About the Africa-Europe Foundation

The Africa-Europe Foundation (AEF) was co-founded by Friends of Europe and the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, in partnership with the African Climate Foundation and the ONE Campaign. The purpose of AEF is to strengthen Africa-Europe relations by facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue, catalysing partnerships and unlocking new opportunities. The Foundation’s work is orientated by the “High-Level Group of Personalities” composed of high-level experts, much-respected experienced leaders, and co-chairs of Africa-Europe Strategy Groups on themes of cooperation critical in an uncertain geopolitical context amidst the ongoing climate emergency.

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

“Together we can become a powerful unifying global player (…). To succeed we must acknowledge the prevailing power dynamics and inequalities of where we stand, build a strategic vision for where we want to go, and commit to take the necessary steps together, to make sure that commitments made are implemented.”

— Charter of the Africa-Europe Foundation (December 2021)

AFRICA AND EUROPE STAND AT A CRITICAL CROSSROADS.

1) Delivering on our Commitments: Trust is built when people do what they say they will do. A lack of transparent follow-up on commitments evidenced between Summits has undermined the credibility of the partners. Buy-in for flagship initiatives is earned through effective and continuous communication and monitoring of their progress. African and European stakeholders should commit to provide regular data and updates on the status of the Global Gateway commitments and open spaces for regular dialogue on progress. This will help to create a sense of ownership on both sides of the Partnership.

2) Driving Global Governance Reform: The current geopolitical crises highlight the imbalance in international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank which were established before most African countries gained independence. The Africa-Europe Partnership could work to drive change through forming a diplomatic alliance that increases African representation at the G20, IMF, World Bank and at the UN Security Council.

3) Making our Partnership on Climate Work: With COP27 on the horizon, issues of Adaptation, Mitigation, and Loss and Damage will all receive due attention in Sharm-El-Sheikh. However, Africa and Europe remain set to miss another milestone opportunity to progress on their climate goals. Existing funding commitments need to be met, and new commitments agreed, in order that momentum on climate action not be lost. The first priority should be the US$100bn that should have been mobilised by COP26, and agreeing the pathway to doubling Adaptation Finance by 2025, but looking into 2023, climate ambition must be stepped up if either of our continents are to see the progress we need. The partnership could help drive progress by supporting G20 steps to push Multilateral Development Banks to more effectively leverage their balance sheets — potentially mobilising an additional $1 trillion for climate and sustainable development without new budgetary resources. The Africa-Europe partnership could tackle the energy security challenge, and make the best of Africa’s potential to build a global green economy.
The AU-EU relationship continues to suffer from a lack of trust and visibility among the people of the Partnership. So tracking, and making easily accessible progress on delivery is critical.

In Brussels, this perspective stemmed from 2019, when the newly elected President of the European Commission signalled a new era for relations between Africa and Europe by making her first official trip to Addis Ababa to meet with leadership and members of the African Union. Symbolically, that trip was seen as a statement to Africa, Europe, and the world, including Russia, China, and the US, that relations between Africa and Europe would feature prominently during her presidency.

Fast forward to mid-February 2022 and the convening of the long-anticipated 6th AU-EU Summit in Brussels which had been scheduled for autumn 2020 but postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The intervening period had seen tensions arise over the response to the pandemic and climate finance, and when comparing the dedicated speeches of both African and European political representatives in the run-up to the Summit, however, key differences emerge. European leaders were much more vocal than their African counterparts about their expectations and ambitions for the Summit, and talked extensively about a ‘true partnership of equals’. On the African side, there was very little mention of the Summit in national headlines, with African media commenting extensively on national politics but providing little coverage of geopolitical issues beyond the national or regional level.

Attendance at the Summit belied this asymmetry, however, with all 27 European leaders and 40 of the 55 African leaders attending. Those African leaders who did not attend, either were unable to or had been barred by the African Union itself. Despite divergences around vaccine access, migration and approaches to partnership on climate which were not resolved at the Summit, it seemed nonetheless that the geopolitical zeitgeist had ushered in a new period of political maturity, and realpolitik had guided the EU and its member states toward a reimagined approach to Africa.

Proceedings at the Summit were characterised by working discussions, rather than reports and presentations, which was a departure from previous Summits. Particularly noteworthy was both the united front and frank expression on the African side, which heralded a new model of style of diplomacy. At the end of the Summit, the sense of cooperation and good neighbourliness was captured in "A Joint Vision for 2030". It committed the two Unions to common principles, shared values, and a matching vision which covered security and prosperity, human rights and democracy, gender equality and women’s empowerment, action on climate change, environment and biodiversity, food security and youth. It emphasised reciprocity and mutually beneficial political, social and economic partnership, as opposed to the traditional focus on development cooperation that had been the European Union’s foreign policy approach to Africa.

Over eight months have passed since the long-awaited, “landmark” AU-EU Summit ended with optimism for the partnership. During this time, while COVID-19 remains a threat and access to vaccines remains highly inequitable (86 percent of Africans have yet to receive two vaccine doses), further crises have brought much greater disruption. One week following the Summit, Russia invaded Ukraine, sending shockwaves through the global system. Climate change has continued to generate a broad range of catastrophes, and a “cost of living crisis” has impacted populations around the world. Together, all of these have combined to create a geopolitical maelstrom that has changed the world as we know it. From the optimism of the immediate lead-up to the Summit, the Africa-Europe relationship is at its lowest point in over a decade. This is reflected in the changing narratives and tone found in monitoring media and social network, as well as the views of civil society conveyed in CSO focus groups.

Trust, a key building block of any successful partnership, and the element already in shortest supply between the two continents, has been further eroded over the past months, in particular when it comes to the question of follow-up of commitments and delivery, and accessibility of information on outputs.
In December 2021, the Charter of the Africa-Europe Foundation (AEF) underlined the need for institutional Summits to have “credible outcomes, continuous follow-up, and effective monitoring, coordination, and delivery mechanisms” to overcome the historic lack of trust in the African Union-European Union Partnership. Encouragingly, the Summit co-chairs committed to such mechanisms to monitor the commitments made. Discussions are already underway at the political level of the Partnership to carry this through. This includes the AU-EU Ministerial Follow-up Committee, with the next meeting now planned for the first half of 2023, and the upcoming AU-EU Commission-to-Commission meeting end of November 2022. There will also be meeting opportunities between African and European leaders not to be missed, such as the forthcoming COP 27 in Egypt in November 2022.

Consideration is also being given to the role of other key actors, such as the African Union’s economic development agency (NEPAD) in providing technical support, and the European Commission’s Committee on International Trade in establishing internal processes to track technical progress on initiatives including the Global Gateway. Given the central importance of the Global Gateway as Summit output, the credibility of the Partnership rests on its capacity to demonstrate and communicate results.

The Global Gateway encompasses the Africa-Europe Investment Package of €150 billion over six years, is aimed at supporting ambitions relating to the Sustainable Development Goals and African Union Agenda 2063. Since the Summit, it has been well commented on that the Global Gateway does not represent new money, but rather relies on instruments included in the existing multiannual financial framework through a ‘Team Europe’ approach consisting of the EU institutions, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, with greater commitments from the European Fund for Sustainable Development, EU budget grants, funding from member states (although the extent of this commitment is still unclear), and strategic development investment to unlock greater finance.

It remains critical to deepen and strengthen the dialogue between Africa and Team Europe by creating spaces at both continental and global levels for frank and open engagement about progress on our common continental futures and global aspirations. Team Europe has recently created the Team Europe Initiatives, which are seen as the main channel for delivering on the Global Gateway. It is clear from the way in which these Team Europe Initiatives are allocated that Africa has been given the lion’s share globally. This development signifies, on paper at least, that the European Union focus on African development cooperation is serious and extensive. This is borne out by the fact that 52.4% of the country Team Europe Initiatives and 48% of regional Team Europe are ear-marked for sub-Saharan Africa.

Currently there are 158 Team Europe Initiatives that have been approved with some already in progress. It is unclear, however, whether any further Team Europe Initiatives will be finalised in the short term, given the current economic climate and the escalation in the war in Ukraine. The Team Europe Initiatives are adaptable, however, as they are designed to be implemented at various different, mutually reinforcing levels, namely country, regional, and thematic levels. At the country level, there are currently 128 Team Europe Initiatives, at regional level 27, and three at the global level.

A few days earlier, the Commissioner visited Côte d’Ivoire to launch a multi-year indicative programme of more than $256.7 million. The funds will be used in the areas of agriculture (sustainable cocoa), climate, and peace and stability. This information was made public by the governments but went unnoticed by the local and...
THE GLOBAL GATEWAY AT A GLANCE

At the 6th AU-EU Summit, 80 African and European leaders adopted ‘A Joint Vision for 2030’ and confirmed the Global Gateway Investment Package of €150 billion to be allocated to Africa over the next 6

INVESTMENT PRIORITIES

Digital Network and infrastructures
Climate Resilience and Clean Energy
Green Smart and safe Transport
Health Systems and Supply Chains
High Quality Education and Research

years.

DELIVERED THROUGH:

- A Team Europe approach: EU + Member States + development institutions + EIB, EBRD
- The private sector
- The new financial tools in the EU multi-annual financial framework 2021-2027

DRAWING ON:

- The current EU budget for the period 2021-2027, with the €150bn as part of the global plan, which is supposed to mobilise up to €300bn of investment between 2021 and 2027
- Instruments of the EU multiannual financial framework, including the Neighbourhood, Development Cooperation and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)

REORIENTING FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS:

- The EC is gradually reorienting its financial commitments in the 2021-2027 budget to align with the objectives of the Global Gateway. This reorientation involves 3 types of projects:
  - Projects initiated prior to the Global Gateway which are no longer aligned
  - Projects initiated prior to the Global Gateway which are extended and integrated
  - New projects developed under the Global Gateway

HURDLES AND OPPORTUNITIES:

- Funding of Global Gateway remains unclear:
  - At least €95bn of the total investment package (€300bn) to be leveraged from financial institutions + development finance institutions, but no details on when and which institutions
  - The €145bn commitment from EU Member States remains uncertain with very few announcements to date on joint projects
  - Lack of tools to systematically track the projects and their progress creates anxiety among stakeholders, as the EU Delegations’ role in coordinating Team Europe Initiatives is still being operationalised
  - Unclear programming process and criteria for Global Gateway projects enforces the perception of lack of transparency: no country and Team Europe projects mapping published to date

European media. Only a few media outlets carried the press release, or explained the ins and outs of this funding, which is obviously key to the development of both Niger and Côte d’Ivoire. Further progress relating to these two announcements remains unclear, which raises questions of whether the AU-EU Summit is moving from words to deeds.

However, the Partnership is not just about Team Europe Initiatives in Africa. Communication on progress on commitments made by African Union Member States is equally important, especially taking into consideration the relative imbalance between the policymaking power the EU has in Europe, versus the AU in Africa. Last year’s AEF High-Level Group Report underlined the need to support African countries to meet the commitments under the 2001 Abuja Declaration to spend 15% of domestic budgets on healthcare, and Chapter 3 of the 2022 Report highlights the importance of meeting the commitments made under the Maputo and Malabo declarations of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) to spend 10% of government budgets on agriculture. Successes on this financing should be communicated and scaling pathways identified.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, both media and political attention understandably shifted to Eastern Europe and away from developments in the Africa-Europe Partnership. At a time when sustaining the Partnership remains vital, there are fears that the ample funding dedicated to the Partnership in the forms of Global Europe, the Global Gateway, and the Special Drawing Rights will be reallocated to deal with domestic European issues. The European Union has said, however, that domestic and continental demands are unlikely to trounce pressing needs in Africa, which is positive news for the Partnership – but such clear affirmation will need to be backed up with action before concerns are allayed.

Bridging the gap between summit promises and actions achieved, and supporting stakeholders including civil society, youth, private sector, and cities to advocate for programming on these promises, is critical to rebuilding trust. Across Africa and Europe. According to the young people polled under the AEF #RemaineAfricaEuro consultation in mid-2022, 64.5% of respondents felt “Sharing reports on how the commitments are implemented will help keep the public informed” to be the best way to support an effective follow-up to the AU-EU Summit.

The Africa-Europe Partnership must, and can deliver tangible benefits to societies across both continents. African Union and European Union leaders need to address a multitude of crises in order to bring palpable mutual benefit, but since none of the complex continental or global challenges will be solved by governments alone, it is imperative that dialogue and interaction develop beyond the confines of formal structures to work with other stakeholders and actors, like Civil Society Organisations and non-profits to take account of the voices of citizens, especially young people. The multistakeholder, geographically balanced approach that has underpinned all of our work can inform a more respectful dialogue between the two continents, and set the Partnership back towards addressing the global existential and geopolitical crises of the 21st Century.

Citizen studies, for example, have continued to reveal that European citizens (if not necessarily governments) recognise the importance and are supportive of the European relationship with Africa. The findings showed that 76% of European citizens think that the European Union should strengthen its partnership with Africa and increase its investment on the Continent. In relation to migration, however, Europe still hosts some of the least pro-immigration countries - from the perspective of its citizens - in the world, and Europeans are increasingly unwelcoming towards the migratory waves arriving on European borders. Sadly, European elections continue to be influenced or won on the anti-immigration ticket by right of centre and far right parties and coalitions.

On the subject of migration, a majority of Africans across 38 do not necessarily see Europe as the primary destination for migration, and would much rather migrate within the continent, if there were jobs and security in place. If they had such assurances, Africans would prefer to stay put. Ahead of the February Summit, the AEF high-level debate on migration and mobility emphasised the need for regular migration opportunities to be better developed within and between both continents, as part of a wider investment in human capital and labour. There is obviously key to the development of both Niger and Côte d’Ivoire. Further progress relating to these two announcements remains unclear, which raises questions of whether the AU-EU Summit is moving from words to deeds.

Beyond institutional funding and implementation agreements, there are also traditional development-cooperation models, which still continue to exist, and this was further underpinned by a joint op-ed by the President of Rwanda and the Prime Minister of Greece following on from this debate. Mention was made of these pathways during Summit discussions, with no concrete proposals finalised.

THE AFRICA-EUROPE FOUNDATION REPORT 2022
Youth engagement: How have the two continents engaged their mobilised and vocal youth populations in mainstream political discussions? Are young people still locked out of the conversation?

Cultural exchange: Africa and Europe have successful partnership programmes such as Erasmus+ that allow for university student exchanges - but how can these be scaled up? Can we see youth teams from across Africa competing in tournaments in Sweden, or authors from Europe appearing at book festivals in Africa?

Subnational cooperation: City-to-city and local authority cooperation offers valuable learning opportunities for both continents. Existing models of community wealth-building and engaging local activists for data gathering can inspire a more bottom-up approach to local and municipal policymaking.

Frank and honest dialogue: For too long, Africa-Europe relations have been characterised by optimistic rhetoric that is rarely seen by either side more than platitudes. The change in tone towards franker language from the leaders across both continents is welcome.

Youth voice, agency and leadership must be central in the Africa-Europe partnership. As the AEF Charter states “[investing] in the next generation” can be the foundation for a prosperous and sustainable future; and common ground between Africa and Europe is perhaps easiest to find amongst the youth. Across both continents, young people feel increasingly disillusioned and dissatisfied with the (lack of) action from politicians on the existential crises of economic inclusion and climate change.

In Europe, this is evidenced both through the electoral preferences of young people (candidates with a strong focus on focus on climate change, housing access, and inclusion are generally preferred by 18-30s), but especially through the electoral preferences of young people (candidates with a strong focus on focus on climate change, housing access, and inclusion are generally preferred by 18-30s). In Europe, this is evidenced both through the electoral preferences of young people (candidates with a strong focus on focus on climate change, housing access, and inclusion are generally preferred by 18-30s).

Young Africans have for a long time recognised the potential of direct action as a means of political expression. Data from 34 African countries show that young people feel that their governments are not supportive enough of their aspirations, with only one in four (27% across all age groups) registering that their governments are doing a fairly/very good job to address the needs of young people.

Furthermore, the data also show that young people are participating less in civic involvement and political issues, including voting. A decade ago, it was young Tunisians who sparked the Jasmine Revolution which initiated the Arab Spring. Since then, the voices of young people have protested and produced change, from Sudan’s overthrow of Omar al-Bashir to Nigeria’s EndSARS fight against police abuses. Despite almost 60% of the continent’s population being under 25, only 14% of lawmakers across the continents are under the age of 40, and this lack of representation (and pro-youth policymaking) has led young people in Africa to find other means of having their voices heard.

Engaging young people in the Africa-Europe Partnership is not a new idea: the Abuja Youth Declaration and Youth Agenda were adopted following the Africa-Europe Youth Summit in 2017, and the AU-EU Youth Cooperation Hub has produced projects from the ideas detailed. However, rather than treating youth as a siloed policy area in the margins of institutional dialogue, creating space and significantly scaling up opportunities for young people in mainstream political discussion can bring fresh perspectives to the Partnership, and drive action in key areas for the two continents.

The war in Ukraine has plunged the geopolitical context into uncertainty. Beyond delivering on commitments made in February, the Africa-Europe Partnership must take root more definitively and generate tangible gains on the ground, as well as on the global stage for the benefit of both Unions, and indeed the world, at this time of turmoil.

Areas of focus:

Continue investing in safe spaces and innovative dialogue formats, to deepen Africa-Europe exchanges on the complex, sometimes contentious, issues at the heart of the partnership (with a priority focus on the climate-development nexus).

Move beyond the existing sectoral dialogue mechanisms, (built on an outdated development paradigm) and build political and multi-stakeholder dialogue around strategic topics of mutual interest and partnership areas that hold the largest promise.

Provide accessible information, on a frequent basis, regarding the status of the Global Gateway, such as the publication of quarterly analysis reports as well as accompanying political discussions with enhanced outreach efforts to keep the people of the Partnership involved in the conversation.

Ensure in-country mapping which captures partnership action underway by local, national and regional actors and identifies practices with potential to achieve wider, cross-sectoral goals or enable private sector investment at scale.

Continue to open the Partnership beyond state and institutional actors to build new ‘coalitions of the willing’. Both the AU and EU need to make space at the table for the voices of city and business leaders, grass-root civil society and youth organisations (…) Prioritise investment in cooperation on education and professional training, as a key benefit consistently underlined by youth communities in both Africa and Europe, and prioritise strategies for significantly scaling-up opportunities for cultural mobility (including virtual exchange and with artists, musicians, sports teams…).

“I look forward to a partnership that is intentional about consultation of all key stakeholders in decision-making processes, from the start to finish, as well as open to feedback and review of non-beneficial or ineffective policies. A partnership that is willing to hold both parties accountable for their actions, as well ensure full support from partners (private, public sectors, and the Civil Society Organizations).”

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, AEF Honorary Co-President, former President of the Republic of Liberia and Nobel Laureate, 2 December 2021

“Both continents have much to offer each other. Neither will solve their respective problems in isolation, rather it is through cooperation that we will be able together to reinvigorate our partnership.”

Mo Ibrahim, Co-Founder of AEF and Chairman of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 8 June 2022

“Exercising leadership means trying to keep the international and multilateral systems running smoothly. It means being a force that builds bridges, that pulls together, that unites. It also means being committed to delivering when we make promises and when we make commitments.”

Charles Michel, President of the European Council, Annual EU Ambassadors’ conference, October 2022
While current geopolitical crises highlight the imbalance in our Partnership, Africa-Europe could drive the needed transformation of the multilateral systems - starting with the African Union at the table.

What demands attention is how future Africa-Europe relations will deal with new shocks resulting from the disruption caused by the pandemic, climate crisis and the war in Ukraine, on top of the many pre-existing unresolved and compounding issues such as visa agreements and illicit financial flows. The Joint Declaration of the February Summit included a “Commitment to Multilateralism” specifying that “both sides commit to contribute to the UN system reform efforts,” but the geopolitical tumult since February demonstrates the need for both continents to go much further.

The voting patterns of African countries at the United Nations, both in terms of condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions on Russia, caught European leaders by surprise because of the Africa-Europe rapprochement that appeared in full swing, and the assumptions that were being made about closer allegiance. The reasons for many countries abstaining from these votes are complex, yet the African reaction was scrutinised (and criticised) by media in the Global North. Limited effort has been made to understand why many African states have been voting the way they have.

There remains a misconception in some circles, for instance, that ‘a partnership of shared values’ must translate into the 55 African Union and 27 European Union Member States embracing a common position on every issue. Such a misconception ignores both the historical contexts and current interests of the African Union and each Member State, on the one hand, and the realities in Europe, on the other. Votes and abstentions are undertaken for many reasons, including internal manoeuvring, regional geopolitics, old and current international relations, and the pressing issue(s) at hand.

Another possible reason for the vote are the treacherous waters that Africans have to constantly navigate between allies and adversaries who constitute the global system. These include the recent coups in Mali, the prolonged conflict in Ethiopia and the Sahel, famine in the Greater Horn of Africa Region, displacement of millions in northeast DR Congo, and violent extremism in Burkina Faso, to name but a selection. Each year, the Norwegian Refugee Council publishes a list of the ten most neglected displacement crises in the world. The purpose is to focus on the plight of people whose suffering rarely makes international headlines, who receive no or inadequate assistance, and who never become the centre of attention for international diplomatic efforts. For the first time, all 10 crises are in Africa. Endeavouring to find a way skilfully through the geopolitical hazards represented by the adversarial positions adopted by the West vis-à-vis Russia and China, say, while dealing with massive domestic and continental issues, it is justifiably prudent for Africans to remain neutral.

This stance was reinforced more recently by the disinclination of African leaders to attend a recent call convened by the President of Ukraine to discuss the war: only four of the 55 African leaders participated. In this instance, one reason may have been the dismay that Africans felt about the abuse by Ukrainian and Polish border guards of Africans fleeing the war.

When contextualising the global impact of the war, it is perhaps more instructive to look at which countries voted for sanctions on Russia. Virtually the entire Global South, across Central and South America, Africa and Asia, did not vote in favour of sanctions. While there are parallels with the voting of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, 30 years of globalisation have also increased interdependence (BRICS being an example) in a way that has not had an influence on foreign policy of much of the Global North. It is also worth remembering that the vast majority of African countries (except for South Sudan and Western Sahara) continue to be Non-Aligned Movement members. Sanctions are seen as a way the West punishes those who step out of line, while there is also a sense of double-standards when the responses to the invasion
of Iraq, and overthrow of Libya’s President Qaddafi are brought into the equation.

In any case, the reaction to the return of non-alignment highlights the 20th Century thinking that still dominates international relations. The post-1989 order was built by the West on the premise of a unipolar world following the collapse of the USSR, but the assumptions that responses to the war in Ukraine mark the return of West vs East collapse of the USSR, but the assumptions that responses are solely shaped by disinformation or foreign influence, rather than the African Union’s and Member States’ own interests and strategic intentions, will contribute positively to mutual respect in the Partnership. Gauging the impact of the Ukraine conflict on Africa through just one of the variables - food security - it is sobering to note that Egypt, as an example, depends on Russia and Ukraine for around 70 percent of its wheat imports. Fifteen other African countries receive more than half of their supply of wheat from Ukraine and Russia. Across sub-Saharan Africa, families spend an average of 40 percent of their income on food (the highest of any region) and the poorest are particularly dependent on often imported cereals, which are becoming more expensive. In Africa (and the Middle East) the pandemic has already pushed between 29 million and 43 million people into extreme poverty.

The pandemic led to heavy demands on fiscal resources and cut receipts, increasing debt burdens - the debt ratios of the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) countries have increased, partly reversing a decline seen in the early 2000s. These conditions have since been exacerbated by the raising of interest rates by the US Federal Reserve and European Central Bank (which may increase rates even higher to become positive in real terms) to combat inflation. Since the overwhelming majority of debt in emerging markets is denominated in USD, debt repayment costs for many African countries have soared.

About 60% of low-income countries are at high risk of debt distress or already in debt distress, at a time when countries have started, or are about to start debt restructuring, or when countries are accumulating deficits. Among the 41 DSSI countries at high risk of or in debt distress, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia and Zambia have already requested debt assistance. This year, around 20 others are breaching agreed thresholds, half of which also have low reserves, rising gross financing needs, or a combination of the two.

Improvements to the G20 Common Framework could play an important role by ensuring broad participation of creditors with fairer burden sharing. Currently, only Zambia has made inroads towards a deal through the Common Framework, with other countries fearing the cost of being locked out of global financial markets even more than debt distress. The European Union, because of its position in the G20 and other global economic structures, could play a major role in efforts towards the successful global restructuring of Africa’s debt, following the measures adopted by the G20.

Meanwhile, China’s recent announcement that it was forgiving 23 loans for 17 African countries has been well received by Africans at large. For clarity, the relief for this debt applies to the Chinese government’s interest-free loans, but does not involve China’s interest-bearing commercial loans, which can be restructured but are not considered for cancellation. From the West, there have been regular allegations that the Chinese announcement is a marketing exercise to offset the accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy” in the context of China’s global aspirations. The debt trap allegations have been vehemently dismissed by Beijing. Economists and researchers have argued that the debt-trap narrative against China is unfounded, contending that Chinese loans were made at a time when the risk appetite was more optimistic, and these investments represented sound fiscal strategy, which has changed over the past two years. African leaders have also pointed to the structural adjustments required by the Bretton Woods institutions before any finance is issued. In the midst of all of this noise, what is urgently needed is a more inclusive debt restructuring architecture to assist low-income economies, a large number of which are in Africa. As the United States Secretary of State pledged last November, it was time to “stop treating Africa as a subject of geopolitics” and pursue an approach that is “not about China or any other third party. It’s about Africa.”

The Chair of the AU’s inaugural address was even more unequivocal: “We are open to all partnerships, without exclusion or exclusivity, as long as they are mutually beneficial and respectful of our development priorities and our societal choices.”

This is emphasised by the views of ordinary Africans, given that China is often singled out for its hegemonic ambitions in Africa. A recent survey shows that Africans give equal support to the Chinese and American models of engagement but would rather see jobs being provided in the Chinese manner than development aid provided by the United States. Findings suggest that the majority of Africans welcome both Chinese and United States engagement (63% and 80%, respectively) with only a few seeing the involvement of either nation in a negative light (14% and 13%, respectively). This sentiment suggests that for many Africans, a United States-China competition is a win-win for the continent, rather than the opposite.

Underpinning all of this is the desire from across Africa to move past donor-recipient relationships and develop partnerships of economic interest, trade, and support for industrialisation. According to surveying, a majority of Africans (55%) say that their own governments should control decisions about how development assistance is used. Even when it comes to tying development assistance to the promotion of democracy, half (51%) of Africans disagree: they want their own governments to decide these things. In sum, Africans largely reject paternalistic development assistance - a position that has been held by African leaders since the first post-colonial states, and has been maintained consistently over the past 60 years. President Kagame has stated the need for fully developed value chains to be located in Africa so that African people benefit from the continent’s
raw materials, rather than companies with headquarters in Europe, North America, and Australia. Whilst the EU has begun to espouse similar rhetoric on going beyond donor-recipient relationships, the EU and US have lost significant ground as trading partners with Africa.

In the face of these contending ideological positions, official statements emanating from Africa and Europe over recent months have not reflected the optimism evidenced during this year’s AU-EU Summit, regarding the pressing issues of health, food security, climate change, and migration. Indeed, a shift in the balance of power is presented from the African side, which stresses that it has multiple new partners, and that it is up to Europe to adapt if it wants to preserve close links with Africa. Overall, more justice, equity and respect in the implementation of the relationship are requested. In Africa, patience is wearing thin, with the view that the European Union has difficulty translating words into action. It would not be uncharitable to say, therefore, that the last eight months have seen a backsliding in the Africa-Europe Partnership.

This is starkly represented by the decision of European Union leaders not to attend a recent Climate Adaptation Summit with African leaders in Rotterdam. A key element of this Summit concerned the need for unconditional financing for addressing liquidity issues to boost climate resilience in Africa, based on the Special Drawing Rights announced by the International Monetary Fund in August 2020. This is an issue that the African Union and Member States see as critical for current and future relief and progress. Africa was only given a small fraction of the US$650 billion equivalent in Special Drawing Rights that were allocated in August 2021 (around 3.6% for sub-Saharan Africa, or about US$23.4 billion, with almost one third of it going to just two countries, South Africa and Nigeria) well below the Continent’s external financing needs (estimated by the International Monetary Fund in 2020 at US$12 trillion through 2023).

In what has been seen as a cavalier display of neglect, on the day of the Climate Adaptation Summit, only the host, Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, attended, and the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, who was on the programme to give a keynote address, sent a note on the day of the Climate Adaptation Summit, only the

Figure 3 - Inter-governmental group country membership.

Africa is geographically too large, strategically too important, and demographically too extensive (and particularly with burgeoning youthful numbers in an ageing world) to not take its rightful place at the global top table. As a precursor to an expanded international role, key will be for the African Union to be granted full membership of the G20 to become the G21 – at a minimum to create a failsafe mechanism for African priorities to remain high on the multilateral agenda. Brussels’ role in advancing the call for the AU to take its place in the G20 is particularly salient given 4 of the G20 members are part of the EU (including the EU), and 10 of the 23 Paris Club members are EU member states. Driving this call should be an urgent priority for the European Council, to demonstrate that the EU is serious about viewing Africa as a real partner, rather than a ‘jungle’ that ‘could invade the garden’, if ‘the gardeners’ do not take care of it, as the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security unfortunately recently remarked. Considering Africa’s strategic importance, this call is one that will be advocated by an increasing number of other powers, so Europe would do well not to be late to the party. Moreover, for European rhetoric on its democratic values to be meaningful, opportunities to allow everyone a vote, not just the richest, must be embraced.

An example of the influence that African leaders hold and could deliver more of in the global arena, if given the chance, is the recent meeting of the President of Senegal with the President of Russia to push for the freeing of 20 million tons of grain trapped in the port of Odessa to save millions of people across Africa from famine. Russia agreed to this request following further intervention from Turkey and the UN Secretary General, and the grain has been released.

A greater role in the international arena for Africa means a stronger Africa-Europe Partnership, but also realising the potential the two continents have to act in concert at global level. The AEF Charter states that together Africa and Europe can represent a strong and firm centre ground – geopolitically and metaphorically’ between great power competition, and build the 21st Century multilateralism that can respond to the demographics and global challenges of today. Progress here can be a foundation and catalyst for the Partnership to bring catalytic initiatives to global level, accelerate progress on Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, and drive change in the Bretton Woods institutions, and bring about real action on climate change.
AFRICA AND A NEW MULTILATERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY WORLD

At a time when multilateralism is more crucial than ever, the multilateral institutions are in trouble. The responses to the pandemic, the climate crisis, and the war in Ukraine, have brought the structural weaknesses in global governance to the fore, and without reform, credibility in the international community to resolve these crises will be lost.

The Africa-Europe Partnership can play a leading role in the international arena, but the flaws in the multilateral architecture must first be addressed – namely the lack of African representation in the G20, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the UN Security Council.

The World Bank, IMF, and UN Security Council were all formed before the majority of African countries had won their independence, and their structures designed by the Allied powers during the Second World War to rebuild the economies of Europe and East Asia prevent future war between great powers. Whilst armed conflict took place during the Cold War, and indeed is still a huge problem in Africa and Europe today, the existential struggles faced across the world today – climate change, pandemics, food insecurity, energy access, and poverty, require a more modern approach to multilateralism.

The AEF High-Level Group is promoting the call for the African Union to become the 21st member of the G20 as the first step towards this 21st Century multilateralism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and increased rivalry between the US and China point to a return of Great Power Competition, and Africa cannot be left at the sharp end. A strong Africa-Europe Partnership can create a stable global middle ground as the world becomes increasingly multipolar – but this requires a strengthened role for Africa in the international arena.

Global governance must prioritise the existential challenges humanity faces today. The African Union would be an invaluable ally to current G20 efforts to push Multilateral Development Banks to more effectively leverage their balance sheets – potentially mobilising an additional US$1 trillion to support work at the nexus of climate and sustainable development.

“Europe together with Africa can be a winning team and play a key role to solve the global issues.”
Macky Sall, President of Senegal and Chair of the African Union, AEF-Talking Africa-Europe Special, 20 January 2021.

“There has to be a change of mind in the way we work in the international world. We have got to create agility in the way we do business and create an understanding that people need cities to work beyond the rules and processes of the multilateral world in order to contribute to solving the global challenges of the 21st century.”
Louise Mushikiwabo, Co-Chair of the AEF Strategy Group and Secretary General of Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, First AEF Forum, 30 June 2021.

“We should be working towards better aligned and designed laws and implementation on shared areas, as well as greater understanding on the diversity of decision making and how to improve multilateral collaboration.”
Anonymous, Sweden, #ReimagineAfricaEurope, July 2021.

“We need to ask ourselves: What needs to be done differently? Is the message not communicated well enough? We have the solutions but now we need to attract the political will to deliver on them.”
Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director General of the World Trade Organization, AEF-Women Leaders Network Meeting, 19 September 2022.

“Care, dare, act: Care for the wellbeing of our people, especially those most vulnerable. Dare to do things differently because the world is changing, and behaviour also has to change. But most importantly: act!”
Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, AEF-Women Leaders Network Meeting, 19 September 2022.

“What Africa needs now are serious investments for massive rollouts as Africa builds purchasing power especially amongst the youth. We in Africa’s private sector, we have the figures and the business models: give us the investments.”
MAKING OUR PARTNERSHIP ON CLIMATE WORK

Climate change has been a central focus for the AEF since its inception in 2020, and the first HLG report outlined the importance of working together the nexus of climate and development for successful partnership on climate change. Two years later, the AEF continues to stress the need to increase ambition on climate as the core pillar for the Africa-Europe Partnership, even as time slips away to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement. With COP27 on the horizon, billed as Africa’s COP by hosts Egypt and promising to focus on adaptation and loss and damage, Africa and Europe are set to miss another milestone opportunity to progress on their climate goals.

The immediate needs of both continents have been intensified by the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s importance in supply of global commodities is widely known, but perhaps most crucial to Africa are Russian and Ukrainian agricultural exports. Between the two countries, they supply almost one-third of total wheat exported globally, and Russia alone supplies over half of the wheat imported by Tanzania, Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Sudan and Benin, the latter relying entirely on Russia for their grain imports. Ukrainian wheat is of similar importance in North Africa, where it accounts for nearly 20% of total wheat imports. Ukraine is also the world’s leading exporter of sunflower oil, with almost half of the global market, including 95% of the sunflower oil imported by Algeria, Sudan and Tunisia. Perhaps even more worryingly, the World Food Programme relies on Ukraine for around half of the wheat it distributes to address food crises.

Both Ukraine and especially Russia are also major exporters of fertiliser to Africa and Latin America, as well as the US. Fertiliser prices have climbed down from their peak in the Spring of 2022, but remain 2-3 times higher than in 2020, following gas price rises and the closing of Black Sea ports. This increase in fertiliser prices disproportionately affects African countries, which use comparatively little nitrogen-based fertilisers, but must pay a high price for imported inputs. Global production of staples such as maize, rice, wheat, and soybeans is predicted to fall by around 18%, but the regional disparities are stark - in Africa the drop in output due to fertiliser shortages is expected to reach 12%. The food crisis, deepened by the conflict in Ukraine, is affecting an estimated 346 million people in Africa. In Europe, despite the EU being largely self-sufficient for food production, spiralling costs are placing citizens at greater risk of hunger. With millions of Ukrainians also now in need of food assistance, the hike in food prices, and the damage the war has done to key farming areas in Ukraine, food shortages for many millions more globally are now probable.

Although the rising cost of food, fertiliser, and fuel may benefit certain exporting nations, most African countries are importers of food and energy and bear the brunt of the current hike in prices. The current crisis has highlighted the challenge that both Europe and Africa face in managing risks from price shocks for essential commodities, but by working closely together, it could become an opportunity to build a more diverse, agile food and energy supply mix that can respond to the crises faced by both continents.

The events of the last three years have highlighted the fault lines in global supply chains, and indeed control over food supplies in particular has been confirmed as a geopolitical tool of great weight. Control over essential resources has always provided both leverage and on occasion conflict, from the OPEC oil price hike in the 1970s to European reliance on Russian gas and oil today. “Strategic autonomy” has forced itself to the top of the global agenda. Even before the conflict in Ukraine, the COVID pandemic showed countries around the world the risks of relying on importing essentials such as medical supplies. As COP27 approaches, civil society organisations have again raised the issue of food sovereignty as an important pillar of climate justice.
THE NEXUS OF CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT

- Addressing climate change and pursuing economic development have traditionally been viewed as separate objectives, involving trade-offs between reducing carbon emissions and stimulating industrial activity.

- The AEF has continuously challenged this framing since the first High-Level Group Report on Africa-Europe Climate partnership, published a week following the launch of AEF in December 2020.

- Adaptation and resilience strategies cannot be addressed without addressing, and redressing, poverty, inequality and the need for economic growth that benefits all of society.

- Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) are crucial for recognising the significance of losses and damages to livelihoods and economic GDP across Africa and Europe.

- Supporting a just transition means ensuring that African countries can benefit from a global green transition, in the form of new jobs, industrial development and clean energy. Agreeing on a shared pathway is a strategic opportunity for both continents to align on climate and development agendas.

- Clean transport networks, investment in energy access, resilient and sovereign food systems, a foresight approach to healthcare, and a sustainable blue economy can underpin a holistic climate-development policy programme.

A concept advocated at the World Food Summit in 1996, food sovereignty refers to the right of people to decide their own food systems, to provide healthy and nutritious food grown in their locality, and to practise climate appropriate agriculture and agroecology – in many ways, strategic autonomy over food. Twenty-five years on, and its necessity has only increased. Small-scale farmers and fisherfolk still provide around 70% of the world’s food, despite the increasing dominance of large agribusinesses over food production resources – the largest 1% of farms (above 50 hectares) operate on 70% of the world’s farmland.

However, the biggest threat to global food security is climate change, as outlined in the previous AEF High-Level Group reports of 2020 and 2021. They both highlighted the role it plays in accelerating food insecurity on the African continent, from land degradation in the Sahel, to droughts and flooding in East Africa and the Horn due to changes in rainfall patterns and locust swarms. Moreover, decades of unsustainable land management, the colonial monoculture approach to agriculture, reinforced by the Green Revolution, and erosion of African soils and their fertility are exacerbating adverse climate impacts. Low yields, and declining nutritional value not only impact the nutrition of consumers, but farmers struggle to earn a living as a result, contributing to rapid urbanisation and fewer food producers. At the meeting of 8 June, the HLG noted that in the 1950s in Africa there were 10 producers of food for one consumer, whereas between now and 2030 there will be one producer for two consumers.

These numbers are of particular salience for Africa given half the population on the continent face moderate to severe food insecurity, and almost 20% face undernourishment – over one quarter of the global total. Despite the fact that over half of the world’s arable land is located in Africa, much of it is uncultivated, and the continent is a net importer of food. Of the global need for food sovereignty, Africa’s is the most pressing.

Many initiatives aimed at combating climate change in Africa such as the Great Green Wall place high value on protecting the agricultural sector, both to reduce food insecurity and to create jobs in rural areas. However, as the strain on food systems has become increasingly acute, measures to protect food production in Africa and Europe are increasingly bound up in national security. Following the meeting of 8 June, the AEF High-Level Group called for the prioritisation of a human security approach in assessing fundamentals such as access to energy, food, water, and healthcare when designing policies that can create lasting peace. Following rapid increases in energy prices and inflation, the recent election of far-right and fascist governments in Sweden and Italy respectively, and the declaration by Senegal’s President Sall, Chair of the African Union, that over 800 million people globally suffer from hunger, Africa and Europe are likely to see increased political upheaval on an even larger scale than the Arab Spring a decade ago.

The swift action undertaken by the AfDB to launch the African Emergency Food Production Facility that will help enable the production of an additional 38m tonnes of food has garnered praise as an emergency response, but an ad-hoc response to a cyclical problem can only ever act as a sticking-plaster, rather than a solution. A paradigm shift in the approach to agri-food systems is needed across Africa and Europe, engaging governments, scientists, regional bodies, and most crucially, smallholder farmers, to create a lasting fix to the problem.

A starting point in Africa could be meeting the commitments made under the Maputo and Malabo declarations of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). In 2003, African governments signed up to invest 10% of government expenditure in food and agriculture, a commitment reaffirmed in 2014. However, a 2018 review showed that less than half of the countries in Africa had delivered on this promise. The AEF Strategy Group on Agri-Food Systems noted in October the squeeze on public coffers that has been seen over the last three years, but emphasised that meeting the commitments and implementing the CAADP should nonetheless remain an urgent priority for national governments to strengthen food systems. Africa and Europe must work together towards these targets, focusing on investment in developing sustainable and local agri-food value chains that can build food sovereignty.

Critical to generating these sustainable and local value chains is shifting to farming models that work best at local level, and away from monocultures, and reliance on high levels of external chemical inputs. Attention to current agricultural staples, such as maize and wheat needs complementary investment in ‘forgotten crops’ such as millet or root crops, such as cassava, to generate more resilient food systems, and expand local and regional food markets in Africa. Investing in cultivation of plant proteins, such as lentils, peas, and beans, can also create more resilient farming systems, as well as cutting back on greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture by seeding more croplands with nitrogenous fixing plants. These fit well within mixed farming systems, offer valuable stover for animals, and enrich soils as they grow. They also provide valuable proteins for improving and better balancing human diets.

Similarly, specialisation and large-scale agribusiness...
production have led to the separation of animal and crop farming in too many cases, and the natural complementarities between arable and pastoral farming have been eroded. Yet livestock and crops create multiple co-benefits, animals foraging from stubble, oxen used for ploughing, and animal wastes providing excellent nutrients for soils. Cutting back on intensive livestock production, which rely heavily on cereals for feed, would also free up grain stocks for human use. A reduction in the use of maize crops for biofuels – which are currently the destination of 30-40% of the maize produced in the US – would also reduce prices and could help alleviate some of the most acute food shortages in the short-term.

Alongside these shifts in farming, the rise in prices in chemical fertilisers should encourage more countries to shift to organic fertilisers wherever possible. At the meeting of 8 June, the HLG agreed on the importance for Africa to become more self-sufficient in the production of fertilisers, highlighting the potential multiplier impacts they can have on food sovereignty and job creation, but noted the need to keep an eye on long-term environmental and climate goals. For African soils in particular, given their vulnerability to infertility, increasing local production of organic fertilisers can help address two problems at once, as well as reducing chemical run-off into water bodies.

Building food sovereignty and local agri-food value chains requires reform of more than agricultural policy alone. Designing cross-sectoral strategies across the food value chain that link rural and urban communities through climate-smart infrastructure will enable small-scale producers to cover the needs of urban populations and local industry. Much focus has been placed on the role that AICFTA will play in building trade links between African countries, but greater attention must also be paid to the local markets where food is bought and sold. Investment here can reduce both food prices and food waste, and help broaden access for local farmers. Key too, is the development of better transport and storage facilities. In Figure 4

Africa, improved transport networks in rural areas can bring a dramatic fall in post-harvest losses, with the added co-benefit of connecting hard-to-reach areas. This can have the additional transformational element of allowing greater access to education for women and girls in particular, and connecting young people with new job opportunities. On both continents, embracing the importance of multimodal transport networks is a relatively low-cost way to boost transport infrastructure networks without large initial costs. For example, inland water barges can transport larger quantities than trucks, can connect riparian communities with larger port towns (and boost trade), and have a lower carbon impact than trucks.

If food sovereignty is to be successfully developed in Africa or Europe, then discussions must be led by the small-scale producers who are at the heart of the value chains. Civil society organisations such as La Via Campesina, the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), the Alliance for Agroecology, and IPES-Food are leading the call for governments and donors to reconsider funding priorities which increase reliance on foreign imports including fertilisers and pesticides. AFSA have called on COP27 to place strategic importance on agroecology as a central pillar of adaptation to climate change. Allocating climate finance for agroecology will help address the climate and food crises simultaneously, as recognised by the IPCC’s 6th Assessment Report, and can give Africa greater agency in the fight against climate change – offering a model for a new approach to production.

Agroecology then, can underpin the agricultural side of climate adaptation, but Africa and Europe can together go much further. Countries on both continents need to push for action on energy access and a shared approach to just transition, even as energy security priorities triggered by the conflict in Ukraine tempt many European countries to backslide on fossil fuel plans. Pressure in Europe to divest from Russian gas imports has resulted in some EU member states reconsidering their stances on financing gas production in Africa, with European leaders travelling to Africa to discuss additional gas supplies to Europe. However, this increased demand on Africa’s energy resources continues to ignore the continent’s own energy needs. With fuel prices increasing, the current resource-extractive model will intensify the gulf between supply and...
Access to energy is crucial for development of sectors such as healthcare and education, and can also further create jobs in storage, transport, and distribution.

The energy transition remains one of the biggest sticking points in Africa-Europe climate negotiations, and arguably in wider Africa-Europe relations as a whole. This issue will likely continue to be an area of divergence between Africa and Europe at COP27. The Global Gateway initiative has the potential to reduce some of the trust deficit between the parties if tangible investment starts to flow, into areas such as energy. Indeed, the EU had begun to realise the importance of hard infrastructure and robust supply chains in Africa before conflict began in Ukraine. However, despite European assertions, there remain fears that some of the €150bn promised to Africa will be reallocated to Eastern Europe. Aside from developing concrete instruments by which Global Gateway funding can be implemented, tracked, and its impact measured, in concert with the African Union, one way of assuaging these doubts and restoring credibility to the Africa-Europe Partnership would be if the two continents can find common ground within the UNFCCC negotiating process, particularly on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGGA). Loss and Damage, the doubling of adaptation finance by 2025, and the post-2025 financial goal. Coming to Sharm-El-Sheikh with a shared position would help to provide much needed finance for climate resilience in Africa, and reinforce the EU’s position as a world leader in climate diplomacy.

The first step towards progress on climate goals must surely be to fulfil existing, outstanding, commitments. The oft-cited $100bn pledge formed the core of the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement and subsequent Paris Agreement of 2015, but was missed at COP 26. This headline figure should be the first priority, but the figure represents barely 3% of the needed funding. At UNGA 77, the AEF WLN argued the necessity for an immediate start on the doubling of adaptation finance promised at COP26 without waiting for 2025, with COP27 a milestone to set down targets and timelines. Existing work on delivering these targets can be built on – the Champions’ Group on Adaptation Finance has already demonstrated a pathway to doubling finance by 2025, and both Canada and Germany have set out delivery plans for mobilising the $100bn of promised annual finance. But both Africa and Europe will need to use their moral and diplomatic influence to push other actors to step up.

Foremost among adaptation requirements is the development of climate resilient infrastructure and cities, including both the retrofitting of existing infrastructure, a huge task for the EU, and the development of new resilient infrastructure, which is a bigger priority for Africa. Structural adaptation measures such as new materials for roads and railways that better resist extreme heat, management measures such as early warning systems, are needed to protect lives and livelihoods from the physical impacts of climate change. Climate adaptation infrastructure measures must also place a strategic focus on the blue economy, particularly the adaptation of port infrastructures, given both the importance of maritime transport to the climate and development agendas of both continents, and the potential of the ocean as a sustainable food source. Whilst many African countries have the chance to leapfrog their European counterparts by building new infrastructures, incorporating climate resilience can add around 3% to the up-front cost of a project. Here again, the importance of both the investment case and long-term thinking are highlighted, as the cost-benefit ratio is high despite the longer payback period. With both the Global Gateway and the ADB already placing high strategic importance on climate-resilient infrastructure, European financial institutions should take this opportunity to add adaptation finance to their existing focus on mitigation.

Some reticence in actually mobilising money is uncertainty about the return on investment – both by donors who worry about the effectiveness of adaptation measures, and by those who forget that prevention is much better than cure. Whilst the argument for adaptation and loss and damage financing can and must be won at a moral level, it is important to make the investment case for this finance. At UNGA 77, the WLN emphasised that every $1 of investment in adaptation can bring in $10 in net economic benefits, highlighting the example of the Adaptation Pipeline Accelerator as a successful demonstration of partnership between public and private financiers and developing economies. Successfully making the investment case for adaptation is crucial to generating additional financing from both the public and private sectors. Given the risks of increasing inequality within and between developing countries associated with private financing, it is of particular importance to direct these funds towards commercially viable avenues such as solar energy, and guard public finance for areas where it is particularly necessary, such as adaptation measures, and for low-income countries and small-island developing states. Although public budgets are under extreme pressure due to inflation, additional funding could be generated by a windfall tax on the profits made by fossil fuel companies – a proposal put forward by the United Nations Secretary General at UNGA77.

However, neither financial commitments nor a successful case for investment will be taken forward without a strengthened partnership between Africa and Europe. As mentioned earlier, the African Adaptation Summit organised by the Global Center on Adaptation, held in Rotterdam in early September was noteworthy for its disappointing outcomes and absence of EU Heads of State. African leaders travelled to the Netherlands with the expectation of raising demand for energy in Africa, and widen the energy gap between the two continents. Following repeated claims from Europe of an end to fossil fuel subsidies, these moves add fuel to the feeling of double standard being applied to Africa and Europe.

Liquefied petroleum gas as a transitional fuel is an issue which the AEF’s Women Leaders Network (WLN) has discussed in depth in connection with the roll-out of clean cooking solutions. Meeting at the Sustainable Energy for All Forum in Kigali on 19 May 2022, the WLN recognised that while Africa and Europe might share a final destination in terms of low-carbon energy and a stable climate, each continent will follow very different pathways. The group called ‘for a proportion of the gas being taken by Europe to be used in Africa, where it is needed most’. The group also called for a new strategy to support the manufacture and assembly of solar and wind-power systems in Africa along the model advocated by the High-Level Group of the AEF for vaccine manufacture, recognising that importing renewable energy components is currently more difficult given China’s Zero-Covid strategy.

Currently, Africa has 40% of the world’s solar potential, but only 1% of the installed capacity – expanding this to 6% of the world’s capacity would take only 5% of the installed capacity – expanding this to 6% of the world’s capacity would take only 5% of the installed capacity (€11bn) and could create 1m jobs in storage, transport, and distribution.

Figure 6 - Evolution of the share of global trade, in calories, impacted by export restrictions.

Lusofonia

Ukraine

Food Price Crisis (2008)

Covid-19

2020

2010

2000

0 10 20 30 40 50

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

0.0 4.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 20.0%

Week of Russian Invasion in 2022

Ukraine Crisis (2022)

France

China

US

UK

Germany

2022

2010

2000

0 10 20 30 40 50

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

0.0 4.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 20.0%

Crisis (2022)

EU

Latin America

Asia

Africa

2022

2010

2000

0 10 20 30 40 50

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

0.0 4.0 8.0 12.0 16.0 20.0%

Crisis (2022)

Asia

Africa

Latin America

Europe

2022

2010

2000
$25bn in new adaptation finance by 2025, but only $5bn of new money was committed. However, equally concerning were remarks made by EC Executive Vice-President and lead on the European Green Deal (who was present) that European citizens are unlikely to be amenable to arguments of historical climate change responsibility, given the crises of energy prices and cost of living that dominate their attention. What this line of argument misses, however, is the interlinkage between the current crises (particularly in cost of living and food), historical climate responsibility, and the urgent need for climate adaptation and mitigation measures (notwithstanding the issue of Loss and Damage). Whilst European citizens certainly benefit from historical and current emission levels in the Global North (much of Europe’s infrastructure and public services are funded from imperial wealth extraction and ‘green’ neocolonialism), the eye-watering profit margins made by oil and gas companies, even as costs have rocketed far beyond affordability, have brought home not only the need for a new paradigm for the provision of necessities, but the shared struggle of global challenges like climate change. Rhetoric around the shared destinies of Africa and Europe, which was once the preserve of European officials, is now arguably better understood by citizens than policymakers on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Whilst this shifting narrative amongst populations is welcome for the future of Africa-Europe relations, in the immediate-term leaders may require more tangible mechanisms on which to create a common agenda. Policymakers from both continents have access to the latest data on historical emissions and impacts of climate change on African and European countries, which demonstrate the importance of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. CBDR-RC are crucial for recognising the significance of losses and damages to livelihoods and economic GDP across Africa and Europe, and for the two continents to agree that loss and damage must be central to the agenda in Sharm-el-Sheikh. However, loss and damage is a technical, political, and financial question and cannot be relegated to pithy words or clauses in the adaptation portfolio, and African and European leaders must aim even higher. Together with continental and international financial institutions, Africa and Europe should explore the feasibility of creating a Loss and Damage Facility, towards which existing and new funding mechanisms could be directed. Europe needs to demonstrate a distinct shift in position, and offer prospects for recycled additional SDRs for loss and damage and debt-for-climate and nature swaps. Political will is key to shifting these positions, but policymakers must not ignore the mobilised citizen and CSO voices that are putting pressure on the Global North to respond practically to this problem.

Loss and Damage is perhaps the most politically sensitive discussion in COP27 and is a priority of the Egyptian Presidency, but adaptation finance remains the key issue for Sharm-el-Sheikh. The question of partnership is again brought to the fore, as the EU and the African Union will have to comprehensively review another’s Adaptation and Climate Change and Resilient Development strategies respectively, to assess areas of convergence and divergence. By working together, the EU and AU could assess preparedness to address climate shocks, in terms of capacity, skills, technology and funding, in collaboration with the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and national and regional enabling organisations. As well as the Global Gateway and Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), these discussions could explore whether Africa wants, needs or is ready to develop its own Green Deal, as the next step in implementing its own climate strategy, and engage with African countries based on current and projected National Adaptation Plans. As well as at the strategic level, the EU can also look to partner at the operational level, and Europe could offer support to African countries’ capacities to actually access and use funding sources. This includes investing in the development of Direct Access Entities and engagement platforms for sub-national actors to implement adaptation strategies. National Adaptation Plans and Nationally Determined Contributions must be leveraged for developmental gains in African states, but this can only be done if there is a ready pipeline of activities that address adaptation requirements.

If Africa and Europe can manage to find common ground on climate adaptation, it could go some way to restoring optimism in a relationship that has never been as strong as either partner would like, particularly on the northern shore of the Mediterranean. Amidst geopolitical tempest, climate change and the most existential threat to both Africa and Europe, and for the Partnership to benefit people across two continents, working to a shared set of solutions must be our ultimate goal.

Amidst cooling relations and geopolitical tempest, climate change remains the most existential threat to both Africa and Europe. Finding a common ground on climate adaptation is not only the most palpable benefit the Partnership can bring to its people, and indeed worldwide, it is also the most symbolic global demonstration of the power the Africa-Europe Partnership can wield. As both the biggest tension and most important issue for the two continents action on climate change can act as a catalyst for the Africa-Europe Partnership bring real positive change to its two continents, and beyond.

AREAS OF FOCUS

- Recognise the injustice associated with global climate financing adequacy, sufficient, affordable, financing, and commit to supporting a just transition for African economies that recognises the specific needs of the continent.
- Fulfil existing funding commitments and agree future funding, starting with the US$100bn that should have been mobilised by COP26, and agreeing the pathway to doubling adaptation finance by 2025. Looking into 2023, climate ambition must be stepped up, including a more ambitious post-2025 financial goal.
- Agree a joint Africa-Europe approach to the Just Energy Transitions, involving research-policy learning platforms to share lessons and progress, monitor actions, and bring citizens around the table.
- Commit to real action on agri-food systems by meeting commitments made under the Mapato and Malabo declarations of the Comprehensive Agriculture Development Program (CAADP).
- Re-engage with civil society organisations such as La Via Campesina and Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), as well as experts such as IPES-Food. Support smallholder farmers in both continents to better provide local and robust agri-food value chains.
- Support the development of climate-resilient infrastructure, including both the rebuilding of existing infrastructure and the development of new infrastructure, that is needed to protect lives and livelihoods from the physical impacts of climate change.
- Open up honest discussion of alternative financial mechanisms for Loss and Damage funds, assessing the pros and cons of established versus new institutions. Recognise the urgent need to address the growing bill for Loss and Damage, and call out the lack of willingness from climate ambassadors in the EU, UK, and US, to advance progress on the Loss and Damage agenda.

"Africa’s climate vulnerability is also its investment opportunity. True collaboration and partnerships can make the most of this opportunity. We don’t have a moment to lose. Let’s work together." – Amina Mohammed, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, AEF dialogue at UNEA7. 16 September 2022

"In 2030 there should be a mutual Africa-Europe partnership built on trust and opportunity. This requires cooperation that can create systemic change in the local markets and not just ad hoc projects. Given the investment gap across both mitigation and adaptation areas, the solution is to invest in bottom-up, country-driven initiatives and market led private sector pipeline of green projects." – Mlawunthu, Aposhi, Phelim McNamara, July 2022

"The green transition should be at the heart of our cooperation agenda for the next 10 years, and of course we have different starting points. (...) The Green Deal is not about a green fortress; it is about bringing others into green growth." COP 27 is coming back to Africa, so let us grasp this opportunity and create a stronger alliance." – Amina Mohammed, UN Deputy Secretary-General, President for the Green Deal, AEF, Talking Africa Europe Special, 21 January 2022.
THE CASE FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM

“The AU-EU relationship, historically, has suffered from a lack of trust, credibility, and visibility among the people of the partnership. This partnership will only have meaning if acceptance of its gains and benefits are understood by our societies.”

— Charter of the Africa-Europe Foundation (December 2021)

There can be no shying away from the fact that Africa-Europe relations are at a low point, and that considerable political courage is needed for a change in direction. Nevertheless, this report lays out areas that, with the right action, can be the foundations for a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership at every level.

Business as usual is no longer an option - as the state of both Africa-Europe relations and the wider world in 2022 has starkly brought home. Our partnership must be at the vanguard of the case for caring and daring to act about the existential global challenges. Given the myriad of strengths and assets on both sides of the Mediterranean, innovative ways of working co-led with new and non-traditional actors need to be introduced. No political project will succeed if it is disconnected from the people whom it is set up to serve and the Africa-Europe Partnership is at a pivotal moment to translate its rhetoric into real and visible gains for the societies of our neighbouring continents.

The case for cautious optimism, then, comes from the will of African and European citizens for the Partnership to succeed. Not only can a strengthened Africa-Europe Partnership help face the major economic and social disruption in the coming decades but also drive the global governance of the 21st century. We all need the Africa-Europe Partnership to work.
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In addition to outputs from:


— #ReimagineAfricaEurope global consultation: aggregation of stakeholder surveys carried out during the inception phase of AEF with: AEF Strategy Group members, networks and partners; AEF’s co-founding organisations’ youth networks (the Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Now Generation Network NGN, Friends of Europe’s European Young Leaders EYL40, and the ONE Campaign’s Africa-Europe Task Force of Champions and Youth Ambassadors); youth in all African and European countries through the use of the crowdsourcing platform Prolific, specifically designed for data collection for academic research. Carried out in three cycles: July and November 2021, July 2022, in addition to focus groups via the citizen platform Debating Africa.

— Strategic orientations and outputs produced by the AEF High-Level Group of Personalities, in particular the HLG meeting of June 2022, as well as the AEF Women Leaders Network (including the in-person meetings on the occasion of the SE4All forum in Kigali and UNGA77 in New York).

— Sectoral in-depth analysis by AEF Strategy Groups with recommendations issued for each the partnership’s priority sectors of cooperation; including convenings of a first Africa-Europe working group on Climate Adaptation run throughout 2022, as well as Strategy Group meetings focused on the an assessment of the follow-up to the AU-EU Summit (Agriculture and Food Systems Strategy Group of 5 October 2022, the Energy Access/Transitions Strategy Group of 6 October 2022 and the Health Strategy Group of 12 October 2022).

— Media mapping (mainstream and social media) carried out together with 35 Nord between November 2021 and May 2022, and the aggregation of data and analysis from leading African and European knowledge centres.

— Talking Africa-Europe broadcast series carried out during the inception phase, including 1) High-Level Debate on Addressing the Vaccine Challenge (2 February 2022), 2) High-Level Debate on Migration and Mobility (27 January 2022); 3) High-Level Debate on Addressing the Climate Crisis (20 January 2022); 4) High-Level Debate on Energy (20 January 2022); High-Level Debate on Mobility (27 January 2022); High-Level Debate on Mobility and Climate Change.

Noting the following information:

— Figure 1: Media and social networks narrative analysis carried out by 35 Nord, covering November 2021-February 2022 and February-March 2022.

— Figure 2: Guyer, Jonathan, ‘Why some countries don’t want to pick a side in Russia’s war in Ukraine’, 9 June 2022

— Figure 3: Data from Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Forum Report ‘The Road to COP27’ - Making Africa’s Case in the Global Climate Debate July 2022

— Figure 4: Data and analysis by ONE Campaign, contents hosted on platform data.one.org, September 2022

— Figure 5: Data and analysis by ONE Campaign, contents hosted on platform data.one.org, September 2022

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEF Africa-Europe Foundation
AICFTA African Continental Free Trade Area
AFDB African Development Bank
AFSA Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa
ARC African Risk Capacity Group
AU African Union
AUDA-NEPAD African Union Development Agency - New Partnership for Africa’s Development
BRICS Brazil Russia India China South Africa
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CBDR-RC Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities
CO2 carbon dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties (United Nations Summit on Climate Change)
COVID-19 coronavirus disease
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DSSI Debt Service Suspension Initiative
EC European Commission
EIB European Investment Bank
EU European Union
G7 The Group of 7
G20 The Group of 20
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GGA Global Goal on Adaptation
HLG High-Level Group of the Africa-Europe Foundation
IMF International Monetary Fund
INRAE Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPES Food International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
NAPs National Adaptation Plans
NDCs Nationally Determined Contributions
NDIC Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
RECs Regional Economic Communities
SARS Special Anti-Robbery Squad
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
TRIPs Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
UN United Nations
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
USD American Dollar
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WLN Women Leaders Network of the Africa-Europe Foundation
WTO World Trade Organization
HIGH-LEVEL GROUP OF THE AFRICA-EUROPE FOUNDATION

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