



AFRICA
EUROPE
FOUNDATION

FINAL REPORT 2023-2024

**CLIMATE ADAPTATION AND THE
REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE:
STRATEGIC PILLARS OF THE
AFRICA-EUROPE PARTNERSHIP**

AEF Report on Africa-Europe Adaptation Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

Advancing Climate Adaptation is crucial to rebalance the power dynamics between Africa and Europe, and address the growing frustration and mistrust felt by African countries as we move towards COP29 in November 2024 and the 7th AU-EU Summit 2025.

2024 represents a watershed moment for revitalising the Africa-Europe partnership and elevating climate adaptation, both politically and financially, with the foreseen EU-AU Ministerial Meeting (TBD), the new EU political cycle (Q3/Q4 of 2024), the 7th AU-EU Summit 2025, as well as the G7 focus of Italy on Africa and the ongoing reform of the international financial architecture at the G20 level with the AU now being a member. Beyond this, 2024 also marks the start of the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan of the AU's Agenda 2063.

The road towards COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, should lead the two continents towards adaptation mainstreaming and greater alignment on issues - ranging from the reality of delivering on the \$100bn unmet target on climate finance, the global goal on adaptation (GGA), the delivery plan for the doubling of adaptation finance by 2025, to the operationalisation of the Loss & Damage Fund, and early steps towards the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance (post-2025), and greater parity of mitigation and adaptation finance given pressing needs.

AEF's work on climate adaptation has also exposed the need to further mainstream monitoring of pledges made and tracking commitments ahead of 2025 with the 7th AU-EU Summit. AEF, through its focus on tracking and monitoring commitments made by AU-EU leaders will keep encouraging both continents to fulfil existing commitments, while making sure that existing initiatives such as the Team Europe Initiative for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa truly deliver.

This report, comprised of 5 policy briefs, intends to inform and support engagement with African and European policymakers, and stimulate thinking and practice on enhancing cross-continental cooperation on adaptation.

The policy briefs were prepared before and after COP28 in 2023 and 2024. They cover topics including building collaboration for better adaptation, bridging the Africa and European adaptation finance agendas, reinforcing the adaptation-health nexus, and the critical role to be played by the Africa-Europe partnership in making progress on Adaptation.

This final report brings together the key points from the policy briefs and makes recommendations for future action and an enhanced Africa-Europe Adaptation Partnership

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This executive summary provides an integrated summary of the policy briefs and the recommendations. More details are contained in the full policy briefs following this executive summary.

BUILDING COLLABORATION FOR BETTER ADAPTATION

“Good adaptation” is tied to the dynamic assessment of people and systems, and the ability to get ready for and counter the effects of long-term climate change and extreme weather. Action through building physical defences and changing production practices as well as putting in place financial and social provisions will be needed to adapt to the considerable uncertainty attached to the changing climate.

The Paris Agreement places an obligation on parties to undertake appropriate planning for adaptation and to report on progress. While documents overviewing adaptation planning processes may differ on matters of emphasis and order, they do not differ on the fundamental substance of their advice on how to plan for and deliver adaptation. Fundamental substance includes:

- Ensuring that climate risk assessments are undertaken and establish a baseline of the current situation to guide and understand the efficacy of future action.
- Ensuring capacity to carry out assessments.
- Ensuring clear coordination and leadership in the integration across sectors and scales for the management of adaptation planning and implementation.
- Assessing vulnerability to climate change is important for defining the risks posed by climate change and provides information for identifying measures to adapt to climate change impacts.
- Enabling practitioners and decision-makers to identify the most vulnerable areas, sectors and communities.
- Getting started and learn by doing. Waiting to try and assess all capacity and organisational needs before taking action is not feasible.
- Being able to make decisions under considerable uncertainty given that the detailed effects of climate change are complex and uncertain.
- Creating an evaluation mechanism to assess progress and adjust actions in the light of experience.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Africa and Europe would benefit from strengthening a shared vision on adaptation. **Although this is no simple task, some immediate opportunities to bridge Africa-Europe differences and make progress on adaptation exist. Namely in the following areas:**

1. Finance. To address the shared goal of increasing the quantity and quality of climate finance, African and European nations should collaborate to reform the climate finance architecture including to streamline and harmonise access and reporting to climate funds, work towards doubling adaptation finance by 2025, scale up all sources of finance for adaptation, and ensure adaptation finance is effectively integrated into new financial goals. This includes improving finance delivery to local levels in accordance with national and local plans and strengthening the capacities of regional bodies managing climate adaptation finance.

2. Planning. There is growing consensus about the need to build robust national plans that support locally led action by devolving decision making, building local capacity, and adapting finance to be able to react to an uncertain future. African countries should set out clear targets for adaptation plans and engage European donors over long term support for the definition and delivery of action.

3. Capacity building and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). It is essential to align Africa-Europe perspectives in the light of the Global Stocktake: NAPs have been a great tool to articulate how adaptation can be done and progress observed. Many developing country parties feel more space is needed to discuss National Adaptation Plans. The Africa-Europe Foundation through its dialogue platform could explore challenges such as whether there are sufficient funding and planning and monitoring mechanisms, and to explore how the vision of more responsive local plans set out by the LDCs and the growing interest in locally led adaptation can be put into practice.

4. Establish targets for adaptation. As above, the Africa-Europe Foundation would be able to act as a space for dialogue, recognising the importance of ensuring plans and targets are adapted to local circumstance and provide meaningful measures of progress.

5. Loss and damage. The Africa-Europe Foundation can provide an informal forum to build consensus on how proposed initiatives to tackle loss and damages such as the loss and damage fund, the Santiago Network and the global shield initiative best be developed to ensure that it can respond effectively to populations most at risk, what role social protection programmes can play to complement and support climate action, and how non-commercial forms of insurance might be strengthened.

BRIDGING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATION FINANCE AGENDAS

The need for more money is clear but there are also major concerns about access to and quality of climate finance. Complicated procedures and rules on how money can be channelled, lack of harmonisation between funds and lengthy time periods from application to disbursement act as a serious brake on action.

Although EU member states are pre-eminent in their contributions to adaptation funds, the \$100bn per year has not been met. Few developed countries are paying their 'fair share' of climate finance. Establishing the New Quantified Collective Goal (NQCG) and setting up the new Loss and Damage Fund are making progress, representing an opportunity for Africa and Europe to work together on practical action on adaptation.

Donor reporting methods for climate finance vary, so it is likely that provisions of climate finance are less than reported. The Africa group recognizes the need to improve financial tracking systems but prioritizes increasing and accelerating finance flow due to Africa's vulnerability and development needs. Africa receives only \$30 billion of the \$250 billion needed annually for climate finance, with a focus on mitigation and larger economies. Currently, annual spending on adaptation across all of Africa is \$11.4 billion, half of which is in the form of loans.

RECOMMENDATIONS

LOOKING AHEAD, AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD FOCUS ON:

1. Addressing the issue of risk management and debt. At the UN General Assembly and Africa Climate Summit in 2023, there was a commitment to fund sustainable development and restructure international finance, with an emphasis on climate risk management, particularly through finance and insurance. However, the effectiveness of insurance as a climate risk management tool in Africa is questionable due to technical problems of pricing, disbursement and affordability. There is a need to keep an open mind on the right financial instruments for particular countries and vulnerable populations, bearing in mind the differing needs of countries and communities. Given the number of actors it may be useful for Africa and Europe to work together to respond to the call in the Nairobi declaration for development partners to align and co-ordinate their technical assistance. The Africa-Europe Foundation could help convene a meeting to listen collectively to African voices on how access can be facilitated and work with Africa to accelerate access to expertise.

2. Lifting constraints on access to adaptation finance. The principles set out by the Task Force on Access to Finance note the need to harmonise procedures among funds for access to finance, and ensure funding is responsive, transparent and predictable. The difficulty of getting access to finance is consistently identified meetings convened on the fringes of formal negotiations. Challenges highlighted have included: (1) The considerable amount of time and effort it takes in getting accreditation; (2) The amount of time between approval and disbursement of funds; (3) The lack of harmonisation of application processes among funding entities; (4) That funding is overwhelmingly project based which means that planning needs to take place well in advance on priorities that may be out of date by the time funding arrives; (5) That climate action is both disjointed and fragmented as funding comes in project by project; and (6) A lack of trust and transparency that acts as a block in allowing funding to move to a more programmatic basis. In order to guide future action, the Africa-Europe Foundation could broker discussions on how best the Africa-Europe partnership can advance some of the reforms required, including taking stock of existing mechanisms and agree principles of funding and access, increasing understanding around how best to support the mainstreaming of climate in policies and plans both in terms of national action and climate funding mechanisms, and convening funds, governments, civil society and implementing agencies to identify specific ideas for changes in funding procedures

3. Empowering local communities and governments. The EU should explore the potential of fleshing out a 'Mission on strengthening climate finance access pathways in Africa', designed to foster capacity development and knowledge exchange to access adaptation finance. In the context of the decision on the GGA this would imply emphasis on planning and monitoring and particular attention to protecting the most vulnerable from climate impacts and increasing the resilience of water supplies, sustainable food production, health, infrastructure, ecosystems and cultural heritage.

4. Decentralising international climate adaptation finance. To improve climate finance effectiveness in Africa, it would be helpful for climate finance providers to decentralize; establishing and empowering regional African offices with specific expertise, able to work closely with applicants to speed up disbursement.

5. Reinforce the growing appreciation of blended-finance. The current trend demonstrates greater interest in combining public and private funds — to further mobilize much-needed capital for resilience investments in Africa. Given the scale of need for adaptation in Africa, further work to identify opportunities for blended finance is urgent. The Mission mentioned above should bring together investors and companies active in Africa to identify how investments in adaptation and resilience, for Africa, and for their businesses, can be increased.

6. Allocating SDRs to climate action, including adaptation. As leaders gear-up towards the Annual Meetings of the IMF/WB, European countries could increase their efforts in reallocating Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to developing country action, matching the French pledge to reallocate 30% of their SDRs, and encouraging other countries to do the same.

CLIMATE AND HEALTH: REINFORCING HEALTH AT THE HEART OF ADAPTATION

Climate change is a significant threat to public health in Africa and Europe. Some of the new and evolving health challenges posed by climate change that require additional efforts and resources include the transmission of vector-borne diseases, the increased risk of water-borne illnesses, impacts on agriculture that could increase the number of food-insecure and malnourished people, increased intensity and frequency of heatwaves, potential increased risk of violence against women and girls, indirect health impacts such as increased air pollution, and increased mental health problems due to disruption of social, economic, natural and health systems due to climate change.

The partnership between Africa and Europe can enable the two continents to tackle the growing impacts of climate change on health. Building on the existing lessons and opportunities, Europe and Africa can pool resources, share expertise at different levels and develop comprehensive policies and strategies that benefit both continents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

SOME OF THE PRIORITY AREAS THAT COULD PROMOTE CLIMATE-RESILIENT HEALTH SYSTEMS IN BOTH AFRICA AND EUROPE.

1. Fundamental changes in health systems are required to adapt to climate change. This includes actions such as policymakers and other stakeholders scaling up efforts to support locally led solutions and both Africa and Europe explicitly integrating health risks associated with climate change into adaptation and health policy

2. Multisectoral adaptation funding and action, which support health systems strengthening at all levels and improves social and environmental determinants of health, are needed to optimise health adaptation. This includes action such as increasing the proportion of earmarked funding and investments to protect health systems against climate-sensitive exposures and increase resilience to the effects of climate change.

3. Build on lessons from current programmes and collaborate on knowledge exchange. This includes action such as investing in public health education and action on water, sanitation, vector control and heatwave management and increasing efforts to establish a monitoring system that can promote learning and scaling up solutions to benefit health systems.

4. Investing in clean cooking solutions: At the nexus of climate, development and health. This includes actions such as building on the momentum provided by the Africa Climate Summit (ACS) to create and resource governmental clean cooking ‘delivery units’ that lead and coordinate clean cooking efforts across agencies and departments.

5. Acting on heatwaves. Planning for greater and more frequent heat will require changes in city and housing design as well as increased data on occurrences. Both Africa and Europe should step up contingency planning for responding to acute needs during heatwaves.

LEVERAGING COP28 OUTCOMES FOR ENHANCED AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION PARTNERSHIPS

COP28 in 2023 hosted by the United Arab Emirates in Dubai included some key adaptation outcomes that hold potential synergies and collaborative pathways to strengthen the adaptation partnership between Africa and Europe. These key outcomes include:

1. The Global Goal on Adaptation Framework. The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), initiated under the Paris Agreement's Article 71, emerged from the persistent advocacy by developing countries, especially the African Group. Their focus was on equalizing adaptation and mitigation within the UNFCCC negotiations. At COP21 in Glasgow, a two-year work programme with four annual workshops was agreed upon, leading to the creation of the GGA Framework at COP28. This framework serves as a crucial instrument for measuring and enhancing adaptation action globally. Key elements include (a) Thematic targets; (b) Dimensional targets; (c) Strategic significance of global climate adaptation targets; and (d) The GGA indicators work programme.

2. New commitments in adaptation finance. As of the latest updates, the total of adaptation finance pledges for 2023 is still pending. However, COP28 witnessed several new commitments to the Adaptation Fund, totalling US\$ 192.31 million, with the majority of the pledges came from Europe. However, this falls short of the Fund's mobilization target of \$300 million.

3. Knowledge sharing through NAP central. Traditionally, the NAP Central has facilitated knowledge sharing among developing countries under the UNFCCC. The recent COP28 decision expands its scope, encouraging developed countries to contribute, thereby enriching the platform's content. It is crucial that developed countries share their plans on the NAP Central to foster a richer, more collaborative exchange of adaptation strategies, enhancing the platform's role as a comprehensive resource in global adaptation efforts.

4. Adaptation progress beyond official UNFCCC processes. Outside the official UNFCCC meeting rooms, there was plenty of adaptation announcements and commitments made that are relevant to the relationship between African and European countries and their adaptation ambitions. For example, the launch of the Coalition of Ambition on Adaptation Finance by the Climate and Development Ministerial, the COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace, the COP Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilience Food Systems and Climate Action, the COP28 Joint Statement on Climate, Nature and People, the launch of a joint statement on adaptation by 18 philanthropies, new commitments and members for the LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience and new endorsers for the Principles for Locally Led Adaptation.

The change of EU political cycle in 2024, the upcoming AU-EU Ministerial Meeting (TBD), and the Second Ten-Year Implementation Plan of the African Union's Agenda 2063 present a chance to integrate the goals set during COP28 into the cooperation between Africa and Europe

RECOMMENDATIONS

THE FOLLOWING IS RECOMMENDED TO ENHANCE AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION PARTNERSHIPS GIVEN THESE COP28 OUTCOMES:

1. Provide a safe space for technical and political experts and negotiators from Africa and Europe:

Lack of preparation and alignment are a major concern ahead of negotiations, and climate diplomatic relations between Africa and Europe could be improved. It can be timely to provide a safe space for technical and political negotiators to meet to explore shared ground. The renewed leadership of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the Least Developed Country Group (LDC), and the G77 offers a window of opportunity to develop with Europe a common understanding on pressing issues affecting the delivery of adaptation action and finance. Both continents should use the positions of convergence to set higher level political and technical targets. It is vital to understand the dynamics of partnering and cooperating. As such, there should be timely and strategic meetings outside the usual negotiation processes for greater convergence and alignment.

2. Establish a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) knowledge transfer programme between Europe and Africa to support GGA implementation:

This programme could promote sharing of MEL expertise in a structured, long-term agenda to include joint workshops, mentorship schemes, and collaborative research projects. It should focus on sharing practical applications of MEL, tailored to specific needs and challenges related to implementing the GGA framework. It is estimated that 30% of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) have already a MEL protocol. Building on what countries already measure and using such programme could inform the UEA-Belem work programme on indicators leading to COP30 for the UEA Framework on Global Climate Resilience.

3. Enhance engagement in “NAP Central” with targeted support mechanisms:

Beyond simply encouraging active participation of European countries in NAP Central¹, the EU could establish targeted support mechanisms, such as technical assistance teams and funding opportunities, to incentivize and facilitate knowledge sharing. This would not only enrich the platform with diverse adaptation strategies but also provide tangible resources and expertise to support developing countries, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in implementing effective adaptation plans.

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4. Redesign, simplify, and reform climate finance:

- Engage Africa and Europe in dialogue to shape how best to quantify adaptation finance, using indicators from the GGA process to enhance grant finance and to increase adaptation finance over time, including the mobilisation of the private sector and public development banks. It will be critical that climate adaptation benefits from the structure that is decided and from the new financial goal that is set, as well as to connect the thematic and dimensional target of the GGA to climate finance. Beyond this, advancing estimates of what it would take to meet the goals articulated in the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience could be useful to take forward NCQG discussion, as well as to ensure the UAE framework is linked to the NCQG in 2024.

- Work together, as Africa and Europe, on options to ease access to climate finance and ensure finance is better able to support long term, flexible adaptation plans, in line with recommendations of the 2023 Climate and Development Ministerial. A partnership between European donors and African finance recipients could combine their experience and needs to suggest effective reforms. This work would cover application, disbursement, and reporting procedures – and trigger greater transparency and predictability of finance.

5. European donors could work towards harmonizing their procedures and reporting requirements for climate finance.

In doing this, they should take advice from recipient countries, particularly in Africa, in preparation for the 7th AU-EU Summit, due to take place in 2025. Harmonisation should align with the GGA framework established at COP28 and related adaptation commitments, aimed at support for the needs and priorities of countries as outlined in national planning documents, and for easing access and streamlining application and reporting processes.

6. Enhance EU political ambition and leadership to fulfil adaptation finance commitments:

The European Union could show political leadership by fulfilling the commitment made by wealthy countries to double adaptation finance by 2025, capitalizing on the momentum from this year's Climate and Development Ministerial dialogue, which took place in 2023, and discussions on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) leading up to COP29. This year's ministerial dialogue on doubling climate adaptation finance must be seen as a strategic milestone to rebuild trust with African partners.

¹ UNCC web-service for all NAP-related resources napcentral.org

7. Build a shared Africa-Europe position on what is needed for a transformational approach to adaptation: African and European countries should strengthen their adaptation efforts in accordance with decisions under the UNFCCC, while also learning from practical experience. Joint advocacy is crucial to engage stakeholders in international finance, countries, communities, and the private sector in driving change under the UNFCCC and elsewhere. This approach aligns with the COP28 decision, which mandates examination of what is meant by “transformational adaptation”. The findings from this examination should further inform and strengthen the Africa-Europe partnership in developing transformative adaptation strategies. With the current Italian G7 Presidency having a focus on Africa and putting emphasis on transformational adaptation, there are opportunities to mirror EU missions, including the one on [adaptation](#), to the African continent.

8. Beyond adaptation, it will be key to build a shared understanding of the Loss and Damage Fund, and how best to position the Africa-Europe partnership to fast-track roll-out of this fund. After much deliberation last year, the Loss and Damage Fund was approved at COP28, to cover the costs and damages resulting from climate-related disasters such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other extreme weather events. According to this agreement, developed countries should contribute to the fund in proportion to their contribution to climate change. Parties to the COP have pledged \$700 million to assist low-income countries in recovering from the effects of climate change. While this is a significant step towards climate justice, the volume of funding falls far short of what climate-vulnerable populations will require to rebuild their homes, livelihoods, and communities when natural disasters strike.

The year 2024 marks a pivotal point in reinforcing the Africa-Europe partnership on adaptation, coinciding with the new European Union political cycle, upcoming AU-EU Ministerial Meeting, and the second decade of the African Union's Agenda 2063. This period offers an ideal opportunity to embed the adaptation strategies from COP28, particularly the GGA framework, into the collaborative agenda. There are existing initiatives, such as the European Climate Adaptation platform (Climate-ADAPT) and Team Europe Initiatives (TEIs), which align with the GGA framework and provide practical tools for climate change adaptation. These initiatives, including the EU-AU Innovation Agenda and the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, not only aim for transformational results in areas like agriculture, water, and cultural heritage but also emphasize the importance of learning from African countries' extensive experience in climate adaptation. These collaborative efforts are essential for implementing NDCs, NAPs, and driving the green transition, thereby strengthening the Africa-Europe Adaptation Partnership.

GLOSSARY

AEF	Africa-Europe Foundation
AU	African Union
COP	Conference of the parties to the UN Framework convention on Climate Change
CMA	Conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (Properly called CMA)
EU	European Union
GGA	Global Goal on Adaptation
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
LDC	Least Developed Country
NAP	National Adaptation Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contribution
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SB	Subsidiary body of the UNFCCC
UNFCCC	UN Framework convention on Climate Change
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USD	US Dollar
WB	World Bank

MAIN REPORT

POLICY BRIEF ONE: **BRIDGING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATION AGENDAS**



POLICY BRIEF ONE:

BRIDGING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATION AGENDAS

This is the first in a series of five briefs to inform the Africa–Europe Foundation’s engagement with European and African policymakers and stimulate thinking and practice on enhancing cross-continental cooperation on adaptation. This brief reviews the setting today, covers good practice in adaptation and makes suggestions for the Foundation’s work over the period beyond COP28. The four subsequent briefs will cover climate funding and access, funding reform, steps Africa and Europe can take to accelerate adaptation action, and finally some recommendations to the EU and AU, Member States and adaptation practitioners as they gear-up towards a new EU policy cycle starting in 2024 and enter the second decade of the African Union’s Agenda 2063

These five policy briefs seek to position the AEF relative to the sequence of forthcoming international milestones, starting with the Africa Climate Summit, followed by the G20, UNGA78, WB/IMF Autumn meetings, the Climate and Development Ministerial (C&DM), the Pre-COP ministerial meeting, and COP28. The year 2023 saw significant steps made in the global reform of the financial architecture that culminated in the first UNFCCC Global Stocktake (GST) delivered at COP28. The production

of these five briefs is intended to inform the AEF as well as to frame options for decision-makers to work with African and European actors in the field of adaptation, building trust and consensus on difficult topics, and mainstreaming the theme of adaptation within the cross-continental Partnership.

The first policy brief outlines good practice in adaptation – key principles, what works well and lessons to date. The two continents’ multiple regions face a growing common challenge to which they need to find solutions both in the immediate and in the longer-term. The two continents would benefit from strengthening a shared vision on adaptation, on which to build a solid partnership, through the reinforcement of a joint learning platform, from which experts can share know-how and best practices, and develop cross-continental solutions. After a period of heightened concern across all the world’s continents at major damaging climate disasters, and with the Global Stocktake at COP28, the next 2-3 months should provide a clear focus on accelerating ambition with cuts to greenhouse gases, and making effective provision for adaptation action and finance, and building greater resilience for communities most at risk..

Progress on adaptation is urgent. At COP 27 the progress on loss and damage was felt by some to eclipse the need to also emphasise the need for adaptation. It is paramount to understand that lack of progress on adaptation is a big loss for Africa. One can hope that the Global Stocktake political phase, together with the Glasgow-Sharm el Sheikh work programme’s contribution to decisions on the Global Goal on Adaptation are going to provide an opportunity to set out the ambition required.

STATE-OF-PLAY FOLLOWING 6TH AU-EU SUMMIT, COP27 AND RECENT INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE- RELATED MILESTONES

The 6th AU-EU Leaders' Summit in February 2022

noted “Aware of unprecedented and mounting common challenges and opportunities, the leaders of the EU and AU commit to a Joint Vision for a renewed Partnership to build a common future, as closest partners and neighbours.” Giving strong support for multilateralism, and the importance of mobilising additional finance, such as through re-allocation of SDRs, the Summit recognised the need to mobilise funds for implementation of NDCs and NAPs in Africa. The Team EU Initiative for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa worth more than €1bn was launched at COP27 by the European Commission together with Germany, France the Netherlands and Sweden. Additional EU member states are joining forces. This supports collection and analysis of climate risk data, reinforces early warning systems, and increases public sector readiness to mobilise international climate finance. The initiative also has a focus on developing and implementing climate and disaster risk finance and insurance, such as the Global Shield.

Since 2013 the EU has more than doubled its climate finance, committing €23.04 bn in 2021, of which 55% (€12.62 bn) was for adaptation or cross cutting actions. Pure adaptation commitment stood at 22% (5.18bn).² The EU provided 66% of the global funds for adaptation and cross cutting finance in 2021. Both EU (Germany, Sweden) and African countries (Rwanda, Senegal, Malawi) are part of the task force on access to climate finance³. EU members are also prominent in the champions group on adaptation finance⁴.

At COP 27 they reiterated their call for improved quantity and quality of adaptation finance⁵.

The World Bank / IMF 2023 spring meetings took place against a groundswell of calls for major reforms to the global financial architecture, spearheaded by developing countries who make clear that financial provisions to tackle the climate crisis are inadequate in scale and speed. The Bridgetown Agenda illustrates clearly the priority reforms to be made⁶, and points out that repeated climate shocks risk pushing developing countries into a downward spiral of debt and poverty. On average, low-income countries are using more than 10% of their national budget to service debt, with some – Senegal (35%) and Angola (46%) – using much more⁷. The rise in interest rates from Central Banks to address inflationary pressures in both US and Europe have worsened further the burden of debt service. Bridgetown calls for expanded development lending and emergency liquidity in the face of climate disasters. Yet, despite many practical ideas for reforms to the global financial architecture gaining traction, observers at the WB/IMF meetings⁸ noted only incremental progress at best. The arrival of a new WB President creates the space to make faster progress at the Marrakesh Autumn meetings in October 2023. And the G20 meeting in Mid-September endorsed the findings of the sustainable finance working group⁹ that called for the finance system to put in place improved risk management and to enable greater inclusion of private and philanthropic finance flows.

² [Chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://climate.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-11/climate_finance_factsheet_en.pdf](https://climate.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-11/climate_finance_factsheet_en.pdf)

³ Steering committee consists of UK (Co-Chair), Fiji (Co-Chair), Belize, Bhutan, Germany, Green Climate Fund, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Sweden, United States, World Bank

⁴ Founded in 2021 the group comprises Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom as well as the African Development Bank

⁵ <https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2022/11/11/cop27-ministers-on-adaptation-finance#:~:text=Since%20the%20Champions%20Group%20on,been%20championing%20increases%20in%20the>

⁶ <https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-2022-barbados-agenda/>

⁷ <https://www.iied.org/third-woman-getting-trade-back-track>

⁸ <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-we-saw-2023-spring-meetings>

⁹ <https://g20sfwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/G20-Sustainable-Finance-Working-Group-Deliverables-2023.pdf>

Subsidiary Bodies (SB) of the UNFCCC meetings – Bonn, June 2023. The results from the Subsidiary Bodies meeting were disappointing. There was a failure to agree on the host for the Santiago Network that will facilitate and fund technical assistance to respond to claims of loss and damage. Disagreement hinges on where it will be based - with Africa raising concerns about gaining sufficient representation if the platform were to be hosted by the Caribbean Development Bank, arguing instead for it to be based in Africa. The alternative proposal for hosting the platform was from a UN consortium composed of the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction and UN Office for Project Services, which poses familiar concerns around country ownership and high transaction costs.

The SB discussions explored the Glasgow/Sharm el Sheikh work programme on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), which will conclude at COP28 this year. However, only slow progress was made on deciding possible headings for the decision which will define the Global Goal, generating mounting frustration from

developing countries. African negotiators noted the urgency of a decision that will bolster the resilience of developing countries and put National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) as a standing item on the climate negotiations agenda. The Least Developed Countries (LDCs) expressed dissatisfaction with levels of funding delivered, and lack of progress with arrangements to address loss and damage. Work on the Global Goal on Adaptation is a critical part of the overall Global Stocktake, also due this year at COP28. The EU saw progress on adaptation less in terms of absolute targets and more in terms of tracking the process of adaptation both locally and the international support systems for it, given the difference of contexts around the world.

The Paris Summit for a New Global Financial Pact in June 2023 provided additional momentum to discussions of the reforms needed to unlock trillions of dollars, but there was no break-through on transformational changes to global finance, to address issues of debt relief and climate action.

CLIMATE ADAPTATION: CONCEPTS AND GUIDANCE FOR GREATER COLLECTIVE ACTION

The IPCC defines adaptation as “the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities”¹⁰.

Adaptation spans a wide array of actions, from delivery of ‘hard’ investment, such as sea defences, to a wide array of ‘soft’ adaptations that acknowledge the importance of social, financial, organisational, political and cultural aspects for ensuring that action is effective. This has led to the concept of ‘hard’ limits of adaptation, when there is nothing that can be done to adapt further - for example when an island is inundated by sea level rise, and ‘soft’ limits where a lack of money, organisation or means for people to migrate is blocked. In practice, being clear about where the limits to adaptation lie is not so simple. About a quarter of studies identify how limits will constrain action,

and of those a quarter identify hard limits to adaptation¹¹. Adaptation action is subject to layers of complexity. Global trends in climate are clear, with the likelihood of more frequent, extreme events increasing with temperature. However, at the local scale, precise impacts can be much harder to predict, with extreme events size and frequency uncertain. Financial, organisational and social constraints on action come on top of that. The identification of adaptation goals and limits is therefore difficult, and has given rise to a more dynamic understanding, based on the concept of building the “resilience” of systems. The IPCC¹² defines this as “the capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reorganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning and transformation”.

Understanding what “good adaptation” means is therefore tied up with the dynamic assessment of people and systems’ ability not only to get ready for and counter the effects of climate change, but also to absorb and react to shocks.

The LDC Group undertook an evidence review in 2019 to document a wide range of interventions being undertaken across the developing world and to identify which ones show evidence pointing to positive outcomes in supporting effective adaptation and resilient development. In doing this assessment, the LDC Group set out 9 criteria¹³, as shown in Box 1 below.

Outcome-based criteria	Process-based criteria
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Targets the drivers of climate vulnerability 2. Promotes far-sighted action for the long term 3. Promotes far-reaching action at scale 4. Promotes social justice with gender equality and social inclusion 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Integrates scientific and technical knowledge within local knowledge systems 6. Supports vertical integration between layers and horizontal integration between sectors 7. Supports the coherent delivery of global commitments including those in SDGs, the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets 8. Uses participatory design and transparent processes 9. Is domestically driven and owned, and strengthens national institutions

Box 1 Nine criteria for long-term adaptation and resilience

¹⁰ IPCC https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/01/SYRAR5-Glossary_en.pdf

¹¹ Thomas, A., Theokritoff, E., Lesnikowski, A. et al. Global evidence of constraints and limits to human adaptation. Reg Environ Change 21, 85 (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-021-01808-9>

¹² IPCC https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2019/01/SYRAR5-Glossary_en.pdf


¹³ LDC Group. Delivering our climate-resilient future: lessons from a global evidence review (2019) <https://www ldc-climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/LIFE-AR-Evidence-Review-English.pdf>

ADAPTATION PLANNING

The Paris Agreement places an obligation on parties to undertake appropriate planning for adaptation and to report on progress. At present 18 African countries have completed a National Adaptation Plan. Detailed progress of countries in the adaptation planning process is available on the UNFCCC website¹⁴. All EU countries have either a National Adaptation plan or strategy¹⁵ and

the EU commission adopted its adaptation strategy in February 2021¹⁶. All countries are required to produce Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) that put forward proposals for greenhouse gas reductions. Some developing countries have included adaptation planning in their NDCs, meaning that 76% of all countries have at least one national level planning instrument¹⁷

Figure 1 Status of adaptation planning (from UNEP Gap report 2021)



Note: Territories marked as N/A are those recognized as disputed by the United nations or whose status has not yet been agreed upon.

¹⁴ <https://napdown.github.io/NAP-Global-Progress/>

¹⁵ <https://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/figures/status-of-national-adaptation-policy-1>

¹⁶ https://climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/adaptation-climate-change/eu-adaptation-strategy_en

¹⁷ <https://www.unep.org/ndc/resources/report/adaptation-gap-report-2021>

Guidance on adaptation planning has been produced to guide both macro-level actions by governments down to lessons learnt from community-based activities. There is a growing literature on methods and metrics for adaptation. Countries are increasingly drawing on accumulated guidance and their own experience, from which to articulate improvements to adaptation actions, the progress to be made, and the types of financial and organisational partnerships needed to deliver this.

A review of 39 examples of adaptation planning processes¹⁸ noted that they had many elements in common, though often presented them differently. The review identified six core steps:

While the above six points are useful as a basic framework, they are silent on some of the critical capacity and organisational aspects of delivering adaptation.

The main documents reviewed are those published by the UNFCCC, World Bank, IMF, the LDC group and the review of adaptation by the Global Center for Adaptation^{19 20 21 22 23 24 25}. These documents draw on wide experience and, while they may differ on matters of emphasis and order, they do not differ on the fundamental substance of their advice on how to plan for and deliver adaptation. A common starting point is the need for a **climate risk assessment and to establish a baseline of the current situation to guide and understand the efficacy of future action**. Assessing vulnerability to climate change is important for defining the risks posed by climate change and provides information for identifying measures to adapt to climate change impacts; and enabling practitioners and decision-makers to identify the most vulnerable areas, sectors and communities. In this scoping phase, the IMF looks at prevention of harm, the alleviation of risk and a focus on the macro financial risks. The World Bank stresses at the outset that rapid, robust economic development underpins adaptation,

- Specify why action is needed and outcomes required (Scope)
- Create plausible scenarios for action (Envision)
- Identify risks and opportunities (Identify)
- Prioritise options to address risks and capture opportunities (Prioritise)
- Take action to adapt as well as monitor (Implement), and...
- Share, learn and adjust course as needed (Evaluate).

with climate challenges necessarily factored into actions to reduce risk, and protect assets, while recognising that some residual risk will remain. Any actions will need to respond to extreme events. An important consideration is the interconnectedness of risk, as when public assets (e.g. roads) are critical to economic activity; putting the right macro policies in place to maintain and repair infrastructure will be an important part of adaptation considerations.

As part of this assessment phase, the UNFCCC guidelines emphasise the need to assess the gaps in knowledge and information associated with climate risks, but there is generally less treatment of the outcomes envisioned. In part this is due to the fact that envisioning the future is difficult, given the complexity of action, and the threat of further disasters pushing plans off course.

¹⁸ [Climate change adaptation guidance: Clarifying three modes of planning and implementation](#) Mark Stafford-Smith*, David Rissik, Roger Street, Brenda Lind, Veronica Doerra, Robert Webbe, Lesley Andrew, Russell M. Wise *Climate risk management* 35 2022

¹⁹ [Developing national adaptation monitoring and evaluation systems: A guidebook](#) Hayley Price-Kelly, Anne Hammill, Julie Dekens (IISD) Timo Leiter, Julia Olivier (GIZ) 2015

²⁰ [Bellon, Matthieu, and Emanuele Massetti, 2022. "Economic Principles for Integrating Adaptation to Climate Change into Fiscal Policy." IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/001, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.](#)

²¹ [Bellon, Matthieu, and Emanuele Massetti, 2022. "Planning and Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in Fiscal Policy." IMF Staff Climate Note 2022/003, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC](#)

²² [Best Practices and lessons learned in addressing adaptation LDC expert group 2015](#) <https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/News/Pages/Capturinglessonslearned.aspx>

²³ [Hallegatte Stephane, Jun Rentschler, Julie Rozenberg. 2020. Adaptation Principles—A Guide for Designing Strategies for Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience. Washington, DC: World Bank.](#)

²⁴ [Global Center on Adaptation. 2022. State and Trends in Adaptation Reports 2021 and 2022:](#)

²⁵ [Delivering our climate-resilient future: lessons from a global evidence review LDC 2050 Vision 2019, updated 2021](#)

Assuring **capacity to carry out assessments** is central to making progress. While this may well involve outside experts, it is critical to **ensure the involvement of all stakeholders** to build an understanding of how macro-level action can enable and complement local interventions, in ways which support the most vulnerable. It is also essential to recognise the differing ways that vulnerability is experienced, due to gender, ethnicity, income level and other intersectional aspects.

The management of adaptation planning and implementation requires integration across sectors and scales. **Clear coordination and leadership** are key here. There is no single recommended way to achieve this, as countries must choose what is right for them, but any mechanism will need to have effective access to decision makers, be empowered to lead, and be well-integrated into existing development planning processes. Given the long term financial implications of climate risk, ministries of finance are central to the process²⁶.

The UNFCCC and GIZ guidance emphasise the need to get started and learn by doing. Waiting to try and assess all capacity and organisational needs before taking action is not a feasible path. Rather, sufficient data and measures which are right for a given country and local context can be discovered through “a thoughtful assessment and robust stakeholder process”²⁷, bearing in mind the need to integrate both large and small scales, and make effective use of qualitative data.

Everywhere, the effects of climate change are subject to some uncertainty. This is especially true for Africa, where future rainfall trends, for example, are difficult to predict²⁸. This uncertainty is compounded by the interplay between the impact of climate extremes and political, economic, and social conditions. **Adaptation actions therefore require having to make decisions under considerable uncertainty.** Guidelines advocate techniques such as theories of change, decision trees, and robust decision-

making procedures that can compare scenarios of the actions taken with results achieved, in order to enable subsequent adjustments. Mechanisms to **manage residual risk** are needed, alongside shock-responsive social protection and assistance for reconstruction.

Given the iterative process of adaptation, an **evaluation mechanism** to assess progress and adjust actions in the light of experience needs to be established. Indicators and metrics must be carefully chosen to fit the given situation. There is no shortage of suggestions for the kind of metrics to be used, and countries have shown an appetite for learning about which indicators might work best. But for indicators to be meaningful, they should guide actions in direction of the changes desired.

There are reasons for caution against relying too much on traditional cost benefit analysis of individual actions, as some risks have slow-onset effects over the long-term, or wider economic co-benefits that would justify investment, but which might be hard to pick up in traditional cost benefit exercises. Simple measures based on GDP alone tend to miss out the human cost of climate impacts and their disproportionate impact on the poor. An important part of the evaluation of adaptation is understanding how inputs are having an effect.

Tagging climate expenditure is not an exact science. This is not surprising as the best climate adaptation is robust effective development, so incremental expenditure to help adapt to climate can be hard to disentangle from wider spending. But understanding how climate finance is having an effect is still important and guidance on methods to do this, such as using Rio markers,²⁹ following MDB reporting,³⁰ the World Bank's climate public expenditure and institutional review³¹ or UNDP guidance³² are all available. The critical point though is to make sure that measures make sense to the country concerned.

²⁶ See Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, Final Summary - Strengthening the role of MoF_0.pdf ([financeministersforclimate.org](https://www.financeministersforclimate.org))

²⁷ Spanger-Siegfried, E., Dougherty, B., Downing, T., Hellmuth, M., Hoeggel, U., Klaey, A., Lonsdale, K., 2004. User's Guidebook. In: Lim, B., Spanger-Siegfried, E., Burton, I., Malone, E.L., Huq, S. (Eds.), *Adaptation Policy Frameworks for Climate Change: Developing Strategies, Policies and Measures*. Cambridge University Press/UNDP, Cambridge, UK, pp. 5–28.

²⁸ <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/chapter/chapter-9/>

²⁹ https://www.oecd.org/dac/environment-development/revise%20climate%20marker%20handbook_FINAL.pdf

³⁰ https://www.eib.org/attachments/lucalli/mdbs_joint_report_2021_en.pdf

³¹ <https://www.greengrowthknowledge.org/resource/climate-change-public-expenditure-and-institutional-review-sourcebook>

³² <https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/climate-and-disaster-resilience-/knowing-what-you-spend.html>

ADAPTATION DELIVERY AND FINANCE

The consensus is clear that adaptation needs to focus on the vulnerable, and this makes Africa, home to 30 of the 46 least developed countries, a clear focus for funding.




Figure 2 EU and EU member state contributions to adaptation in Africa USD million (source OECD³³)




Figure 3 Total adaptation finance to Africa USD million (OECD)

The OECD data in Figure 2 above shows the EU contributed over \$2bn to Africa in 2021 in finance, where adaptation is a significant factor. Figures 3 and 4 show the importance of this finance, relative to other funders.

³³ https://public.tableau.com/views/Climate-RelatedDevelopmentFinanceRecipient2021/CRDFRP?:language=en-US&publish=yes&:display_count=n&:origin=viz_share_link&:showVizHome=no#1




Figure 4 The top contributors to Africa of adaptation finance USD million 2016- 2021(OECD)

The EU are clearly among the top contributors to climate adaptation, with the figure above under-representing EU contributions, as they are also major donors to multilateral banks and the GCF.

The LDCs (33 of Africa's 54 countries are LDCs) are particularly vulnerable to climate change and are committed to stepping up action. In 2019 they launched their Vision 2050³⁴, which recognised the need for strong country-led action to deliver adaptation by putting in place the finance architecture, inclusive governance that integrates climate action into broader strategies, and capacity building. This commitment to action by LDCs was complemented by an ask to the international community to provide the flexible long-term funds to deliver at least 70% to local level action, reduce transaction costs, and assist in building capabilities.

LDC countries are putting this vision into practice. The LDC Initiative for effective adaptation and resilience (LIFE-AR) aims to put in place the national structures, adapted to local circumstances, that will deliver the LDC vision of finance and action reaching those who

need it most. The initiative aims to grow in stages, with the 'frontrunner' African countries being Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Malawi, and Uganda. The initiative has been endorsed by 10 donor countries³⁵ of which 6 are EU member states (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy). The initiative is currently funded by Ireland, the UK and the US.

With a similar idea of seeking to build local capacities, the LoCal³⁶ programme, designed by United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) in 2011, channels finance to local governments through performance-based grants. It has led to the creation of ISO standard 14093³⁷ related to funding of subnational authorities. LoCal is working with 11 African countries³⁸ and is supported by 7 European donors³⁹

Building on the various sources of guidance and accumulated learning, and taking note of the LDC vision, the World Resources Institute and the International Institute for Environment and Development facilitated the development of the locally led adaptation principles⁴⁰.

³⁴ <https://www.iied.org/ldc-2050-vision-for-climate-resilient-future#:~:text=The%20LDC%202050%20Vision%2C%20launched,their%20societies%20and%20ecosystems%20thrive.>

³⁵ Austria, USA, Norway, UK, Italy, Ireland, Germany Finland, Denmark, Canada

³⁶ <https://www.uncdf.org/article/8328/local-report-2019-2022>

³⁷ <https://www.iso.org/standard/68511.html>


³⁸ Benin , Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania,

³⁹ EU Commission, Sweden, Luxembourg, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Government of Catalunya.

⁴⁰ <https://www.wri.org/initiatives/locally-led-adaptation/principles-locally-led-adaptation> and <https://www.iied.org/10211iied>

These principles include calls to devolve decision making, build a robust understanding of risk and uncertainty, provide patient, flexible funding, invest in capability and ensure collaboration across sectors (Figure 2). Over 100 organisations have endorsed the principles, including 14 country agencies or ministries⁴¹ of which 5 are EU member states (Denmark, Finland,

Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden). The G7 has welcomed the principles. Endorsement of the principles by African governments has been held back as they have not been produced through an intergovernmental process, but in general they are held to be a useful statement of good practice.



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Figure 5 The principles for locally led adaptation⁴²

The **Team Europe Initiative**⁴³ and the **Nairobi declaration** show strong overlap, most notably in the need to integrate climate into whole-of-government plans, strengthen climate information and the urgent need to accelerate enhanced action and deliver finance. This includes the need to strengthen disaster risk assessment and response. While Team Europe focusses on disaster risk finance and insurance, the Nairobi declaration concentrates on getting the financing mechanisms operational for addressing loss and damage. Overall, however, the Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi offered

much greater focus on the African continent being a “solution provider” for building a global green economy. Questions of adaptation and resilience represent just one of six lines of discussion. As a consequence, it would be worth seeing how adaptation dovetails and complements actions in the other fields, such as building more sustainable agri-food systems, investing in nature and carbon sinks, responses to extreme events, and emerging health challenges from disasters, heat and changing disease patterns.

⁴¹ Uganda Vanuatu Jamaica Antigua and Barbuda Ireland Denmark Finland Netherlands Nepal Norway, South Africa, Sweden, UK, USA

⁴² https://twitter.com/grp_resilience/status/1353988553001168897

⁴³ <https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/team-europe-tracker/partner-countries/sub-saharan-africa/climate-change-adaptation-resilience-africa#:~:text=The%20Team%20Europe%20Proposal%2C%20specific,responsive%20and%20inclusive%20development%20pathways.>

IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES TO BRIDGE AFRICA-EUROPE DIFFERENCES AND MAKE PROGRESS ON ADAPTATION.

This paper suggests that there are several opportunities for the AEF to create a space for parties to explore and discuss options in critical, contested areas. While there are numerous think-tanks generating papers and recommendations on different aspects of climate action, what is needed is an honest broker able to help advance the process of discussion and consensus-building, rather than proposing ready-made solutions. The Africa Climate Summit presented a vital arena in which to identify and

explore with different actors the areas in which a trust-building and consensus-generating process could work. Such an approach pursued over the next 2-3 months could embed such practices as a legacy of the current EU policy cycle as well as to reinforce AU's aspirations as enshrined in its Agenda 2063 and its Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032)

FINANCE

Noting the common desire to get finance flowing to support climate action, what scope is there for joint African and European action to work towards improved financing mechanisms that will get money to where it is needed most? This could include coordinating action to reform access to climate funds, working jointly towards the delivery of the doubling of climate finance by 2025 compared to 2019, and making progress on how adaptation finance will feature in the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance and on improving

the delivery of climate finance to the local level in line with nationally and locally agreed plans, supporting with technical, regulatory, jurisdictional, and financial assistance the strengthening of national and regional bodies in charge of receiving and allocating climate adaptation finance. For example, in relation to the GCF, Europe could use its position of contributing nearly 50% of the close to \$20bn confirmed as pledges to the GCF to try and speed up delivery of climate funding.

PLANNING

There is growing consensus about the need to build robust national plans, devolve decision making, tailor funding, and support capacity building to strengthen locally led action at both policy and practical levels. This can include supporting African countries with no NAPs to start laying the foundations for these plans to be elaborated further and contribute to pressing needs. How best can Africa and Europe accelerate this process? The

climate and development ministerial on October 29th, as well as the Pre-COP ministerial meeting offer useful opportunities to underline European and African resolve to integrate adaptation across all government and local actions. This can draw from the synthesis report of the UNFCCC on the Global Stocktake to ramp-up adaptation action and finance, as well as to reinforce and reframe the Africa-Europe partnership on adaptation.

CAPACITY BUILDING

What can Europe best do to support African countries in their drive to build capacity for climate action? What opportunities are there for mutual exchange and learning on adaptation planning and action? How can funding seek to build capacities and capabilities, including strengthening African institutions and practitioners?

What role for state and non-state actors? What should the Santiago Network deliver and how? Would it be useful if the AEF establish a forum in partnership with front-runners in adaptation action to explore ways forward for good adaptation to become the norm, and advance thinking on loss and damage?

NATIONAL ADAPTATION PLANS (NAPS)POL

It is essential to align Africa-Europe perspectives in the light of the Global Stocktake: NAPs have been a great tool to articulate how adaptation can be done and progress observed. Leading up to COP28, there will be more focus on NAPs as a tool for adaptation, but also recognition that they are not the only tool. While the EU feels that NAPs are already well underway, many developing country parties feel more space is needed to discuss National Adaptation Plans, notably with a focus

on progress and implementation. Through the work of the NAP Global Network, LDC Expert Group, and others, there seem to be many layers of information around progress with NAPs, including the level of financing. But it would be good to get to the nub of the issue: Are there not sufficient mechanisms for tracking progress? Is there not sufficient funding? The Africa-Europe Foundation through its dialogue platform could get to the nub of these challenges.

ESTABLISH TARGETS FOR ADAPTATION:

The period between now and COP28 is critical in making progress towards drawing lessons learned, and inspiration from existing frameworks. Let's not wait until we get to COP28 to eventually operationalize the Global Goal on Adaptation. There are already some targets, indicators and criteria. It is timely to build on and reinforce these, working with what is already available instead of trying to duplicate and create more top-down structures. As a way forward, it would be good to ask why discussions around targets have been challenging at the last inter-

session in Bonn (SB) for the developed world, including the EU. Agreeing on targets is one of the main sticking points on adaptation. As such, it would be good to hear from the EU on what they thought was challenging, and why the discussion couldn't move faster. The intention with this is not to be too prescriptive, in how the global adaptation strategy is applied to vastly different local contexts. This is the challenge with adaptation, since it is both transboundary but also very specific to different regions and contexts.

LOSS AND DAMAGE

Europe's commitment is to enhance Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance including through the Global Shield⁴⁴ initiative. How can this initiative best be developed to ensure that it can respond effectively to populations most at risk, in particular amongst the most impoverished, where commercial insurance is

unlikely to be viable? Can social protection programmes complement and support climate action to reduce vulnerabilities? How might non-commercial forms of insurance be strengthened, such as through collective action and informal institutions?

PREPARING FOR COP 28

Lack of progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation is a major concern. There is strong consensus between Europe and by the LDCs (a majority of countries in Africa) on best practice in delivering adaptation, as evidenced by support for LIFE-AR and the locally led adaptation principles. What scope is there for further Africa and Europe dialogue in the run up to COP 28 that can help build and disseminate consensus on agreed good practices? Bringing together stakeholders from Africa and Europe to meet, listen and discuss sticking points, and the most contested issues, could be extremely valuable in building consensus or making sure that the two continents can find common ground for agreement and action.

As such, it can be timely to provide a safe space for technical and political negotiators to meet to explore shared ground. There is a need for the EU and the Africa Group to develop a common understanding so the two groups can work towards convergence, as opposed to contestation. At UN discussions, regrettably, the two usually end up focusing on areas of difference rather than where there is convergence of views. Both continents should use the positions of convergence to set higher level political targets, which feed into specifically defined action and targets by countries, regions, provinces. It's vital to understand the dynamics of partnering and cooperating. As such, there should be continuous meetings with lead negotiators outside the usual negotiation process.

⁴⁴ <https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/climate-change-and-development/global-shield-against-climate-risks>

MAIN REPORT

POLICY BRIEF TWO: BRIDGING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATION FINANCE AGENDAS

POLICY BRIEF TWO:

BRIDGING THE AFRICAN AND EUROPEAN ADAPTATION FINANCE

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND CONTEXT

The 2015 Paris Agreement's article 2.1c notes that finance flows should be “consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development”. Article 9 calls for developed country parties to take a lead in mobilising climate finance that should be a “progression beyond previous efforts.”

But there is no agreed definition of what “climate finance” includes. The EU's 2023 submission to the UNFCCC on Article 2.1c acknowledges this⁴⁵. The previous policy brief in this series pointed out that adaptation is dependent on robust, risk-aware development. But how should one identify the “progression beyond previous efforts” and relate them to climate change, as suggested above? It is not straightforward. The foreseen Annual Meetings of the IMF/WB in Marrakech and the COP28 Global Stocktake are immediate opportunities for world leaders to discuss this.

In practice, donors score and report on their own climate finance, and their methods vary⁴⁶, on the percentage of finance estimated as related to climate in any one project, and whether they count funds that have been committed, or actually disbursed. The reporting of climate finance

has therefore been criticised as overestimating the actual quantity of finance provided^{47 48}.

The Africa group acknowledges the need for a transformation of the financial system to track finance flows more effectively⁴⁹, but the scoring of climate finance is, for Africa, eclipsed by their concern to get more finance flowing and faster, with a focus on a just transition, given Africa's vulnerability and development needs.

Africa currently receives only \$30bn, or 12% of the \$250 billion needed per year in climate finance. Most of this money is for mitigation and weighted towards large economies such as South Africa. Adaptation finance counts for 24% of the total \$250bn needed, but this is thought to be an underestimate, given the lack of detailed local adaptation planning and uncertainty over climate impacts.⁵⁰

Recent analysis shows that current annual climate finance for adaptation across all of Africa is US\$11.4 billion, which represents about 39 percent of total climate finance committed to Africa annually.

⁴⁵ “On the technical side, it can for example be noted that there is no tracking system/framework (indicators and data) in place to capture in a systemic way the fragmented landscape of initiatives on financial flows consistent with the Paris Agreement.” (EU submission on article 2.1c) 26 April 2023

⁴⁶ Results of the survey on the coefficients applied to Rio Marker data when reporting to the UN Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity OECD 2021

⁴⁷ Malte Toetzke , Anna Stünzi , and Florian Egli ,Consistent and replicable estimation of bilateral climate finance Nature climate change 2022 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41558-022-01482-7> put overestimation 21% on principal markers and 60% on subsidiary markers

⁴⁸ Oxfam Climate Finance Short-changed: The real value of the \$100 billion commitment in 2019–2020 Oxfam 2022 estimates climate finance about 67% over reported.

⁴⁹ Africa Submission thon 2.1 c 29.05.23 “a holistic transformation of the financial system consistent with climate action will still require additional regulatory, structural, and capacity efforts”

⁵⁰ Climate Finance Needs of African Countries Sandra Guzmán, Greta Dobrovich, Anna Balm and Chavi Meattle


About half of this finance was in the form of loans⁵¹. Recently, Africa has called for new global taxes to fund climate change action, along with greater grants.

Many countries are paying more in debt service than they receive in climate finance support, with a set of Small Island and Developing States (SIDS) and LDCs spending \$33 billion on debt repayments in 2021 as compared with \$20 billion in climate finance.⁵² Africa's debt increased from 36% to 71.4% of GDP between 2010 and 2020, and is projected to increase a further 10 to 15% over the next

three to ten years⁵³ The inaugural African Climate Summit organised in Kenya in September 2023 highlighted the need for action of debt including incentivizing investment in climate aligned opportunities and inclusion of 'debt pause' clauses to help deal with shocks.

REFORMING THE CURRENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

Figure 1 below shows the contributions from different countries to adaptation and a range of multi-focus climate finance funds. The complexity of the current finance architecture is further demonstrated by Annex 1. Figure 1 illustrates that EU member states are pre-eminent in their contributions to adaptation funds.



Annex 2 shows that the EU contributed 65% of total adaptation finance between 2019 and 2021 and breaks this down by EU country. **Annex 3** shows amounts for adaptation committed to Africa by fund.

There is another way of looking at climate finance. The concept of 'fair share', based on the unmet \$100bn climate finance annual target from 2020 onwards, historical emissions, GNI and population.

By this measure seven countries paid their ‘fair share’ of climate finance in 2020 (Sweden, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Japan). By contrast, the US provided just 5%, Canada 18% and Australia 23% of their ‘fair shares’ in 2020. Australia, Canada, Italy and Spain are also notable laggards (see Figure2). Looking forward to 2025 and the foreseen New

Quantified Collective Goal (NQCG) on Climate Finance, only four countries globally have made climate finance commitments commensurate with their fair share: Norway, Sweden, France and Japan, although Germany and Denmark come very close⁵⁴.

⁵¹ Global Center on Adaptation. 2022. State and Trends in Adaptation Reports 2021 and 2022

⁵² <https://www.iied.org/poorest-countries-spending-billions-more-servicing-debts-they-receive-tackle-climate-change>

⁵³ <https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/press-releases/african-economic-outlook-2021-africas-growth-prospects-bullish-despite-covid-19-constraints-and-debt-burden-42692#:~:text=The%20average%20debt-to-GDP%20ratio%20for%20Africa%20is%20expected,is%20now%20%E2%80%93%20President%20Akinwumi%20A.%20Adesina%2012-Mar-2021>

⁵⁴ Colenbrander, S., Pettinotti, L. and Cao, Y. (2022) A fair share of climate finance? An appraisal of past performance, future pledges and prospective contributors. ODI Working Paper. London: ODI (<https://odi.org/en/publications/a-fairshare-of-climate-finance-an-appraisal-of-past-performance-future-pledges-andprospective-contributors/>)

⁵⁵ Colenbrander, S., Pettinotti, L. and Cao, Y. (2022) A fair share of climate finance? An appraisal of past performance, future pledges and prospective contributors. ODI Working Paper. London: ODI (<https://odi.org/en/publications/a-fairshare-of-climate-finance-an-appraisal-of-past-performance-future-pledges-andprospective-contributors/>)

Figure 2 Scorecard of progress towards Annex II countries' fair share of the \$100 bn climate finance goal, 2020 and 2025 ⁵⁵

2020	Fair share (US\$ billions)	Climate finance provided (US\$ billions)	Progress towards providing fair share (%)	2025	Fair share (US\$ billions)	Climate finance provided (US\$ billions)	Progress towards providing fair share (%)
Sweden	0.91	1.47	161%	Norway	0.58	1.7	161%
France	5.39	8.66	161%	Sweden *	0.91	1.89	161%
Norway	0.58	0.9	154%	France	5.39	7.9	154%
Japan	11.89	16.09	135%	Japan	11.89	14	135%
Netherlands	1.76	2.14	122%	Netherlands	1.76	Commitment does not address FY 24/25	
Germany	8.33	9.91	119%	Germany	8.33	8.18	119%
Denmark	0.62	0.62	101%	Denmark	0.62	0.6	101%
Switzerland	0.94	0.68	72%	Ireland	0.94	0.35	72%
Finland	0.56	0.33	60%	UK	0.56	3.7	60%
UK	5.84	3.2	55%	Spain	3.43	2.03	55%
Austria	0.82	0.44	53%	New Zealand	0.82	0.23	53%
Belgium	1.13	0.59	52%	Switzerland	1.13	0.46	52%
Ireland	0.52	0.19	37%	Finland	0.52	0.26	37%
Iceland	0.04	0.01	37%	Italy	0.04	2.01	37%
New Zealand	0.43	0.15	36%	Belgium	0.43	0.35	36%
Luxembourg	0.09	0.03	31%	US	0.09	11.4	31%
Italy	4.73	1.43	30%	Canada	4.73	0.85	30%
Australia	2.93	0.68	23%	Australia	2.93	0.3	23%
Spain	3.43	0.64	19%	Luxembourg*	3.43	Commitment does not address FY 24/25	
Canada	4.13	0.74	18%	Austria*	4.13		
Portugal	0.69	0.07	10%	Portugal*	0.69		
Greece	0.78	0.06	8%	Greece*	0.78		
US	43.48	2.3	5%	Iceland	43.48		

“Note: Countries in dark green are paying their fair share of climate finance. Colours are in quartile increments. Light green, paying 75–100% of their fair share; yellow, paying 50–75% of their fair share; orange, paying 25–50% of their fair share; red, paying less than 25% of their fair share”⁵⁶.

Establishing the New Quantified Collective Goal (NQCG) to replace the unmet \$100bn per year climate finance goal and setting up the new Loss and Damage Fund are making slow progress while representing an opportunity for Africa and Europe to align on expectations and greater delivery of adaptation action. This is against a backdrop of dramatic, accelerating climate impacts across the world and an increasingly strident consensus that the amount of finance mobilised is woefully inadequate.⁵⁷ Climate finance provided and mobilised by developed countries reached USD 79.6 billion in 2019. Projections indicate climate finance could yield numbers above USD 100 billion from 2023 onwards⁵⁸. Germany and Canada have developed a delivery plan to demonstrate how the USD 100 billion of annual climate can be delivered by

2023, including the New Collective Quantified Goal for climate finance post-2025⁵⁹.

The need for more money is clear but there are also major concerns about access and quality of climate finance. Complicated procedures that demand large amounts of precious government time, rules on how money can be channelled, lack of harmonisation between funds and the length of time it takes to get to disbursement are all areas where progress needs to be made. This is particularly so in the case of the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which is by far the largest mechanism for delivering multilateral climate finance.

⁵⁶ https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI_WP_fairshare_final0709.pdf

⁵⁷ <https://www.oecd.org/climate-change/finance-usd-100-billion-goal/>

⁵⁸ OECD (2021), Forward-looking Scenarios of Climate Finance Provided and Mobilised by Developed Countries in 2021-2025: Technical Note, Climate Finance and the USD 100 Billion Goal, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/a53aac3b-en>.

⁵⁹ <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/canada-international-action/climate-finance/canada-germany-open-letter-climate-finance.html>

THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND: A WORK IN PROGRESS

This is the largest multilateral fund having received confirmed pledges of \$19.1bn⁶⁰ since its inception in 2014, of which \$9.1bn (47%) is from EU countries. Several EU countries have already made pledges for the next GCF replenishment. This includes USD 232.2 million from Denmark, 2.2 billion from Germany, 1.74 billion from France and 243.1 million from Spain⁶¹. The GCF has approved \$12.6bn in funding since 2015 of which \$3.2bn is for adaptation and a further \$4.5bn labelled as ‘cross cutting’, hence likely to include some adaptation component. It disburses funds through “accredited entities”. The accreditation process to manage or receive funds from the GCF can take 6 months, but it can also take much longer. Globally, there are 78 accredited agencies, of which only 17 are African institutions, of which 4 are government institutions⁶². Most money (76%) goes through international agencies and banks, direct national funding accounts for 13% and direct funding regional 11%⁶³. Recipients complain at the level of overhead payments charged by international agencies (typically 7%), which are on top of costs to administer and run the agreed project at international salaries.

At the GCF, the average time taken from review of funding proposals to first disbursement of funds has fallen from 26-28 months in 2018 to an average of 12-17 months for projects approved in 2021⁶⁴. But it is important to note this is an average. Countries complain that some funding has taken up to 5 years to arrive.

GCF funding is overwhelmingly project based, which means that all planning must be done in advance and then the money waited for. This is in sharp contrast to best practice in adaptation, which recognises the long term nature, process-focused, flexible finance required to support adaptation in the face of climate uncertainty and changing needs.

Pillar 2 of the Team Europe Initiative on Climate Change and Resilience in Africa, which was launched at COP27, notes the importance of mainstreaming adaptation and disaster risk reduction in policies and plans, and Pillar 3 notes the need to increase public sector capacity and improve access to finance and project readiness. However, neither of these pillars explicitly acknowledge the calls for more direct access to funds and appear to accept the status quo of projects being the preferred response to adaptation.

⁶⁰ <https://www.greenclimate.fund/about/resource-mobilisation>

⁶¹ <https://www.nrdc.org/bio/joe-thwaites/green-climate-fund-pledge-tracker>

⁶² Ministry of Environment Rwanda, Ministry of Water and Environment Uganda, Ministry and finance and economic cooperation Ethiopia, National environment management authority Kenya. GCF website

⁶³ <https://www.greenclimate.fund/projects/dashboard>

⁶⁴ GCF website

ADDRESSING THE ISSUE OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND DEBT

The recent UN General Assembly has pledged to fully implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and take actions to finance sustainable development in developing countries⁶⁵. It highlighted the importance of international debt mechanisms to support debt review, debt payment suspensions and debt restructuring. The Assembly also emphasized the need for debt swaps for SDGs, including for climate and nature, to enable developing countries to use debt service payments for investments in sustainable development.

Similarly, the Nairobi Declaration, stemming from the Africa Climate Summit, stated the need to restructure the international finance architecture, particularly given the risks of many countries entering a spiral of rising debt due to climate impacts. With this statement, Africa has explicitly endorsed the Bridgetown agenda⁶⁶, which calls for: the provision of emergency liquidity to countries facing a debt crisis, especially generated by natural shocks; expansion of multilateral lending by \$1 trillion; a mechanism to raise reconstruction grants; and an agency to accelerate private investment flows into the low carbon transition.

In Europe, the Paris Summit for A New Global Financing Pact⁶⁷, attracted representatives from 32 countries, including a strong representation from African and European heads of states, the presidents of the European and African Union Commissions, as well as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), the UN

General Secretary, and representatives from civil society and academia. The meeting produced an ambitious road map⁶⁸ of possible actions. The summit showed an increasing willingness of countries and financial institutions to discuss the need for urgent action and to alter the status quo on delivering assistance to those affected by climate change. This summit also discussed the need for more sustainable debt management, the exploration of new sources of finance through taxation and simplified access to existing finance⁶⁹.

A particular focus of the Nairobi summit and the Team Europe Initiative is enabling better climate risk management and response. Pillar 4 of the Team Europe Initiative seeks to develop better climate and disaster risk finance and insurance, and specifically mentions the Global Shield⁷⁰ initiative and the Africa Risk Capacity Group⁷¹.

The use of insurance to manage climate risk is not straightforward and raises a host of difficult questions. There are technical problems of pricing, disbursement and affordability, especially for countries who are poor and suffer frequent shocks. There are also issues of climate justice over who should pay, which can lead to real anger and resentment. The idea of insurance has been compared to the developed world setting the houses of the global south on fire and then offering to sell them a fire extinguisher.

⁶⁵ https://hlpf.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/A%20HLPF%202023%20L1.pdf?_gl=1*szuo7q*_ga*MzlxNDc2NDc1LjE2ODYxMiMwMDg.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTY5NTc2OTMyMi45LjEuMTY5NTc2OTY1NC4wLjAuMA..

⁶⁶ <https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-2022-barbados-agenda/>

⁶⁷ <https://nouveaupactefinancier.org/pdf/chairs-summary-of-discussions.pdf>

⁶⁸ <https://nouveaupactefinancier.org/pdf/proposed-roadmap.pdf>

⁶⁹ [Chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/15/ae591f67adb68240e785486564ee0da587ff9b8e.pdf](chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcjpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.elysee.fr/admin/upload/default/0001/15/ae591f67adb68240e785486564ee0da587ff9b8e.pdf)

⁷⁰ <https://www.bmz.de/en/issues/climate-change-and-development/global-shield-against-climate-risks>

⁷¹ <https://www.arc.int>

The performance to date of the Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) Group is also instructive. ARC provides drought insurance to African countries, and is valued for building national government capacity in risk management and the use of its products. However, staff turnover, weak government systems and poor targeting have led to delays in implementation. Domestic capacity does not seem to be sustainable without ongoing ARC support, and those countries participating express concerns around the drought model, the timeliness of payouts and price of the insurance premium. ARC is also more expensive (\$4.1mn) to operate than the larger Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance agency (\$2.4mn). Up to January 2022, donors had supplied around \$250mn of the funds required to operate the insurance pool, and the donor share of premiums for 2021-22 stood at 73%. Despite subsidy being available, only 16 of 36 African countries signed up to ARC had actually bought policies by 2021.⁷²

The focus on insurance as a mechanism is unlikely to have a major role in climate risk management for much of Africa, especially as the frequency and scale of impacts rise. While there is more that can be done, especially with larger companies in the private sector, most people will not be able to afford the insurance premium. Take, for example, the 60% of sub-Saharan Africans who are involved in smallholder agriculture⁷³, or those who have moved to Africa's growing cities where 80% of jobs are low-paid and in the informal sector.⁷⁴ The Africa Climate

Summit acknowledged the need for more understanding and managing climate risks and the importance of early action. Pillar 2 of the Team Europe Initiative aimed at helping with policy and planning should therefore be a particular focus.

The call for action to enable better management and action on debt, reinforced by the Nairobi Declaration, is starting to show some movement. At the Paris Summit, the World Bank unveiled a plan that will involve (1) pausing debt repayments; (2) redirecting financing in emergencies; (3) linking crisis preparedness and financing; (4); backstopping development projects with private sector support, and (5) building enhanced catastrophe insurance without debt⁷⁵. The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund appealed to donors to cover the \$1.2 billion subsidy still needed to enable the fund to lend at zero interest rates to those countries that need it through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust⁷⁶ and asked developed countries to channel 40% of their special drawing rights issues to the fund or the development banks.

Donor pledges for early action are not an exact science, but the Risk Informed Early Action Partnership estimates that \$368 million was pledged for early action in 2022, of which \$311mn was from Europe, and \$195 million for the Global Shield initiative⁷⁷, including \$189 million from Europe.

⁷² Oxford Policy Management Independent evaluation of ARC October 2022

⁷³ <https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/agriculture/our-insights/winning-in-africas-agricultural-market>

⁷⁴ <https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/supporting-africas-urban-informal-sector-coordinated-policies-social-protection-core#:~:text=Accounting%20for%2080.8%25%20of%20jobs,key%20in%20ensuring%20food%20security>

⁷⁵ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/2023/06/22/comprehensive-toolkit-to-support-countries-after-natural-disasters>

⁷⁶ [https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/PRGT#:~:text=What's%20the%20PRGT%3F,%2Dincome%20countries%20\(LICs\)](https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/PRGT#:~:text=What's%20the%20PRGT%3F,%2Dincome%20countries%20(LICs))

⁷⁷ <https://www.early-action-reap.org/early-action-state-play-2022>

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS TO BRIDGE AFRICA-EUROPE DIFFERENCES AND MAKE PROGRESS ON ADAPTATION FINANCE AHEAD OF THE ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE WB/IMF AND COP28

LIFTING CONSTRAINTS ON ACCESS TO ADAPTATION FINANCE

On finance for adaptation, opportunities exist but there are no ‘easy’ means to access adaptation finance. There is interest to look at the capacity constraints of African countries (including local organisations) to plan and submit proposals for adaptation finance from international organisations (including the Green Climate Fund). There is also a lack of capacity for developing pipeline projects for implementation, including collecting all the data that is required for each application. The process of accessing seed finance, and becoming accredited to access funds is often extremely time consuming and expensive. Another issue is in relation to fund allocation: most projects that access finance are pre-determined, having to fit in a framework that aligns with donors and funds requirements and agenda. The international community is more interested in ensuring that projects fit with their own perspectives instead of listening to the needs of local communities. Finally, the time issue is also important, with adaptation projects sometimes not being relevant anymore due to the time it takes to get them approved.

As these constraints limit the ability of countries/local organisations (including civil society and youth-led organisations) to access adaptation finance, there is an interest to shed light on bottlenecks, how to overcome

them, and to advocate for more fluidity in the process of accessing adaptation finance for project implementation. The inaccessibility is also caused by ever-changing project requirements, leading to more information required, resulting in delays of project planning.

Improving access to finance for those that need it most is a common concern in both Africa and Europe.

The principles set out by the Task Force on Access to Finance⁷⁸, reflect wider concerns that adaptation activities need to be country-led and owned. The principles go on to note the need to harmonise procedures among funds for access to finance, and ensure funding is responsive, able to react to changing needs and be transparent and predictable.

The Locally Led Adaptation Principles⁷⁹, which are endorsed by over 40 organisations, including four EU members (Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands and Sweden) align with calls from the LDCs⁸⁰ and the Task force on access to finance. There is an increasing consensus that the way finance is accessed and used needs to be faster, more responsive to locally identified priorities, long term and able to respond to changes in priorities.

⁷⁸ DAI Annual report on the Task Force on Access to Finance Nov 22

⁷⁹ <https://www.wri.org/initiatives/locally-led-adaptation/principles-locally-led-adaptation>

⁸⁰ <chrome-extension://efaidnbnmnibpcapcglcfindmkaj/http://www ldc-climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/2050-Vision.pdf>

The difficulty of getting access to finance is consistently identified in blogs⁸¹ and meetings convened on the fringes of formal negotiations. Firstly, **applying for funding takes time, soaking up precious administrative capacity and expertise.** This includes time and effort in getting accreditation, or negotiating and working through the added layer of process if working through an intermediary. Once projects are submitted **approval is often slow** with examples of the lead time for funding actually arriving being measured in years. This is compounded by a **lack of harmonisation among funds** with each bit of funding requiring a separate application tailored to the procedures of each funding entity, which adds further administrative burden and difficulties in co-ordinating funding streams. Funding is **overwhelmingly project based.** This means that planning needs to take place well in advance, raising expectations of communities and **based on priorities that may be out of date by the time the funding arrives.** If action is spread across a number of projects and funders, **action may become disjointed and fragmented,** as a result of different project management requirements and unco-ordinated funding schedules. Greater **trust and transparency** will be needed in order to enable funding to move to a more programmatic basis. Processes to enable this, such as through the LDCs LIFE- AR⁸² and Kenya's financing locally led climate action (FLLoCA⁸³) that put in place national mechanisms to channel funds to the local level will be required from recipient countries to make the most of improvements in access to finance.

The EU-Africa Global Gateway investment package of €150 billion⁸⁴ announced at the EU-AU Heads of States summit in 2022 includes assistance to implement National Adaptation Plans. The Team Europe Initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa under pillar 2 commits to help mainstream climate

change adaptation into policies and plans, pillar 3 will increase public sector readiness and improve access to finance. The Team Europe initiative, however could usefully more explicitly address action on funding body reform to enable more direct and programmatic based access to funding, which is a gap in its response to the expressed needs of developing countries in general, including Africa.

There is clearly convergence between Africa and Europe in wanting to see effective adaptation, integrated into national processes and responsive to local conditions. However, in practice there is some way to go in adjusting procedures in access to finance and enabling locally led approaches.

In order to guide future action, the Africa-Europe Foundation could broker discussions on how best the Africa-Europe partnership can advance some of the reforms required, including:

- Take stock of existing mechanisms and agree principles of funding and access, drawing from the LDC vision 2050, the Task Force on Access to Finance and the principles for Locally-Led Adaptation Principles.
- Understand how best to support the mainstreaming of climate in policies and plans both in terms of national action and European funding mechanisms. Convene funds, governments, civil society and implementing agencies to identify specific ideas for changes in funding procedures that will help deliver nationally led action and move away from piecemeal project funding.

⁸² <https://www.iied.org/supporting-ldc-initiative-for-effective-adaptation-resilience-life-ar>

⁸³ <https://www.treasury.go.ke/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ToR-for-the-Development-of-the-ASSA-Manual-Cleared-by-WB-June-2020.pdf>

⁸⁴ https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/global-gateway/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package_en

RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE

The growing strain on African economies and people from climate impacts is a concern in the Nairobi Declaration and the Team Europe Initiative's pillar 4, which aims to develop and implement climate and disaster risk finance mechanisms through the Global Shield⁸⁵. The Global Shield has already started to be made operational, for example through the World Bank⁸⁶ ⁸⁷ and the German managed Global Shield solutions platform⁸⁸. The Global Shield initiative is committed to using “evidence-based, systematic, and inclusive analyses of countries’ protection gaps, and apply these analyses to design, fund, and facilitate interventions to address these gaps“⁸⁹ with a view to putting in place schemes for pre-arranged finance for disasters. While the Global Shield is central to the Team Europe Initiative, it is important to keep in mind it exists in a rich landscape of other initiatives such as the Zurich flood resilience alliance⁹⁰ the risk informed early action partnership⁹¹ and the centre for disaster protection⁹².

The need to keep an open mind on the right financial instruments for particular countries and vulnerable populations is recognised as essential, bearing in mind the differing needs of countries and communities and the limits of insurance mechanisms. Looking at sources of technical assistance and finance from a recipient's point

of view remains daunting and confusing. This is made worse when efforts are being made to integrate private providers of risk finance⁹³.

Given the number of actors it may be useful for Africa and Europe to work together to respond to the call in the Nairobi declaration for development partners to align and co-ordinate their technical assistance. The Africa-Europe Foundation could help convene a meeting to listen collectively to African voices on how access can be facilitated and work with Africa to accelerate access to expertise.

The Nairobi Declaration and wider initiatives such as the Bridgetown Agenda are explicit on the need to address the debt burden for developing countries and that climate change adds further stress to an already stressed system. Work on debt as started by MDB's is welcome, as is work under the G20's Common Framework for Debt Treatment, but the urgency of more action is clear, and Europe and Africa must work jointly in discussing and agreeing the terms and conditions for enabling more fiscal space for African countries to invest in climate adaptation.

⁸⁵ <https://www.bmz.de/en/news/press-releases/v20-g7-agree-launch-global-shield-against-climate-risks-cop27-125782>

⁸⁶ <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/11/14/world-bank-group-launches-global-shield-financing-facility-to-help-developing-countries-adapt-to-climate-change>

⁸⁷ <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-uk-germany-and-world-bank-come-together-expand-risk-financing-communities-vulnerable>

⁸⁸ <https://global-shield-solutions.org/about/about-global-shield>

⁸⁹ <https://www.globalshield.org/about/vision-mission/>

⁹⁰ <https://floodresilience.net/zurich-flood-resilience-alliance/>

⁹¹ <https://www.early-action-reap.org/>

⁹² <https://www.disasterprotection.org/>

⁹³ <https://www.early-action-reap.org/early-action-state-play-2022>

EMPOWERING LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND GOVERNMENTS

Managing climate risk for the most vulnerable will require close co-operation between African national and local government systems, and international and donor agencies. How can the steps towards this be defined and how best to share experience and approaches at municipal and local government levels? Can Africa and Europe work to bring together technical advice and expertise that demonstrate appropriate actions and approaches at sub-national levels? Building on the EU's Adaptation Mission, and the wide range of networks linking municipal governments, is there a valuable space for the Africa-Europe Foundation to strengthen learning within and between the two continents, focused on building greater urban and rural adaptation and resilience?

As the EU currently reflects on past achievements and future programming priorities and the legacy it will leave to the next EU policy cycle, **it could explore the**

potential of fleshing out a 'Mission on strengthening climate finance access pathways in Africa', designed to foster capacity development and knowledge exchange to access adaptation finance. The Mission would support efforts to mobilise, empower and assist African communities/countries in accessing climate finance, and build essential capabilities and skills to initiate and manage processes to access available finance, as well as devise pathways to scaling up adaptation action and solution. The Mission would be led by the demands from national and local level adaptation processes and learn from peer exchange and between experts and country officials. It would direct support to technical agencies and actors already working in this area to build capacity in Africa. It would co-ordinate European funding to encourage co-ordination and responsiveness of technical support to African priorities. It would evaluate progress on improved access and timeliness of funding to inform wider European engagement with climate funds and adaptation policy reform.

DECENTRALISING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE ADAPTATION FINANCE:

Another way forward would be to encourage international climate finance organisations to decentralise their processes, especially in the context where funds have been allocated to Africa. Global Climate Funds often lack continental and regional offices in Africa. There is an interest in having different regional/country desks offering African organisations the opportunity to apply and be supported (at a more local level), instead of

having to pass by headquarters located elsewhere. In addition, having global climate funds set up continental office in Africa would greatly assist that finance meets priorities identified by the African countries, and their partner organizations. There is an interest to look at these different climate funds and international organisations through which international climate finance is channelled and call on them to set up regional African offices.

REINFORCE THE GROWING APPRECIATION OF BLENDED-FINANCE

The current trend demonstrates greater interest in combining public and private funds — to further mobilize much-needed capital for resilience investments in Africa. Historically, blended finance for adaptation has been about 11% of all blended finance deals, although there has been a 72% increase in volume of finance in 2019/21 compared to 2016/18⁹⁴. **Given the scale**

of need for adaptation in Africa, further work to identify opportunities for blended finance is urgent.

The Mission mentioned above should bring together investors and companies active in Africa to identify how investments in adaptation and resilience, for Africa, and for their businesses, can be increased.

FINANCE: ALLOCATING SDRS TO CLIMATE ACTION, INCLUDING ADAPTATION.

Bridging the gap between needs for climate action and funds available may also require looking at the global financial infrastructure, including how to recycle more Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). SDRs are allocated as a percentage share of a country's GDP, so low-income countries receive a very low share of the SDR total. Today, it is estimated that of the total ⁶⁵⁰ billion SDRs recently issued, close ⁸² billion have been pledged to be recycled to developing countries⁹⁵. Given the growing impacts of

climate change, there is strong interest in having these funds recycled and serving climate adaptation first. **As leaders gear-up towards the Annual Meetings of the IMF/WB, European countries could increase their efforts in reallocating SDRs to developing country action, and match the French pledge⁹⁶ to reallocate 30% of their SDRs, and encouraging other countries to do the same.**

ADAPTATION NEEDS A RADICAL SHIFT IN MINDSET AND APPROACH TOWARDS FINANCE:


The shortfall in finance compared to needs in Africa shows that efforts need to be radically stepped up in order bridge the adaptation gap, and that more emphasis needs to be given to grants and blended finance to help ease the debt burden on states. In addition, the ability of Africa to get access to finance and have it applied in ways that fit the need for long term programmatic approaches

to adaptation is essential. This includes capacity to source the fund, and implement projects on the ground. Incremental approaches are unlikely to deliver the change needed. **The AEF encourages Europe and Africa to join forces to press for the reforms needed, unlocking more finance and improving access to and application of funds.**

⁹⁶ <https://twitter.com/KGeorgieva/status/1572692055586906113?s=20&t=YX9uTdeyo0cQ3YYMmxqgbA>

⁹⁷ <https://climatefundsupdate.org/about-climate-finance/global-climate-finance-architecture/>

Annex 1
An overview of the Climate Finance Architecture 97.



⁹⁶ <https://twitter.com/KGeorgieva/status/1572692055586906113?s=20&t=YX9uTdeyo0cQ3YYMmxqqaB>

⁹⁷ <https://climatefundsupdate.org/about-climate-finance/global-climate-finance-architecture/>

Annex 2 98

Adaptation Funding

Adaptation-related development finance commitment in millions USD: principal and significant (including overlaps—development finance marked for both adaptation and mitigation)

Year	All Climate Provider Countries	EU Countries and its Institutions	Percentage of the total climate finance
2021	27,420.8	18,078.86	6
2020	31,258.31	7,628.55	6
2019	22,406.8	16,609.17	4
Total	81,085.6	52,315	65

Adaptation-related development finance commitment in millions USD: principal and significant (including overlaps—development finance marked for both adaptation and mitigation)

EU Countries and its institutions

Country	2021	2020	2019
Austria	146.83	89.80	86.60
Belgium	230.87	253.70	343.51
Czech Republic	6.47	5.80	5.61
Denmark	241.53	212.32	405.86
Estonia	1.36	0.33	-
EU Institutions	3,853.53	3,849.84	5,091.23
Finland	239.21	96.97	117.14
France	4,620.32	5,529.60	2,930.77
Germany	6,484.02	4,857.48	5,144.63
Greece	-	0.02	-
Hungary	13.21	30.19	2.54
Ireland	95.72	87.60	109.64
Italy	393.81	570.44	204.61
Latvia	0.01	169.66	0.01
Lithuania	1.16	1.03	0.65
Luxembourg	23.02	3.87	23.64
Netherlands	1,037.81	1,554.83	1,332.96
Poland	3.05	6.54	3.52
Portugal	2.50	1.38	3.37
Romania	0.00	0.06	-
Slovak Republic	0.46	0.56	2.27
Slovenia	1.76	0.16	0.96
Spain	94.35	65.40	99.69
Sweden	585.74	238.90	699.87
Total	18,078.76	17,628.52	16,661.09

⁹⁸ <https://climatefundsupdate.org/data-dashboard/regions/>

Annex 3 99

Funds approved for climate action in Sub-Saharan Africa (as of December 2022)

Fund	Funding approved (USD millions)
Partnership for Market Readiness	5.85
MDG Achievement Fund	20
BioCarbon Fund Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes (BioCarbon Fund ISFL)	26
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)	33.51
UN-REDD Programme	36.38
Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF)	40.5
Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF)	83.11
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility - Readiness Fund (FCPF-RF)	121.42
Global Environment Facility (GEF4)	122.76
Global Environment Facility (GEF5)	153.89
Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)	160.63
Global Environment Facility (GEF6)	225.92
Forest Investment Program (FIP)	287.56
Global Environment Facility (GEF7)	289.87
Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR)	298.03
Central African Forest Initiative (CAFI)	308.43
Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP)	316.03
Adaptation Fund (AF)	365.75
Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA)	386.30
Clean Technology Fund (CTF)	700.66
Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF)	942.37
Green Climate Fund (GCF-1)	1115.15
Green Climate Fund IRM (GCF IRM)	1167.07

⁹⁸ <https://climatefundsupdate.org/data-dashboard/regions/>

MAIN REPORT

POLICY BRIEF THREE: CLIMATE AND HEALTH: REINFORCING HEALTH AT THE HEART OF ADAPTATION.



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Climate-related health impacts place an additional burden on already overburdened health systems, and could reverse hard-won health and development gains. For example, it is estimated that an additional 250,000 annual deaths from diarrhoeal diseases and heat stress only, could occur between 2030 and 2050 due to climate change¹⁰⁰. The impacts of climate change on human health cannot be overstated, and it will require concerted efforts from all stakeholders, including policymakers, researchers, NGOs and others. Policy recommendations to reinforce health adaptation include the following.

1. Increase policy support and direct financing for community-led adaptation solutions to the health impacts of climate change.

2. Explicitly integrate climate-related health risks into adaptation and health policies to ensure that health systems are designed better to cope with extreme weather events like floods.

3. Invest a proportion of climate finance in the health sector. Prioritise funding for local and innovative solutions that, in most cases, require minimal catalytic funding but could lead to significant impacts. These include early warning and response systems and integrated vector control programmes.

4. Facilitate public education and cross-continental knowledge exchange on local adaptation solutions for health.

5. Establish monitoring systems, including intercontinental and bilateral systems, to track the impacts and co-benefits of health systems' climate change adaptation solutions, to promote learning and scaling up efforts.

6. Support the creation of governmental clean cooking 'delivery units' that lead and coordinate clean cooking efforts across agencies and departments.

¹⁰⁰ WHO. (2021). COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action. <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/346168/9789240036727-eng.pdf?sequence=1>

¹⁰¹ Thomson, M. C., Muñoz, Á. G., Cousin, R., & Shumake-Guillemot, J. (2018). Climate drivers of vector-borne diseases in Africa and their relevance to control programmes. *Infectious Diseases of Poverty*, 7(1), 81. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40249-018-0460-1>

POLICY BRIEF THREE:

CLIMATE AND HEALTH: REINFORCING HEALTH AT THE HEART OF ADAPTATION

Climate change is a significant threat to public health in Africa and Europe. Extreme weather events such as droughts, floods, storm surges, heat waves and intense cold snaps are becoming more frequent and hard-hitting. These events have severe impacts on the socio-economic and environmental determinants of health, affecting air and water quality, livelihoods, food security, nutrition, health and built infrastructure, and psychosocial well-being, among others. Health systems are already facing several challenges, such as a shortage of health workers in Africa and Europe. The effects of climate change further jeopardise access to health services by making health facilities unreachable, and damaging health and other infrastructure. Climate change effects also create new and evolving health challenges that require additional efforts and resources.

Climate change impacts the transmission of vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, dengue and chikungunya. Changes in climatic conditions influence disease vector dynamics, including survival, breeding, distribution, reproduction, and development rates¹⁰¹. The risk of malaria, chikungunya, Zika virus and Rift Valley fever could rise in Africa¹⁰². Mosquito-borne diseases are

of particular concern for the continent. In a worst-case scenario, an additional 75.9 million people in east and southern Africa and 51 million in west Africa could be exposed to mosquito-borne diseases by 2080, despite some areas seeing a reduction in risk due to increased heat¹⁰². As the planet warms and the climate becomes more suitable for disease vectors, diseases such as malaria, dengue, West Nile fever and chikungunya will rise in Europe. Since 2010, locally transmitted cases of these diseases have been reported in southern and southeastern Europe¹⁰³.

Water scarcity, pollution and higher temperatures can increase the risk of **water-borne diseases** such as diarrhoea. Climate change can also alter pathogen dynamics in water and compromise water and sanitation infrastructure. Diarrhoea is the largest component of water-borne diseases and is the leading cause of child mortality and morbidity¹⁰⁴ in low- and middle-income countries, accounting for over 90% of under-five deaths¹⁰⁵. Morbidity due to climate-induced water-borne diseases is likely to increase more in Africa than in Europe.

¹⁰² Giesen, C., Roche, J., Redondo-Bravo, L., Ruiz-Huerta, C., Gomez-Barroso, D., Benito, A., & Herrador, Z. (2020). The impact of climate change on mosquito-borne diseases in Africa. *Pathogens and Global Health*, 114(6), 287–301. <https://doi.org/10.1080/20477724.2020.1783865>

¹⁰³ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/observatory/evidence/health-effects/vector-borne-diseases>

¹⁰⁴ IFRC. (2021). Reducing the Health and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Impacts of Climate Change. https://www.climatecentre.org/wp-content/uploads/RCRC_IFRC-Health-and-Water-Sanitation-and-Hygiene-WASH-V1-2021-2.pdf

¹⁰⁵ Demissie, G. D., Yeshaw, Y., Alemineu, W., & Akalu, Y. (2021). Diarrhea and associated factors among under five children in sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence from demographic and health surveys of 34 sub-Saharan countries. *PLOS ONE*, 16(9), e0257522. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0257522>

Climate impacts on agriculture could increase the number of food-insecure and malnourished people.

Declines in harvests and increasing production costs are being observed in Europe, especially in the south. Yields of non-irrigated crops such as wheat, corn and sugar beet could decrease in southern Europe by up to 50% by 2050, significantly impacting farm incomes and nutrition¹⁰⁶. However, Africa is even more severely impacted due to the fragility of its agriculture, characterised by low mechanisation and high prevalence of smallholder farming. In 2021, sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa accounted for 239 million and 17 million of the world's 795 million hungry people, respectively¹⁰⁷. These numbers will increase as climate change impacts both rainfall and ecosystem-dependent agriculture in Africa¹⁰⁸. These trends are already being observed. For example, in April 2023, more than 20 million people in the Horn of Africa were at risk of acute food insecurity after five consecutive rainy seasons have failed since 2020, largely attributed to climate change, which led to the worst drought in 40 years¹⁰⁹.

Heatwaves—extended periods of very high temperatures and often high humidity - will become more severe and frequent with climate change.

Heatwaves are characterised by temperatures that exceed the daily maximum for at least three consecutive days¹¹⁰. Age, pre-existing medical conditions and social deprivation increase people's vulnerability to heat-related health risks. Additionally, people living in urban areas are at greater risk due to the urban heat island effect¹¹¹. Exposure to extreme heat can cause heat stress or dehydration within three days, and it can also worsen

medical conditions such as cardiovascular, respiratory and kidney diseases¹¹². Over the last two decades, heat-related deaths of people aged 65 and above have almost doubled, reaching 300,000 deaths in 2018¹¹¹. In Europe, deaths increased by more than 30% over the same period, and over 60,000 deaths occurred in 2022 alone¹¹³. The rise in heat-related deaths in Europe is significantly influenced by the ageing population in addition to other factors¹¹¹. In Africa, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, the extent of the problem is unknown due to inadequate recording¹⁰⁴. However, given rapid urbanisation, more people will likely be exposed to heat waves. By 2030, over 50% of Africa's population is projected to reside in urban areas. The total urban population is projected to increase to 1 billion in the 2040s and 1.23 billion by 2050 from just a mere 395 million in 2009¹¹⁴.

Climate change can increase the risk of violence against women and girls and lead to negative Sexual and Reproductive Health outcomes.

Climate-induced displacements and disasters make women more vulnerable to sexual abuse, violence, exploitation and trafficking, increasing the risk of sexually transmitted diseases and maternal mortality¹⁰⁴. Exposure can also result from women and girls travelling long distances to look for water and fuelwood as they become scarcer due to climate impacts. Climate-related impacts, such as extreme heat-induced dehydration, vector-borne diseases and air pollution, can affect neonatal and maternal health and lead to miscarriage, death and birth complications¹¹⁵. Furthermore, climate-related disasters damage health facilities and disrupt access to sexual and reproductive health services.

¹¹¹ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/observatory/evidence/health-effects/heat-and-health>


¹¹² Parkes, B., Buzan, J. R., & Huber, M. (2022). Heat stress in Africa under high-intensity climate change. *International Journal of Biometeorology*, 66(8), 1531–1545. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00484-022-02295-1> 113 Ballester, J., Quijal-Zamorano, M., Méndez Turrubiates, R.F. et al. Heat-related mortality in Europe during the summer of 2022. *Nat Med* 29, 1857–1866 (2023). <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-023-02419-z>

¹¹⁴ UN-Habitat. (2020). UN-Habitat Sub-Saharan Africa Atlas. https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/07/atlasroaf_v02_final-compressed.pdf 115 Women Deliver. (2021). *The Link Between Climate Change and Sexual And Reproductive Health And Rights. An Evidence Review.* Women Deliver.

Climate change can have indirect health impacts, such as increased air pollution caused by climate-induced wildfires, dust and sandstorms. Also, actual or expected violence, loss of resources and incomes, and disruption of social, economic, natural and health systems due to climate change can increase mental health problems¹¹⁶. Some of these health risks are already significant public

health concerns in Africa and Europe. For example, air pollution caused 1.1 million premature deaths in Africa¹¹⁷ and 364,200 premature deaths in the 27 EU member countries in 2019¹¹⁸. Indoor air pollution from cooking with conventional and unclean energy sources is a particular problem in Africa, killing over 500,000 prematurely every year¹¹⁹.

Figure 1 highlights some of the numerous pathways in which climate change can affect health.



Health outcomes


 Respiratory illness


 Injury and mortality from extreme weather events


 Water-borne diseases & other water-related health impacts


 Mental & psychosocial health


 Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs)


 Malnutrition & foodborne diseases


 Health related illness


 Vector borne diseases

¹²⁰ WHO. (2021). COP26 special report on climate change and health: the health argument for climate action. <https://iris.who.int/bitstream/handle/10665/346168/9789240036727-eng.pdf?sequence=1>

The partnership between Africa and Europe can enable the two continents to tackle the growing impacts of climate change on health. Building on the existing lessons and opportunities, Europe and Africa can pool resources, share expertise at different levels

and develop comprehensive policies and strategies that benefit both continents. **Building blocks exist, including domestic and international policies (Box 1), commitments, and declarations to accelerate action.**

Box 1: EU and AU Domestic Health Priorities¹²¹

a. Aligned across AU and EU

- Ensuring equitable access to quality primary health care
- Increasing innovative and domestic health financing
- Promoting drivers of good health and addressing risk factors and premature mortality from non-communicable diseases.
- Developing an adequate health workforce and addressing imbalances
- Strengthening health research by leveraging digitalisation and other innovations.

b. Aligned across AU and EU and supported by the 6th AU-EU summit and Global Gateway

- Enhancing health emergency preparedness and response systems.
- Building domestic capacity to manufacture medical products and technologies.
- Access to sexual and reproductive health services.
- Combating pandemics by introducing new international rules, global surveillance and developing a permanent vaccine development and access platform.
- Strengthening domestic regulatory and monitoring capacity.
- Combating emerging and re-emerging communicable diseases such as AIDS, malaria, hepatitis and waterborne diseases.

Commitments, such as the EU-Africa Global Gateway Investment Package, and stronger political recognition of the climate and health nexus during the 2023 UN General Assembly (**Table 1**), could drive collective

action to mobilise sufficient funds and political support for effective adaptation measures to strengthen health system resilience to the effects of climate change.

Table 1: Examples of commitments that can accelerate resource mobilisation and political support for adaptation in the health sector.

<p>The African Leaders' Declaration at the African Climate Action Summit (ACS), September 2023¹²²</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase Africa's renewable energy capacity from 56 GW in 2022 to 300 GW by 2030. • Implement measures to ensure clean energy options reach rural communities most dependent on biomass fuels. • Identify, prioritise, mainstream, and enhance disaster resilience, prioritising anticipatory action. • Reform climate finance, including better deployment, and issue new SDRs to the tune of USD 650 billion.
<p>The heads of state and health experts gathering at the UN General Assembly 2023 (UNGA 2023)¹²³.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasis on climate threat to human health. • Call for investment in adaptation and resilience solutions, including mainstreaming health in climate action, creating climate-friendly healthcare systems, and advocating for increased financing of adaptation and resilience in the health sector. • Commitment to host a Health Day at COP28 to prioritise adaptation and resilience of the health sector, particularly in developing and least developed countries.
<p>UNGA 2023 Statement from Climate Change and Health Experts, Ministers and CEOs of NGOs: Accelerating Climate Adaptation for Health Equity¹²⁴</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Putting local communities at the centre of adaptation decision-making and solutions • Integrating monitoring, evaluation and learning into adaptation efforts to understand and iterate approaches, identify and scale effective solutions and mobilise political commitment and financing. • Channelling finance directly to local communities to enhance adaptation finance's quantity, quality and equity. • Promoting an enabling environment for sustained progress on local adaptation, including recognition and policy support for local adaptation across all levels, to enhance health resilience, equitable outcomes, and safeguard vulnerable populations.
<p>COP28 UAE Declaration on Climate and Health</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing and implementing policies for health benefits from climate action, emphasising partnerships across all stakeholders. • Fostering collaboration on human, animal, environmental and climate health challenges, for example, by the One Health approach and strengthening research. • Recognising the interdependence of a healthy population and climate resilience by prioritising adaptation actions across sectors for positive health outcomes • Strengthening health systems to anticipate and address climate-sensitive health risks, for example, by improving surveillance and climate-health information services. • Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of finance flows, including sharing lessons and best practices on financing climate-health interventions and improving monitoring and transparency of climate finance.
<p>The EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package (Global Gateway Africa)¹²⁵.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUR 150 billion (50% of the Global Gateway finance aims) in European Union-financed investments to support African countries for a strong, inclusive, green, digital recovery and transformation. • Improve pandemic preparedness, health security and access to health services with funding of EUR 150 million. • Enhance sexual and reproductive health rights with funding of EUR 60 million. • Accelerate green transition, particularly climate resilience, disaster risk reduction, and strengthening food systems.

¹²¹ AEF. (2023). Info sheet bulletin: health- May 2023. https://www.africaeuropefoundation.org/uploads/AUEU_Tracking_Infosheet_Bulletin_Health_May2023_ac317caf9b.pdf

¹²² African Union. (2023). African Leaders Nairobi Declaration on Climate Change and Call to Action. https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2023/09/08/the_african_leaders_nairobi_declaration_on_climate_change-rev-eng.pdf

¹²³ WHO. (2023, September 18). Leaders spotlight the critical intersection between health and climate ahead of COP-28 first-ever Health Day. Media Release. <https://pnmch.who.int/news-and-events/news/item/18-09-2023-leaders-spotlight-the-critical-intersection-between-health-and-climate-ahead-of-cop-28-first-ever-health-day>

¹²⁴ <https://www.africaeuropefoundation.org/areas-of-action/time-to-adapt:-accelerating-climate-adaptation-for-health-equity/>

¹²⁵ European Commission. (2022). EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment

PATHWAYS AND PRIORITY OPTIONS FOR CONCRETE AND ACCELERATED ACTIONS

Climate change adaptation in the health sector aims to reduce climate-related deaths and illness by enhancing disease surveillance, developing comprehensive health action plans and strategies and implementing robust early warning systems¹²⁶. These systems should anticipate and prepare the sector for extreme weather events and climate-sensitive infectious diseases, and help boost the resilience of the health infrastructure to shocks and stresses. In addition, adaption also involves extended mental and psychosocial health care services. The healthcare sector currently contributes about 5% of global carbon emissions¹²⁷. In some countries, healthcare generates a high share of carbon emissions in the service sector, only surpassed by transport, energy and construction sectors¹²⁸. Strategies to build

local pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities should promote green energy use, to include energy needs within health facilities, to help reduce carbon emissions.

On the adaptation side, the building blocks of climate-resilient health systems include a knowledgeable health workforce with tools and resources to promote climate resilience; reliable health information systems that facilitate effective management of extreme events and climate-sensitive diseases; robust service delivery and emergency-ready health services; and adequate financing¹²⁹. Below are some of the priority areas that could promote climate-resilient health systems in both Africa and Europe.

1. FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN HEALTH SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO ADAPT TO CLIMATE CHANGE.

Adaptation to climate change in the health sector requires a system-wide, integrated and transformational approach focused on reducing risks and increasing the resilience of health systems.³⁶ A resilient and environmentally sustainable health system has the double benefit of reducing the impacts of climate change and minimising the risk of future pandemics¹³⁰. Top-down donor and institutional approaches to health programmes have effectively controlled major disease outbreaks. However, most ministerial and departmental programmes for managing disaster and health risks were not originally designed to factor in climate change, and thus, health ministries and departments are ill-prepared

to adapt to the ever-increasing impacts of climate change¹³¹. In addition, some climatic risks and hazards fall outside the scope of health ministries and have no specific lead entity³⁶. Even in areas where there have been cross-sectoral adaptation actions, they tend to be largely incremental, adjusting the existing systems while maintaining core structures and functions.³⁶ These approaches, which could have worked before, may be insufficient to safeguard health systems and protect the well-being of communities in light of the changing climate. Good practice in adaptation points to well-coordinated action, building on locally-led insights and plans.

¹²⁶ Alcayna, T., O'Donnell, D., & Chandaria, S. (2023). How much bilateral and multilateral climate adaptation finance is targeting the health sector? A scoping review of official development assistance data between 2009–2019. *PLOS Global Public Health*, 3(6), e0001493. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0001493>

¹²⁷ 35 Pichler, P.-P., Jaccard, I. S., Weisz, U., & Weisz, H. (2019). International comparison of health care carbon footprints. *Environmental Research Letters*, 14(6), 064004. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab19e1>

¹²⁹ Ebi, K. L., Vanos, J., Baldwin, J. W., Bell, J. E., Hondula, D. M., Errett, N. A., Hayes, K., Reid, C. E., Saha, S., Spector, J., & Berry, P. (2021). Extreme Weather and Climate Change: Population Health and Health System Implications. *Annual Review of Public Health*, 42(1), 293–315. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth-012420-105026>

¹³⁰ Romanello, M., McGushin, A., Di Napoli, C., et al. (2021). The 2021 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: code red for a healthy future. *The Lancet*, 398(10311), 1619–1662. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)01787-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01787-6)

¹³¹ Ebi, K. L., Berry, P., Campbell-Lendrum, D., Cissé, G., Hess, J., Ogden, N., & Schnitter, R. (2019). Health system adaptation to climate variability and change. Washington, DC: Global Center on Adaptation. <https://gca.org/reports/health-system-adaptation-to-climate-variability-and-change/>

Action Point (1):

Policymakers and other stakeholders need to scale up efforts to support locally-led solutions, including policy support and direct financing, for adaptation of health systems in response to the effects of climate change.

As we approach the new EU policy cycle and the second decade of the African Union Agenda 2063, there needs to be collective efforts to advocate for more funding and political support for local adaptation

solutions to the health impacts of climate change. This can also include a greater call for improved local health infrastructure and local health workers with enough capacity to address climate impacts on health systems.

Action Point (2):

Both Africa and Europe should explicitly integrate health risks associated with climate change into adaptation and health policy - from ensuring systems are able to cope with levels of demand arising from extreme events, such as floods and heatwaves, to monitoring the shifting patterns of disease.

This will include making sure that health infrastructure is safeguarded, for example, by being sited in a floodproof area and having access to backup power, and that emergency response plans to deliver medical staff and supplies are in place. It also implies ensuring

that training of medical personnel and drug supply can deal with the spread of disease into new areas. Skills exchanges, for example, African expertise on the management of malaria, could help prepare Europe for the threat of endemic malaria becoming established.

2. MULTISECTORAL ADAPTATION FUNDING AND ACTION, WHICH SUPPORT HEALTH SYSTEMS STRENGTHENING AT ALL LEVELS AND IMPROVES SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, ARE NEEDED TO OPTIMISE HEALTH ADAPTATION.

Current levels of health adaptation finance still fall short of the needs¹³². In 2020, only 34% of the total climate finance (about USD 28 billion) was directed towards climate adaptation, whereas the current annual adaptation needs are estimated to be USD 70 billion, and are expected to increase to USD 200 billion by 2030¹³³. Less than 5% of adaptation finance has been allocated to health, with multilateral and bilateral institutions

contributing less than 0.6%¹³⁴. The major barriers to financing climate adaptation in the health sector include a lack of information about funding opportunities, limited contact between health actors and those involved in the climate change process, a lack of capacity to develop proposals, and limited incorporation of health issues into national climate planning and leadership¹³⁵.

Action Point (3):

Increase the proportion of earmarked funding and investments to protect health systems against climate-sensitive exposures and increase resilience to the effects of climate change.

Targeted investments can focus on early warning and response systems and integrated vector control programs. For example, investments can target early warning and response systems and integrated vector control programmes. Early warning systems are of particular importance for health adaptation to climate change. Adaptation in the health sector will increasingly rely on accurate forecast information,

monitoring and surveillance of emerging health threats and developing and deploying early warning systems, including response and implementation of actions¹³⁶. Africa and Europe need to prioritise funding for local and innovative solutions that, in most cases, require minimal catalytic funding but could lead to significant impacts.

132 Romanello, M., McGushin, A., Di Napoli, C., et al. (2021). The 2021 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: code red for a healthy future. *The Lancet*, 398(10311), 1619–1662. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)01787-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01787-6)

133 UNEP. *Adaptation Gap Report 2022: Too Little, Too Slow – Climate adaptation failure puts the world at risk*, Nairobi, Kenya, 2022.

134 Arame Tall, Sarah Lynagh, Candela Blanco Vecchi, Pepukaye Bardouille, Felipe Montoya Pino, et al. *Enabling Private Investment in Climate Adaptation & Resilience: Current Status, Barriers to Investment and Blueprint for Action*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group and International Finance Corporation.

3. BUILD ON LESSONS FROM CURRENT PROGRAMMES AND COLLABORATE ON KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE.

Africa and Europe can collaborate on longer-term, multifaceted approaches, including funding and targeted activities for capacity building, risk communication, and monitoring and evaluation. The EU-Africa Global Gateway is the result of the renewed partnership and an outcome of the 6th EU-AU Summit of February 2022. It paved the way for a more structured approach to health issues, with EU support for the development of manufacturing capacity in Africa. Opportunities for capacity development between Africa and Europe within such existing strategies, including policies and programmes for managing several health risks, like infectious diseases and undernutrition, need to be created or identified and reinforced. These need to be informed by location-specific information on hazards, exposures, vulnerabilities and capacities.

European funding clearly has a place in assisting Africa in planning for and responding to health challenges. At the same time, health challenges in Europe with, for example, the likely establishment of malaria transmission,¹³⁷ means that African expertise in vector control and disease management will be valuable for Europe's preparedness. The impact of some climate-related changes, for example, heatwaves and changes in vector-borne disease, can be greatly reduced through community and private sector action. Health planning should place a special emphasis on public education and local action so as to keep the population healthier and reduce strain on health services. This could include ensuring that employers adjust working conditions to safeguard employees, building and city design help mitigate heatwaves, and environmental standards and sanitation infrastructure are managed to reduce disease transmission.

Action Point (4):

Africa and Europe should invest in public health education and action on water, sanitation, vector control and heatwave management.

A peer exchange and learning system would be useful, with Europe and Africa exchanging expertise on vector control, heat wave management and disaster response. In addition to bilateral initiatives, organisations such as the Africa-Europe Foundation could support

exchanges among professionals on disease and vector management, as well as discussions on gaps in knowledge in health planning and climate in Africa to help direct funding.

¹³⁶ Romanello, M., McGushin, A., Di Napoli, C., et al. (2021). The 2021 report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: code red for a healthy future. *The Lancet*, 398(10311), 1619–1662. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)01787-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01787-6)

¹³⁷ Fischer L, Gültekin N, Kaelin MB, Fehr J, Schlagenhauf P. Rising temperature and its impact on receptivity to malaria transmission in Europe: A systematic review. *Travel Med Infect Dis*. 2020 Jul-Aug;36:101815. doi: 10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101815. Epub 2020 Jul 3. PMID: 32629138.

Action Point (5):

Efforts should be made to establish a monitoring system, including intercontinental and bilateral systems, for health adaptation and mitigation solutions, including their impacts, that can promote learning and scaling up solutions to benefit health systems.

4. INVESTING IN CLEAN COOKING SOLUTIONS: AT THE NEXUS OF CLIMATE, DEVELOPMENT AND HEALTH

Ambitious commitments and concrete actions to achieve universal access to clean cooking are still lacking, despite presenting powerful levers to achieving both climate, development, and health development goals.

To date, the level of political commitment and investment in clean cooking has not matched the global magnitude of the challenge.

With fewer than ten years until we reach 2030, and as we enter a decisive year for monitoring SDGs progress with the mid-term review assessment (2015-2030), the world remains far off track to its SDGs, including number 7 which commits to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all.

It is increasingly recognised that safeguarding nature is critical to addressing climate change and protecting billions of the most vulnerable people around the world.

Yet, as governments, donors and investors look for ways to protect and restore nature, and improve the global health system, they often overlook one of the most accessible and impactful solutions: clean cooking.

Nearly 1 billion people still lack access to modern cooking solutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, and almost 500,000 Africans die prematurely due to household air pollution every year¹¹⁹. Considering the annual toll on human health, forests, climate and local economies, clean cooking solutions should be central to national climate, health and development strategies.

National and continental political leaders must take bold action to ensure the about 940 million Africans who currently lack clean cooking solutions¹³⁸ have the means to prepare food in a safe, clean and affordable way, as well as to contribute to ecosystem recovery, regenerative livelihoods, clean air and community health, and female empowerment.reduce disease transmission.

¹³⁸ <https://www.lboro.ac.uk/news-events/news/2023/september/africa-clean-cooking-energy-ai-model/>

Action Point (6):

Build on the momentum provided by the Africa Climate Summit (ACS) to create and resource governmental clean cooking ‘delivery units’ that lead and coordinate clean cooking efforts across agencies and departments.

Kenya and Sierra Leone have announced at ACS that such clean cooking delivery units will be established at the presidential level.

These ‘delivery units’ would help shape funding and action where commitments exist and promote the adoption of effective and robust policy frameworks. The EU and the international community must commit the resources—both financial and technical support - to

support African governments to set up these ‘delivery units’, make investments to fund the successful delivery of ambitious policies and programmes, and operate in service of commitments that national governments have made in partnership with these ‘delivery units’.

5. ACTING ON HEATWAVES

Dealing with heatwaves requires both a long-term and short-term response. During a heatwave, the imperative is to ensure vulnerable populations can keep cool and that working conditions are managed to reduce heat stress, especially for manual labourers. Planning for greater and more frequent heat will require changes in city and housing design, especially in countries where power for air conditioning is unavailable or unaffordable for people at risk. There is much that can be done in building design, incorporating green spaces in cities, educating people on actions they can take, improving early warning systems and putting contingency plans in place¹³⁹.

There appears to be a data gap in recording and responding to heat waves in Africa. Given that heatwaves are likely to be significant in the future in both Africa and Europe, both should step up contingency planning for responding to acute needs during heatwaves. Mutual learning and learning from elsewhere, such as the responses in cities in India, will allow authorities to plan a more effective response. City authorities should be encouraged to exchange how public information, planning, architecture and contingency actions can reduce the deadliness of heatwaves.

¹³⁹ The Lancet. (2021). Health in a world of extreme heat. The Lancet, 398(10301), 641. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(21\)01860-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01860-2)

Annex 1. EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package: A step towards Climate-Resilient Health Systems.

The European Commission announced EUR 150 billion (50% of the Global Gateway finance aims) in European Union-financed investments during the 6th European Union-Africa Union Summit in February 2022¹⁴⁰. Termed as the Global Gateway Africa, the investment package aims to support African countries for a strong, inclusive, green and digital recovery and transformation. For the health sector, the investment package's priority is on pandemic preparedness, health security and access to health services¹⁴¹. The summit led to unremarkable investment in health, albeit with a major focus on pandemic preparedness (inspired by the COVID-19 pandemic), vaccines and pharmaceuticals. However, the investment package targets certain aspects that can enhance the resilience of communities to climate change impacts. Firstly, it committed EUR 1.15 billion to strengthen health systems and increase preparedness for pandemics, including supporting efforts of skills development, universal health coverage, infrastructure and production capacities and regulatory frameworks. This initial investment is to be enhanced by further funding from Team Europe. Drawing the lessons from

the increased vulnerability due to the intersection of COVID-19 and climate change, targeting health system preparedness for pandemics could directly or indirectly enhance health systems' reliance to climate change.

Secondly, the funding targets sexual and reproductive health rights, developing a regional Team Europe Initiative on sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) together with African partners. With a funding commitment of EUR 60 million to be enhanced by other funding from Team Europe, the aim is to improve SRHR among young women and adolescent girls who are disproportionately impacted by climate change, as highlighted earlier on. Third, the funding intends to accelerate a green transition with a particular emphasis on climate change resilience and disaster risk reduction and agri-food systems, significantly benefitting the health sector. The Global Gateway for Africa has a strong involvement of Team Europe, both in funding and implementation of the policy priorities.

¹⁴⁰ EU, & AU. (2022). 6th European Union - African Union Summit: A Joint Vision for 2030. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf

¹⁴¹ European Commission. (2022). EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package - Health. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/fs_22_870

MAIN REPORT

POLICY BRIEF FOUR: ENHANCING AFRICA- EUROPE COOPERATION ON ADAPTATION AHEAD OF COP28



POLICY BRIEF FOUR:

ENHANCING AFRICA-EUROPE COOPERATION ON ADAPTATION AHEAD OF COP28

This policy brief, the fourth in a series, outlines the critical role to be played by the Africa-Europe partnership in making progress on Adaptation, in advance of COP28 in Dubai, November 30th - December 12th. It is now 18 months since the 6th Summit of African and European Heads of State was held in February 2022, at which both continents pledged to promote effective multilateralism within the rules-based international order, with the UN at its core, including at COPs. Both sides committed to reduce global inequalities, strengthen solidarity, promote international cooperation, fight and mitigate climate change and improve delivery of 'global public goods'.

Since February 2022, much has happened in terms of geo-political tensions, which inevitably impacts on global agreements and relationships between countries and blocs. Nevertheless, the EU continues to work on implementing its Adaptation Mission and Strategy, while the AU has agreed its own Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy (2022-2032), and both of these provide a strong foundation for a shared approach to adaptation.

This policy brief recommends three focus areas to be taken forward by Africa and Europe:

- Europe should work with African countries to enhance funding, capacity and technology transfer for locally based adaptation planning. Since effective adaptation is based on comprehensive locally based plans, ensuring these are in place will enable funding to flow and for it to be used effectively.
- European countries should step up their climate finance, pledging to pay at least their 'fair share' by 2025, as well as to anchor in national plans the doubling of adaptation finance by 2025 compared

to 2019. Based on historic emissions, GDP per capita, and the \$100bn target, only four developed countries have made climate finance commitments commensurate with their 'fair share': Sweden, France, Norway, and Japan. At COP26, developed countries were urged to double adaptation finance by 2025 from 2019 levels, yet measures to ensure such delivery are not always visible.

- European and African countries should work together with finance providers to increase the direct accreditation of African institutions. This should be accompanied by a shift towards long term programmatic funding and away from the current project-based models.

DOUBLING DOWN ON AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION ACTION IS AN IMPERATIVE:

Current policies around the world are projected to result in 2.7C warming by 2100¹. Above 2C, Africa would suffer a catastrophic loss of biodiversity, and reduction in crop yields and range productivity. Millions more people would be exposed to vector and water-borne disease. Even at current levels of warming, some regions of Africa have experienced a more than 20% fall in per capita income².

In Europe agricultural losses in the south would not be offset by any gains in the north, and the risks of heat, drought and floods would have significant impacts on health, infrastructure and economies³. Sea levels will keep on rising for centuries due to warming that has already taken place⁴.

The amount of sea level rise is uncertain but could be 1.3-1.6 m by 2100, and if ice sheets collapse the rise could be a catastrophic 9-10m by 2300⁵. The situation clearly demands significant effort in protecting coastal infrastructure where possible and plans to move people and urban centres away from the coast.

Redoubling efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions are more urgent than ever, but so are efforts to deal with the increasingly bleak prospect of having to adapt to ever more challenging levels of climate change impact.

FAST-TRACK PLANNING AND SEEKING ALIGNMENT FOR GREATER AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION ACTION:

While the IPCC has shown that increasing impacts are now inevitable, there is considerable uncertainty over the timing and magnitude of such effects, especially for Africa where data is much more limited, and the models do not all agree⁶. This uncertainty places special emphasis on the need for effective adaptation and planning in Africa. 'Hard' changes, such as increasing sea defences to cope

with a clear threat, will be needed alongside an array of 'soft' adaptations, such as organisational changes that acknowledge the importance of social, financial, organisational, political and cultural aspects which enable or hinder action, and which have the flexibility to cope with high levels of uncertainty about the precise impacts of climate change.

The process of adaptation planning should follow six core steps⁷:

- Specify why action is needed and the outcomes sought (Scope)
- Create plausible scenarios for action (Envision)
- Identify risks and opportunities (Identify)
- Prioritise options to address risks and capture opportunities (Prioritise)
- Take action to adapt as well as monitor (Implement), and
- Share, learn and adjust course as needed (Evaluate).

These steps need to be accompanied by the organisational machinery and capacity to carry them out and put a plan in place. Given the variety of contexts and needs, the involvement of stakeholders is essential, to ensure plans are fit for the local context and can adjust to circumstance⁸. This implies a commitment to long term programmes, with finance being flexible in response to changing circumstances.

All countries in Europe have an adaptation plan or strategy⁹. The EU-wide adaptation strategy¹⁰ sets out that a clear understanding of the risks faced must provide the basis for action, to be followed by putting in place the macro-economic policies required and ensuring that climate adaptation is mainstreamed at all levels to strengthen resilience from local to macro-scales. It also explicitly undertakes to support African initiatives and institutions which address local, national, and regional adaptation.

In Africa, 18 countries have completed a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) while others have included adaptation elements in their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) documents. African countries are ready for climate investment with 32 countries having assigned some specialised institutions to process

climate investment, identified priority sectors and set out connections to disaster risk reduction. Among these, 7 countries stand out as having more detailed plans with clear institutional frameworks to coordinate climate work and with ideas in place for a monitoring and evaluation system¹¹. Europe has pledged to assist the implementation of Africa's adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts¹⁰.

The positions of Africa and Europe are closely aligned on climate adaptation. They are both clear that action needs to be rooted in the management of risks at the local level, backed up by national, regional and international action. The 2022–2032 AU strategy¹² states that climate action needs to be people-centred, African-owned and African-led. The Nairobi Declaration¹³ calls for 'climate positive growth', emphasising the need to support smallholder communities and the centrality of indigenous knowledge and citizen science in design of adaptation and early warning mechanisms. The European strategy on adaptation to climate change published in 2021 speaks of the local level as the 'bedrock of adaptation' and the importance of building local resilience¹⁴. One of the pledges made by the Team Europe Initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa¹⁵ is to enhance the mainstreaming of adaptation and disaster risk reduction into all plans and programmes.

ADAPTATION THE FOCUS OF THE CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT MINISTERIAL MEETING:

In 2021, as COP26 hosts, the UK held a climate and development ministerial process with the objective to help insert vulnerable country priorities into political level conversations ahead of COP26. The second ministerial was co-hosted by the UK and Rwanda in 2022, ahead of COP27. The process was developed to facilitate more genuine conversations, with the priority given to space for call and response discussions, instead of pre-prepared statements. The first two ministerial meetings led to the establishment of the taskforce on access to finance, building the appetite and consensus for doubling adaptation finance at COP26 and for reporting against it at COP27, generating political attention to fiscal space challenges that then seeded COP26 decisions calling for greater use of SDRs and growing the support for climate resilient debt suspension clauses. It also strengthened solidarity and common ground between countries.

The third climate and development ministerial was co-hosted by Malawi, UAE, UK and Vanuatu on the 29th October 2023. Attended by ministers from across provider and recipient countries and institutions¹⁶, including from Africa and Europe, the meeting discussed how to amplify and work together on improving access to finance and good practice in adaptation finance delivery.

In the lead up to the ministerial, discussions focused on building a shared vision for adaptation finance and for translating the vision into tangible goals and actions. These discussions progressed through a series of technical workshops, including those held at the Africa Climate Summit in Nairobi and the Climate Ambition Summit during the 78th United Nations General Assembly.

The three goals identified under the vision through the process, and then discussed at the ministerial, are:

1) **Enhancing country-owned programmatic financing:** increasing programmatic financing and capabilities for delivery of transformative adaptation action, so that climate vulnerable countries have the resources to deliver their adaptation priorities as set out in their adaptation plans through national platforms, with finance based on policy and delivery milestones.

2) **Easing access:** Significantly reduce the time it takes to access finance, cut transaction costs, simplify compliance and reporting requirements, and enable substantial flows to reach countries and communities through direct access.

3) **Scaling all sources of adaptation financing:** Tackle the barriers to scaling accessible and delivery-focused adaptation financing from all sources, including mobilising innovative finance, attracting private sector finance to stimulate domestic enterprise and exploring debt considerations.

All participants shared support for setting a common political direction on adaptation finance. Several countries raised their interest to co-champion one or more of the goals, encompassing marshalling and tracking action over 2024 and reporting back at the next Climate and Development Ministerial in late 2024. These co-champions, who will be driving action across the goals, will be announced at COP28. In their role in marshalling action, the co-champions will require bilateral and multilateral cooperation from a range of actors well placed to achieve the goals. Given the relevance of the agenda for AU-EU cooperation, engaging with these goals and co-champions presents a key opportunity for progress.

ADAPTATION THE FOCUS OF THE CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT MINISTERIAL MEETING:

While Europe and Africa agree on the need for action on adaptation, there is less agreement on the details on how this should happen as evidenced by preparations for COP 28.

Box 1 Adaptation and Loss and Damage in the COP28 climate negotiations

COP28 will be a busy time for negotiations on adaptation, and loss and damage. The talks will take place against a backdrop of emission reduction pledges that imply a dangerous level of warming, well over 1.5°C.

The concern of developing countries is to ensure sufficient attention is paid to adaptation - something they feel has been lacking and thus needing an agenda item of its own.

Specifically, there will be further discussion on goals for adaptation in the Global Stocktake on climate action, a process that will take place for the first time at COP28. The stocktake has been called a “moment for course correction” to ensure the world can rise to the challenge of addressing climate change. There is an expectation that the stocktake should be balanced between mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage.

Main topics for negotiation on adaptation, and loss and damage are:

Global Goal on Adaptation: (<https://unfccc.int/documents/632815>) A framework for the global goal on adaptation, which was established but not defined in the Paris Agreement has been being discussed since COP 26 in eight workshops under the Glasgow Sharm el Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation. While countries agree that targets on adaptation should cover risk assessment, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation, disagreement continues over the precise nature of what will be measured. There is also lack of consensus on whether there should be a set of common global metrics or whether detailed measurement of adaptation is better left to locally determined indicators. A particular bone of contention is whether means of implementation should have their own measures, with concern from some that this would then effectively become a monetary target. Definition of the Global Goal on Adaptation will form part of the global stocktake, but the details are unlikely to be resolved at COP28.

Loss and Damage: COP 27 made the historic decision to set up a loss and damage fund. The details of its establishment have been discussed over 5 workshops by a transitional committee (<https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/constituted-bodies/transitional-committee>). A text has been forwarded to COP 28/CMA5 that has the fund being hosted by the World Bank on an interim basis, subject to conditions. Financial contributions to the fund are encouraged from a wide set of sources, with developed countries taking the lead. The text forwarded to the COP/CMA does not enjoy the full consensus of the committee however, and so may be subject to further negotiation. There is also unfinished business from June 2023, when the parties failed to agree on the hosting of the Santiago Network – an initiative to provide technical help to countries to make plans to counter and respond to loss and damage that has already received significant pledges of money from donors.

FINANCE, AND ACCESS TO IT, CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM OF UTMOST RELEVANCE:

The UN's Adaptation Gap report just out¹⁷ shows yet again how far adrift we are from meeting the finance needs of the most vulnerable parts of the world. The gap is growing and is currently estimated globally at US\$387 billion per year. Over the last twelve months, everyone has seen the apocalyptic visions from forest fires, devastating floods, and storms, such as the catastrophic deaths and damage in Libya's city of Derna. There is only so much "resilience building" which can be done to cope with such powerful forces.

COP28 needs to see Africa and Europe working together to enhance funding, capacity and technology transfer for adaptation planning. We need programmatic approaches to support ambitious national adaptation plans, based on locally-led climate action, and following the principles of Locally Led Adaptation. Ensuring these local plans are in place will enable funding to flow and for it to be used effectively.

Estimating adaptation costs is notoriously difficult. For Europe, costs are expected to be around US\$40 billion a year at 1.5C warming, rising to US\$180 – 210 billion a year at 3-4C warming.

Adaptation costs in Africa are arguably harder to estimate, given the relative lack of climate data and lower level of costed adaptation needs. Based on submitted NDCs, the cumulative adaptation costs for Africa have been estimated at US\$60 billion a year for the next 10 years¹⁸. However, this is likely to be a dramatic underestimate, given the lack of detailed adaptation plans for many countries.

Current annual spending on adaptation across all of Africa is US\$11.4 billion, which represents 39 percent of total climate finance committed to Africa annually. And about half of this finance was in the form of loans, which raises multiple concerns.¹⁹

Access to all climate funds continues to be difficult. For example, the largest climate fund, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) makes its funds available only through accredited entities. Of a total of 78 accredited entities, there are only 4 African governments²⁰ out of a total of 17 accredited African institutions (mainly banks and government institutions).

Most money (76%) goes through international agencies and banks, while direct national funding only accounts for 11-13% of funds²¹. Recipients of finance from the GCF complain at the level of overheads charged by international agencies (typically 7%), which are levied on top of costs to administer and run the project at international salaries.

The average time taken from review of funding proposals to first disbursement of funds has fallen from 26-28 months in 2018 to an average of 12-17 months for projects approved in 2021²². But it is important to note this is an average. Anecdotally, countries complain of some funding taking 5 years to arrive.

The funds are overwhelmingly project-based, meaning that activities need to be mapped out in advance and applied to parts of a wider adaptation strategy. This runs counter to the good practice emerging in adaptation that places emphasis on the ability to put in place flexible strategies to ensure that adaptation action can deal with the inherent uncertainties in climate impacts and associated measures.²³

African countries are already financing climate action and responding to climate impacts with their own resources, which is driving further indebtedness. The Nairobi Declaration²⁴ called for action to tackle this indebtedness and restructure the global finance architecture in ways which would guarantee access to the scale and cost of funds needed to address climate action. This was echoed at the summit called by the president of France in June 2023²⁵. This restructuring will require leveraging the capital balances of Multilateral Development Banks, bringing in new forms of finance from the private sector, and ensuring the availability of finance to cover disaster risks, which is pillar 4 of the Team Europe initiative on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa²⁶.

WAYS FORWARD: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must be stepped up to avoid increasingly catastrophic impacts that it will be difficult or impossible to adapt to. Present policies put the world on a path that threatens to make adaptation impossible for many. Countries must cut emissions now.

Even if emissions are cut further, adaptation is more needed than ever, and both Africa and Europe will need

to face the reality that action so far has been grossly inadequate. Many millions of people are exposed to ever greater risks from more extreme weather and face their livelihood options being eroded.

Adaptation action is being held back by a lack of finance, insufficient focus on adaptation, and its poor integration into policy, combined with a global funding system that does not enable the long-term action that is needed.

BETTER PLANNING MEANS GREATER ACTION:

Adaptation must be embedded across all activities of government and the private sector. This is facilitated by having an adaptation planning process that is sufficiently detailed to guide action at the local level.

African countries should increase efforts to gain a more complete picture of their adaptation needs and means of delivering the action needed. Europe should work with African countries to enhance funding, capacity and technology transfer for adaptation planning in Africa, where required.

In addressing climate change, it is clear that no one nation has a monopoly of knowledge. Exchanges on how best to enable early warning, cope with floods, droughts, and heatwaves, and limit the risks from the spread of disease could be of mutual benefit, especially at the local level.

Africa and Europe should work together to put in place peer-to-peer knowledge exchanges to learn from each other about good adaptation practice.

Africa and Europe agree that effective adaptation needs to be tailored to specific situations and draw on local knowledge. The discussion at COP28 on the global goal on adaptation is an opportunity for Africa and Europe agree that effective adaptation needs to be tailored to specific situations and draw on local knowledge.

The discussion at COP28 on the global goal on adaptation is an opportunity for Europe and Africa to work together to ensure that decisions endorse locally led adaptation, as the best means of ensuring actions are appropriate to local people's priorities.

FINANCE MOBILISATION AND ACCESS FOR GREATER ACTION:

The funds devoted to adaptation are a fraction of what is needed. The COP21 pledge in 2015 to mobilise \$100 bn a year from developed countries by 2020 may finally be met in 2023, just before a new and more ambitious goal is due to be debated in 2024, namely the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). The \$100bn covers all forms of climate action, and adaptation makes up only 7%²⁷ of this.

It is possible to calculate what represents a 'fair share' of climate finance for individual countries, based on the \$100bn target, historical emissions, GDP and population. In 2020, seven countries had paid their 'fair share' of climate finance - (Sweden, France, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark and Japan) In the period leading up to 2025, only four countries have made

climate finance commitments commensurate with their fair share: Sweden, France, Norway, and Japan²⁸.

European countries should step up their climate finance, pledging to pay at least their 'fair share' by 2025.

At COP 26, developed countries were urged to double their adaptation finance by 2025, from 2019 levels.

European countries should set out how they are making progress towards the doubling of adaptation finance.

Access to finance remains problematic in terms of the limited number of African bodies for which accreditation has been agreed, the highly bureaucratic and time-consuming procedures, and the project-based nature of funding.

European and African countries should work together with finance providers to increase the direct accreditation of African institutions.

Shifting finance from the current project-based funding model to more long-term programmatic support will require clear operating models to be demonstrated, which the major climate funds can then follow.

More African countries could come forward to develop national plans and identify mechanisms for handling international funding, in partnership with specific European bilateral partners.

There is already movement in this regard among the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) through the LIFE-AR initiative²⁹ with 6 countries embarking on the process³⁰.

Partners will need to invest in monitoring and evaluation processes to provide clear recommendations for changes in multilateral funding procedures, to open up more timely, programmatic funding.

Access to finance can be complex, especially where more than one donor is involved. Recipients have to deal with multiple applications, monitoring and reporting procedures for a single activity, which results in significant duplication in applying for and reporting on finance.

European donors should seek to harmonise reporting and due diligence procedures, and expand arrangements whereby donors pool funds, working through a lead donor (delegated co-operation) wherever possible.

Climate impacts can help drive a spiral of indebtedness for individuals, households, local and national governments. The Nairobi Declaration³¹, the Summit for a new Financial Pact³² and the Bridgetown agenda³³ have all called for action to reduce the debt burden on developing country governments, especially those suffering from repeated extreme weather events. The costs of borrowing for African countries have become punitive, as a consequence of US and EU monetary policy measures which have raised international interest rates.

Europe and Africa should work together to set out a workable timetable for debt relief and restructuring, for both existing and new debt.

Managing climate risk and delivering adaptation need new forms of finance, as set out in Team Europe's Initiative pillar 434 on risk finance and pillar 3 on increasing the involvement of the private sector. Understanding the possibilities for the scope and reach of this finance will be essential to understand how gaps can be filled.

Europe and Africa could usefully set-up a joint task force to set out existing risk and blended-finance options, where it has worked well, and highlighting where more needs to be done. Such evidence would be of value in building a consensus towards defining the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance.

MAIN REPORT

POLICY BRIEF FIVE: **LEVERAGING COP28** **OUTCOMES FOR AN ENHANCED** **AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION** **PARTNERSHIP**



POLICY BRIEF FIVE:

LEVERAGING COP28 OUTCOMES FOR AN ENHANCED AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION PARTNERSHIP

This policy brief, the fifth in a series, delves into the key adaptation outcomes of COP28, with particular reference to the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) and adaptation finance in the lead-up to COP29 and the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG). It builds on a recent meeting of the Africa-Europe Foundation Working Group on Adaptation, and offers some recommendations

as to how progress made at COP28 can be integrated into enhanced co-operation between Africa and Europe in advance of the new EU political cycle in 2024, the upcoming EU Joint Communication with Africa, and the start of the second 10-year Implementation Plan of the African Union's Agenda 2063.

THE POLICY BRIEF RECOMMENDS THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE AFRICA-EUROPE ADAPTATION PARTNERSHIP'

1. Provide a safe space for technical and political experts and negotiators from Africa and Europe:

Lack of preparation and alignment are a major concern ahead of negotiations, and climate diplomatic relations between Africa and Europe could be improved. It can be timely to provide a safe space for technical and political negotiators to meet to explore shared ground. The renewed leadership of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), the Least Developed Country Group (LDC), and the G77 offers a window of opportunity to develop with Europe a common understanding on pressing issues affecting the delivery of adaptation action and finance. Both continents should use the positions of convergence to set higher level political and technical targets. It is vital to understand the dynamics of partnering and cooperating. As such, there should be timely and strategic meetings outside the usual negotiation processes for greater convergence and alignment.

2. Establish a Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) knowledge transfer programme between Europe and Africa to support GGA implementation:

This programme could promote sharing of MEL expertise in a structured, long-term agenda to include joint workshops, mentorship schemes, and collaborative research projects. It should focus on sharing practical applications of MEL, tailored to specific needs and challenges related to implementing the GGA framework. It is estimated that 30% of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) have already a MEL protocol. Building on what countries already measure and using such programme could inform the UEA-Belem work programme on indicators leading to COP30 for the UEA Framework on Global Climate Resilience.

3. Enhance engagement in “NAP Central” with targeted support mechanisms: Beyond simply encouraging active participation of European countries in NAP Central¹⁴², the EU could establish targeted support mechanisms, such as technical assistance teams and funding opportunities, to incentivize and facilitate knowledge sharing. This would not only enrich the platform with diverse adaptation strategies but also provide tangible resources and expertise to support developing countries, in particular Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in implementing effective adaptation plans.

4. Redesign, simplify, and reform climate finance:

- Engage Africa and Europe in dialogue to shape how best to quantify adaptation finance, using indicators from the GGA process to enhance grant finance and to increase adaptation finance over time, including the mobilisation of the private sector and public development banks. It will be critical that climate adaptation benefits from the structure that is decided and from the new financial goal that is set, as well as to connect the thematic and dimensional target of the GGA to climate finance. Beyond this, advancing estimates of what it would take to meet the goals articulated in the UAE Framework on Global Climate Resilience could be useful to take forward NCQG discussion, as well as to ensure the UAE framework is linked to the NCQG in 2024.
- Work together, as Africa and Europe, on options to ease access to climate finance and ensure finance is better able to support long term, flexible adaptation plans, in line with recommendations of the 2023 Climate and Development Ministerial. A partnership between European donors and African finance recipients could combine their experience and needs to suggest effective reforms. This work would cover application, disbursement, and reporting procedures – and trigger greater transparency and predictability of finance.

5. European donors could work towards harmonizing their procedures and reporting requirements for climate finance. In doing this, they should take advice from recipient countries, particularly in Africa, in preparation for the 7th AU-EU Summit, due to take place in 2025. Harmonisation should align with the GGA framework established at COP28 and related adaptation commitments, aimed at support for the needs and priorities of countries as outlined in national planning documents, and for easing access and streamlining application and reporting processes.

6. Enhance EU political ambition and leadership to fulfil adaptation finance commitments: The European Union could show political leadership by fulfilling the commitment made by wealthy countries to double adaptation finance by 2025, capitalizing on the momentum from this year's Climate and Development Ministerial dialogue, which took place in 2023, and discussions on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) leading up to COP29. This year's ministerial dialogue on doubling climate adaptation finance must be seen as a strategic milestone to rebuild trust with African partners.

7. Build a shared Africa-Europe position on what is needed for a transformational approach to adaptation: African and European countries should strengthen their adaptation efforts in accordance with decisions under the UNFCCC, while also learning from practical experience. Joint advocacy is crucial to engage stakeholders in international finance, countries, communities, and the private sector in driving change under the UNFCCC and elsewhere. This approach aligns with the COP28 decision, which mandates examination of what is meant by “transformational adaptation”. The findings from this examination should further inform and strengthen the Africa-Europe partnership in developing transformative adaptation strategies. With the current Italian G7 Presidency having a focus on Africa and putting emphasis on transformational adaptation, there are opportunities to mirror EU missions, including the one on adaptation, to the African continent.

8. Beyond adaptation, it will be key to build a shared understanding of the Loss and Damage Fund, and how best to position the Africa-Europe partnership to fast-track roll-out of this fund. After much deliberation last year, the Loss and Damage Fund was approved at COP28, to cover the costs and damages resulting from climate-related disasters such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, and other extreme weather events. According to this agreement, developed countries should contribute to the fund in proportion to their contribution to climate change. Parties to the COP have pledged \$700 million to assist low-income countries in recovering from the effects of climate change. While this is a significant step towards climate justice, the volume of funding falls far short of what climate-vulnerable populations will require to rebuild their homes, livelihoods, and communities when natural disasters strike.

¹⁴² UNCC web-service for all NAP-related resources napcentral.org

COP28 ADAPTATION OUTCOMES:

A. The Global Goal on Adaptation Framework

The Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), established by the Paris Agreement in Article 7¹⁴³, was a direct result of sustained and dedicated advocacy from developing countries. This advocacy was fundamentally rooted in establishing a parity between adaptation and mitigation within the negotiations of the UNFCCC, ensuring adaptation receives the attention and resources needed.

At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, parties agreed to establish a two-year work programme on the GGA with four workshops each year¹⁴⁴ which resulted in establishment of the GGA Framework at COP28¹⁴⁵. This framework serves as a crucial instrument to measure and enhance adaptation action globally, by strengthening adaptive capacity and resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change, “with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response” in the context of the global mitigation goal of keeping temperature rise to below 2°C and as close as possible to 1.5°C. It includes the following key elements:

Thematic targets

COP28 agreed on seven thematic targets (water, food security, health, biodiversity, infrastructure, poverty eradication, and cultural heritage).¹⁴⁶ The targets chosen demonstrate consensus on the need for greater efforts to adapt and build resilience to climate change. It is important to note that thematic targets are inter-alia, and theoretically there could be more or different ones. A full list of the seven targets is included in Annex 1 of this brief

Dimensional targets

During the 2023 workshops on the GGA framework, there was consensus that adaptation action needs to be iterative to deal with the complexity and local specificity of climate action, as recognized in the first global stocktake¹⁴⁷ as crucial to “building adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability”. Adaptation actions encompass risk and impact assessment, planning, implementation, and cycles of monitoring, evaluation, and learning. The GGA framework thus incorporates specific targets for each stage in this process, to apply to all countries as follows:

- **Impact, Vulnerability, and Risk Assessment:** By 2030, have conducted comprehensive climate assessments, informing national adaptation strategies. By 2027, establish advanced early warning and climate information systems.
- **Planning:** By 2030, implement inclusive, transparent adaptation plans and policies, integrating adaptation across all relevant sectors and strategies.
- **Implementation:** By 2030, make significant progress in applying adaptation plans, policies, and strategies, reducing climate hazard impacts.
- **Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning:** By 2030, set up and operationalize robust systems for tracking and learning from adaptation efforts, ensuring effective institutional capacity.

¹⁴³ https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

¹⁴⁴ <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/workstreams/glasgow-sharm-el-sheikh-WP-GGGA>

¹⁴⁵ <https://unfccc.int/documents/636595>

¹⁴⁶ See Annex 1

Strategic significance of global climate adaptation targets

Agreeing a set of global thematic and dimensional adaptation targets in the UNFCCC is a significant milestone. It provides extra space for nations and various stakeholders to navigate the complexities of climate adaptation. It agrees overall priorities and sets up specific milestones for parties to put in place the necessary planning, management and monitoring systems. The agreement recognises that adaptation cannot follow a specific formula, but needs to be tailored to national and local circumstances. As such, it will:

- **Enable the formulation of targeted interventions.** By recognizing the distinct challenges and needs within each thematic area, stakeholders can develop more tailored, impactful adaptation strategies. This specificity ensures that resources are efficiently allocated and that interventions are directly aligned with the most pressing needs.
- **Promote coherent planning.** With a clear structure and defined objectives, stakeholders can formulate coherent, integrated adaptation plans, which is crucial for ensuring that different initiatives are harmonized and mutually reinforcing, thereby amplifying the overall effectiveness of adaptation efforts.
- **Facilitate systematic tracking of progress.** The targets provide tangible benchmarks against which nations and organizations can measure progress with climate adaptation. This not only fosters accountability but also enables identification of gaps needing further attention. Regular monitoring and evaluation, guided by these targets, should ensure a continuous learning process, enabling stakeholders to refine their strategies overtime.

The GGA indicators work programme, a technical and political exercise

The targets noted above are silent on what good progress might be, recognising the wide range of actions needed. Under the GGA decision package, COP28 initiated a two-year work programme to put forward indicators to monitor progress with the target, the structure of which will be agreed in the first half of 2024. In preparation, countries and interested entities are encouraged to share their perspectives on the programme's structure and objectives by March 2024, for discussion at the subsidiary bodies meeting (SB60) in June 2024. The current framework lacks specific, measurable indicators to track actions on-the-ground and measure progress towards achieving the GGA goals. Defining these indicators will be critical to driving national efforts on adaptation and resilience, and to tracking support for adaptation action.

Agreeing how progress can best be monitored will need to consider tailoring actions to local conditions, and so it is unlikely that a global standard set of indicators will be achievable. But setting out indicators will encourage countries to choose those which can best help them manage, understand, and demonstrate progress to citizens and funders. These indicators need to be practical, helping to guide progress, and avoiding additional data collection and reporting burdens for governments. As such, it could be of interest to leverage existing frameworks and harmonising these together, including SDGs, CBD, etc.

The GGA framework is currently silent on how countries might mobilize adaptation finance. Ambitious finance targets are necessary to provide the means for implementing adaptation efforts, especially in climate vulnerable countries and communities. By 2030, international climate finance for adaptation should be on an equal footing with finance for mitigation, with a further ramping up in line with intensifying climate change impacts.

Also missing in the GGA Framework so far are references to “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC). This concept acknowledges that different countries have different levels of responsibility in addressing climate change, according to their wealth and development levels.

Europe and Africa have the opportunity to pool adaptation expertise, facilitating achievement of both thematic and dimensional targets, and drawing upon the rich experience of adaptation planning and action that has already taken place. The GGA framework provides a lot of learning opportunities. There is no need for the framework to conclude for the GGA to start.

¹⁴⁷ <https://unfccc.int/documents/636584>

Now is an opportunity to champion the GGA framework. Given that not much is expected on the GGA framework ahead of COP30, as a result of the 2-year UAE-Belem work programme, it is suggested to keep the momentum building and for countries to keep working together. As such, there might be an opportunity for the EU to champion the GGA to demonstrate its continued climate leadership.


B. Adaptation finance: a pledge in progress

In 2021 at COP26 in Glasgow, developed nations were urged to double their adaptation finance¹⁴⁸ to reach approximately \$40 billion by 2025. However, the adaptation finance on offer, even if it was doubled, still falls woefully short of requirements. The UNEP Gap Reports highlight that realizing this doubling goal would narrow the current adaptation financing gap by only 5% to 10%, a gap that is currently estimated at between US\$215 billion and US\$387 billion¹⁴⁹. COP28 recognised the need for adaptation finance, how the gap of adaptation finance is widening, and why there is a need to go beyond the doubling of adaptation finance in the NCQG. The acknowledgement of these figures paves the way for quantification conversations.

Since COP26, developing nations have persistently advocated for increased adaptation finance, noting the unfulfilled \$100 billion pledge and relatively low levels of adaptation funding. In response to this demand, COP27 mandated the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) to evaluate progress toward this goal¹⁵⁰. However, the SCF's report, released before COP28, highlighted significant challenges in tracking adaptation finance, which include difficulties distinguishing funds allocated for dual-purpose activities (both mitigation and adaptation) and inconsistencies in the official reporting of climate finance within the UNFCCC, complicating the accurate assessment of progress in doubling adaptation finance¹⁵¹.

As of the latest updates, the total of adaptation finance pledges for 2023 is still pending. However, COP28 witnessed several new commitments to the Adaptation Fund, totalling US\$ 192.31 million¹⁵², though this falls short of the Fund's target of \$300 million. A majority of the pledges came from Europe, with Denmark notably marking its first contribution to the Adaptation Fund (Figure 1). COP28 also agreed that a ministerial dialogue will be held in 2024, that will focus on the doubling of adaptation finance. Such a ministerial dialogue would offer an opportunity to discuss the share of finance as part of the NCQG, and a stocktaking moment to recognise the adaptation finance gap against the needs of communities.

Figure 2: Adaptation Fund Pledges at COP28



¹⁴⁸ https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma3_auv_2_cover%20decision.pdf

¹⁴⁹ <https://www.unep.org/resources/adaptation-gap-report-2023>

¹⁵⁰ https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Decisions_1CMA4_1COP27.pdf

¹⁵¹ <https://unfccc.int/SCF>

¹⁵² <https://www.adaptation-fund.org/press-release-adaptation-fund-mobilizes-nearly-us-160-million-in-new-pledges-at-cop28-for-the-most-climate-vulnerable/>

Greater attention to adaptation finance is illustrated by the fact that it accounts for only 24% of the total \$250bn assessed as needed for Africa. In practice, the need is likely to be higher than \$250bn, given the lack of detailed local adaptation planning and uncertainty over climate impacts.¹⁵³ The Global Stocktake¹⁵⁴ underlined that finance for adaptation would have to be significantly scaled up, well beyond the doubling urged in Glasgow.

COP28 delivered little on adaptation finance, with no strong outcome on the doubling. It also highlighted that there are still a lot of distrust among African countries on the delivery of that goal. Furthermore, it stressed that the next battleline will be on reporting. The fact that COP28 decision transferred reporting expectations from the UNFCCC to developed countries, for them to self-report on climate finance, was perceived as demotivating for African countries, which called for accountability in the delivery of climate finance. Finally, the final text recognised that the 'extent to which developing countries can implement adaptation actions is tied to the level of support provided, including climate finance', thus offering an important narrative for African countries to support in the lead-up to COP29.

The stocktake also set out the difficulties in accessing finance and consequent need to simplify mechanisms. It highlighted that Africa needs to speak on issue of debt, blended, innovative sources of finance, access to climate finance, and the nature of arrangement of delivery of climate finance. Earlier chapters in this series have highlighted how reform of access to finance could usefully go hand in hand with how finance is applied, moving from piecemeal project funding to longer-term support to adaptation plans. Such support is likely to become more apparent as work on the GGA encourages clearer long-term planning, management and metrics.

C. Knowledge sharing through NAP Central

Under the agenda item related to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) at COP28, a decision was reached to invite developed countries to upload their adaptation plans and strategies to NAP Central¹⁵⁵. This platform has been instrumental for developing countries, providing crucial resources for drafting National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), since it offers a wealth of data and insights into the adaptation process, serving as a guide and reference point.

Traditionally, NAP Central has facilitated knowledge sharing among developing countries under the UNFCCC. The recent COP28 decision expands its scope, encouraging developed countries to contribute their experience, thereby enriching the platform's content. As of January 30th, 2024 New Zealand is the only developed country to have shared its plan on NAP Central¹⁵⁶. The setting of targets under the GGA and work on indicators underline the importance of pooling experience of effective action, better make progress on the production of useful indicators. Making all NAPs easily available on NAP Central will greatly facilitate this goal.

D. Adaptation progress beyond official UNFCCC processes

In addition to the milestone outcomes for adaptation achieved at COP28, progress was also made outside the official halls that offers insight into how Africa and Europe could collaborate on adaptation in future. For example: *[EDITORIAL NOTE: having some embedded link issues in this section which will be corrected when text is typeset into formal template]*

- The Climate and Development Ministerial launched the **Coalition of Ambition on Adaptation Finance**, with 13 countries signing up to work together on enhancing country-owned programmatic financing, easing access and scaling all sources of adaptation finance. African and European countries involved include Denmark, Italy, Ireland, Malawi, the Netherlands, and Somalia as well as the Adaptation Fund and non EU-African countries, such as the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, and Nepal
- The **COP28 Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery and Peace**, supported by 70 states and 39 organizations, recognises the role of climate action in the peace-building process and calls for increased support and collaboration on climate adaptation and resilience.

¹⁵³ Climate Finance Needs of African Countries Sandra Guzmán, Greta Dobrovich, Anna Balm and Chavi Meattle June 28, 2022 <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/climate-finance-needs-of-african-countries/>

¹⁵⁴ <https://unfccc.int/gcse?q=FCCC/PA/CMA/2023/L.17>

¹⁵⁵ <https://unfccc.int/documents/635257>

¹⁵⁶ <https://napcentral.org/developedcountriesnaps>

- More than 130 countries signed the [COP28 UAE Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems and Climate Action](#), which has a focus (among others) to scale up adaptation and resilience activities to support sustainable agriculture
- The [COP28 Joint Statement on Climate, Nature and People](#) firmly connects the nature and climate agendas (which is especially relevant for 2024 since all Rio Conventions - biodiversity, desertification, and climate COPs - will take place later in the year) and includes a focus on harmonising planning and investment instruments across adaptation, resilience, and nature.
- Members of the Champions Group on Adaptation Finance continue to work together to increase the share of climate adaptation funds in the total finance package, and to advocate for improved ‘quality’ and accessibility. Members include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom as well as the African Development Bank, and is supported by the European Commission.
- A group of 18 philanthropic organisations launched a [call to action](#) that commits to accelerated progress and action on climate adaptation and resilience, bolstering government and private sector action at and after COP28.
- New commitments to the [LDC Initiative for Effective Adaptation and Resilience \(LIFE-AR\)](#) at COP28 will accelerate efforts for climate adaptation and resilience in the least developed countries. [Four new countries signed up](#) to LIFE-AR (Benin, Madagascar, Senegal, and Nepal joining existing countries Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Malawi, Uganda and Bhutan) and Canada joined as a donor (joining US, UK and Ireland).
- The number of governments and organisations endorsing the Locally Led Adaptation Principles grew to 126. There are now more than 22 governments who have endorsed the principles, including Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Uganda, South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Italy, Switzerland, and Estonia, as well as the French Development Agency (AFD).

These initiatives are part of a growing number of adaptation-focused efforts being announced and showcased at COPs. They are an integral part of pushing strong adaptation action. Underpinning a number of these initiatives is the need to reform the international finance system. In the coming years, there is a critical opportunity for governments and partners to work together to reimagine what a more transformative and ambitious approach to adaptation could look like.

2. Looking ahead - Strengthening the Africa-Europe adaptation partnership

The new European Union (EU) political cycle in 2024, the upcoming EU Joint Communication with Africa, and the second action-packed decade of the African Union's Agenda 2063 together offer timely opportunities to integrate the adaptation outcomes agreed during COP28 into the cooperation agenda between Africa and Europe.

The work on the GGA could benefit from a number of existing initiatives:

For example, the European climate adaptation platform ([Climate-ADAPT](#))¹⁵⁷, a partnership between the European Commission and the European Environment Agency (EEA), provides several tools (e.g. the [Regional Adaptation Support Tool – RAST](#))¹⁵⁸ and [resources](#)¹⁵⁹ that offer practical guidance on how to develop, implement and evaluate plans for adapting to climate change. One element of particular interest is the development of indicators for adaptation.

¹⁵⁷ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/>

¹⁵⁸ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/knowledge-and-data/regional-adaptation-support-tool>

¹⁵⁹ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/knowledge-and-data/regional-adaptation-support-tool/step-6-monitoring-and-evaluating-adaptation>

A useful source of inspiration on such indicators can be the [Adaptation Dashboard](#)¹⁶⁰. The importance of these indicators is highlighted in the recent [decision](#)¹⁶¹ from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to deliver a specific product on adaptation indicators, metrics and guidelines during its seventh assessment cycle. These resources can provide useful inputs to the structure and objectives of the GGA indicators work programme and support the delivery of the dimensional target on MEL of the GGA framework.

[Team Europe Initiatives](#)¹⁶² (TEIs) are flagship initiatives that aim to deliver concrete, transformational results for partner countries or regions, implemented by European development/external action partners as Team Europe. A TEI of particular importance for the Africa-Europe partnership is the initiative on [Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa](#)¹⁶³. This TEI was announced on [16 November 2022](#)¹⁶⁴ at COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh by the EU and the African Union (AU) as part of the [EU-Africa Global Gateway Investment Package](#)¹⁶⁵. This TEI builds on the outcomes from the [6th EU - AU Summit](#)¹⁶⁶, which calls for large-scale sustainable investments, supported by TEIs, with due consideration to the priorities and needs of African countries, including support to the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) of African Countries under the Paris Agreement to enhance mitigation and adaptation. Furthermore, the [AU-EU Innovation Agenda](#)¹⁶⁷, a strategic partnership supported by the Global Gateway, proposes specific objectives with short-, medium- and long-term actions for the green transition, one of the four priority areas agreed by the [AU-EU High-Level Policy Dialogue on Science, Technology and Innovation](#)¹⁶⁸. Climate adaptation is a key focus of the actions identified, and the following sectors are highlighted: agriculture and food systems, water, and cultural heritage. These are aligned with the thematic targets of the GGA framework agreed at COP28.

Africa and Europe have an opportunity to work together through the Africa-Europe adaptation partnership to help ensure that adaptation planning, finance and monitoring is as efficient as possible. **Europe is not simply a funder in this but a strategic partner, and stands to learn from African countries and communities with decades of experience on climate change impacts and adaptation measures.** This is recognised in the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change [“Forging a climate-resilient Europe”](#)¹⁶⁹: *“The EU can also learn from others: many of our international partners have long been on the frontlines of climate change and have valuable experience that can help Europe become more climate resilient.”* Furthermore, this strategy also notes that *“The EU is well equipped to conduct structured dialogues to share solutions and is keen to learn from others”* and that *“there are significant knowledge gaps and innovative approaches where the EU could benefit from existing experience, for instance on community-led and nature-based adaptation”*.

Together, these initiatives provide excellent opportunities to strengthen the Africa-Europe partnership on adaptation, building on the outcomes from COP28. The recommendations provided in this policy brief offer tangible ways in which this can be taken forward.

¹⁶⁰ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/en/mission/knowledge-and-data/data-dashboards>

¹⁶¹ <https://www.ipcc.ch/2024/01/19/ipcc-60-ar7-work-programme/>

¹⁶² https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/team-europe-initiatives_en

¹⁶³ https://capacity4dev.europa.eu/resources/team-europe-tracker/partner-countries/sub-saharan-africa/climate-change-adaptation-resilience-africa_en

¹⁶⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_6888

¹⁶⁵ https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-region/initiatives-sub-saharan-africa_en

¹⁶⁶ https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54412/final_declaration-en.pdf

¹⁶⁷ https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-07/ec_rtd_au-eu-innovation-agenda-final-version.pdf

¹⁶⁸ https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/strategy/strategy-2020-2024/europe-world/international-cooperation/regional-dialogues-and-international-organisations/eu-africa-cooperation_en

¹⁶⁹ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021DC0082>

Key moments from January to June 2024:

- 2024 Adaptation Forum by the Adaptation Committee – **18-19 March 2024, Bonn**
- Copenhagen Climate Ministerial – **20 March, Copenhagen**
- EIB Adaptation Days – **24-25 April 2024**
- Ministerial dialogue on the doubling of Adaptation Finance (TBC)
- UNFCCC 60th sessions of the **Subsidiary Bodies - 3-13 June 2024, Bonn**
- UAE Special Meeting to follow-up on the COP28 Finance Declaration - **June 2024**

ANNEX 1:

The GGA Framework thematic and dimensional targets as agreed at COP28:

Themes:

Water: Significantly reducing climate-induced water scarcity and enhancing climate resilience to water-related hazards towards a climate-resilient water supply, climate-resilient sanitation and towards access to safe and affordable potable water for all;

Food: Attaining climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply and distribution of food, as well as increasing sustainable and regenerative production and equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all;

Health: Attaining resilience against climate change related health impacts, promoting climate-resilient health services, and significantly reducing climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities;

Biodiversity and ecosystems: Reducing climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, and accelerating the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems;

Infrastructure: Increasing the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all, and minimizing climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements;

Poverty and livelihoods: Substantially reducing the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all;

Cultural heritage: Protecting cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems;

Dimensions:

Impact, vulnerability and risk assessment: by 2030 all Parties have conducted up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure to risks and vulnerabilities and have used the outcomes of these assessments to inform their formulation of national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, and by 2027 all Parties have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services;

Planning: by 2030 all Parties have in place country-driven, gender-responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes and/or strategies, covering, as appropriate, ecosystems, sectors, people and vulnerable communities, and have mainstreamed adaptation in all relevant strategies and plans;

Implementation: by 2030 all Parties have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies and, as a result, have reduced the social and economic impacts of the key climate hazards identified in their assessments

Monitoring, evaluation and learning: by 2030 all Parties have designed, established and operationalized a system for monitoring, evaluation and learning for their national adaptation efforts and have built the required institutional capacity to fully implement the system;



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