), Mali (-12.1, 5th), and Niger (-8.9, 7th) were all among the ten most declined countries in Africa in the sub-category ‘Security & Safety’ since 2017.
• Data shows that African coups did not have a positive impact on the security situations they allegedly aimed to address but brought higher insecurity and worsening domestic circumstances. The latest 2022 IIAG findings for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger highlight a declining security situation and a shrinking participatory environment over the years 2017 to 2021, while data analysis from 2021 onwards also shows that insecurity worsened after coups.
Examples of progress to date:

• The AU is taking a growing stance against unconstitutional changes of government. The AU has developed a series of definitions and response toolkits to deter unconstitutional changes of government and protect democracy on the continent. The AU’s response toolkit includes suspension from all the organisation’s activities, as well as sanctions in cooperation with RECs. As of September 2023, countries suspended for unconstitutional changes of government are Burkina Faso (February 2022), Gabon (August 2023), Guinea (September 2021), Mali (June 2021), Niger (July 2023) and Sudan (April 2023). Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger are under ECOWAS sanctions which range from travel/visa bans to financial asset freezes. However, these stances are not necessarily mirrored at global multilateral level—as Burhan’s participation at last UNGA shows. This considerably weakens AU’s position and points towards better coordination.

• The launch of the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT) is an important development. Launched in July 2023 by the AU and UNDP, the AFSIT aims to provide specific programmatic support to countries undergoing complex political transitions or at risk of political crisis. They assist in the development of credible, inclusive and legitimate transition roadmaps, mechanisms and institutions, ultimately leading to the restoration of constitutional rule, democracy and stability in relevant countries. The EU joining that effort would be welcome.

## PARTNERSHIP FOR SECURITY AND PEACE

### The Ten Commitments Framework

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<th>Main Commitments</th>
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<td>I. Addressing the entire conflict cycle, through a renewed and enhanced cooperation for peace and security premised on the principle of African solutions to African problems, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and reflected in the AU-EU Memorandum of Understanding on Peace, Security and Governance (2018), designed to combat instability, radicalisation, violent extremism, and terrorism to tackle the root causes of conflicts, and addressing the entire conflict cycle through the integrated approach.</td>
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<td>II. Maintaining peace, security and stability, training, capacity building and equipment by strengthening and scale up autonomous peace operations of African defence and security forces, including through EU missions and assistance measures, as well as support for law-enforcement capacity-building.</td>
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<td>III. Supporting African-led operations and human rights compliance by supporting the implementation of the AU human rights compliance framework in that context and the on-going discussions on the use of UN-assessed contributions for operations authorised by the UN Security Council.</td>
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<td>IV. Cooperating on security and cybersecurity, by intensify our cooperation on security, including on cybersecurity.</td>
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<td>V. Promote the rule of law by implementation of the Women, Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict and the Youth, Peace, and Security Agendas, and underpin it with concrete actions to achieve durable peace.</td>
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<td>VI. Complying with human rights and international humanitarian law by contributing funding to the Human rights and international humanitarian law compliance mechanism.</td>
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I. Addressing the entire conflict cycle

Examples of progress to date:

• Establishment of 12 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations (out of 22) in Africa. More than 2,500 European soldiers, Police officers and civil servants (acting either under a mandate of the UN Security Council or at the request of African partners) train and advise more than 30,000 African counterparts.

• Since the 6th Summit, approved financing for African peace and security under the European Peace Facility (EPF) includes a general programme for support to the AU worth EUR 730 million for the period 2021-24, comprising two assistance measures, the support for the AU totals EUR 130 million in 2021 and EUR 600 million for the period 2022-24.

• Over EUR 78 million for 12 crisis response actions were spent in 2022, including EUR 10 million to support the Académie Internationale de Lutte contre le Terrorisme's regional counterterrorism response.

• Increased focus on Africa under the Strategic Priorities for a more inclusive, action-oriented Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF). The Network was expanded to cover Egypt and work is ongoing to create additional posts, including one in the Gulf of Guinea.

• On November 28, 2022, nine months after the AU-EU Summit, the European Union and African Union evaluated the advancements in Summit commitments related to peace, security, and governance. The assessment took place during the inaugural Senior Official Meetings, reflecting a longstanding cooperation built on African solutions to African problems.

• The second Senior Officials' Meeting under the EU-AU MoU on Peace, Security and Governance was held by videoconference on 30 June 2023. The EU and the AU agreed, inter alia, to establish a structured AU-EU dialogue on Conflict Prevention and Peace Mediation.

• The first Schuman Security and Defence Partnership Forum took place in Brussels in March 2023 with the participation of nine African ministers of defence, the AU, and the League of Arab States. The Forum convened the EU’s closest partners in the field of security and defence and allowed for targeted discussions on common security challenges and common responses. It consolidated implementation of the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences (EUCMP) concept in the Gulf of Guinea and the North-Western Indian Ocean, which contributes to addressing maritime security challenges, deepening European-Africa cooperation, while increasing the EU's capacity to act as a reliable partner and maritime security provider.

• The EU has also been collaborating with African partners at national and regional level on maritime domain awareness, port security and information sharing, with ongoing support in the Gulf of Guinea, Western Indian Ocean and Red Sea region.

• In light of the recognized security needs in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, and Benin, the Council of the European Union initiated a customized decision on December 11th, 2023, to combat armed groups with terrorist affiliations operating in their northern regions. With an initial duration of two years, this initiative will involve the provision of short-term training teams or the deployment of visiting experts, coordinated in conjunction with European Peace Facility (EPF) assistance measures.

• AU-coordinated efforts for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) aim to foster stability across Africa. DDR processes, increasingly vital for peacebuilding, benefit the economy, society, and infrastructure, laying fundamental preconditions for stability. These interventions address fragility in
II. Strengthened autonomous peace operations of African defence and security forces, and support for law enforcement capacity building

Examples of progress to date:

Key initiatives:

- EUR 40.5 million under the IV APSA support programme (APF – 2020-23) designed to improve the AU conflict cycle management under the APSA continental framework.
- EUR 25 million under the III AGA support programme (APF - 2021-24) which aims at strengthening the capacity of AGA Platform.
- EUR 25 million for the third phase of the Early Response Mechanism within its time frame from 2020 to 2024 to prevent violent conflicts or to seek opportunities for peace building. (Chad and Liberia)
- A EUR 600 Assistance Measure General Programme under the European Peace Facility (EPF) supporting the AU aimed at strengthening the armed forces capabilities of individual AU member states.

Bilateral programmes:

- EUR 109 million EU Mozambique bilateral EPF Assistance Measures
- EUR 1 million to bolster the Somali National Army.
- EUR 21 million earmarked for supporting military actors and navies in the Gulf of Guinea.
- EUR 11.75 million dedicated to supporting the Beninese Armed Forces.
- EUR 20 million, under the European Peace Facility, directed to back the 31st Rapid Reaction Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC).
- EUR 4.7 million allocated for supporting the Nigerien Armed Forces with military equipment.

EU civilian and military missions currently operational:

- EUTM-S - Training Mission in Somalia
- EUTM RCA - Training Mission in Central African Republic
- EUTM Mozambique - Training Mission in Mozambique
- EU RACC Sahel
- EU Naval Force Operation ATALANTA
- EUCAP Somalia - Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
- EUCAP Sahel Mali (suspended)
- EUBAM Border Assistance Mission in Libya
- EUAM RCA Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
- IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED) Mission to Monitor Libya’s UN arms embargo
- EUTM Mali - Training Mission in Mali (suspended)
III. Supporting African-led operations and human rights compliance

Examples of progress to date:

- Support of the AU Human Rights Compliance Framework operationalisation through the mobilisation of EUR 10 million;
- Launch of the Tripartite AU-EU-UN compliance and Accountability Framework (AUCF) project in November 2022.

IV. Cooperating on security and cybersecurity

Examples of progress to date:

- The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the EU Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) convened in June 2022 in the new geopolitical context following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Topics included the situation in Libya, Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, and the Great Lakes, ongoing AU Peace Support Operations and ways to enhance their sustainability. Efforts to increase convergence in multilateral fora and address governance challenges by working on preventive diplomacy were discussed.
- CyberSouth project in North African region, and the Tunisia programme on border management.
- The first Cyber Resilience for Development hub was launched in Mauritius in May 2022. It was established in cooperation with Mauritius, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, the Gambia and Rwanda, to support the development of national cyber strategies, implement cyber awareness campaigns, and develop critical infrastructure prevention frameworks. Since its launch, the project has delivered training exercises to Congo-Brazaville, Gambia, and Seychelles.
• The AU Agenda 2063 Flagship Cyber Security aims to incorporate emerging technologies into African development plans while ensuring data protection and online safety. The AU Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection guides this project. 11 Member States out of the required 15 have ratified the Malabo Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. Key developments include:
  o Data protection guidelines developed and launched in 2018.
  o An Africa Cyber Security expert group established in 2019.

V. Promoting the rule of law

Examples of progress to date:

• Support to the development of African election observation capabilities; electoral observation missions
• The EU-AU Human Rights Dialogue;
• The AU Strategic Plan on Protection of children affected by armed conflict (CAAC);
• The EU Youth Action Plan.
• The Africa Governance Architecture (AGA) established as the platform for dialogue between the various stakeholders mandated to promote good governance and strengthen democracy in Africa is supported by the EU through a contribution of EUR 25 million.
• The EU has launched new Actions supporting the AU Transitional Justice as well as its Election Observation and Assistance work. Building on long-standing cooperation premised on African solutions to African problems, a Senior Officials Meeting under the Memorandum on Peace, Security and Governance was held in the margins of the Commission-to-Commission Meeting in November 2022.
• The EU has committed to support the harmonisation of pan-African electoral capacities by strengthening both institutional capacities of continental (AUC- Political Affairs, Peace and Security), regional (RECs) and national authorities, as well as the capacities of civil society organisations.
• Establishment of thematic programmes and flagships contribute to enhancing respect for the rule of law, in legal and judicial reform, the elaboration of sector strategies, institutional capacity development, support to legal aid, access to justice and criminal justice.
• Implementation of the Youth and Women in Democracy initiative which contributes to good governance.
VI. Complying with human rights and international humanitarian law

Examples of progress to date:

• Cooperation centres around the follow-up of the annual Human Rights Dialogue;
• Actions under NDICI-GE’s thematic programme on Human Rights and Democracy;
• EUR 10 million for the Human rights and international humanitarian law compliance, applicable to African-led and mandated peace and security operations.

Additional comments:

• In crisis management and peace support across Africa, EU-Africa collaboration is evident, marked by heightened collaboration and EU backing such as the EU support for Mozambique’s fight against terrorism. The EU remains actively engaged in training the police and military forces of various African nations, like the Central African Republic and Somalia, contributing to their enhanced security.
• Despite these initiatives, challenges loom large. The aftermath of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger led to a reduction in EU cooperation in some areas; notably, the expulsion of French forces, which played important role in combating terrorist and criminal armed groups in the Sahel region. Nevertheless, efforts persist in countering piracy, particularly in crucial areas such as in the North-West Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea.
• The EPF flexibility allows direct financial assistance, including funding for weaponry. While this flexibility is advantageous, it carries inherent risks. Operating outside established AU frameworks may undermine the AU’s authority in this domain and impede fundraising efforts. Striking the right balance between flexibility and adherence to agreed-upon processes is imperative for sustaining effective cooperation.
Chapter 7: Mobility and Migration

This chapter deals with commitment 9 in the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: enhanced and reciprocal partnership for migration and mobility.
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Context:

• Moving between places and across borders is much more than just crossing them. It is a journey of ideas, talent and cultures. Culture and creativity is an area where Africa and Europe present a unique added value: Europe is revered and respected around the world for its culture, art and history, and Africa has demonstrated the value of its cultural dynamism in the areas of fashion, food and music.

• The need to reshape the narrative remains: migrations are a key component of global history; there is no specific 21st century hike; Africa’s migrants mainly move within their own continent; growing contrary demographic trends between ageing Europe and young Africa need to be addressed. Over the past 30 years migration has increased, but not at the same rate as the global population. Looking at African migrations in Europe, only slightly above a quarter (27.2%) of African migrants live in Europe, while slightly above a tenth (12.7%) of all migrants in Europe are African. The majority of African migrants move within their own continent. Most are economic migrations, driven by the search for better prospects. In Europe, migrants continue to be a key solution to labour shortages.

• For some time now, research has revealed public attitudes toward immigration in Europe are not uniform and clear-cut. A 2023 public opinion study found that European natives in areas with a higher proportion of foreign-born populations tend to exhibit less anti-immigrant sentiment. However, a temporary increase in the number of immigrants in a specific region is associated with a more negative outlook. This may help explain why prominent anti-immigration policies continue to be on the political agenda. Yet, there is evidence of changing attitudes at national level; for example, in France positive sentiments towards migrants surpassed negative sentiments in 2016. In 2018, 63% of Swedes reported that immigrants make the country a better place to live. Nevertheless, it is still challenging to develop policy propositions and political narratives that are comprehensive with these positive public attitudes towards immigrants.

Potential areas of action:

• With the European Parliament elections in June 2024 there will likely be heightened attention in Brussels on intra-European debates on irregular migration. In this context preventing irregular migration remains key. This underscores the need for sustained commitment and cooperation among EU member states to develop and implement comprehensive policies that not only deter irregular migration but also address its root causes. This balanced approach is essential for achieving meaningful and lasting solutions.

• While the Continent-to-Continent Migration and Mobility Dialogue and the re-launch of the joint AU-EU-UN Tripartite Task Force aimed at addressing irregular migration
have been welcome developments, action is needed from African countries to accelerate the readmission, repatriation, or reception of migrants and asylum seekers. Stronger enforcement of international and AU standards on human rights must be safeguarded to protect and save lives along the migratory routes, as well as those on the ground.

• **By 2050, Africa will potentially provide 796 million people to the global labour force.** Promoting both relevant education and training, as well as mobility is therefore key. AfCFTA must be accompanied by progress in other African initiatives such as the Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, as for many businesses in Africa it is often easier to employ a skilled non-African expatriate than a skilled African expatriate. The Youth Mobility for Africa initiative, which includes the Erasmus+ programme and Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme and aims to promote student exchanges and targeted scholarships and university collaboration, provides a significant platform for promoting skills exchanges for youth. This can contribute to providing access to talent where there is market demand.

• **Promoting mobility and skills exchanges should not lead to ‘brain drain’ undermining national development strategies.** Progressing with new programmes which aim to attract skilled talent from Africa to Europe, such as the New Talent Partnerships, can contribute to enhancing labour capital. Yet, ensuring a balance between policies and initiatives that provide mobility for skilled workforce, and opportunities for skills development, and take into account domestic development strategies should be prioritised: a) to avoid potential discrepancy on how these initiatives and programmes may potentially counter efforts; and b) to avoid ‘brain drain’.

• **Better and more equal Africa-Europe relations calls for progress in visa regimes.** Schengen countries have established a unified short-stay visa regime, allowing third-country nationals to visit any Schengen Area member for tourism or business for up to 90 days. However, Africans still face stringent visa requirements, with a high rejection rate. At the same time, the ease of access for EU citizen to African e-visas has increased dramatically since 2016.

• **Exchanges among African and European cities are developing, with great potential to contribute to the implementation of the 6th Summit commitments.** For example, the Mayors’ Dialogue managed by ODI, connecting more than twenty cities, from Lisbon to Amsterdam, Accra to Kigali and Abidjan, aims to build on the connections rather than the differences between cities, countries, and continents with a focus on practical innovations, local solutions and learning from each other’s experiences; these networks have great potential for scale-up.
I. Promoting an enhanced and reciprocal partnership for migration and mobility

Examples of progress to date:

• There have been notable efforts to enhance migration dialogues between Africa and Europe, facilitated through the components of the Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD):
  o Three migration dialogues: Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process, and the Continent-to-Continent Migration and Mobility Dialogue (C2CMMD);
  o Joint-Valletta Action Plan (JVAP) Follow-up.

• At continental level: Progress within the C2CMMD framework, implemented by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), rolled out a Training of Trainers (ToT) for the AU Migration Governance Training Programme held in Kenya on 3-7 July 2023. The 14 trainers represented 12 institutions from academia, research and the public sector. Delivered with support from the AUC, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the University of the Western Cape in South Africa (UWC), capacity-building efforts will continue with the certified trainers foreseen to deliver training course across the continent. Additional modules are under development targeting policymakers, local authorities, diplomats, media practitioners, and civil society representatives.

• At regional level multiple activities under the Khartoum Process have taken place, including thematic meetings and workshops focusing on climate change, human mobility nexus, innovative law enforcement tools to curb irregular migration, and the protection of and durable solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Reinforcing the technical
seminars, the *Khartoum Process* leadership held its Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) on 15-16 March 2023 in Berlin, Germany to discuss key priorities and future plans, building a roadmap to reflect on what the immediate, medium- and long-term future holds.

- The *Rabat Process* held its Ministerial Conference in Cadiz, Spain on 13-14 December 2022 leading to the adoption of the *Dialogue’s Political Declaration* and its new multi-annual *Cadiz Action Plan* for 2023-2027. The *Action Plan* presents Five Action Areas, which contains 10 objectives and 29 related actions, aiming to address the current and future challenges faced by partner countries. The Ministerial Conference was also the occasion to bring on board four new members of the Steering Committee (Niger, Nigeria, the Netherlands and Switzerland).

II. Working to prevent irregular migration, enhance cooperation against smuggling and trafficking in human beings

**Examples of progress to date:**

- Two Team Europe Initiatives to combat illegal migration routes were launched in December 2022, focusing on the *Atlantic/Western Mediterranean* and the *Central Mediterranean routes* with overall funding of EUR 2 billion.
  - EUR 675 million EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding, signed in July 2023, for a strategic and comprehensive partnership, which includes EUR 105 million allocated for migration management, including anti-smuggling operations.

- EU’s *Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)* has funded over 250 projects for a total value of EUR 5 billion over the past six years with its main purpose to address the root causes of migration, fight against irregular migration and promote the return and reintegration of migrants.

- The AU Flagship African Passport and Free Movement of People Flagship Project of the AU Agenda 2063 aims to remove restrictions on Africans’ ability to travel, work, and live within their own continent by promoting the issuance of visas by Member States to enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries. Progress to date:
  - Four countries (Rwanda, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mali) have ratified the Protocol as of July 2022.
  - The AUC and UNECA have launched a study to identify the benefits of the free movement of persons for implementing the AfCFTA. AfCFTA Secretariat, RECs and Member States co-organised an expert meeting in March 2023 to make policy recommendations on how to accelerate the ratification of the flagship in support of the implementation of AfCFTA.

- The NDICI-funded *Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration (MPRR)* programme, implemented by IOM, responds to the needs of stranded and vulnerable migrants along migratory routes in African countries, through protection assistance, assisted voluntary return as well as reintegration support.

**Coupled with the EUTF, other projects and policies include:**

- Renewed *EU Action Plan* against migration smuggling from the period of 2021-2025 aims to strengthen cooperation and information sharing between EU countries and law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute smuggling networks.

- The *Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC)* created in 2017, ended its project in 2023 to jointly identify key threats to effective border management in Africa. Project
outcomes have been handed over to border police analysts, which include the risk analysis cells of eight countries: Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo. Cooperation between the AFIC countries is foreseen to continue through workshops, plenary meetings, trainings, and other trainings in the future.

**Funded under the EU’s national and regional 2021-2027 financial envelopes, several actions and initiatives were launched covering all aspects of migration and mobility including:**

- Migration management and preventing irregular migration (e.g., various measures under the EC’s *Action Plan for the Central Mediterranean*);
- Return, readmission and sustainable reintegration (including a EUR 170 million regional programme on migrant protection and voluntary return and reintegration);
- Cooperation against the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings (e.g., *Anti-Smuggling Operational Partnership* with Niger; regional anti-smuggling actions);
- Addressing forced displacement (e.g., regional actions for Sub-Saharan African on durable solutions, climate-induced displacement and urban displacement, amongst others, as well as the emergency transit mechanisms for evacuations from Libya to Niger and Rwanda);
- Strengthening asylum systems; cooperation on border management (through several programmes covering security and border management);
- Legal pathways (e.g., various mobility initiatives including *Erasmus+*; preparation of possible talent partnerships);
- Investment in skills, education and employment prospects, notably of youth and women.

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**III. Deepening cooperation in finding durable solutions for asylum seekers, refugees, and vulnerable migrants**

**Examples of progress to date:**

- The *Taskforce* met on 1 November 2022 and 20 March 2023. The following commitments were made:
  - Increase engagement and alignment across multilateral forums and enhance EU-AU cooperation on helping Libyan refugees together with the UN.
  - Reaffirm step-up efforts to further support the development of non-discriminatory legal and policy frameworks for migrants and refugees, based on international and AU standards and human rights, with the aim of protecting and saving lives along the migratory routes and particularly in Libya.
  - Enhanced used of *Emergency Transit Mechanisms* in Niger and Rwanda, reiterating the need for coordinated support from the international community to ensure safe and regular pathways for migrants.
IV. Addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and enhance cooperation on tackling all issues related to migration

Examples of progress to date:

• Various programmes funded through NDICI-GE across three pillars: geographic programmes, thematic programmes and rapid response actions; and coupled with EFSD+, which provides an integrated financial package including grants, budgetary guarantees and other financial instruments.

• The AU signed a three-year agreement with the IOM to focus on key areas of governance, continue addressing the root causes of irregular migration, and engage in thematic research as part of the migration intersectionality.

This reinforced the aims of the AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA) and Plan of Action for the period of 2018-2030.

Scaled up policy and programming in the field of displacement and migration related to disasters, climate change, and environmental degradation. Update on Migration Partnership Facility: the MPF has launched 49 projects involving 18 EU Member States and 12 Partner Countries in Africa (out of 24 Partner Countries in total).

V. Further developing pathways for legal migration opportunities between both continents and within Africa

Examples of progress to date:

• With a budget of 9.88 billion EUR for 2021-2027, the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) was established to fund a range of initiatives including resettlement, humanitarian admission and transfers, integration measures, and infrastructures for the reception of third country nationals.

• Migration Partnership Facility (MPF), first launched in 2016, has since launched 48 projects in collaboration with 16 EU Member States and 8 Partner Countries in Africa (out of 16 Partner Countries in total). The MPF continues to manage projects dedicated to supporting mobility schemes between EU and Partner Countries to support youth employment and strengthen cross-border partnerships.

• In April 2022, the EU adopted the Skills and Talent package that aims to address labour market needs linked to current demographic trends and skill shortages in the EU. The package includes legal, operational and policy initiatives, such as the New Talent Partnerships, mobility schemes for work or training at all skill levels, anchored in broader cooperation on migration management. Talent Partnerships have been launched with Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia and under preparation with Nigeria and Senegal. The Talent Partnerships aim to combine direct support for mobility schemes for work or training with capacity building and investment in human capital, including skills development, technical and vocational education and training and work-based exchange schemes. The aim of these actions is to ensure a proportionate win for partner countries, EU member states, business communities on both sides, and those individuals who benefit from the partnerships.
• An Assessment of Legal Labour Migration Frameworks in Africa was updated in 2023 with support from the AU, ILO, IOM and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The continental assessment lauded the efforts of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Ministerial Employment and Labour Committee and the COMESA Business Council (CBC)- for the consistent engagement through policy dialogues and sharing of best practices for the former, and proposals on the gradual elimination of visa requirements within the COMESA region for the latter. Progress is also underway with COMESA and ILO’s work within the Southern Africa Migration Management Programme (SAMM), focused on labour migration and the development of regional databases.

• Support will continue at regional level through a comprehensive programme to maximise the development potential of free movement of persons and migration within a more secure and rights-based ECOWAS in the context of the regional integration process.

VI. Addressing challenges posed by the brain drain, and investing in youth and women

Examples of progress to date:

• During the 6th Summit, the EU Opportunity-driven Skills and VET in Africa was announced aiming to improve access to Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) throughout the continent. The EU Commission provided funding for pilot projects in seven countries to develop TVET curricula and provide training for teachers and instructors.
  o Ethiopia, Togo, and Ghana have made steps to developing its TVET ecosystem with special priority given to core sectors such as agriculture, tourism and manufacturing. These efforts will be key to boosting growth and facilitating economic and social growth.

  o September - October 2023, the second call for the EU SIFA Innovation Window III was launched to continue supporting innovative approaches to skills development and TVET projects in Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Togo and Tunisia. Thematic areas focus on digital tools and skills, women’s entrepreneurship, and training innovation in informal sectors particularly for vulnerable people.
Chapter 8: Multilateralism

This chapter deals with commitment 10 in the Final Declaration of the 6th Summit: promoting effective multilateralism.
KEY OBSERVATIONS

Potential areas of action:

• Africa’s growing representation on the global stage presents opportunities to push common agendas in these institutions. The EU’s support for an African Union seat at the G20, and for a third sub-Saharan African seat on the IMF’s board could pave the way for future cooperation. Close Africa-Europe alignment on reform processes underway in the UN and Bretton Woods institutions remains critical, including a focus on the next IDA replenishment and joint positioning on the WTO reform ahead of MC13.

• Further showcasing and strengthening an Africa-Europe partnership as a middle-ground within the global multilateral system is a key opportunity not to be missed. Efforts can be stepped up on finding common ground to concretely advance multilateral agendas – from health and finance to climate-development. Focus could be on ensuring that the WTO reform process is on target for February 2024, that negotiations around the Pandemic Treaty are accelerated, on facilitating a joint positioning at COP28, as well on IDA replenishment.

• ‘Partnership of shared values’ must not necessarily translate into the 55 AU and 27 EU member states embracing a common position on every issue. This misconception ignores both the historical contexts and current interests of each AU member state, and realities in Europe too. Coalitions of interest can be encouraged with member states joining forces around issues of joint interest to complement institutional processes, offering greater agility and speed in addressing urgent and complex issues across the board.

• Partnership means steering away firmly, on both sides, from the donor-beneficiary approach, to embrace the crafting of common solutions and positions to shared challenges.

• Coalitions of individual member states grouped around issues of common interest are an important opportunity to complement institutional processes. Arrangements of variable geometry offer greater agility and speed in addressing urgent and complex transnational issues. Because of limited institutional constraints, the shared interests of a smaller number of more cohesive members, and their greater ability to mobilise resources in support of joint actions, when traditional mechanisms fail or are blocked due to a lack of consensus, should be exploited. Enhanced investment in such diplomatic alliances across the Africa-Europe Partnership could foster accelerated results in all development domains, be it energy access, food security, global health, climate adaptation, mobility, and youth training and employment.

• The need for frankness about the larger global geopolitical context within which the partnership finds itself, with the EU recognising that Africa cannot be a battleground in a ‘new cold war’ and the opportunity linked to African counterparts partnering with multiple global actors, including BRICS, in an effort to advance shared agendas; and with the AU acknowledging and transparently communicating about the fact that the EU and its member states remain the largest development provider and trade partner.
EFFECTIVE MULTILATERALISM

The Ten Commitments Framework

Main Commitments

| COMMITMENT 10: Promoting effective multilateralism | I. Promoting effective multilateralism, within the rules based international order, with the UN at its core |
| | II. Work towards more converging positions in multilateral fora to reduce global inequalities, strengthen solidarity, promote international cooperation, fight and mitigate climate change and improve delivery on ‘global public goods’, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and AU Agenda 2063 |
| | III. Supporting the reform of the WTO to strengthen the multilateral trading system |
| | IV. Working together to develop WHO international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response as part of its commitment to multilateralism |

I. Promoting effective multilateralism, within the rules based international order, with the UN at its core

Examples of progress to date:

- With the UN at its core, both in Geneva and in New York regular ambassador-level dialogues between the EU, its Member States and the African Group took place.
  - In New-York:
    - Meeting of the EU and African Group Permanent Representatives to the UN in New York in April 2022, and in February 2023
    - Meeting of the EU HRVP with the African Group Permanent Representatives to the UN-NY in July 2022
    - Fourth Trilateral Meeting AU/EU/UN on 18 September 2023 on the margins of the UN General Assembly
    - the triilogue resulted in a call for more robust action to solve crises in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, expressed support for financing of African Union-led peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, and addressed actions needed to accelerate just transitions and to address migration between African and Europe.
  - In Geneva:
    - Sustainable and long-term dialogue between the EU and African Group Permanent Representatives in Geneva launched in May 2022.
    - Second meeting in November 2022 with subgroups focusing on digital, migration and health.

- The AU was granted permanent membership in the G20 at the Delhi Summit on 9-10 September 2023, with the EU supporting a reinforced presence of Africa in multilateral fora, notably in the G20, as expressed by the European Council in June 2023.
- The 78th session of the United Nations General Assembly reaffirmed Africa’s request to drive joint global agendas. Following the AU’s G20 seat, African leaders continued to call for reform of UNSG to become more representative and effective. In their addresses to the UN General Assembly, the Presidents of Ghana, Sierra Leone, Namibia, Angola, Seychelles and Liberia all urged the rebuilding of trust and solidarity in the face of the current interconnected global challenges.
• The Africa-EU Partnership is based on shared commitments to pursue the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development as well as the AU Agenda 2063. The SDGs provides guidance to global action, with the recently adopted EU Voluntary Review showing the progress in the implementation of the SDGs in its main areas of action, notably in the development of the Global Gateway Strategy in Africa. In this line, UNGA78 clearly exposed the need for more ambitious collective action: the midterm report of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development outlined, that while 12% are on track, close to half, though showing progress, are moderately or severely off track and despite the efforts some 30% have either seen no movement or regressed below the 2015 baseline.

II. Work towards more converging positions in multilateral fora

Examples of progress to date:

• Examples of African and European collaboration in the multilateral system include:
  o UNFCCC: the EU and Africa welcomed the Sharm el-Sheikh Implementation Plan. Both continents are committed to the Paris Agreement and the outcomes of the COPs.
  o UNCBD: the EU and the Organisation of ACP States called for an ambitious global agreement on biodiversity.
  o UN Water Conference: launch of the new TEI on Transboundary Water Management in Africa in March 2023.
  o WTO
    » Launch of a climate coalition of trade ministers.
    » Ministerial declarations (Emergency response to Food Insecurity; UN WFP Food Purchases Exemptions from Export Prohibitions and Restrictions).
  » Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies setting bunding rules to curb harmful fisheries subsidies, which are a key factor in the widespread depletion of the world’s fish stocks. The agreement prohibits support for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, bans support for fishing overfished stocks, and ends subsidies for fishing on the unregulated high seas. It also recognises country needs by establishing a fund to provide technical assistance and capacity building to assist in the implementation of the obligations. The EU accepted the agreement in June 2023; Nigeria, Gabon, Gambia, Cote d’Ivoire and Botswana have also accepted.
  o Peacebuilding: UN General Assembly Resolution on Financing for Peacebuilding, facilitated by Kenya and Sweden and adopted by consensus (September 2022).
  o 1st Africa Climate Summit saw a range of partnership announcements and commitments made between European and African countries on adaptation, renewables, digital infrastructure and others. Among such initiatives are:
    » launch of the Green Hydrogen Strategy and Roadmap for Kenya under the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative (grants worth $12 million)
    » announcement by Germany of a EUR 60 million debt swap with Kenya in return for investments in green projects.
    » Finland’s EUR 3 million commitment to strengthen data governance in Africa with a focus on green transition.
Norway’s International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) commitment of $US 25 million between 2023-2026 to support Ethiopia’s forest sector, including the conservation of 1.5 million hectares of forests.

Portugal signed a guarantee agreement with the African Development Bank worth EUR 400 million euros under the Lusophone Compact, to support investments, principally in renewable energies, in Angola, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique and São Tomé e Príncipe.

Belgium announced EUR 24 million to climate adaptation projects in Burundi, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania in 2023 and 2024.

The Samoa Agreement, signed in November 2023, provides a framework for EU-OACPS partnership, replacing the Cotonou agreement. Complemented by 3 regional protocols for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, the Samoa Agreement aims to strengthen the capacity of the EU and ACP countries to jointly tackle global challenges. The EU-Africa Regional Protocol specifically envisions a more prominent role for dialogue between the EU and the AU, aligning with the Comprehensive Strategy for Africa. Pending approval ratification from at least two thirds of OACPS members, the agreement provisionally apply from January 2024.

III. Supporting the reform of the WTO to strengthen the multilateral trading system

Examples of progress to date:

- The 12th WTO Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022 was key for the WTO Reform Process,
  - Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) meeting held on 20 July 2023 ahead of senior officials meeting in Geneva on 23-24 October 2023 prepared a comprehensive process of WTO reform, for delivering meaningful outcomes by the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13) in February 2024.
  - Informal meeting on WTO reform at the request of the African Group and the EU with a focus on trade and industrial policy (25-26 September 2023).
  - The EU and the African Group part of the process on dispute settlement reform the US is leading in Geneva. There is also focus on reforming the deliberative function.
IV. Working together to develop WHO international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response

Examples of progress to date:

- The EU continues to engage with African countries in Geneva to develop a WHO international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (the Pandemic Accord). A draft text of the Accord was shared on 16 October 2023 with the agreement expected to be finalised at the World Health Assembly in 2024.

  - While some progress is under way in developing the Accord, there have been multiple points of contention in the draft texts, including misalignment in demands surrounding IP rights, pathogen access and benefit sharing, financing of research and more broadly issues of national sovereignty and relevant deadlines for agreeing on a pandemic instrument.

  - The draft text of the agreement forms the basis of negotiations with multiple convenings scheduled to conclude the process. Following sessions in 2023, two additional meeting rounds are scheduled in 2024: 19 February - 1 March and 18-29 March. These convenings present an opportunity for EU and AU, and their Member States, to work together for a common positioning as part of the negotiations.

Potential areas of action:

- Reaching an agreement on WTO reform at the 12th Ministerial Conference is noteworthy. There is a window of opportunity to agree a joint position or proposal for a reformed WTO ahead of the 13th Ministerial Conference planned for February 2024. Consultations to this end started between the AU and EU in September 2023 at the request of the African Group.

- The Fourth Trilateral Meeting of the AU, the EU and the UN on the margins of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly called for more robust action to solve crises in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions, expressed support for financing of African Union-led peace support operations mandated by the Security Council, and addressed actions needed to accelerate just transitions and to address migration between African and Europe.

Additional comments:

- Progress linked to the reform of the trading system with the WTO as well as a joint response at the WTO to the food security crisis and overall support to the COP process can be seen as positive examples of strengthened collaboration within the global governance framework.

- Historical data on working together through multilateral system indicates decline. In the context of the UN, historical data on voting coincidence between the EU and AU Member States, as expressed in coincidence with the French vote, shows that alignment between the two blocs has decreased between the periods of 2010-2014 and 2015-2019 (no newer analysis readily available). The same period highlights weakened alignment within the two blocks, not just between them.
Graphic 9: Voting coincidence of EU and AU Member States in the UN (in reference to the French vote) in the periods 2010-2014 and 2015-2019

2010 - 2014

EU coincidence oscillating between 82-88% with Cyprus (72%) and the UK (93%) at the extremes.

Meanwhile, AU coincidence oscillating around 45-50% with South Sudan and Sierra Leone at the extremes at 31% and 52%.

2015 - 2019

EU coincidence oscillating around 84% with Greece (79%) and the UK (93%) at the two extremes.

Meanwhile, AU coincidence oscillating around 50-52% with Cameroon and Liberia and Cabo Verde at the extremes at 36% and 55% for the latter two.
Anchored by the 6th EU-AU Summit, the Africa-Europe Foundation (AEF) has engaged extensively with diverse stakeholders of the Partnership, from its citizen platforms to its multistakeholder Strategy Groups involving leaders from institutions, civil society, academia, the private sector, and policymaking. This included AEF’s far-reaching #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation. This has been complemented by the analysis of mainstream media reporting and large-scale data sets from strategic partners such as Afrobarometer and leading African and European knowledge centres. The following key findings are relevant to the implementation of commitments of the AU-EU Partnership.

Growing misperceptions despite renewed political commitments to the Africa-Europe Partnership. Despite the enhanced political emphasis of a renewed “partnership of equals” created around the 6th Summit and underpinned with new financial and political commitments at the Summit, there is evidence of growing misperceptions among and between the societies of both continents. This has been aggravated by the shifting geopolitical context; with weakened relations stemming from the inequitable responses to the Covid-19 pandemic, continuing climate finance gaps, misperceptions in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Israel/Palestine conflict, and the global economic and financial repercussions of these events. From the optimism in the immediate lead-up to the 6th Summit, media monitoring has exposed a clear change in narratives and tone. Civil society organisations increasingly convey concerns around an erosion of trust in the partnership due to a lack of accessible information around the follow-up of commitments and delivery. “Despite the 6th EU-AU Summit Commitments, there is only limited visibility on the current flagship initiatives. We urgently need to make sure that the ones with the greatest potential are supported and put into practice”, was one of the statements captured at the most recent cycle of sectoral AEF Strategy Group. A series of focus groups involving African and European young leaders exposed how the young generation across the neighbouring continents are affected by the accumulation of crises and changing geopolitical realities. They agreed that decisive joint action on global challenges is needed more than ever: the ripple effects of the pandemic, the impact of climate change and the implications of the war in Ukraine were all underlined as major threats to global security.

“We should be working towards better aligned and designed laws and implementation on shared areas, as well as greater understanding on the diversity of decision making and how to improve multilateral collaboration.”

Young participant in AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation

In the context of the EU elections in 2024, what do you consider the most important policy issue the EU should focus on during its next mandate to strengthen its relationship with Africa?
“Implementing tracking mechanisms for existing commitments. It would be great to see how the resolutions taken during these conferences trickle down to benefit communities on the ground.”

Phakama, AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation
“I believe trust is broken between the two continents and definitely is something that needs to be worked on. I think proper media coverage about both continents can help as well as honest government and private sector engagement. This will benefit and help both partners to develop their partnership.”

Sibusiso, AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation

Growing appetite for exchange and engagement across continents – in particular among and between young people. Despite misconceptions, a strong appetite remains for exchange among the citizens of both continents. The added value of cooperation is clearly recognised as well as the idea that a strong Africa-Europe Partnership can create a stable global middle-ground as the world becomes increasingly multipolar. Results of the #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation also demonstrated a clear understanding of what Africa-Europe cooperation can offer; the extent to which a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership can benefit our respective societies rated on average 4.1 out of 5 stars by youth across Africa and Europe. 76% consider economic inclusion and decent job creation for young people as the area where a strengthened partnership is most beneficial. For a generation benefiting from unprecedented interconnectedness, diverse forms of exchange and encounter between Africa and Europe present new opportunities. Intercultural exchange and mobility opportunities (38%) and recognition of cultural diversity and prevention of extremist narratives (32%) have been highlighted by African and European youth as key priorities for both continents.

“One of the significant obstacles in Africa-Europe relations is the historical legacy of colonialism and its enduring impact on political, economic, and social structures. This legacy has sometimes created tensions and power imbalances in the relationship. To overcome this obstacle, they need to address historical injustices, collaborate politically, and make cultural and educational exchange programs available and easily accessible between the two continents.”

M.M, AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation

In addition to policymakers, who should be the priority groups involved in the follow-up to AU-EU Summits, and ensuring we are prepared for the challenges of this century?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Winter 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First most selected answer</td>
<td>Business and investors</td>
<td>Youth leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most selected answer</td>
<td>Youth leaders</td>
<td>Civil society and grassroot organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most selected answer</td>
<td>Civil society and grassroot organisations</td>
<td>Business and investors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: #ReimagineAfricaEurope: Priority actors to involve in AU-EU Summit follow-ups
A majority (80%) of African and European youth surveyed by AEF in early 2024 thought it was important for the continents to work together in the future. To strengthen the voices of youth in the renewed partnership, they indicated youth exchanges and mobility (34%) and capacity-building and knowledge-sharing sessions (19%) as activities the AU and EU should promote.

Youth surveyed in early 2024 selected Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines Medicines and Health; Resilient Food Systems; and the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative as the most important AU-EU initiatives.

“Different narratives exist on issues that both sides agree are problematic for good relations such as illicit financial flows, irregular migration and just energy transitions. There should be more opportunities for open and transparent dialogue beyond government officials and including the private sector and civil society organizations from Africa and Europe. This will enable both sides to appreciate each other’s perspectives and encourage the search for mutually acceptable solutions.”

Yemi, AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation

1. The African Union Summit, which promotes Africa’s growth and economic development, and the European election, where citizens get to choose who represents them, are both taking place in 2024. With these two events coming up next year, how important do you think it is that both Africa and Europe work together in the future?

2. Below are a range of youth engagement activities that the African Union and European Union could promote. Which one would you personally be most interested in seeing them promote?

3. There are several initiatives that African and European countries have been working on together recently. How important do you think each of the following is?

1. Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative
2. Great Green Wall
3. Resilient Food Systems
4. Opportunity-driven Skills and VET (Vocational Education and Training) in Africa
5. Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines Medicines and Health
6. Investing in Young Businesses in Africa
7. EU support to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
8. Youth Mobility in Africa
9. Africa Continental Qualification Framework Project
10. AU-EU Skills for Youth Employability Programme
Added value of a multi-stakeholder approach to the Africa-Europe Partnership, reinforcing a bottom-up approach. Consultations carried out in relation to the EU-AU Summit have consistently highlighted that the complexity of today’s challenges cannot be solved by governments alone. Dialogue and interaction need to develop beyond the confines of formal institutional structures, to include a multitude of stakeholders, from civil society networks, to business, youth, local governments and grassroot organisations. 61% of citizens consulted through the #ReimagineAfricaEurope campaign considered ‘Enlarging the Africa-Europe dialogue to diverse stakeholders who have the capacity for action, such as creating space for young people, the private sector and city leaders’ was the top priority to reset the partnership. AEF’s Talking Africa-Europe debates and localised Partnership Initiatives across the African continent have underlined the vital role local actors and cities can play, noting that, “there has to be a change of mind in the way we work in the international world. We have got to create agility in the way we do business and create an understanding that people need cities to work beyond the rules and processes of the multilateral world”. AEF dialogue platforms, including the Women Leaders Network, have pointed out the growing disconnect between citizens and political institutions, processes and agendas. They also highlighted the need for enhanced African ownership and voice in shaping initiatives such as Bridgetown and the broader reform of global governance and international financial systems.

Figure 4: #ReimagineAfricaEurope: Primary topic for mutually beneficial Africa-Europe cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First most selected answer</th>
<th>Winter 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training, skills and professional development</td>
<td>Training, skills and professional development</td>
<td>Climate-health nexus</td>
<td>Global governance and finance systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most selected answer</td>
<td>Climate-health nexus</td>
<td>Regenerative agriculture</td>
<td>Global governance and finance systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most selected answer</td>
<td>Global governance and finance systems</td>
<td>Climate-health nexus</td>
<td>Mobility and migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth most selected answer</td>
<td>Mobility and migration</td>
<td>Global governance and finance systems</td>
<td>Cultural exchange and challenging misperceptions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- ‘Training, skills and professional development’ comes consistently at the top, as the primary most selected answer (51% of participants on average selected this option over the last three years, selecting from a list of 12 options)
- ‘Climate-health nexus’ (36% of participants on average selected this option over the last three years, selecting from a list of 12 options) and ‘Mobility and migration’ (23% of participants on average selected this option over the last three years, selecting from a list of 12 options).
“The decisions made within the AU-EU partnership through initiatives such as the Africa-EU Global Gateway Package should be shaped by local realities. There is no other actor that has the know-how to bring real and lasting solutions other than African and European civil society.”

Adam Alqali, Editor, African Newspaper

Africa’s demographic makeup and natural resources present significant additional dimensions to the Africa-Europe scenario. Civil society actors have pointed to the collective energy of Africa’s youth as a catalyst for empowering the continent towards a future where it stands as an equal player on the global stage. A varied community with diverse identities, young Africans are increasingly less sympathetic to democracy, and thus, presenting an unpredictable variable in the geopolitical landscape.

“European and African youth are ready to change the way Europe and Africa work together, and get leaders to commit to policy changes that ensure youth are empowered for the future. Leaders on both continents need to commit to doing things differently. They need to start listening to youth, and prioritise the issues that will affect their lives.”

Laura Maschio, ONE Youth Ambassador for the ONE Campaign

In Europe, youth who are vocal about the impacts of a global pandemic, climate crisis and conflict, are finding common ground with peers across the globe and in Africa. ONE youth activists in Europe, for instance, have been advocating for causes such as climate justice, stressing Africa’s overwhelming climate burden, despite having contributed the least to historic carbon emissions. With the ability and means to disseminate inclusive narratives, and emboldened by the global momentum towards reforms, youth are uniquely positioned to help forge inclusive relations and mutually beneficial futures.
Protecting and reforming the multilateral space as the only way to address interconnected crises. The citizen consultations have also highlighted that despite, or indeed because of, shifts in global geopolitics, a strong Africa-Europe partnership remains the most effective way to resolve the interconnected crises of inflation, energy access, food insecurity and climate change impacting on societies across the neighbouring continents. AEF dialogue platforms and Strategy Groups have consistently exposed the need to first address larger issues around governance structures, processes, and representation, before being able to effectively tackle sectoral challenges, whether for food systems, energy or health. 57% of participants surveyed in the #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation consider ‘New delivery and monitoring mechanisms that translate political rhetoric into action more efficiently between key political meetings such as Summits’ what is most needed to re-set the Africa-Europe partnership.

“A relationship where Africa-Europe both understand that both continents are giants in the global system. Europe needs to start understanding that Africa is no longer a developing country but a country that is developed and will continue to develop as we have immense resources at our disposal.”

BinoP, AEF #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What policy tool or action is most needed to move from political commitments to action?</th>
<th>Winter 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First most selected answer</td>
<td>Enlarging the Africa-Europe dialogue to diverse stakeholders who have the capacity for action, including the private sector, city leaders and youth</td>
<td>Enlarging the Africa-Europe dialogue to diverse stakeholders who have the capacity for action, including the private sector, city leaders and youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most selected answer</td>
<td>New delivery and monitoring mechanisms that translate political rhetoric into action more efficiently between key political meetings such as Summits</td>
<td>Acknowledgement of prevailing power dynamics and inequalities as a prerequisite to build a strategic vision for future relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most selected answer</td>
<td>Financial resources for joint actions involving SMEs and CSOs in Africa and Europe</td>
<td>Investment in intercultural dialogue and exchange to enhance mutual understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth most selected answer</td>
<td>Investment in intercultural dialogue and exchange to enhance mutual understanding</td>
<td>New delivery and monitoring mechanisms that translate political rhetoric into action more efficiently between key political meetings such as Summits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intercultural dialogue, and new delivery and monitoring mechanisms were also consistently selected among the top four priorities (19% of participants on average selected ‘Investment in intercultural dialogue and exchange to enhance mutual understanding’ over the last three years, and 18% ‘New delivery and monitoring mechanisms that translate political rhetoric into action more efficiently between key political meetings such as Summits’).
Africa is emerging as a pivotal player in global affairs. Ahead of incoming COP28, Nairobi hosted the first ever Africa Climate Summit (ACS) where leaders united to articulate a Common African position and highlight the continent’s green growth potential, rather than focusing mainly on its specific vulnerability. The adoption of the joint Nairobi Declaration at the ACS, which will form the basis of Africa’s negotiating position at November’s COP28 summit, is a key outcome and symbol. With more vocal stances on global geopolitical affairs, the African governments have sought to increase their role in global governance. The Ukraine-Russia peace mission, led by a delegation from South Africa, Egypt, Senegal, Congo-Brazzaville, Comoros, Zambia, and Uganda, represented a significant milestone for the continent. It was the first time African states took the lead to seek a peaceful resolution for a conflict outside Africa. By inviting the AU to adopt a permanent seat at the G20, putting it on par with the EU, the G20 has signalled its recognition of the AU’s role.

“Having a clear articulation of African priorities towards Europe, for example through an AU strategy towards Europe, would help build a more balanced partnership.”

Mariella Di Ciommo, associate director of ECDPM’s

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Figure 6: #ReimagineAfricaEurope: Priority areas for strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In which areas could a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership be most beneficial?</th>
<th>Winter 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2022</th>
<th>Summer 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First most selected answer</td>
<td>Opportunities for education and training</td>
<td>Economic inclusion and decent jobs for young people</td>
<td>Economic inclusion and decent jobs for young people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second most selected answer</td>
<td>Environmental sustainability</td>
<td>Environmental sustainability</td>
<td>Enhanced trade and investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third most selected answer</td>
<td>Economic inclusion and decent jobs for young people</td>
<td>Opportunities for education and training</td>
<td>Peace and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth most selected answer</td>
<td>Intercultural exchange and mobility opportunities</td>
<td>Enhanced trade and investment</td>
<td>Opportunities for education and training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- When asked in which area a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership could be most beneficial, ‘Economic inclusion and decent jobs for young people’ and ‘Opportunities for education and training’ were consistently among the top 4 responses by #ReimagineAfricaEurope consultation participants over the course of the last three years. (52% of participants on average selected ‘Economic inclusion and decent jobs for young people’ over the last three years, selecting from a list of 14 options, and 38% ‘Opportunities for education and training’)

- The importance of trade and investment, and environmental sustainability was also consistently highlighted as areas where strengthened Africa-Europe cooperation could be beneficial (40% of participants on average selected ‘Enhanced trade and investment’ over the last three years, selecting from a list of 14 options, and 37% ‘Environmental sustainability’.)
The elephant in the room: the need for better communication

Two years since the Global Gateway Africa-Europe Investment Package was announced at the 6th Summit, too many are still not sure what it is and how it differs from previous approaches. While the EU remains the main development partner of Africa, the perception of the Global Gateway strategy among many stakeholders in Africa, as well as the civil society in Europe, is that of ambiguity and concern. This, if not addressed, risks undermining the EU’s credibility as a development partner owing to insufficient and unclear communication about the Global Gateway package, which may be construed as a lack of transparency.

CSOs have raised concerns that the EU’s slowly shifting focus over the last decade to a more business-centred approach, especially in infrastructure and trade opportunities, could signal a shift away from its more people-centred initiatives. Civil society actors, not present in the Global Gateway’s governance structure, have warned against an emphasis on ‘de-risking’ private sector investments instead of poverty alleviation and sustainable development. The perceived bias towards the business community could also impact its standing with traditional partners.

It is not just the CSOs but also the public that lack a good understanding of the EU’s strategies and investment plans. The EU, historically, has faced challenges in communicating on its policies and programmes, both to its own populations and further afield. The fact that the EU, as a bloc, is Africa’s largest provider of aid is not widely known. Citizens from both continents know little about the Global Gateway, and what it accomplishes. Support for working with partner countries around the world remains strong with EU citizens (75%) with 62% of Europeans surveyed by Eurobarometer selecting Africa as a main priority for investment. Meanwhile, in Africa, country-specific studies show the EU is lagging behind other development partners in Africa; for example, in South Africa and Botswana, where China, the United States and Russia are perceived as key influences, up to 70% of respondents said they did not know enough to assess the economic and political influence of the EU. With this in mind, and due to competing narratives and models of cooperation offered by China and Russia, the EU needs a coherent and transparent approach to the implementation of its programming, as well as more visible outreach.

Support for EU’s investments in partner countries
Source: Special Eurobarometer 530 – EU citizens and relations with partner countries – Fieldwork: April-May 2023

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of EU investments in partner countries outside the EU according to Europeans</th>
<th>Priority regions for EU investment according to Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total ‘Important’</td>
<td>Total ‘Not Important’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LatAm &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This first independent assessment demonstrates that there have been significant and tangible actions contributing to implementation of the 6th Summit commitments. Not all, however, are easily identifiable and thus recognised by the stakeholders of the partnership, including the general public.

The period between now and the 7th AU-EU Summit in 2025 presents an opportunity for the Africa-Europe Partnership to gain acceptance from its respective populations as a “Partnership of Equals”. For that, progress across all sectors should be solid, credible and visible. The hoped-for achievements need to be easily identifiable and tangible to the public.

With this in mind, we encourage a joint communication strategy which could be devised by both Unions that enjoys consistent and accessible messaging, drawing on the large reserves of communication resources in the EU and AU. This could involve, inter alia, the mobilisation of the EU Delegations in Africa and its European offices in the capitals, as well as the AU’s capacity in Addis.

Importantly, the monitoring should go beyond the specific commitments, not focusing solely on the substance of the political declaration (the ‘what’); but also include the monitoring of the partnership implementation process (the ‘how’). The Joint Vision included in the Final Declaration sets out principles for both Unions, which should guide them in their joint efforts to achieve the ‘renewed partnership’ – through a process of meaningful change in approach to one another.

The six working principles underpinning the new approach of the ‘renewed partnership’ include:

- Principle I: Acknowledgement of each other’s history;
- Principle II: Human ties;
- Principle III: Respect for sovereignty;
- Principle IV: Mutual respect and accountability;
- Principle V: Equality between the two continents; and,
- Principle VI: Reciprocal arrangements.

Going further, tracking of progress against the Summit commitments could include monitoring implementation of the Joint Vision; thus, the progress in a maturing partnership. Three potential elements could form part of the systematic assessment:

1. **The partnership-building process itself:** assessing to what extent both Unions adhere to the six working principles in delivering the ten commitments as a means to “realising a partnership of equals”;

2. **The short-medium term actions:** by assessing the actions each Union does together as a result of the maturing partnership that
contributes to mutual benefits expressed in the Final Declaration: solidarity, peace, security and sustainable economic development; and,

3. The long-term impact of this “partnership of equals” on the welfare of citizens of both continents.

As meaningful outcomes (mutual benefits of the maturing partnership) and impact (wellbeing of its citizens) are dependent on the partnership-building process, in the space allowed between the 6th and 7th Summits, the focus on assessing and learning about progress made towards establishing a partnership of equals - the quality of the partnership-building process – is critical.

AEF stands ready to support the two Unions in developing an enhanced monitoring mechanism that can help track the quality of engagement and joint decision-making, including the adherence to the principles adopted in the Joint Vision (see ANNEX B).
The AEF Annual Report 2024 is structured around chapters which represent strategic pillars of the long-term partnership between Africa and Europe. Each chapter captures data and information on progress of one or more of the 10 commitment areas in the Final Declaration of the 6th EU-AU Summit.

Commitments are presented in chronological order of the Final Declaration, complemented as needed by specific commitments included in the Investment Package:

**COMMITMENT 1:**

Access to Vaccines, African Health Sovereignty, and Comprehensive WTO Response to the Pandemic:

"The immediate challenge is to ensure a fair and equitable access to vaccines. Together we will support local and regional mechanisms for procurement, as well as allocation and deployment of medical products. The EU reaffirms its commitment to provide at least 450 million of vaccine doses to Africa, in coordination with the Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team (AVATT) platform, by mid-2022. Contributing to this and complementing the actions of the AVATT, Team Europe has provided more than USD 3 billion (i.e., the equivalent of 400 million vaccine doses) to the COVAX Facility and to vaccination on the African continent. Team Europe will mobilise EUR 425 million to ramp up the pace of vaccination, and in coordination with the Africa CDC, to support the efficient distribution of doses and the training of medical teams and the capacity of analysis and sequencing. We will also contribute in this context to the fight against health-related disinformation. Learning from the current health crisis, we are committed to supporting the full-fledged African health sovereignty, in order for the continent to respond to future public health emergencies. To this end, we support a common agenda for manufacturing vaccines, medicines, diagnostics, therapeutics and health products in Africa, including investment in production capacities, voluntary technology transfers as well as strengthening of the regulatory framework to enable equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics. The African Union and the European Union underlined the urgency of the WTOs contribution to the fight against the pandemic and to the recovery of the global
economy, and commit to engage constructively towards an agreement on a comprehensive WTO response to the pandemic, which includes trade related, as well as intellectual property related aspects.”

“For the health sector, we will support initiatives for pandemic preparedness, health security and equitable access to quality essential health services, in line with the Rome Declaration adopted at the Global Health Summit.”

**COMMITMENT 2:**

**Facilitation of Economic Recovery through the Common Framework for Debt Treatments (CFDT), Reallocation of SDRs, and Increased Spending through International Programmes:**

“In response to the macroeconomic effects of the Covid crisis on African economies, we support the Common Framework for Debt Treatments beyond the Debt Service Suspension Initiative. We also call for ambitious voluntary contributions, by channelling part of the recently allocated Special Drawing Rights, in order to achieve the total global ambition of at least USD 100 billion liquidity support to countries most in need, of which a major part should benefit Africa. We welcome the USD 55 billion that have been pledged already from the new allocation of SDRs, of which several EU Member States (Team Europe) have so far pledged USD 13 billion and encourage more EU member states to consider contributing to this global effort. African institutions, in consultation with national authorities, will be involved in the use of these SDRs to support the continent’s recovery. We will seek to ensure increased spending through international programmes in the fields of health, climate, biodiversity, education and security to facilitate economic recovery. We agree to examine lending instruments for sustainable investment projects in priority sectors.”

**COMMITMENT 3:**

**Combating Illicit Financial Flows, Addressing Domestic Tax Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, and Cooperating on Tax Transparency:**

“We commit to combatting Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) and to addressing domestic tax base erosion, profit shifting (BEPS), and cooperate in tax transparency. In this regard, we agree to continue cooperating to develop and consolidate the strategic capability in the fight against different types of IFFs including money laundering, the financing of terrorism, and proliferation financing as well as those linked to fiscal governance systems and return of stolen funds and items from countries of origin.”
COMMITMENT 4:

Scientific and Technological Cooperation, Student, Research and Cultural Exchanges, Restitution of Cultural Assets and Promotion of Cultural Heritage:

“Together, we will step up our support to scientific cooperation between researchers to develop knowledge together, as well as sharing technology and expertise, including through a joint AU-EU Innovation Agenda. We will encourage exchanges of young citizens, volunteers and students, through the expanded Erasmus+ programme and develop partnerships between universities, in order to improve our mutual understanding and foster excellence. We will strive to facilitate cultural exchanges and the movement of artists and artworks between our two continents, and encourage mutual undertaking for the restitution of cultural assets and promote access to and protection of cultural heritage.”

COMMITMENT 5:

Africa-Europe Investment Package for Education (Quality and Safe Education Services, Addressed Learning Gaps, and Vocational Education and Training):

“For education, we will invest in inclusive and equitable quality education by improving policy and legal frameworks, access and teacher training, to contribute to safe delivery of education services and ensure learning gaps resulting from the pandemic are addressed. To this end we will promote opportunity oriented technical and professional Vocational Education and Training, including at regional level.”

COMMITMENT 6:

Investment Package (Energy Transport and Digital Infrastructure, Energy Transition, Green Transition, Digital Transformation, Sustainable Growth and Decent Job Creation, Transport Facilitation, and Human Development):

“An Africa-Europe Investment Package of at least EUR 150 billion that will support our common ambition for 2030 and AU Agenda 2063, composed of an Investment, a Health and an Education Package. The Investment Package will help build more diversified, inclusive, sustainable and resilient economies... This Global Gateway Investment Package aims to boost public and private investment building on existing initiatives and partnerships. The Package will boost largescale sustainable investments, supported by Team Europe Initiatives, with due consideration to the priorities and needs of the African countries, including: i) investment in energy, transport and digital infrastructure aligned with the PIDA PAP II; ii) energy transition that is fair, just and equitable, taking into account specific and diverse orientations of the African countries with regards to access to electricity; iii) green transition including supporting the implementation of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) of African Countries under the Paris Agreement to enhance mitigation and adaptation;”
COMMITMENT 7:

Implementation of the Investment Package through Public Funds and Innovative Financing, and Boosting Regional and Continental Economic Integration:

“To implement the Package, we will leverage public funds to stimulate private investments by mobilising innovative financing instruments. We commit to promote accountable, transparent, inclusive and responsive governance, in conformity with the relevant international instruments, to boost efforts towards improving investment and the business climate as well as towards unlocking and increasing responsible and sustainable African and European investments. We will use all means of implementation, including Official Development Assistance and financial tools such as infrastructure trusts and capital market instruments, to ensure support to African entrepreneurship in engaging in strong and vibrant economies. International and national financing development institutions, including the European Investment Bank, and the African Development Bank, and public/private partnerships will be mobilised to this effect. We will continue our work to leverage and facilitate transparent remittances, including the reduction of transaction costs, for the development of national and local economies. We will also boost regional and continental economic integration, particularly through the African Continental Free Trade Area. The existing trade agreements between the EU and some African countries have contributed to the strengthening and deepening of trade and economic development between the two continents. We will work gradually towards the progressive and mutually beneficial integration of our respective continental markets.”

COMMITMENT 8:

Renewed and Enhanced Cooperation for Peace and Security:

“A renewed and enhanced cooperation for peace and security. Facing growing common security challenges, we announce a renewed and enhanced peace and security cooperation. The two continents have a long-standing cooperation premised on the principle of African solutions to African problems, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and reflected in the AU-EU Memorandum of Understanding on Peace, Security and Governance (2018), designed to combat instability, radicalisation, violent extremism and terrorism, tackling the root causes of conflicts, and addressing the entire conflict cycle through the integrated approach. We express our commitment to foster our cooperation through support for adequate training, capacity building and equipment, to strengthen and scale up autonomous peace operations of African defence and security forces, including through EU missions and assistance measures, as well as support for law-enforcement capacity-building. Together, we will also continue to support African-led Peace Support Operations and the on-going discussions on the use of UN-assessed contributions for operations authorised by the UN Security Council, and the implementation of the AU human rights compliance framework in that context. We will intensify our cooperation on security, including on cybersecurity. We will join efforts to further promote the rule of law and the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict and the Youth, Peace and Security Agendas, and underpin it with concrete actions to achieve durable peace. We will continue to respect and promote compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law.”
COMMITMENT 9:

Enhanced and Reciprocal Partnership for Migration and Mobility:

"An enhanced and reciprocal partnership for migration and mobility. We will continue addressing all aspects of migration and mobility, in line with national competences, in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced manner. We will work in a spirit of joint responsibility and commitment, in full respect of international law and fundamental human rights. Through joint action and capacity-building, including with dedicated African migration institutions, we will aim at preventing irregular migration, enhancing cooperation against smuggling and trafficking in human beings, supporting strengthened border management and achieving effective improvements on return, readmission and reintegration, including promoting voluntary return and facilitating sustainable reintegration of returned persons, as well as enhancing migration dialogues between the two Continents and delivering on their key priorities. We will deepen our cooperation in finding durable solutions for those asylum seekers, refugees and vulnerable migrants in need of international protection and commit to revitalise the work of the joint AU-EU-UN Tripartite Task Force. We will further strengthen asylum systems with a view to providing adequate reception and protection for those entitled, as well as work on their integration. We will keep addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, and enhance cooperation on tackling all issues related to migration. Respecting national needs, competencies and legal frameworks, pathways for legal migration opportunities will be further developed between both continents and within Africa. We commit to addressing the challenges posed by the brain drain, and investing in youth and women to support their empowerment, skills, education and employment prospects, notably through increased support for technical and vocational education and training."

COMMITMENT 10:

Promoting Effective Multilateralism:

"A commitment to multilateralism. We will work together to promote effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core. We pledge to work towards more converging positions in multilateral fora to reduce global inequalities, strengthen solidarity, promote international cooperation, fight and mitigate climate change and improve delivery on ‘global public goods’, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and AU Agenda 2063. We commit to providing political support to achieve the necessary reform of the WTO and to improve its functioning with a view to strengthening the multilateral trading system. Both sides commit to contribute to the UN system reform efforts, including of the UN Security Council. We also recommite to the full implementation of the Paris Agreement and the outcomes of the COPs. We recognise that Africa’s energy transition is vital for its industrialisation and to bridge the energy gap. We will support Africa in its transition to foster just and sustainable pathways towards climate neutrality. We recognise the importance of making use of available natural resources within that energy transition process. We support Africa’s hosting of COP 27 in Egypt in 2022, as well as an ambitious global biodiversity framework. We commit to working together to develop a new ambitious WHO international agreement on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response."
Meaningful outcomes and impact are dependent on the partnership-building process. As such, and in the space allowed between the 6th and 7th AU-EU Summits, the focus on assessing and learning about progress made towards establishing a partnership of equals - the quality of the partnership-building process – is critical. In practice, at this stage, the priority focus should be on the quality of engagement and joint decision-making, and their adherence to the principles adopted in the Joint Vision.

Figure 7 shows how the three elements of the Joint Vision guide movement, through adherence to the six principles, towards a renewed partnership of equals (Outcome) that delivers mutual benefits to itself and contributes to the welfare and prosperity of citizens of both continents (Impact). To track the quality of engagement, both Unions could engage in a reflective process to assess the status of their partnership maturity applying a “rubrics method” as outlined below.
Figure 7: Monitoring Framework for the AU-EU Partnership

The Ten Commitments
1. Access to health vaccines and AU-EU health package
2. Facilitation of Economic Recovery
3. Combating Illicit Financial Flows, Addressing Domestic Tax Base Erosion
4. Scientific and Technological Cooperation
5. Africa-Europe Investment Package for Education
6. Investment Package Energy Transport and Digital Infrastructure. Energy Transition, Green Transition
7. Implementation of the Investment Package
8. Renewed and Enhanced Cooperation for Peace and Security
9. Enhanced and Reciprocal Partnership for Migration and Mobility
10. Promoting Effective Multilateralism

The Six Principles
1. Acknowledgement of each other's history
2. Human Ties
3. Respect for sovereignty
4. Mutual respect and accountability
5. Equality between the two continents
6. Reciprocal arrangements

Outcome
Solidarity ———— Peace ———— Security

Development Impact

Example of benefits to African citizens
Health: Increased health sovereignty, reduced deaths from infectious disease, clean energy for cooking Improves health,
Environment: reduced biodiversity loss, reduced global heating
Other: Greater Interaction with European citizens, Africans with skills relevant in European labour market.

Example of benefits to European citizens
Economic: reduced labour shortages, cheaper food.
Health Reduced Infectious disease in Europe, Improved preparedness, Improved healthcare workforce,
Environment: reduced biodiversity loss, net zero by 2050, reduced global heating
Other: Greater Interaction with African citizens, less irregular African migration

A fundamental principle of rubrics is that collaboration and the construction of partnership is a process that takes time and experience; and that both Unions will develop greater capacity to do this as they engage with each other over time.

Each of the six principles below is described across four different levels of maturity. This allows for reviewing the status of readiness to work with one-another and enables assessment of progress over time. Shared by both the EU and the AU, and their respective Member States, these principles could guide decisions and actions to guarantee the solidarity and sustainability of the partnership.
### Figure 8: Rubrics for assessing partnership maturity (adherence to partnership principles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Degree of Maturity</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| **1) Acknowledgement of each other's history** | 1. Only looking forward to the future with no acknowledgement of each other's history  
2. Acknowledging each other's history past with gestures of regret but no apology  
3. Acknowledging each other's history with an apology  
4. Acknowledging each other's history with an apology by making distinct amends for it |
| **2) Respect for sovereignty** | 1. No respect for each other's right to control what happens within each of the Unions' territories and complete reliance on external assistance  
2. There is only a limited ability to act autonomously and a high degree of reliance on external assistance associated with conditions  
3. There is a high degree of respect shown by both parties with only limited dependence on external assistance with no conditions  
4. There is complete respect for each other's autonomy with no dependence on external assistance. |
| **3) Human Ties** | 1. There are no examples of opportunities for both Unions and their member states to exchange beliefs, values, customs, and artifacts in shared spaces  
2. Only a few examples are evident of both unions and their member states sharing elements of their culture in formal shared spaces organised by both Unions  
3. There are several examples of different groups from both unions and member states sharing spaces to interact with each other but only a few are not organised by governments.  
4. There are many examples where both unions and different groups among their member states – e.g. youth, business, civil society - meet together in a wide variety of shared spaces and movement of people that foster cultural exchanges |
| **4) Mutual respect and accountability** | 1. Each union is unfair, does not do what it says it will do and there is no mechanism to regulate each other's behaviour and report their joint actions and decisions  
2. Each union is sometimes fair and does some of what it says it will do but without a mechanism for self-regulation and reporting  
3. Each union often treats the other fairly and does what it says it will do but with limited evidence and reporting  
4. Each union always treats the other fairly, does what it says it will do without contradiction and with full transparency |
| **5) Equality between the two continents** | 1. There is a significant asymmetry between the two unions across all areas of the partnership with significant perceived power imbalance.  
2. There remain asymmetries between the two in most areas of the partnership, but one remains superior to the other  
3. In most areas of the partnership, there is an equal relationship  
4. There are equal status and power relations between the AU and the EU where no one union is termed superior and subordinate in any areas of collaboration. |
| **6) Reciprocal arrangements** | 1. All arrangements, actions and lessons reflect a highly unequal relationship with one partner benefitting and putting in more than the other  
2. There are some arrangements where each partner puts in and gets out as much as the other, but one is still not willing to learn from the other.  
3. Many arrangements and actions are informed by learning from each other and are mutually beneficial  
4. All arrangements and actions reflect an equal and balanced give-and-take |
The assessment of performance against these principles should be best undertaken through a joint reflective process of the AU and EU; for example, taking the opportunity of the annual Ministerial Meetings to review the degree of their maturity of partnership.

For the other two elements, measuring the medium to long-term changes – outcomes and impact – can be derived from delivery of the Summit commitments in the spirit of the ‘partnership of equals’ based on a mix of metrics, which may include:

- Perceptions of Africans towards Europe and Europeans towards Africa;
- Percentage of converging positions/votes in the multilateral system;
- Perceptions of Africans and Europeans on peace, safety and security.

Given the time-lag between the actions and observable results, the outcomes and impact shall be measured on a multi-annual basis, for example on the occasion of the Africa-EU Summits.
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In addition to outputs from:

• #ReimagineAfricaEurope global consultation, which is an aggregation of stakeholder surveys and interviews carried out by AEF beginning in the inception phase with: AEF Strategy Group members, networks and partners; AEF’s co-founding organisations’ youth networks (the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Now Generation Network NGN, Friends of Europe’s European Young Leaders EYL40, and the ONE Campaign’s Africa-Europe Task Force of Champions and Youth Ambassadors); youth in all African and European countries through the use of the crowdsourcing platform Prolific, specifically designed for data collection for academic research. Carried out in four cycles: July and November 2021, July 2022, July 2023, and January 2024 in addition to focus groups via the citizen platform Debating Africa.

• Stakeholder consultations questionnaire conducted by AEF in January 2024 on strengthening EU-Africa Partnership. Over 30 stakeholders from AEF strategy groups and work streams participated in the interview questionnaire, including foundations (e.g. African Climate Foundation), think tanks (e.g. IIED), academics (e.g. European University Institute) and civil society (e.g. seed global health).

• In depth focus group projects led by citizen-engagement platform Debating Africa projects, including in partnership with Debating Europe. Specifically, outcomes of studies: ‘Securing Our Future: 100 African and European Voices
on Climate Change, Conflict and Security’ (conducted between August and September 2022, with 113 participants aged 18-35 from 19 EU Member States and 16 African countries); and ‘Youth to the Rescue: What Kind of Democracy Do Young People in Africa, Asia and Europe Want?’ (conducted in November 2022, with 150 participants aged 18-35 from Africa, Asia, and Europe); and ‘Reordering the Future: 100 African Voices on Global Governance and Finance Reform’ (conducted in April 2023, with 105 participants aged 18-36 from South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana).

• Media mapping (mainstream and social media) carried out together with 35 Nord between November 2021 and May 2022, and the aggregation of data and analysis from leading African and European media outlets between May 2022 and January 2024.

• #TalkingAfrica-Europe broadcast series carried out during the inception phase, including #TalkingAfrica-Europe High-Level Debate on Climate and Energy (20 January 2022); #TalkingAfrica-Europe High-Level Debate on Migration and Mobility (27 January 2022); #TalkingAfrica-Europe High-Level Debate on Addressing the Vaccine Challenge (3 February 2022); #TalkingAfrica-Europe special dialogue on building new bridges between Africa and Europe for space exploration (6 June 2022).

• #AUEUTracker Special Dialogue broadcast series dedicated to the follow-up on the 6th EU-AU Summit commitments, including #AUEUTracker Special Dialogue on Building an Africa-Europe partnership on pandemic preparedness (17 May 2023); #AUEUTracker Special Dialogue on Combating Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) (5 July 2023); #AUEUTracker Special Dialogue on AU-EU partnership on skills for green job creation, co-organised with GIZ (7 September 2023).


• Data from the Afrobarometer and Eurobarometer research network, which conducts public attitude surveys in Africa and Europe.

• Strategic orientations and outputs produced by the AEF High-Level Group of Personalities, in particular the HLG meeting on Commitment Tracking and Governance Reform (28 April 2023) and HLG meeting on the AEF report on the State of Africa-Europe (7 November 2023);

• Strategic analysis and insights provided by the AEF Women Leaders Network (WLN), in particular the WLN meeting on Reform of the Global Governance and Financial Architecture (18 January 2023); WLN meeting on Carbon Markets (23 February 2023); WLN meeting on Governance and Financial Reforms (30 April 2023); WLN meeting on Climate Finance and Agri-Food (25 July 2023); WLN meeting on Climate-Health nexus and Local Adaptation (18 September 2023); WLN meeting on Taking stock of COP28 and other WLN topics (18 December 2023), including the in-person meetings on the occasion of the SE4All forum in Kigali, UNGA77 in New York and COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh.

• Sectoral in-depth analysis by AEF Strategy Groups (SGs) through convenings focused on the assessment of the follow-up to the 6th EU-AU Summit, in particular, SG on Energy (6 October 2022, 5 April 2023 and 10 October 2023); SG on Agriculture and Food Systems (5 October 2022, 11 April 2023 and 3 October 2023); SG on Health (12 October 2022, 6 October 2023); SG on Ocean Governance and Blue Economy (10 July 2023, 26 September 2023, 24 October 2023, 2 November 2023, 8 December 2023).
• Strategic orientations and outputs produced by the convenings of Africa-Europe Working Groups (WGs) in 2022 and 2023, particularly WG on Climate Adaptation (9 June 2022, 13 July 2022, 22 September 2022, 3 November 2022, 14 December 2022, 29 June 2023); WG on Carbon Markets (5 July 2023, 5 September 2023 and 9 December 2023); WG on Illicit Financial Flows (27 September 2023 and 13 November 2023); and Earthshot initiative (4 April 2023, 30 April 2023, 22 June 2023, 5 September 2023, 5 December 2023).

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

• ACB African Central Bank
• ACFQ II African Continental Qualifications Framework II
• ACS Africa Climate Summit
• ADEPT Africa-Europe Development Platform
• AEDIB African-European Digital Innovation Bridge
• AEF Africa-Europe Foundation
• EGEI Africa-Europe Green Energy Initiative
• AEP African Economic Platform
• AfCDC Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
• AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area
• AFD Agence Française de Développement
• AfDB African Development Bank
• AFIC Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community
• AfSEM Africa Single Electricity Market
• AFSA Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions
• AGA Africa Governance Architecture
• AI Artificial Intelligence
• AIB African Investment Bank
• AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
• AMA African Medicines Agency
• AMCOA African Ministers’ Council on Water
• AME Africa Meets Europe
• AMF African Monetary Fund
• AMIF Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
• AML/CFT Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorist Financing
• ANBO African Network of Basin Organisations
• APF African Peace Facility
• APIS Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients
• APSA African Peace and Security Architecture
• ASEA African Securities Exchanges Association
• ATI Addis Tax Initiative
• AU African Union
• AUC African Union Commission
• AUCF AU-EU-UN compliance and Accountability Framework
• AU-CoEs AU Centres of Excellence
• AUDA-NEPAD African Union Development Agency - New Partnership for Africa’s Development
• AU-IBAR African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources
• AVATT Africa Vaccine Acquisition Task Team
• BBNJ Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction
• BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
• BRICS emerging market countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa)
• C2CMMD Continent-to Continent Migration and Mobility Dialogue
• CAAC AU Strategic Plan on Protection of children affected by armed conflict
• CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
• CBAM Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
• CBC COMESA Business Council
• CBD Biodiversity Conference
• CDC Centres for Disease Control and Prevention
• CDS COVID-19 Delivery Support
• CFDT Common Framework for Debt Treatments
• Chat GPT Chat Generative Pre-Trained Transformer
• CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement
• CME Continuous Medical Education
• CMP Continental Power System Master Plan
• CoES Centres of Excellence
• COP Conference of the Parties (United Nations Summit on climate change)
• CORSIA Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
• COVAX COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access
• COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease of 2019
• CPHIA International Conference on Public Health in Africa
• CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
• CSOs Civil Society Organisations
• D4D Digital for Development
• DAC Development Assistance Committee
• DFIs Development Finance Institutions
• DG AGRI Directorate General for Agriculture and Rural Development
• DG Trade Directorate General for Trade
• DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
• EABF EU-Africa Business Forum
• EASA European Union Aviation Safety Agency
• EBID ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development
• EBR European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
• EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
• ECA Economic Commission for Africa
• ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
• EDI s European Development Finance Institutions
• EFSD+ European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus
• EIB European Investment Bank
• EnDev Energising Development
• EO Earth Observation
• EOI Exchange Of Information
• EOIRs Exchange of Information Requests
• EPAs Economic Partnership Agreement
• EPF European Peace Facility
• ERASMUS plus EU’s programme to support education, training, youth and sport in Europe
• ETPs Energy Transition Plans
• EU ETS European Union Emissions Trading System
• EU European Union
• EU RACC Sahel European Union Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for the Sahel
- EUAM RCA European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic
- EUBAM Border Assistance Mission in Libya European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya
- EUCAP Sahel Mali European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali
- EUCAP Somalia European Union Capacity Building Mission in Somalia
- EUPSC EU Political and Security Committee
- EUR Euros
- EUTF EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
- EUTM Mali European Union Training Mission in Mali
- EUTM Mozambique European Union Training Mission in Mozambique
- EUTM RCA European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic
- EUTM-S European Union Training Mission in Somalia
- FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
- FATF Financial Action Task Force
- FDI Foreign Direct Investment
- Frontex European Border and Coast Guard Agency
- FTYIP First Ten-Year Implementation Plan
- G20 Group of 20
- G5 Group of Five
- GCTF Global Counter-terrorism Forum
- GDP Gross Domestic Product
- GEAPP Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet
- GeCCo Global eCooking Coalition
- GGW Great Green Wall
- GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
- GMA Great African Museum
- GST Goods and Services Tax
- GW Gigawatt
- HAQAA3 African Continental Qualifications Framework
- HLG High Level Groups
- HLP High Level Panel
- HoSG Heads of State and Government
- HRVP High Representative Vice President
- IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
- ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
- ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development
- ICT Information and Communications Technology
- IDA International Development Association
- IDPs Internally Displaced Persons
- IFFs Illicit Financial Flows
- IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- IIAG Ibrahim Index of African Governance
- ILO International Labour Organization
- IMF International Monetary Fund
- IMO International Maritime Organization
- IOM International Organization for Migration
- IPR Intellectual Property Rights
- IRINI (EUNAVFOR MED) Operation IRINI (European Union Naval Force Mediterranean)
- IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
- IYBA SEED Supporting Entrepreneurial Ecosystem Development programme, part of Investing in Young Businesses in Africa
- JETPs Just Energy Transition Partnerships
- JVAP Joint-Valletta Action Plan
- KfW Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
- KLCD Key Landscapes for Conservation and Development
- MC12 12th WTO Ministerial Conference
- MC13 13th WTO Ministerial Conference
- MDBs Multilateral Development Banks
- MECS Modern Energy Cooking Services
- MFF Multi-annual Financial Framework
- MIPs Multi-annual Indicative Programmes
- MMD Migration and Mobility Dialogue
- MNJTF Multinational Joint Task Force
- MoU Memorandum of Understanding
- MPF Migration Partnership Facility
- MPFA AU’s Migration Policy Framework for Africa
- MRV Measurement Reporting and Verification
- NAPs National Adaptation Plans
- NCQG New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance
- NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
- NDICI Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
- NDICI-GE NDICI – Global Europe
- NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development
- NGOs Non-governmental organization
- OACPS Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific States
- ODA Official Development Assistance
- ODeL Open, Distance, and eLearning
- OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
- PAGE Support Programme for Economic Governance
- PASE Pan-African Stock Exchange
- PAVEU Pan-African Virtual and E-University
- PAVM Partnership for African Vaccine Manufacturing
- PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
- PIDA-PAP1 First PIDA Priority Action Plan
- PIDA-PAP2 Second PIDA Priority Action Plan
- PRGT Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust
- PSC Peace and Security Council
- RECs Regional Economic Communities
- RFDA Rwanda Food and Drugs Authority
- RHR Reproductive Health and Rights
- RST Resilience and Sustainability Trust
- SAATM Single African Air-Transport Market
- SAF Sustainable Aviation Fuels
- SAMM Southern Africa Migration Management Programme
- SDG 3 Sustainable Development Goal 3 (Good health and well-being)
- SDG14 Sustainable Development Goals 14 (Life below water)
- SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
- SDRs Special Drawing Rights
- SEAR Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve
- SEforALL Sustainable Energy for All
- SG Strategy Group
- SIDA Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
- SMART Specific Measurable Achievable Relevant Time-bound
- SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises
- SOM Senior Officials’ Meeting
- SRHR Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights
- SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
- STC - TTIEE Specialised Technical Committee on Transport, Transcontinental and Interregional Infrastructure, and Energy
- STEM Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics
- STYIP Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan
• TEI YBA Team Europe Initiative Investing in Young Businesses in Africa
• TEI MAV+ Manufacturing and Access to Vaccines, medicines and health technologies in Africa
• TEIs Team Europe Initiatives
• TEI-TWM Team Europe Initiative on Transboundary Water Management in Africa
• TFTC Task Force on Tax Crimes and Other Crime
• TNC Trade Negotiations Committee
• TOC Transnational Organised Crime
• ToT Training of Trainers
• TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
• TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training
• UAE United Arab Emirates
• UHC Universal Health Coverage
• UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
• UN United Nations
• UNDP United Nations Development Programme
• UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
• UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
• UNGA United Nations General Assembly
• UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
• UNOC3 3rd United Nations Ocean Conference
• UNSC or UN SC United Nations Security Council
• US or USA United States of America
• USD United States dollar
• UWC University of the Western Cape in South Africa

• V20 Vulnerable Twenty
• VAT Value-added tax
• VCM Voluntary Carbon Markets
• VET Vocational Education and Training
• VSAT Very Small Aperture Terminal
• WB World Bank
• WHO CA+ Drafting Group of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body to draft and negotiate a WHO convention
• WHO World Health Organization
• WTO World Trade Organization
• WYDE Women and Youth in Democracy Initiative
• Y4P Youth for Peace
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This report is the combination of work undertaken by the Africa-Europe Foundation (AEF) since the 6th EU-AU Summit of February 2022. While the High-Level Group endorses the core thinking, messages, and areas of action of the report, with such a heterogeneous group, it does not imply personal endorsement of each statement in the Report. Reproduction in whole or in part of the report is permitted, provided that credit is given to the Africa-Europe Foundation.

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